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ABSTRACT 
Purpose- Megaprojects are large, complex, and expensive projects that often involve 
social, technical, economic, environmental and political (STEEP) challenges. Despite 
these challenges, project owners and financiers continue to invest large sums of money 
in megaprojects that run high risks of being over schedule and over budget. While some 
degree of cost, schedule and quality risks are considered during planning, the challenge 
of understanding how risk interactions and impacts on project performance can be 
modelled dynamically still remains. The consequences learnt from past experiences 
indicate that there was a lack of dynamic tools to manage such risks effectively in 
megaproject construction. In seeking to help address these problems, this research put 
forward an innovative dynamic systems approach called SDANP to risk assessment in 
megaprojects construction. 
Design/methodology/approach – The research has developed an innovative SDANP 
method which involves an integrative use of system dynamics (SD) and analytic 
network process (ANP) for risk assessment. The SDANP model presented in the thesis 
has been testified by using data and information collected through a questionnaire 
survey and interviews from supply-side stakeholders involved in the Edinburgh Tram 
Network (ETN) project at the Phase One of its construction stage. The SDANP method 
is a case study risk assessment driven process and can be used against STEEP 
challenges in megaprojects. 
 
Findings – The result of the case study project revealed that the SDANP method is an 
effective tool for risk assessment to support supply-side stakeholders in decision making 
in construction planning. The SDANP model has demonstrated its efficiency through 
case study, and has convinced construction practitioners in terms of its innovation and 
usefulness. 
 
Research limitations/implications – Although the SDANP model has been developed 
for generic use in risk assessment, data and information used to run the simulation were 
based on the ETN project, which is in Edinburgh, Scotland. The use of the SDANP 
model in other megaprojects requires further data and information from local areas. 
 
Practical implications – The SDANP method provides an innovative approach to a 
comprehensive dynamic risk assessment of STEEP issues at the construction planning 
stage of megaprojects for the first time. It provides an interactive quantitative way for 
developers to prioritise and simulate potential risks across the project supply network, to 
understand and predict in advance the consequences of STEEP risks on project 
performance at the construction stage. 
 
Originality/value - The research made an original contribution in quantitative risk 
assessment with regard to the need for a methodological innovation in research and for a 
powerful sophisticated tool in practice. The SDANP has shown its advantages over 
existing tools such as the program evaluation and review technique (PERT) and the risk 
assessment matrix (RAM). 
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    CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces an overview of the doctoral research, giving why such research 
is done and placing the research in a context that demonstrates its importance. First, the 
background of the study and statement of the research problem are addressed. The 
research aim and objectives are also presented. Subsequently, the scope and boundaries 
of the study are presented followed by a summary of the research methodology adopted. 
Thereafter, a statement of the contribution to knowledge and the significance of the 
research findings are described. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the 
organisation of the thesis.  
 
1.2: Problem Statement 
Construction, like many other industries is a free-enterprise system, and has sizeable 
risks built into its structure (Ashley, 1977, Mohammad et al., 1991). From the initiation 
to the closing stages, the construction process, especially that for megaproject 
development, is complex and characterized by a number of uncertainties, and, as such, 
involves many risks that influence the project from feasibility through to the 
commissioning stages (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). For example, uncertainty about changes 
in weather conditions, subcontractor delays, and unpredictable site conditions are 
typical risk variables that exist in every construction project. As a result, many 
construction projects fail to achieve their time, cost and quality goals. 
 
For large and complex projects, such as highways, bridges, and airport expansion 
projects, risk management during construction is paramount to successful project 
delivery. Project Managers who do not interact attentively with the environment of 
these projects are likely to face difficulties during planning and execution of their 
projects (Ali-Mohammed, 2010).  Evidence suggests that such megaprojects are 
usually money pits where funds are simply ‘swallowed up’ without delivering 
sufficient returns as a result of unbalanced subjective beliefs and information in 
assessing risks and uncertainties, and not taking corrective actions to control and 
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manage the identified risks. For example, in Poole (2011), the transportation 
infrastructure industry has been revealed to have a major credibility problem. Its track 
record on megaprojects development is terrible. Project costs are often grossly 
underestimated, and traffic, often overestimated. These problems are well documented 
in history for many recent rail projects across the globe. 
 
A study carried out by Danish academics Bent Flyvbjerg and colleagues, on 258 
highway and rail projects (USD90 billion worth) in 20 countries in a book called 
Megaprojects and Risk (Cambridge University Press, 2003), revealed that transportation 
infrastructure projects do not perform according to budgets as estimated. According to 
the study, nearly all (90%) suffered cost overruns, with the average rail project costing 
45% more than projected, the average highway project 20% more. Traffic forecasts 
were also far from accurate, with rail projects generating an average of 39% less traffic 
than forecast (though highway projects averaged a 9% underestimate of traffic). Based 
on a continuous research, Bent Flyvbjerg emphasized that cost overrun has not 
decreased over the past 70 years and seems to be a global phenomenon.  
 
Other high profile highway projects are Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel, the “Big Dig” 
and Virginia’s Springfield Interchange. These projects have made practitioners in the 
construction industry, and public taxpayers acutely aware of the problems of project 
delay and cost overruns. For example, the Big Dig was estimated at a cost of USA 2.6 
billion but was completed at a cost of USA 14.6 billion. Additionally completion was 
delayed from 2002 to 2005.  This indicates clearly that construction cost estimating on 
major infrastructure projects has not increased in accuracy over the past 70 years. The 
underestimation of cost today is in the same order of magnitude that it was then. 
According to Flyvbjerg et al. (2002), there is need for new ideas and techniques to be 
developed to improve this area where no learning seems to have taken place. One of the 
main reasons of megaproject cost and time overruns in Flyvbjerg’s study is that “risk is 
simply disregarded in feasibility studies by assuming what the World Bank calls the 
EGAP principle: Everything Goes According to Plan.”  
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With regards to the increasingly complex dynamics of megaprojects coupled with new 
procurements methods, the tendency today is to use risk quantification and modelling 
more as vehicles to promote effective risk response planning amongst multi-disciplinary 
project team members. According to Leung and Chuah, (1998), an effective risk 
management approach can provide such a framework for project managers to identify 
and assess potential risk factors and take response actions in order to achieve the desired 
objectives of a given project. However, many of the risk management approaches 
developed by contractors and their consultants to analyze and assess risk generally rely 
on the contractor’s experience and intuition (AI-Bahar, 1988). Rarely do megaproject 
contractors and Project managers quantify uncertainty and systematically assess the 
risks involved in a project. As a result, communicating construction project risks 
becomes poor, incomplete, and inconsistent throughout the construction supply chain.  
 
Consequently, project members do not have adequate shared understanding of issues 
facing the project in order to implement effectively early warning systems and 
contingency plans to deal with problems resulting from the project environment. In 
addition, the proliferation of techniques and software packages purporting to provide 
project risk management facilities, has also failed to meet the needs of project 
managers. Tah and Carr (2000) emphasized that these systems are primarily founded on 
principles and methodologies derived in the 50s from operational research. 
 
According to Tar and Carr, the focus is on quantitative risk analysis based on estimating 
probabilities and probability distributions for time and cost risk analysis. As a result, the 
techniques do not encourage project participants to develop in-depth understanding of 
the underlying elements and structures which constitute megaproject risk systems and 
render explicit latent concepts and assumptions which are implicit to current risk 
assessments. The techniques do not allow for the risks and uncertainties, remedial 
measures and lessons learned from previous projects with similar environments to be 
captured and re-used when developing new projects, to facilitate continuous learning 
and improvement. 
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For these reasons, the research aimed at developing a comprehensive new approach to 
risk management for megaproject development and construction. The interest of 
developing a new risk assessment tool for megaproject development is because the risk 
management assessment processes in construction project development implementation 
literature, while acknowledging adaptation as one phase in construction process and 
delivery, offers inadequate theory to address the problems faced during its 
implementation in megaproject delivery (Ali-Mohammed, 2010). Therefore, this 
research purposed to provide a risk management tool able to enhance the capabilities of 
the over 30 risk management techniques contained in the British Standards codes of 
practice (BS 31100:2011 Risk management- Code of practice; BS ISO 31000:2009 Risk 
management- Principles and guidelines and BS EN 31010:2010 Risk management-Risk 
assessment techniques) for risk management, and to lead the construction industry to 
establish a self-sustaining and grounded risk management procedure for megaproject 
development and construction. 
 
To achieve the above purpose this research tends to dwell into a partial or entire set of 
social, technical, economic, environmental and political (STEEP) risks involved in 
transportation megaprojects during construction with a view to exploring the dynamics 
of the impact of such risks on the performance of megaprojects over time and adding to 
the understanding of their complex nature. This is by proposing a novel approach to 
policy makers capable of testing different strategies and interventions for reducing the 
risks of project cost and time overruns and quality deficiency in transportation 
megaprojects during construction. 
 
It is on this basis that the research seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the generic risk events inherent in transportation megaprojects during 
construction? 
2. How can the qualitative risk effects on project performance be quantified, prioritized 
and analyzed in transportation megaprojects? 
3.  How can risk interrelationships in transportation megaprojects be modelled? 
4. How can project managers (PMs) assess the dynamics of risk effects in 
transportation megaprojects over time? 
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1.3: Aim and Objectives 
The purpose of the research is to develop a new risk assessment model to enhance the 
decision-making process for megaproject development. The proposed risk decision-
making model would be a useful tool to effectively and efficiently assist megaproject 
planners and managers to become more knowledgeable and effective in their decision-
making with regard to risks in megaproject development. Eventually, the efficient use 
of the new model will benefit clients and the public by saving them time and money 
from construction delays. In order to achieve this purpose, the research has the 
following aim and objectives: 
 
The study aims to develop a new risk assessment tool for megaproject construction 
through analytical and simulation models for comprehensive, integrated and proactive 
risk management in megaproject construction. The models, which comprise of the 
Analytical Network Process (ANP) and the System Dynamics (SD) methodology, will 
be useful to project managers for proactive measures in assessing risks effectively, 
efficiently and equitably during project lifecycles to avoid project delays and cost 
overruns. To achieve the aim, the study has the following objectives:  
 To identify and describe the significant risks of a partial or entire set of social, 
technical, economic, ecological and political (STEEP) problems for megaprojects 
development and construction.  
 To simulate and analyse the interactions among the risks. 
 To assess major options against all risks and 
 To develop a new methodology and tools for megaproject development. 
 
 
1.4: Research Methodology Employed 
In addressing the key research objectives, it was important to adopt an appropriate 
approach, which would enable appropriate data collection, analysis and interpretation of 
the findings for the benefit of practitioners and researchers. Consequently, as in all 
researches, the study commenced with an extensive literature review to help provide a 
thorough understanding of the recent developments in the methodologies used for 
assessing risks within the construction management discipline. The literature review 
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provided profound opportunity to enable the author to understand related subjects of  
risks management in  construction projects and to identify an appropriate theoretical 
framework for the study.  
 
 
Following the literature review, a post positivism research paradigm was adopted to 
reflect the methodological (epistemological, ontological and axiological) approach 
involved. To this effect, qualitative and quantitative approaches were used to obtain 
relevant data from industrial stakeholders in the United Kingdom. Subsequently, 
interviews, case studies and a postal structured questionnaire survey were used in 
eliciting the main data (including piloting) and also in validating aspects of the findings 
relating to the potential relevance of the recommended application of the model. The 
research paradigm adopted also enabled pairwise comparison and a statistical tool such 
as a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to be used in the analysis and 
interpretation of the data and discussion of the findings. 
 
 
It must be noted that an underlying conception of this research was to help provide 
project managers, consultants, engineers and other industrial stakeholders involved in 
megaproject development the opportunity to have a clear understanding of the 
competencies expected of them to procreate excellent managerial practices during risk 
assessment. A detailed discussion of the research methodology including the rationale 
for eliciting the data from relevant respondents is presented in chapter three.  
 
 
1. 5: Scope and Boundaries of the Study 
The focus of this thesis is on risk management in megaproject development. The 
objective is to create a framework to identify and model the factors from the project’s 
external environment that contribute to risk in the development and construction of 
megaprojects. Just as solving an engineering or construction problem requires the 
definition of system boundaries, writing a dissertation requires the definition of the 
problem scope, as well as the boundaries of the systems and factors to be included in the 
tentative problem solution. These boundaries can also be arbitrary, but must be large 
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enough to include the factors that contribute to the problem at hand, without being as 
large as to waste resources on unimportant factors. 
 
 
Therefore, the risks considered in this research include the risks of a partial or entire set 
of social, technical, economic, environmental and political (STEEP) problems which 
result in cost and schedule overruns in megaproject construction. Following data 
obtained from literature and the administration of questionnaires, a case study from the 
UK was also incorporated into the study to develop and validate the proposed risk 
assessment models for illustrative decision making process on risk management. 
 
 
Most of the techniques upon which this study is based were derived from the analytical 
network process (ANP) and system dynamics (SD) methodology. For the development 
of the new methodology, the STEEP risks were decoupled from programmatic risks that 
include budget, schedule and performance risks, and so these concerns were a critical 
part of modelling risk in the development of the new methodology. As part of the scope, 
the models of each STEEP risk when developed fulfilled two main conditions: (1) The 
models have a large number of risk components that the internal environment of the 
project has no influence on, and (2) exhibited social, technical, economic, 
environmental and political complexity.   STEEP complexity is not a discrete 
characteristic, but can be defined along a continuum which ranges from very simple to 
extremely complex. Moreover, complexity is relative and a function of current 
intellectual manageability, which is evolving as new tools and techniques are developed 
(Leveson, 2000). 
 
 
Consequently, it was extremely challenging to measure the level of complexity of 
different systems within the STEEP system. However, it should be obvious to readers 
that the examples used in this research belong to the set of complex STEEP systems for 
megaproject construction.  
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1.6: Research Significance  
Every project faces a considerable amount of risk right from the initiation to the closing 
stages. A risk may or may not be unforeseen and can pose itself as an opportunity or a 
threat to the project. Risks may be business risks (with gains or losses) or pure risks 
(only losses) based on a scenario. In nature, they may be scope risks (with technical, 
performance or quality issues), external risks, organizational risks or exclusively project 
management risk. 
 
In response to such growing uncertainty in modern projects, over the last decade the 
project management community has developed project specific standards for risk 
management. These include the British Standards Institution (2011), the Office of 
Government Commerce (2001), the UK Association for Project Management (2005) 
and the Project Management Institute (2009). The basic structure of all these models is 
similar and has a complete and acceptable framework. The 2000 edition of the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK); (PMI 2000) for example, consists of six 
risk management processes of planning, identification, qualitative analysis, quantitative 
analysis, response planning and monitoring and control.  
 
While these risk management standards provide comprehensive approaches to decision 
making, their effectiveness relies on the ability to cope with the multidimensional 
uncertainty of risks: likelihood, impact and occurrence from the project’s external 
macro environment. The traditional tools and techniques used to manage risks are 
unable to address risks in megaproject construction. As a result, many megaprojects 
development fail to achieve their intended cost and schedule objectives during 
construction. Section 1.2 illustrated historical problems of many such megaprojects 
development. These problems and limitations identified, called for further development 
of tools and techniques in this research to model the dynamics and complexities of the 
factors that arise as risks during megaproject development. 
 
1.7: Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis comprises ten chapters and these have been organised as follows:  
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Chapter One: This chapter deals with the background to the research including 
justification and the problem statement, aim and objectives and the associated 
contribution to knowledge emanating from the research.  
 
Chapter two addresses generic risks relating to megaproject development and 
construction. Subsequently, an appropriate definition of the terms megaprojects, risks 
and risks management are provided. Another relevant issue discussed here is methods 
used for assessing risks in construction projects.  
 
Chapter three addresses the research methodology adopted. The research paradigm is 
described including the design of the research instrument and method for collecting the 
relevant data. It also involves the systemic procedures upon which the research is based 
and against which the data collected is interpreted and the findings evaluated.  
 
Chapter four presents the overview of the main case study for this research. The 
objective for selecting the case study is to deliver a critical review of the entire project 
and to identify, at the construction phase, mistakes and pitfalls which led to risks of 
project cost and time overruns and quality deficiency. 
 
Chapter five introduces the first part of the data analysis. Having concluded the 
research introduction, the relevant literature review and the research methodology 
chapters, a preliminary analysis is undertaken as a prelude to the substantive analysis 
which led to the development of the dynamic simulation model for megaprojects 
(MegaDS model) for the assessment of risks in transportation megaprojects. This 
includes descriptive analysis of demographic data and the use of appropriate statistical 
methods on the dependent system variables.  
 
 
Chapter six addresses the development of the substantive ANP models for the potential 
risks considered in this research. The chapter concluded with the Risk Priority Index 
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(RPI) calculation as a project ranking method for all risks and a summary of the 
relevancies of using the ANP for risk prioritization in the research.  
 
 
Chapter seven is devoted exclusively to the development of the substantive causal loop 
diagrams for the identified STEEP risks. 
 
Chapter eight is devoted to the development of the integrated ANP/SD stock and flow 
models including discussions of the findings. The application of the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) is used to determine the extent to which STEEP risks affect the performance 
of the case study project.  
 
Chapter nine describes the validation process and the methodology adopted in the 
validation procedure, namely empirical and rational validation for building confidence 
in the integrated ANP/SD models. The validation processes are discussed in terms of 
the literary, conceptual and substantive domains of the research. Results of both the 
empirical and rational validation process lend reasonable support to the reliability and 
robustness of the dynamic fit of the model and the literature search respectively. 
 
 
Finally, in chapter ten, the fundamental objectives of the research are reviewed and 
highlighted. Conclusions drawn from the thesis are presented and recommendations are 
made.  
 
 
1.8: Summary 
The background of the study including the problem statement, aim and objectives, 
scope and research methodology have been presented. The significance of the findings, 
in particular, aspects relating to the potential contribution to knowledge has been 
illuminated. The next chapter, (i.e. chapter two) introduces a critical review of the 
generic risks in megaproject development, especially those relating to the 
underperformance in transportation megaproject at the construction phase. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1: Introduction  
This section defines megaprojects, risk, and the risk management process related to the 
BS 31100:2011 and other risk management codes and standards. It also defines the 
approaches used to identify external risk such as STEEP and classify them for 
megaproject development and construction. The sections further provided extensive 
review into literature to formulate a comprehensive list of risks and to identify the 
impacts caused by such risks on megaproject construction.  
 
As no references were found on risks related to the whole process of megaproject 
development management, literature focusing on the construction part of megaproject 
development was mainly investigated. Other complementary aspects of the relevant 
literature were also investigated in order to prepare a comprehensive list of risks that are 
related to the type of projects under discussion. The review was carried out in order to 
point out why there is the need for a new and more effective method of modelling and 
assessing risks in megaprojects at the construction stage.  
 
2.2: Definitions 
2.2.1: Megaprojects 
For the purpose of this study, megaprojects are defined as being large infrastructure or 
major projects of over one billion (USD) in total installed cost, excluding development 
costs expended prior to the project being formally approved. Megaprojects are huge in 
magnitude and are characterized by a significant number of interfaces, 
interdependencies, complexity, and risks, some of which are strategic and must be 
managed at a level above the project team.  
 
Britain’s Major Projects Association (MPA) defines major projects as “those which 
require knowledge, skills or resources that exceed what is readily or conventionally 
available to the key participants” (Major Projects Association, 2008). Flyvbjerg (2007) 
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described a megaproject as “the most expensive infrastructure and investment projects 
that are carried out today, typically at costs per project from several hundred million to 
several billion dollars” (Flyvbjerg, 2007). A panel discussion at the 39th Engineering 
and Construction Contracting (ECC) Conference defined a megaproject as generally 
costing in excess of USD one billion (ECC 2007). It involves new technology 
development or an extension of existing technology. Megaprojects have significant 
interfaces, are complex and construction normally starts before engineering is complete.  
 
By their nature, “Megaprojects tend to stretch available resources to the limit and 
sometimes beyond (Owen, 2004).” As a result, their developments are generally not 
decisions owners make today and execute tomorrow. Rather, each megaproject is a 
stream of highly complex decisions over a long time frame with increasing levels of 
commitment. Strategic decisions related to site selection, project financing and 
structuring, contracting, project scheduling, advance procurement and staffing and 
training will have a material impact on the economics of such projects. As such, large 
capital projects (megaprojects) face unique risks due to their complexity, resource 
requirements, long time horizons, and exposure to interrelated and pervasive drivers of 
risk. As a result, unique strategic application of decision analytic concepts, tools, and 
processes is needed to better manage the risks of these projects and lock in the full value 
of their investments.  
 
2.2.2: Characteristics of Megaprojects 
As discussed in section 2.2.1, megaprojects developments in the relevant body of 
literature are noted to be characterised by sizeable risks during construction. The 
common perception is that megaprojects often exhibit typical managerial problems that 
make them complex technologies when initiated and developed. At least nine features 
associated with megaprojects are notable. These are: 1. extreme complexity; 2. long 
project duration; 3. large amount of resources; 4. public entities involvement and public 
spending; 5. embedded in a network of public interest; 6. multiplicity of stakeholders; 7. 
technological challenges; 8. Uniqueness, 9. high impact on society and the general 
public. 
 
13 
 Extreme complexity: Technically, megaprojects are complex undertakings requiring 
cutting-edge engineering and construction techniques. Difficulty resulting from the 
lack of cooperation between stakeholders with conflicting interests and the changes 
occurring during the duration of the projects, such as changes in laws and 
regulations, increase the complexity (Capka, 2004). Complexity also implies risk 
and uncertainty in terms of funding and construction (Frick, 2008). Prominent 
examples are construction projects in the fields of transport infrastructure and 
resources extraction. Other types of technologies are described as ‘high-tech’ or 
scientific artefacts, such as particle accelerators (Stough & Haynes, 1997). Of these 
features, complexity emerges as a major challenge for managers of megaprojects. 
This challenge is brought about by a number of contributing factors such as tasks, 
components, personnel, and funding, as well as numerous sources of uncertainty and 
their interactions (Mihm, Loch, & Huchzermeier, 2003; Sommer & Loch, 2004). 
Research evidence suggests that the principal factors leading to complexity include: 
the large scale, long time span, multiplicity of technological disciplines, the number 
of participants, multi-nationality, the interests of stakeholders, sponsor interest, 
escalating costs over time, country risk, uncertainty, and high levels of public 
attention or political interest (Van Marrewijk et al., 2008). 
 
 Also, the challenge of complexity of megaprojects can be studied under both 
technical and social complexity. While technical complexity is related to the size of 
the project, social complexity includes the interactions among the people involved 
in the project (Baccarini, 1996; Bruijn & Leijten, 2008; Cleland and King, 1983). As 
an example, the Channel Tunnel, which was opened in 1994 as an undersea rail 
tunnel linking England to northern France, presented both technical and social 
complexities. Technical complexities were encountered because the project entailed 
building the longest undersea portion of any tunnels worldwide.  According to 
Anderson and Roskrow, (1994), the considerations for geology, design, engineering, 
and power supply aggravated the technical complexities of the Channel Tunnel.  
However, social complexities were mostly due to coordination among the large 
number of front-ended stakeholders and are similar to many other megaprojects 
across the world such as the ‘‘Big Dig’’ Central Artery/Tunnel Project in the 
U.S.A., Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia, Ultra Mega Power Plants 
in India; Port of Shanghai, the world’s busiest container port, in China, and Burj 
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Khalifa, the world’s tallest building, in Dubai and the Hong Kong international 
airport (Davies, Gann, and Douglas, 2009). 
 
 These examples illustrate the widespread nature of the dilemmas encountered by 
project management.   According to Frick (2008), the reason for complexity is the 
large scale and scope of international megaprojects. This is enormous and highly 
visible in infrastructure projects such as tunnels, bridges, airports and rail systems.  
Capka (2004) argued that during the period of project initiation to final completion, 
changes occur in the economy, political landscape, and within the laws and 
regulations (Williams, 2000) which can take several years to come into force. In 
addition, is the existence of significant numbers of different, ambiguous, and 
interconnected tasks and activities to complete the project.  Since the technology 
used in megaprojects is often new, developmental or cutting-edge, its behaviour and 
functionality are often hard to predict. In the case of an already complex product as 
the channel tunnel, the design phase took several years and witnessed countless 
adjustments during construction as the underlying technologies constantly evolved. 
Evidence shows that new developments and changes in technology increase 
uncertainty (Shenhar, 2001). 
 
 Also, researches conducted by Merrow, (2011); Davies, Gann, and Douglas, (2009); 
Hertogh et al., (2008); Van Marrewijk et al., (2008); Merrow et al., (2008); Pryke 
and Smyth, (2006); Brady and Davies (2004); Flyvbjerg et al., (2003); Williams, 
(2002); Davies and Brady (2000); provided deeper understanding on how 
substantial number of project participants including contractors, sub-contractors, 
sponsors/governments, suppliers, investors, funding agencies, etc.,  can lead to 
further increase in complexity. Aligning a significant number of stakeholders is 
difficult and unpleasant if each stakeholder’s interests are to be maintained. 
Sponsors and stakeholders often have competing characteristics and goals. In 
addition to the difficulty of finding common ground for a large number of people, 
conflicts and misinterpretations can arise during the long life of project 
implementation. Undertakings with large amounts of resources may create 
controversy among stakeholders and over the management of resources. Moreover, 
the visibility of megaprojects and public attention increase the complexity (Capka, 
2004; Kolltveit & Grønhaug, 2004; Vaaland & Håkansson, 2003). 
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 Further contributing to complexity is the work of Williams (2008). A review of 
Williams’s book ‘Complexity and its implications for megaproject research’ 
revealed the complex causal chains that are in evidence in complex projects such as 
megaprojects. Williams argued that feedback loops in causal chains of complex 
projects leads to emergent, unpredictable and ‘vicious’ cycles of poor megaproject 
performance. He emphasized that the socio-political complexity in evidence in 
megaprojects exacerbate these cycles even further. Williams proposed that the 
emergent phenomenon of poor performance and its relationship to areas that 
traditionally lie outside concerns of formal project management means that new 
theory is required to design and deliver megaprojects effectively. 
 
 Long project duration: Another characteristic typical to megaprojects is that they 
have very long project duration. For example, it can take up to several decades for 
the final product to be delivered (Haynes, 2002; Stough & Haynes, 1997; Merrow, 
1988). This poses a challenge to project participants and planners as the long-time 
provides plenty of opportunities for changes to occur within the project or its 
environment. Essentially, these may cause a different project outcome than 
originally intended and planned (Merrow, 1988).  
 
 Large amount of resources: Further to the above two characteristics is the very 
large amount of resources (physical supplies, funds and labour) needed to develop 
such projects. The total amount of funding that is regarded typical for a megaproject 
varies between authors, but figures of up to USD one billion are not considered 
unusual (Sewell, 1987). As Hall (1980) puts it, megaprojects typically require “a 
great deal of money by almost anyone’s standard”.  
 
 Involvement of public entities and public spending: As the fourth characteristic, 
megaprojects exhibit the involvement of public entities and public spending – this 
serves as a possible explanation for why megaprojects are often an issue of public 
interest (Willians et al., 2009) and attract significant attention from public media 
outlets (Feldmann, 1985). What also follows from the involvement of public entities 
is that the reputation of the project participants involved, in particular that of public 
officials and the government, may be highly dependent on the success of these 
projects (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003).  
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 Embedded in a network of public interest: The fifth characteristic is that 
megaprojects are usually embedded in a network of public interests where often 
complex has and interdependent goals oppose to each other. This is particularly 
challenging as these may change over time and because political decisions in 
various areas might be intertwined and impact on the project: For example, the 
revenue generation that follows from the construction of commercial buildings may 
depend on whether traffic policy facilitates easy access to the buildings (Flyvbjerg, 
Bruzelius & Rothengatter, 2003). In this sense, traffic policy can have a strong 
effect on the performance of the construction project. Next to policy conflicts, 
megaprojects may also depend on values and judgments of society: the public 
perception of a megaproject and its advantages and disadvantages along with the 
attitude towards the project can change with changes in the political climate or after 
elections (Hall, 1980). When the attitude becomes negative, this can, in turn, lead to 
a change in public policies causing sudden megaproject abandonment or hold-up 
(Hall, 1980).  
 
 Multiplicity of stakeholders: This can be seen as a consequence of the potential for 
creating large-scale impacts. As a consequence, it may be difficult to fulfil each 
stakeholder’s requirements, and a large number of stakeholders may be difficult to 
manage (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003; Kumaraswamy & Morris, 2002; Miller & 
Lessard, 2001; Feldmann, 1985). Diverging interests among public vs. private 
stakeholders are only one example for this type of challenge (e.g. public 
administrations might aim to increase security while private companies look for 
increased economic return). Even in homogeneous looking groups, e.g. the public 
administration, goals might diverge (according for example to local or temporal 
political initiatives). Moreover, large impact and long project duration often act as a 
kind of multiplier for this inherent complexity.  
 
 Technological challenges: As the seventh characteristic, technological challenges 
are often mentioned as a typical megaprojects issue. First, the technology applied in 
the project is often very complex or even novel and innovative – in this case, the 
behaviour and functioning of the technology can be very hard to predict, and past 
experiences are typically not applicable (Hall, 1980). Secondly, the megaproject 
might be dependent on technological trends outside of the project itself (Feldmann, 
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1985). This poses management challenges since trends are often subject to change 
and hard to predict and may force the project to adapt (Feldmann, 1985).  
 
 Uniqueness: Eighth, in conjunction with being technologically challenging, 
uniqueness is a constituent characteristic of megaprojects as they aim at developing 
“unique, dedicated, and usually one-off products” (Miller & Lessard, 2001), for 
which past experiences do not necessarily apply or not exist. Hence, megaprojects 
are considered an “engineering craft business” (Miller & Lessard, 2001).  
 
 High impact on society and the general public: The ninth characteristic is 
concerned with the high impact on society and the general public (also related to the 
public spending) that mega projects can have on the world around them and the 
reactions they provoke (Goemans & Visser, 1987). Some research on mega projects 
has even been devoted exclusively to this topic, e.g. by Stough and Haynes who say 
that these impacts are usually “large-scale and complex” and “unevenly distributed 
in time and space”. Furthermore, the impacts may be trans-national, occur on a long-
term basis affecting multiple generations (Stough & Haynes, 1997), and affect the 
economy, the civil society, and the natural environment (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and 
Rothengatter, 2003; Sewell, 1987). Because megaprojects are “embedded in 
contexts that are complex and adaptive” (Stough & Haynes, 1997), they usually 
have unforeseen and unintended consequences that are difficult to forecast or to 
plan. Consequently, possible responses to megaprojects comprise the rejection by 
the public or the protests of special-interest groups, e.g. environmental 
protectionists. These are often cited in literature as common problems in 
megaprojects with sabotage being the extreme case (Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003; 
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter, 2003; Sewell, 1987; Feldmann, 1985; Hall, 
1980). Derived from the former characteristic but also related to other attributes, like 
spending of large amounts of public funds, we identify the public awareness that is 
devoted to megaprojects (e.g. in mass media) as the final characteristic.  
 
2.2.3: Typical Problems Associated with Transportation Megaprojects 
Constructing a megaproject facility takes a long time and usually involves a large 
capital investment. Megaprojects are often portrayed in literature to experience typical 
problems such as cost overrun, schedule slippage and the failure to meet stakeholders’ 
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requirements or to deliver the intended outcome (Gould, 2002). In addition, revenue 
generation of completed megaprojects is often seen to be below expectations and that 
the project becomes unviable from an economic point of view. According to Kaliba et 
al., (2009), if project costs or schedules exceed their planned targets, client satisfaction 
would be compromised. The funding profile no longer matches the budget requirement 
and further slippage in the schedule could result. Ahmed et al., (2002), emphasised that 
delays on construction projects are a universal phenomenon and are usually 
accompanied by cost overruns. These have a debilitating effect on contractors and 
consultants in terms of growth in adversarial relationships, mistrust, litigation, 
arbitration, cash-flow problems, and a general feeling of trepidation towards other 
stakeholders.  
 
 
Several studies have been undertaken on factors causing project time overruns (delay), 
cost overruns, quality deficiency, etc. and other specific risks in different types of 
megaproject development. Empirical evidence and studies show that these major 
instances of risks in megaprojects usually take place in the construction phase 
(Frimpong et al., 2003). These studies usually focus on specific aspects of project 
performance.  
 
2.2.3.1: Review of Delays in Megaproject Construction 
In construction, the word “delay’’ refers to something happening at a later time than 
planned, expected, specified in a contract or beyond the date that the parties agreed 
upon for the delivery of a project (Pickavance, 2005). Delay can lead to many negative 
effects such as disputes and legal actions between megaproject owners and contractors, 
project cost overruns, loss of productivity and revenue, and contract termination. 
Although schedule delays seem to be embedded in all projects, identifying the main 
causes and preventing these problems from occurring are better than resolving 
subsequent delay-related disputes. Increasingly, realistic ‘construction time’ has become 
important because it often serves as a crucial benchmark for assessing the performance 
of a project and the efficiency of the contractor (Chan and Kumaraswamy, 2002). In this 
study, research literature from all around the world has been collated and consolidated 
for the better understanding of the overall picture of the issues.  
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According to the World Bank (2009), for many projects completed worldwide between 
1999 -2005, the overrun varied between 50% - 80%. In the past few years, the number 
of claims submitted to the American Arbitration Association (AAA) reached almost 
25% of the 1.7 million claims submitted over the past 74 years. In the United Kingdom 
(U.K), report by the National Audit Office entitled “Modernizing Construction”, 
published in January 2001, revealed that 70% of government construction projects were 
delivered late. Similarly, a research conducted by the Building Cost Information Service 
(BCIS, 2012) found that nearly 40% of all studied project had overrun the contract 
period. Safer et al., (2012) point out in a study that the most common factors of these 
delays are related to financial and payment problems, improper planning, poor site 
management, insufficient experience, and shortage of materials and equipment. The 
study also acknowledged others which are: natural disaster such as flood and 
earthquake. In Ali Mohammed (2010), a study conducted on Highway and Bridge 
megaprojects at Bahrain revealed that, predominant factors (risks) such as traffic 
congestion, utility diversion, consultant’s supervision fees, land acquisition, 
environmental considerations and accuracy of existing services locations among the rest 
contributed to delays and disruptions in the project development.  
 
 
Tommy et al., (2006) revealed that natural ground conditions, poor communication, 
manpower problem, insufficient knowledge on work are the delay related risks in 
construction project in Hong Kong region. Jyh-Bin et al., (2010) evaluated delays in 
construction and concluded that the phenomena are universal and are almost always 
accompanied by cost and time overruns. Therefore, it is essential to identify the actual 
causes of delay in order to minimize and avoid the delays and their corresponding 
expenses.  
 
 
2.2.3.2: Review of Cost Overrun in Megaproject Construction 
Cost overrun is common in megaproject construction. The sad truth about cost overrun 
is that they have been a fact of life since Biblical times “For which of you, intending to 
build a tower, does not sit down first and count the cost, whether he has enough to 
finish it?” (Luke, 14:28-NKJ).  The problem of cost overrun, especially in the 
construction industry, is a worldwide phenomenon. Its forms are normally a source of 
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conflict among clients, consultants and contractors on the issue of project cost variation. 
Project cost overruns create a significant financial risk to clients. However, in spite of 
the risks involved, the history of the construction industry is full of projects that were 
completed with significant cost overruns (Garry, 2005). For example, studies conducted 
by Flyvbjerg and others (2002, 2006 and 2009) on a sample of 258 transport projects 
indicated that, cost overruns in transport projects revealed that 9 out of 10 projects have 
cost overruns. Across 20 nations and 5 continents, the average overrun is found to be 
45%, 34% and 20% for rail projects, bridges and tunnels, and road projects, 
respectively. This cost overrun is constant over a 70-year period and cost estimates have 
not improved over time.  
 
The next example is a research conducted by Flyvbjerg, (2009) on the Danish Great 
Belt rail tunnel. This tunnel was opened in 1998 and happened to be the second-longest 
underwater rail tunnel in Europe. However, before it was opened, the cost of 
construction was about 120% over budget and proved nonviable. Only by cross-
subsidizing the tunnel with revenues from a nearby motorway bridge made it possible to 
pay for the tunnel (Flyvbjerg, 2009).  
 
Another example is the Boston’s “Big Dig” (a/k/a “Central Artery/Tunnel Project”). 
This project has been a thorn in the side of the city and its commuters for over twenty 
years. The project’s purpose was to build a 2 mile stretch of underground highway 
through the heart of Boston, replace the existing above-ground highway with green 
space, and to build a tunnel from Boston beneath the Boston Harbour to Logan 
International Airport in East Boston. At its height the project employed over 5,000 
workers. The “Big Dig” has been troubled from the start by shoddy workmanship, as 
evidenced by problems with sub-standard materials, paving fraud, grout heaves, leaking 
tunnels and defective anchor bolts in the Ted William and I-90 tunnels. Originally 
proposed at $2.2 Billion, the project cost was estimated in 1985 at US$6.0 billion but 
was adjusted for inflation as of 2006. By 2006, the project costs have risen to US$15 
Billion (143% cost escalation), with 73% of the cost being subsidized by Massachusetts 
taxpayers (Murphy 2008).  
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The last example is the case study adopted for this research (Edinburgh Tram Network 
Project). It is a tramway system which is currently under construction in Edinburgh, 
Scotland. With an original budget at a cost of £375 million in 2003, the cost of this tram 
system was revised by the City of Edinburgh Council (Project owners) to £776 million 
in 2011. It was originally scheduled to enter service in February 2011 but had to be 
postponed to summer 2014 due to budget problems. In February 2011, Edinburgh 
Evening News published that the German engineering contractors responsible for the 
delivery of the project have revealed 72% of the construction work remaining with just 
38% of the budget left.  
 
Other example cost overruns revealed in literature is a study conducted by the UK 
National Audit Office in 2007 to examine how the costs of building and improving 
roads were estimated and monitored from early forecasts through to the final cost of 
schemes. The UK Department for Transport had approved expenditure of over £11 
billion between 1998 and 2021 for the development of new and existing trunk roads and 
motorways in the UK by the Highways Agency and under £1.7 billion on major road 
schemes which were proposed and developed by the local authorities. By 2006, the 36 
schemes by the Highways Agency had been completed and had cost 6% more than 
estimated. By 2006 the 20 schemes by the local authorities completed had also cost 18% 
more than initially estimated.  
 
Deviations in cost for some selected projects from Europe are presented in Table 2.1. 
Among these projects are six high-speed rail links: ICE Frankfurt-Cologne, Eurotunnel, 
Madrid-Seville AVE, Paris-Lille TGV, Lyon-Marseille TGV, and the Oeresund Fixed 
Link. Costs overruns lay between 8% (Lyon-Marseille TGV) and 116% (ICE Frankfurt- 
Cologne) adopted from the European Commission’s EVA-TREN project (EVA-TREN, 
2008). Others include Edinburgh Tram Network Project (ETNP).  
 
Many types of risks in literature were also identified to account for under performance 
of megaproject construction. In Zou et al., (2007), 25 key risks factors were identified to 
influence project objectives in large construction projects in China. Zou and his 
colleagues compared their findings with a parallel survey carried out in the Australian 
construction industry to highlight the unique risks associated with construction projects 
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in China. The result concluded that, clients, designers and government bodies should 
take the responsibility to manage their relevant risks and work cooperatively from the 
feasibility phase onwards to address potential risks in time; contractors and 
subcontractors with robust construction and management knowledge should be 
employed to minimize construction risks and carry out safe, efficient and quality 
construction activities.  
Table 2.1: Deviations in Total Construction Cost for Selected Megaprojects in Europe 
Projects Forecast 
 
Actual 
 
Overrun 
(%) 
Source 
ICE Frankfurt -Cologne €2784 million €6015 million 116 
Adapted from 
EVA-
TREN(2008),  
p. 45 
 
Eurotunnel €2702 million €4568 million 69 
Oeresund Fixed Link €1795 million €2924 million 63 
Paris - Lille TGV €2666 million €3334 million 25 
Madrid - Seville AVE €3263 million €4029 million 23 
Lyon – Marseilles TGV €4015 million €4338 million 8 
Seville-Madrid HSR €1575 million €2693 million 71 Adapted from 
 E-COST  
Action 
(TU1003), 
Megaproject 
portfolio of case 
studies (2012) 
Madrid-Barcelona HSR €6 billion €9 billion 50 
Edinburgh Trams £545 million £776 million 42 
Notes: ICE stands for “InterCityExpress”, the German HSR; TGV stands for “Train Grande 
Vitesse”, the French HSR; AVE stands for “Alta Velocidad Española” (with “ave” meaning 
"bird"), the Spanish HSR.  
 
Chen et al., (2004) conducted a case study research on the West Rail Project of Hong 
Kong and identified 15 risks concerned with the project cost. The risks revealed, were 
classified into three groups of resources factors, management factors and parent factors. 
The results concluded that “price escalation of material” pertaining to resource factors, 
“inaccurate cost budget” and “supplier or subcontractors’ default” pertaining to 
management factors, and “excessive interface on project management” pertaining to 
parent factors are the most significant risks in the West Rail Project. 
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In Shen (1997), eight major risks accounting for project delay were identified and 
ranked based on a questionnaire survey with industry practitioners. Shen, in conclusion, 
proposed risk management actions to deal with the risks identified through individual 
interview surveys. In addition, other research works were identified to investigate into 
classifying the diverse risks influences on the project objectives in terms of cost and 
time risks and in different other phases. Levitt et al., (1998) in a research “Impact of 
Owner-Engineer Risk Sharing on Design Conservatism,” classified construction project 
risks as 1) Socioeconomic factors (environmental protection,  public safety regulation,  
economic instability,  exchange rate fluctuation); 2) Organizational relationships 
(contractual relations,  attitudes of participants,  communication) and 3)  technological 
problems ( design assumptions, site conditions,  construction procedures,  construction 
occupational safety). The result of the research concluded that, the combination of the 
above risk factors causes out of control uncertainties for all parties involved in the 
project stages.  
 
Abdou (1996) identified and classified construction risks into three groups (construction 
finance, construction time and construction design). The study of Abdou further 
addressed the classified risks in detail and highlighted the different contractual 
relationships that existed among the functional entities involved in the design, 
development and construction of a project.  
 
 
Scholten (2006) estimated that problems of external factors have had a strong impact on 
about 17% of projects supported by European Cohesion Funds and a small to negligible 
impact on 41% only. The main external factors identified by Scholten were: Public 
protest, Archaeological factors / habitats, Weather conditions, Economic growth 
(faster/slower than expected) and Land purchase.  
 
 
2.3: Generic Risks in Megaproject Development 
Based on the objective one of this research which seeks to identify and describe all 
significant risks of the partial or entire set of social, technical, economic, environmental 
and political (STEEP) problems for megaprojects construction and development and the 
historic problems relating project performance in literature, the next sections of this 
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report tried to investigate the sources of STEEP risks that impact on megaproject 
performance during construction. At the end, a summary of the identified risks in the 
relevant body of literature is presented in Table 2.6 of this report 
 
 
2.3.1: The Social Risks 
It is often the case that during the construction phase of megaprojects, local socio-
economic impacts are at their highest, with nearby communities potentially affected by 
the acquisition of land and assets, disturbance to lifestyle and cultural values, various 
forms of noise, air and water pollution, and in some cases, potential for the transmission 
of disease (e.g. from worker camps). As a result, social risks may arise when civil 
societies and stakeholders take up issues concerning environmental standards, labour 
standards, human rights, sustainability and apply pressure on the project developer, so 
that the company can change policies and approaches to operations. These impacts can 
pose a risk to the efficient management of a project.  
 
 
In addition to the project team, there is also a wide range of people and organisations 
that have an interest in a particular project and become involved, to varying degrees, in 
decision-making. These are known collectively as stakeholders. They may have a 
professional interest in the project, they may be potential users of a scheme, or their 
environment or livelihood may be affected in some way by the implementation of the 
scheme; their opposition may make it very difficult to proceed with the project.  
 
 
Given the broad range of stakeholders involved, they are likely to have conflicting 
interests; which need to be recognised and carefully managed as part of the engagement 
process. Stakeholders can be grouped under three broad categories: 
government/authorities, businesses/operators and communities/local neighbourhoods. 
Examples of each are shown in Table 2.2. Furthermore, increasing degrees of social 
risks interaction with other STEEP factors would in turn generate collateral effects via 
spreading and cascading failures within project interrelated subsystems (Boateng et al., 
2012). The results will then be catastrophic scenarios and crippling losses of public 
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invested funds and valuable time that were previously thought to be uncorrelated and 
unforeseeable (Boateng et al., 2012). 
 
                   Table 2.2: Typical Stakeholders involved in Transport Projects 
 Government/Authorities Businesses/Operators Communities/Local 
Neighbourhoods 
European Union  National Business 
Associations 
National Environmental 
NGOs 
Ministry of Transport  Major Employers Motorist Associations 
Other National Ministries  Regional and National 
Businesses 
Trade Unions 
Regional Government  Private Financiers Media 
Local Authorities  Local Business Associations Local Authority Forums 
Neighbouring Cities  Town Centre Retailers Local Community 
Organisations 
Local Transport Authority  Small Businesses Local Interest Groups 
Other Local Transport Bodies  Transport 
Operators/providers 
Cycle/Walking Groups 
Other Local Authority Bodies  Transport Consultants Public Transport User 
Groups 
Politicians   Transport Users 
Other Decision-Makers   Citizens 
Partnership bodies   Visitors 
Project Managers   Citizens in Neighbouring 
Cities 
Professional Staff   Disabled People 
  Landowners 
  Transport Staff 
Source: European Commission Directorate-General for Energy and Transport 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the involvement of project investors to resolute changes to 
company policies, the change requests from customers and suppliers, and grievances 
from employees and other external stakeholders from the civil society, NGOs, local 
business owners and others may result to social risk (Kytle and Ruggie, 2005). The 
entry of these social risks into a company’s divisions can cause many megaprojects to 
fail to achieve their intended cost and schedule objectives during construction. 
 
26 
State (Government)
Project 
Owner
Local 
Authority
Specialist 
Contractors
Company
Project 
Investors
Employees
Suppliers
Customers
Board
C.E.O
Global Ops 
Mgt
Strategy
Local Ops 
mgt
CSRFinance
Mkt & 
Sales
Sourcing
HR
Public 
relations
Legal
- Civil Society
- NGOs
- Local businesses
- Others
Ext. Stakeholders
Key
                        Contractual relationship
                        Line of authority
                        Direct influence
                        Indirect influence
 
 Figure 2.1: Social Risk Entry Points during Megaproject Construction 
Source: Kytle and Ruggie (2005) (modified) 
 
Conversely, the construction period (as well as the operations phase) offers 
opportunities for communities and local businesses to secure employment or procure 
contracts. Fully realised, these opportunities can be of benefit not only in terms of 
promoting local economic development, but in making a positive contribution to the 
commercial and reputational objectives of both the main engineering contractors and the 
project proponent or client. However, there is a challenge in managing the risks 
emanating from the social environment effectively in order to realise the opportunities 
and benefits of such projects. These challenges lie not only with the project proponent 
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(ie. client), be that a public agency or private entity, but also with the large engineering 
service companies contracted to develop or manage the project, and with the 
engineering consultants advising the client in the formulation and review of tender 
documents and in the task of construction management.  
 
2.3.1.1: Effects of Megaproject during Construction  
Megaproject constructions are complex and have relatively large effects on people and 
environment compared to other construction projects. Due to the capital intensity of 
such projects, they often require diversion of traffic, and even in some cases to divert 
rivers. This, in turn, affects existing user rights and access to some parts of roads, and 
therefore has significant impact on livelihoods as well as the environment. Evidence in 
literature proved that the effects of such large developmental projects on socioeconomic 
activities and the archaeological historical sites of every nation are enormous.  Table 2.3 
indicates the various issues and their associated effects that generate social risks in 
transportation megaprojects during construction. 
 
Table 2.3: Social Effects and Issues of Transportation Megaproject during construction 
Effects Issues 
Social Effects - Community Cohesion 
- Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety 
- Accessibility to Family, Friends, and Community 
Resources 
- Construction Disruptions 
- Need to Relocate 
- Choice of Travel Modes 
Economic Effects 
 
- Changes in Traveler Costs 
- Land and Property Value 
- Effects on the Competitiveness of Businesses 
- Linkages Between Residences and Jobs 
Aesthetics and Livability 
 
- Air and Water Quality 
- Traffic Noise 
- Availability of and Access to Public Space 
- Lighting 
- Signage and Visual Changes 
 
Drawing on the typology set out in Table 2.3, it is important to note at this point that the 
extent to which a given effect and issue is studied and/or appears within the literature 
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does not denote the level or extent of its impact across different vulnerable social groups 
within society. We further recognise that whilst many of the social issues identified in 
this section are similar to those found in the environmental literature, these are often 
presented with a view towards overall impact levels, as opposed to more detailed 
discussions of how they impact differentially upon various segments of society and 
businesses.  We attempt to identify each of these issues to a certain extent. Extracts of 
summaries of the individual risk issues indicated in Table 2.3 were taken from the 
National Cooperative Highway Research Program (2001); Contractor’s Final Report, 
NCHRP Web Document 31 (Project B25-19) and are presented below.  
 
 Social Effects  
According to Sinha and Labi, S., (2011), Geurs et al., (2009, p.71) and FHWA (1982), 
the social effects of transportation megaprojects under construction can take many 
forms and can be very difficult to estimate with precision. Perceptions as to the relative 
importance of different sorts of social effects also vary quite widely.  
 
-  Community Cohesion 
As Geurs et al., (2009, p.71) and FHWA (1982) indicated, community cohesion stems 
from the social interaction among members of a community. Such interaction can 
involve regular participation in community social events or neighbourly exchanges on 
the street. Cohesion also is likely to involve a sense of closeness among residents, and a 
sense of being safe in one’s neighbourhood. While it is easy to define in general terms 
what community cohesion is, expressing it analytically is difficult because it is the 
product of myriad interacting factors that are difficult to quantify. 
 
 
-  Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety 
Changes in transportation systems may affect the safety of persons as they go about 
their daily lives in their neighbourhoods or places of work. Increased traffic or changes 
in traffic patterns may transform a pedestrian-friendly environment into one in which 
residents are at greater risk of injury. It also may make it more difficult and unsafe to 
walk or travel by bicycle. Such changes necessitate a consideration of pedestrian and 
bicycle traveling patterns and of possible alternative routes for pedestrians and cyclists. 
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-  Accessibility to Family, Friends, and Community Resources 
Few would disagree that an important element in quality of life is easy access to family, 
friends, and community. Transportation system changes can significantly limit or 
enhance people’s opportunities for interaction in their community by altering routes of 
access. 
 
-  Construction Disruptions 
Transportation projects inevitably create disruptions in normal vehicle operations during 
the construction phase, creating delays for motorists or forcing them to take alternative 
routes. Construction delays may last from a few days to many months, and often require 
people to allow more time for travel. Much of the literature on estimating the 
disruptions caused by the construction of a project prior to its initiation takes the form 
of estimating motorist delay for specific road types. Most of this research focuses on 
traffic diversion and lane or road closures, rather than on the impact construction may 
have on neighbourhood quality or business viability. 
 
 
-  Need to Relocate 
Some transportation projects necessitate the relocation of residents of a particular area. 
This raises strong concerns among planners and residents regarding the quality of the 
area to which residents will relocate, and the ability of residents to adjust to their new 
surroundings, form social relationships, and travel to work, school, or other important 
destinations.  
 
 
The majority of relocation research takes the form of neighbourhood/community 
surveys and is based on displacement events, typically from the perspective of how 
poorly the displaced residents fared after they were relocated. Research also exists on 
factors that influence the ability of residents to adjust to a new location, regardless of 
their motivation for moving. Very little research has attempted to estimate impacts, but 
some has looked at the displaced population before, as well as after, the displacement, 
and considers the emotional impact on residents who expect to be displaced sometime 
in the future. 
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-  Choice of Travel Modes 
New transportation projects have the potential to provide individuals with the 
opportunity to choose travel modes that were previously not a viable option. 
Occasionally, such projects may also remove options for some individuals. It is 
important to consider how a transportation change may affect individuals’ mode choice 
and the compatibility of modes. 
 
According to World Commission for Dams (2000), these issues are not confined to the 
design, construction and operation of transportation megaprojects. However, they are 
also about social, environmental and political choices which aspire towards the 
development and improvement of the well-being of people. The relocation of people to 
make way for the construction of the routes of such projects can create conflict.  
Farmers and business owners along the project’s routes may also suffer from the 
allotment of different but poor agricultural land and business areas with inadequate 
facilities and substandard housing and infrastructure. 
 
 
Kytle and Ruggie (2005) indicated that social risk will occur when stakeholders identify 
a company’s vulnerability on a social issue, such as a potentially inflammatory policy, 
ethic, or practice, and pressure the organization to change its approach. According to 
Kytle and Ruggie (2005), social risk often involves human rights, labour, or 
environmental sustainability, and can destroy a company’s reputation if left unchecked. 
Kytle and Ruggie further viewed social risk as a measure of the gap between the 
boundary of responsibility which the project organization acknowledges and that 
perceived by its stakeholders. This gap is obviously widened if the project organization 
takes a “legal minimum” approach to their responsibilities, without acknowledging the 
broader dimensions of social licence to operate.   
 
 
To minimise social issues and militate against social grievances, conflicts and disputes, 
legal actions, and treats to persons and asset security, Ofori (1992) suggested that 
environmental issues should be considered as the fourth objective of every construction 
project besides time, cost, and quality.  It should be considered even before embarking 
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upon project feasibility studies. Table 2.4 presents a list of risks that can be generated 
through a project’s interactions with its local stakeholders at the construction phase.   
 
         Table 2.4: Risks Generated Through a Project’s Interactions with Stakeholders 
Risks Reference(s) 
- Inability to obtain land/access rights Hilber, and Robert-Nicoud (2013); Turner et al., 
(2011); Funderburg et al., (2010), Glaeser and Ward. 
(2006). 
- Compensation costs higher than 
expected 
Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, (2013), Turner et al., 
(2011), Funderburg et al., (2010), Glaeser and Ward 
(2006), Fraser, (1990), McTague and Jergeas, (2002). 
- Delays due to community/legal 
action  
Funderburg  et al., (2010) 
- Delays due to local labour disputes  Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, (2007), Al-
Momani (2000), McTague and Jergeas, (2002). 
- Threats to personal or asset security  Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, (2007), Jones and 
Brinkert, (2008). 
- Vandalism & damage Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, B. (2007), Al-
Momani (2000). Jones and Brinkert, (2008). 
- Cost overruns  Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg and Rothengatter, (2002), 
Altshuler and Luberoff. (2003), Lee (2008), Fraser 
(1990). 
- Third part claims  Galloway, (2009) 
- Costs due to community action  Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, (2007), Al-
Momani (2000), Jones and Brinkert, (2008), 
Funderburg et al., (2010) 
- Delays dues to local labour disputes Fraser (1990) Al-Momani, (2000). 
 
  
 Economic Effects 
 
Transportation megaprojects under construction can have dual effects: they improve the 
public’s access to many forms of opportunity when completed, but they can also result 
in problems related to disruptions, pollution and greater traffic levels within or near a 
corridor area when delays occur during construction. In this section, we try to explain 
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four major areas of risks evolved from such projects on society in the following sub 
headings.  
 
 
-  Changes in Traveller Costs 
Transportation megaprojects under construction may significantly affect travellers, 
often by increasing or decreasing the amount of time these travellers may require to 
reach their destination. Project delays, disputes and legal actions relating to the project 
will also further increase delays and congestion and often provide a significant time 
increase for motorists. In addition, construction delays of such projects may increase 
time en route for some travellers, while creating longer journeys for others. However, 
when such projects go as planned, they may often improve the safety of users and 
reduce the safety of particular groups, such as pedestrians. Vehicle operating costs may 
also be reduced by smoother, more direct facilities involving fewer stops and starts, but 
higher speeds may actually increase the per-mile cost of operating a vehicle. 
 
 
-  Land and Property Value 
Transportation megaprojects may serve as catalysts for comprehensive urban 
reinvestment projects with the expectation that they will improve economic 
development. They may affect property values in a number of ways. Construction of 
such projects may provide improved access to an area and thereby increasing property 
values. On the other hand, properties adjacent to and along the routes of the projects 
may decline in value as a function of their proximity to the facility, or as a result of a 
new undesirable visual feature in the environment.  
 
-  Effects on the Competitiveness of Businesses 
 
Major construction works involved in transportation megaprojects may disrupt routine 
business activity along the project routes. Business owners may suffer customer losses 
as access to their business becomes restricted, which in turn will affect the number of 
employees the business requires. Customers who find alternative businesses during the 
construction period may not necessarily return once construction is completed. 
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Likewise, businesses may lose parking spaces during construction and not be able to 
serve as many customers. 
 
 
-  Linkages between Residences and Jobs 
 
The way in which transportation megaprojects are structured and constructed often has 
significant effects on the ability of persons to travel from their homes to their jobs. 
Evidence from Edinburgh Tram Network (ETN) Project revealed that inner-city 
residents of the main City Centre and Haymarket frequently face transportation 
disadvantages when trying to reach jobs located in the suburbs. Evidence suggests that 
if affordable housing were located near their jobs, many would have relocated rather 
than commute long distances to work or use alternative transport.  
 
 
 Aesthetics and Livability 
 
Effects on the aesthetics and livability of neighbourhoods and communities in which the 
megaproject is executed, are certainly closely related to social and economic effects. 
Construction of transportation megaprojects can substantially affect an area’s aesthetics 
and other aspects of quality of life, either positively or negatively. Livability such as air 
quality (especially localized pollution, such as that near streets upgraded to handle 
greater traffic volumes), changes in noise levels and accessibility to public buildings 
and spaces, the psychological effects of excessive glare from lighting on roadways and 
signage are among the livability issues that affect people when transportation 
megaprojects are undertaken. Further explanations of these factors are presented below. 
 
 
-  Air and Water Quality 
 
The activities of transportation megaproject construction have the potential to impact 
water quality and contribute to area emissions of air pollutants. The largest sources of 
anticipated pollutants would be dust generated by excavation, grading, and other 
ground-disturbing activities and exhaust emissions from equipment. All construction-
related emissions would be temporary and vary from day to day, depending on the type 
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of work being done. Construction-related emissions would also be experienced at 
different locations during the construction process, depending on the area(s) under 
construction at any one time and the distance to likely receptors. Because of the 
changing nature of these conditions (i.e., construction activity, construction location, 
and distance to receptors), an estimate of total construction emissions is not possible.  
 
 
Also, the project could have potential adverse impacts on water quality related to 
construction activities. These include, but are not limited to: exposure of soils 
potentially resulting in erosion impacts to receiving waters; footing excavations for pier 
foundation resulting in possible groundwater contamination; potential surface water 
impacts from dredging and dewatering operations, concrete pouring, and washout 
activities, management and application of chemical products; construction activities 
performed on barges; and the potential for accidental spills from construction equipment 
and materials. Additional construction-related impacts may include discharges of waste 
material, accidental spills, and suspension of bottom sediments. Measures similar to 
those taken during construction will be taken to address these impacts. However, 
preventing these impacts may be difficult due to the complex site conditions, with 
limited space and several constraints. 
 
 
-  Traffic Noise during Construction 
 Megaproject construction would result in intermittent and varying levels of 
construction noise. Construction noise is unavoidable and could adversely affect some 
nearby residents during construction activity periods. Noise effects are often the most 
significant impact on the livability of an area because they are not confined to the 
outside environment but intrude into people’s homes. For example, pile driving during 
construction would generate noise that is unique in terms of noise level.  Noise may 
result from a number of sources, including increased traffic or a new rail line, and may 
affect residents in a variety of ways, including creating sleep disturbances and 
heightening stress levels. However, the impact would be temporary and limited to the 
time of the construction in any one location. Because of vehicle technology 
improvements and more strict noise regulations, Noise levels generated by construction 
equipment will be minimised.   
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-  Availability of and Accessibility to Public Space 
 
Availability of/and accessibility to public space serves significant social and 
recreational functions. Construction period may diminish or cause the removal of 
residents’ access to public space, which may in turn have repercussions on levels of 
social interaction and cohesiveness within a neighbourhood. It is therefore useful to 
consider the importance of public spaces to residents of an area when developing a 
transportation project.  
 
 
-  Lighting 
 
Construction activities may increase lighting in a neighbourhood or community in the 
form of roadway or signage lighting. Also, night time construction activities which 
involve the use of lighting equipment could cause glare, potentially affecting residents 
in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, it is useful for planners to have a basic 
understanding of light trespass and glare, and how to minimize their intrusion into 
residents’ homes. It is important for planners to consider the overall increases in 
lighting in an area that may result from increased signage.  
 
 
-  Signage and Visual Changes 
 
All construction activities would involve the use of barges, heavy equipment, stockpiles 
of soils and materials, removal of trees and other structures on the project routes to 
provide staging areas and clearances for heavy equipment and other visual signs of 
construction. Increases in signage, as a result of construction activities, may have a 
significant effect on the visual quality of a neighbourhood. During construction periods, 
residents would experience the most noticeable visual changes. It is advisable to 
consider residents’ preferences for types of signs; such preferences can be assessed 
through neighbourhood surveys and photomontage techniques.   
 
36 
2.3.2: Technical Risks  
Essentially, technical risk is the most common and well understood form of risk. 
Technical risk is the subject of close surveillance. To minimize the technical risk, the 
contractor’s project manager is responsible to evaluate the risk in detail to ensure that 
the project will be constructed in accordance to the design specification and host 
government’s requirements and function well. Thus, a well reputed and established 
consultant together with an experience contractor should be hired to implement the 
project without any tolerance to the standard codes and practice.  
 
Tatum, (1987) defined construction technical risks as risks associated to the 
combination of construction methods, construction resources, work tasks, and project 
influences that define the manner of performing a construction operation to 
“unaccomplished desired aim necessary for human sustenance and comfort” (Shin, 
Watanabe, and Kunishima, 1989). Also, these risks are related to technological 
problems that are familiar to the design/construct professions which have some degree 
of control over this category. However, because of rapid advances in new technologies 
which present new problems to designers and constructors, technological risk has 
become greater in many instances (Dvir, 2005). Certain design assumptions which have 
served the professions well in the past may become obsolete in present time. Site 
conditions, particularly subsurface conditions which always present some degree of 
uncertainty, can create an even greater degree of uncertainty during construction. Klein 
and Cork, (1998) concluded that the designs may have to be modified after construction 
has begun because construction procedures may not have been fully anticipated. An 
example of facilities which have encountered design change uncertainty is the 
Edinburgh Trams Network project (ETNP). Owners, designers and contractors of ETNP 
have suffered site technological problems such as site conditions and design changes for 
undertaking such projects.  
 
Further to the site conditions problems and design changes are requirements or scope 
ambiguity in megaproject construction projects.  Complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity 
associated with megaproject requirements influence the difficulty of managing such 
large infrastructure projects. Project complexity refers to the number of different 
activities that must be performed to complete the project (Pich et al., 2002). On the 
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other hand, ambiguity exists when relationships between project decision variables and 
even the variables themselves are unknown. It can also be referred to as a lack of 
awareness of the project management team about certain states of the real world or 
causal relationships due to information inadequacy that arise from both project 
ambiguity and project complexity. This implies that many different actions and states of 
the real world parameters interact to make it difficult for the effect of actions to be 
assessed. This usually makes tasks become ambiguous since the full range of tasks 
required to complete the project is likely to be unknown at the outset, and the full range 
of decision variables that must be specified to satisfy the completion of each task is also 
unknown. Because of the interdependencies that may exist among decision variables 
associated with project tasks, communication and coordination are needed so that 
detailed product and process specifications and task requirement can be determined 
(Moenaert et al., 1995).  
 
 
The risk of technical difficulties including latent defects in operation of project plant, 
equipment during construction is another factor and other unforeseen situations. 
Unforeseen uncertainty makes contingency planning more difficult because not all 
influencing factors in the project can be anticipated, and prevented. While unforeseen 
events are, by definition, unforeseen, the project manager is not completely at the mercy 
of unpredictable events. Therefore, the megaproject manager has to be an opportunistic 
manager who can detect the new threats very quickly and control them. Project 
financiers may usually try to minimize this risk by preferring tried and tested 
technologies to new unproven technologies. However, as Flyvbjerg (2009) put it in a 
research, project promoters appear to be particularly prone to cost underestimation. But 
as Klein and Cork (1998) indicated, lending can only take place if such risks are 
minimised earlier through expert report as to the proposed technology to be adopted. 
Also, Shin, Watanabe, and Kunishima, (1989) emphasised the need to manage technical 
risks during the loan period by requiring a maintenance retention account to be 
maintained so that a proportion of cash-flows to cover future maintenance expenditure 
can be received. That means there is a need of technological advancement to overcome 
this type of risk. 
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Another key area of technical risks is supply chain breakdown. Analysis carried out for 
BIS by Harris (2013) has shown that for large project the main contractor may be 
directly managing around 70 and more sub-contracts of which a large proportion are 
small or less. For example, projects where 70% of sub-contracts are below certain 
contract price (£50,000 or less). Notwithstanding the structure of the industry, 
insufficient material or not supply in time, material type mismatch or quantity mistake 
of material and equipment will demonstrate supply chain problems and cause 
fragmentation in the main contracting organisation.  
 
Other technical risks that can impact megaproject performance include: scheme design 
risk such as difficulty of engineering, defective design, inefficient optimized 
construction scheme, large percentage of new technology adopted; too advanced 
scheme, unqualified technology, insufficient estimation, over-evaluation of one's own 
strength, underestimate rivals, risk of construction quality, poor time management 
during project control, the confused financial administration and many others.  
 
2.3.3: Economic Risks 
Economic risks for megaproject development are mostly risks of project finance that 
evolve during the project delivery (Baloi and Price, 2003). For example, inadequate 
sources of project funds by an owner or funding agent may create time delays and 
financing problems. Capital costs of projects are also influenced by fluctuations in the 
exchange rates of foreign currencies against the dollar, inflation, and many other 
financial and economic factors such as tariffs and fiscal policies (Chen et al., 2004; 
Leung et al., 2004, Ling and Lim, 2007).   The term Project Financing refers to a wide 
range of financing structures where the provision of funds is not primarily dependent 
upon the credit support of the sponsors or the value of the project’s physical assets but 
on project’s capacity to service the debt and provide an equity return to the sponsors 
through its cash flows (Wang et al., 2000). Project finance involves the setting up of an 
“ad hoc” project company (called Special Purpose Vehicle - SPV) to carry out the 
venture (Opler et al., 1997). According to Opler, the SPV is capitalised through equity 
and debt funding which is used to cover project capital expenditures and pre-operational 
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costs; once the project is completed, the SPV can start its commercial activities thus 
generating the necessary cash flows to repay the financing.  
 
Risk management is essential to ensure the project is completed on time, to budgeted 
cost and the delivery of service in line with expected standards. As cash flow generation 
depends on all these variables, financiers are closely concerned with the feasibility of 
the project as a whole and with the way to manage the impact of potentially adverse 
factors (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005 and Molenaar, 2005). A successful financing 
structure for megaprojects entails a balanced allocation of project risks among the 
various interested parties (Kapila and Hendrickson, 2001). These risks must be fully 
understood by all involved parties and must be properly mitigated. 
 
In transportation megaproject such as Tram network construction, financing the nature 
and level of risks vary during the life cycle of the project and fall into two broad areas 
of completion and market (Opler et al., 1997). Completion risks may arise during 
investment phase, while market risk is associated with the operational one.  
 
2.3.3.1: Completion Risks 
Completion risk is the risk that the mega transportation system will not be completed 
within the established performance, schedule and cost objectives (Poole and Peter, 
2011). This type of risk basically evolves from three sources such as the adoption of 
unproven technologies or innovative technical solutions; the involvement of 
inexperienced project managers; and an inadequate definition of contractual structure. 
For most megaprojects, the government or the major project financiers will examine 
carefully the contractual obligations of the contractor vs. the SPV and will require that 
certain provisions be contained in the relevant contracts. The most common structure of 
project finance construction contract is the Engineering, Procurement and Construction 
(EPC) Contract. An EPC contract generally provides for the obligation of the contractor 
to build and deliver the project facilities on a turnkey or fixed price basis, that is, at a 
certain pre-determined fixed price, by a certain date, in accordance with certain 
specifications, and with certain performance warranties. EPC contract is quite 
complicated in terms of legal issues therefore the project company the EPC contractor 
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should have enough experience and knowledge about the nature of the project in order 
to avoid their faults and minimize risks during the contract execution. Other alternative 
forms of construction contract are project management approach and alliance 
contracting. Basic contents of an EPC contract are description of the project; contract 
price; payment; completion date; completion guarantee and Liquidated Damages (LDs); 
performance guarantee and LDs and Cap under LDs.  
 
Since vendors will be willing to enter into such a contract only if the system’s 
requirements are well developed this will give the lenders a high degree of confidence 
that the system can successfully be completed. In addition, the contract will be 
structured around an incentive payment scheme which involves the contractor placing a 
portion of the contract price at risk (i.e. the contractor is paid a part of the contract only 
if the system meets performance criteria during its nominal in-orbit life). Clearly, the 
greater is the portion “at risk” and the level of performance required, the greater is the 
contractor’s commitment to the new system and, consequently, financiers’ confidence in 
the venture.  
 
2.3.3.2: Market Risk 
Market risk is the risk the target market will not materialise. In project finance this risk 
must be carefully assessed and mitigated; the most usual way of doing this is through an 
agreement between the project company and the operator. The project company 
delegates the operation, maintenance and often performance management of the project 
to a reputable operator with expertise in the industry under the terms of the Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) agreement. The operator can be one of the sponsors of the 
project company or third party operator. In other cases the project company may carry 
out the operation and maintenance of the project by itself and may eventually arrange 
for the technical assistance of an experienced company under a technical assistance 
agreement. Basic contents of an O&M contract are Definition of the service; Operator 
responsibility; Provision regarding the services rendered; Liquidated damages and Fee 
provisions. 
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As indicated in section 2.4.3, not only the nature but also the level of project risks varies 
over the life cycle of megaproject development. The investment phase comprises all the 
activities associated with the construction of project assets, under a turn-key contract, 
that is the capital expenditure relating to the ground infrastructure. The investment 
phase starts with the so called “Financial closure” when the financing contracts are 
finalised and the SPV is entitled to draw down the funds and ends when the project’s 
assets are completed and the SPV starts commercial operations to generate revenues.  
 
2.3.4: Environmental Risks  
‘Environmental risks are risks to the natural health and productivity of environmental 
systems and risks to human health stemming from alteration and/or degradation of 
environmental systems’ (Lerche and Glaesser, 2006 as cited in Chen, Z., et al., 2011). 
These risks include extreme natural disasters (Storms, flood, landslides, snow, 
hailstorm, earthquake, tsunami, etc.) and socioeconomic consequences (Chen, Z., et al., 
2011). Failure to mitigate these risks can result in serious impacts such as erosion, 
permanent loss of wild life, community severances, increased accidents, and destruction 
of indigenous lifestyles. 
 
 
For construction projects, several aspects of environmental issues have been identified 
by academic researchers in the literature. According to Chen et al. (2000), dust, harmful 
gases, noise, solid and liquid wastes, fallen objects, and ground movements are types of 
pollution and/or hazards sources from construction activities which impact on the 
environment. Chen et al., (2005) considered construction impacts on the natural and 
social environments under eight categories: soil and ground contamination, ground and 
underground water, construction and demolition waste, noise and vibration, dust, 
hazardous emissions and odours, wildlife and natural features impacts and archaeology 
impacts. Cole (2000) emphasised that resource use, ecological loading and human 
health issues are the major impacts of construction process on the environment.  
 
In Shen and Tam (2002) construction environmental impacts were classified as 
environmental resources extraction (fossil fuels and minerals); the extension of generic 
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resources consumption (land, water, air, and energy); the production of waste that 
require the consumption of land for disposal; and pollution of the living environment 
with noise, odours, dust, vibrations, chemical and particulate emissions, and solid and 
sanitary waste.  
 
The study by March (1992) categorised environmental impacts by the construction 
industry under ecology, landscape, traffic, water, energy, timber consumption, noise, 
dust, sewage, and health and safety hazards. These impacts by construction activities 
typically cause negative effects which include waste production, mud, dust, soil and 
water contamination and damage to public drainage systems, destruction of plants, 
visual impact, noise, traffic increase and parking space shortage and damage to public 
space Cardoso (2005). Failure to mitigate these risks can result in further potential 
occupational health and safety risks, primarily in the areas of erosion, permanent loss of 
wild life, community severances, increased accidents, and destruction of indigenous 
lifestyles (Chau, 1995). For example, exposure to dust particles, toxic fumes from 
chemicals used in material testing and many other hazardous materials can damage both 
the natural and human health. Figure 2.2 indicates the major effects of the construction 
industry on the natural environment. 
 
The environmental effects 
of the construction 
industry
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Use of water 
resources
Water discharges
 
 Figure 2.2:  The Main Environmental Effects of Construction Activities. 
Source: Griffith, (1994) 
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2.3.5: Political Risks 
Political risks may arise from the interactions between the government and the 
surrounding environment or society. Typically, they prevail from politically motivated 
events that adversely affect investments, contracts, or other businesses, be it national or 
international. In megaproject development and construction, the exercise of political 
power is the root cause of political risks in its delivery. For example, changes in laws 
and regulations permit requirements and government approvals, changes in pollution 
laws, and public consultation. 
 
According to Kettis (2004) political risk is difficult to clarify due to the fact that it is a 
phenomenon present in the interface between an organization and a political 
environment and involves the concepts of risk and uncertainty, political sources and 
political environments. At a general level political risk is ‘an implicitly unwanted 
political activity’ (De-Mortanges  and Aller, 1996) and has been classified under two 
categories (See Table 2.5); risks arising from government action and risks arising from 
government and societal events, also known as instability risks.  
 
       Table 2.5: Political Risks Classification and Categories in Project Development 
Risks 
Classification 
 
Category 
Government Risks Instability Risks 
Firm-Specific  - Discriminatory 
regulations 
- “Creeping” expropriation 
- Breach of contract 
- Sabotage 
- Kidnappings 
- Firm-specific boycotts 
Country-Level  - Mass nationalizations 
- Regulatory changes 
- Currency inconvertibility 
- Mass labour strikes 
- Urban rioting 
- Civil unrests 
- politically motivated violence 
 
The first distinction that must be made is between firm-specific political risks and 
country-specific political risks (Murray, 2007). Firm-specific political risks are risks 
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directed at a particular company and are, by nature, discriminatory. For instance, the 
risk that a government will nullify its contract with a given firm or that a terrorist group 
will target the firm's physical operations are firm-specific. By contrast, country-specific 
political risks are not directed at a firm, but are countrywide, and may affect firm 
performance. Examples include a government's decision to forbid currency transfers or 
the outbreak of a civil war within the host country (Reinersten and Reinersten, 2000). 
Firms may be able to reduce both the likelihood and impact of firm-specific risks by 
incorporating strong arbitration language into a contract or by enhancing on-site 
security to protect against terrorist attacks. By contrast, firms usually have little control 
over the impact of country-level political risks on their operations. 
 
There is a second distinction to be made between types of political risk: government 
risks and instability risks (Murray, 2007). Government risks are those that arise from the 
actions of a governmental authority, whether that authority is used legally or not. A 
legitimately enacted tax hike or an extortion ring that is allowed to operate and is led by 
a local police chief may both be considered government risks. Indeed, many 
government risks, particularly those that are firm-specific, contain an ambiguous 
mixture of legal and illegal elements. Instability risks, on the other hand, arise from 
political power struggles. These conflicts could be between members of a government 
fighting over succession, or mass riots in response to deteriorating social conditions. 
 
With regard to megaprojects development, political risks are frequently classified into 
two categories: project risks and general risks (Loosemore et al., 2006). Project risks are 
those specific to the project’s micro-environment and include such risks arising from 
the technical, contractual, management and site conditions. General risks are those 
arising from the project’s macro-environment. General risks have a significant impact 
on the outcome of the project and include legal, political, economic, social or 
technological risks. It is recognized by project sponsors that the most significant general 
risk to a project is political risk. Whereas project risk is identified, quantified and 
assessed to form part of the business cases (value for money) for decision making, it is 
the general risks such as political risk that are not (Gannon, 2007).  Some project 
sponsors have experienced problems in identifying and representing political 
information that is political support for a project, within a project’s business case and 
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using this information to make decisions on the political risk associated with a project. 
In many instances there is a tendency for project sponsors to focus on the quantifiable 
aspects for the business case for decision making and keep the qualitative political 
information for decision making outside of the business case. Fundamentally, a 
project’s business case is used as a tool to support project decision making and 
planning. 
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                             Table 2.6: Summary of Types and Sources of Risks in Megaproject Construction 
No Risk Type Risk Source Reference(s) 
1 Social Inability to obtain land and 
access rights 
Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, (2013), Turner et al., (2011), Funderburg et al., (2010), Glaeser and Ward, 
(2006). 
Compensation costs higher than 
expected 
Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, (2013), Turner et al., (2011), Funderburg et al., (2010), Glaeser and 
Fraser, (1990), McTague and Jergeas, (2002). 
Community and legal actions Funderburg et al., (2010) 
Delays dues to Local labour 
disputes  
Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, (2007), Al-Momani, (2000). McTagueand, (2002), Fraser, (1990), 
Al-Momani, (2000). Case: the Vasco da Gama Bridge (EC, 2003), the Thailand Underground Rail 
Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
Threats to personal or asset 
security  
Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, (2007), Jones and Brinkert, (2008). 
Vandalism & damage Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, (2007), Al-Momani, (2000). Jones and Brinkert, (2008). 
Cost overruns  Bruzelius, Flyvbjerg and Rothengatter, (2002), Altshuler and Luberoff, (2003), Lee, (2008), Fraser, 
(1990), Singh, (2009). 
Third party claims  Galloway, (2009) 
Costs due to disputes, 
community and  legal action  
Alinaitwe, Mwakali and Hansson, (2007), Al-Momani, (2000). Jones and Brinkert, (2008). 
Funderburg et al., (2010) 
Involvement of too many Multi-
level decision making bodies 
Winch, (2000), Olander and Landin, (2005), Bourne and Walker, (2006), Miller and Lessard, (2001), 
Jafaari, (2004). 
Social issues and grievances Soderholm, (2008), Cole, (2000), Chen et al., (2005), March, (1992), Cardoso, (2005). 
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                    Table 2.6: Summary of Types and Sources of Risks in Megaproject Construction (Continued) 
No Risk Type Risk Source Reference(s) 
2 Technical Ambiguity of project scope/ 
Scope change  
Miller & Lessard, (2008), HS2 Ltd (2009), Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link(PAC, 2006a), the 
Thailand Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004), Edinburgh Trams (Audict 
Scotland, 2011)  
Ground conditions on given 
project sites 
Tommy et al., (2006), Case: the Thailand Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 
2004). 
Inadequate project complexity 
analysis 
Audit Scotland, (2011); Brockmann, (2007);  HS2 Ltd (2009), Yasemin (2013),  
Unforeseen modification to 
project 
Audit Scotland (2011), HS2 Ltd (2009). Case: the Thailand Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
Inaccurate project cost estimate Audit Scotland (2011)., HS2 Ltd (2009), Yasemin (2013), 
Failure to meet specified 
standards 
Audit Scotland (2011). HS2 Ltd (2009), Yasemin (2013). 
Technical difficulties in utilities 
diversions 
HS2 Ltd (2009), Audit Scotland (2011), Yasemin (2013), 
Engineering and design change Austin (2000), Choo et al., (2004), Ross,Cartwright and Novakovic (2006). Case: the BBC’s White 
City 2 Development (PAC, 2006b), the Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 2004), The Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004).  
Supply chain breakdown Haynes, (2002), Eglin (2003), Norrman and Jansson (2004), Kane (2001), CIOB (2010), 
Wolstenhome, (2009), Case: the London Underground (NAO, 2004a), the Bangkok Elevated Road 
and Track System (The Work Bank, 1999), the Labin B Power Plant (Lu, 2004), the STEPS Deal 
(PAC, 2005b), the BBC’s White City 2 Development (PAC, 2006b). 
Project time overruns Jyh-Bin Yang et al., (2010), Fugar (2010), Yasemin (2013), Chidambaram, et al., (2012), Shaikh and 
Muree (2010), Kang, (2010), Kikwasi,(2012), Safer ali et al., (2012), Mohd (2010), 
Project cost overruns Jyh-Bin Yang et al., (2010), Case: the Boston’s Artery/tunnel, the Great Belt Rail Tunnel, the 
Shinkansen Joetsu Rail Line, and the Channel Tunnel (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Reilly, 2005). 
Project delays of all forms Jyh-Bin et al., (2010),  Fugar (2010), Yasemin et al., (2013), Chidambaram, et al., (2012), Shaikh and 
Muree, (2010), Kang, (2010), Kikwasi, (2012), Safer ali et al., (2012), Mohd (2010). 
 
 
48 
                        Table 2.6: Summary of Types and Sources of Risks in Megaproject Construction (Continued) 
No Risk Type Risk Source Reference(s) 
3 Economic  Change in government funding 
policy;  
Haynes, (2002). Case: the Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 2004), the London Underground (EC, 2002)  
Taxation changes the London Underground (EC, 2002) 
Change in government  Hertogh et al., (2008) 
Wage inflation;  Frimpong et al., (2003); Denini, (2009). Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (PAC, 2006a), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) 
Local inflation change;  Frimpong et al., (2003). Case: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (PAC, 2006a), the Thailand Underground 
Rail Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004) 
Foreign exchange rate;  Case: the North-South Expres sway (NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway(The Work Bank, 
1999), the Water Conservancy and Hydropower Project in Southern China (Lu, 2004), the Thailand 
Underground Rail Project (Ghosh &Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
Material price changes; Audit Scotland (2004), Haynes (2002) 
Economic recession;  Audit Scotland (2004), Haynes (2002). 
Energy price change/interest rate  Case: the North-South Expressway (NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway (The Work Bank, 
1999), the Harnaschpolder Wastewater Treatment Project (Smith, 2006). 
Catastrophic environmental 
effects;  
Case: the Great Belt and Oresund Links/Demark (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003), the London Underground (EC, 
2002), the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (PAC, 2002b), the Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 2004), the Labin B-
Power Plant (Lu, 2004), the Thailand Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
Project technical difficulties  Audit Scotland (2004) 
Project delays of all forms Jyh-Bin et al., (2010), Fugar (2010), Yasemin et al., (2013), Case: the Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 
2004), the Thailand Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
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Table 2.6: Summary of Types and Sources of Risks in Megaproject Construction (Continued) 
No Risk Type Risk Source Reference(s) 
4 Environ -
mental 
Environmental issues from 
works (Pollution) 
Tommy (2006), Case: the Great Belt and Oresund Links/Demark (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). 
Unfavourable climate conditions 
(Snow, rain, etc.) 
Case: the Great Belt and Oresund Links/Demark (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003), the London Underground 
(EC, 2002), the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (PAC, 2002b), the Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 2004), 
the Labin B Power Plant (Lu, 2004), the Thailand Underground Rail Project (Ghosh & 
Jintanapakanont, 2004). 
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Table 2.6: Summary of Types and Sources of Risks in Megaproject Construction (Continued) 
No Risk Type Risk Source Reference(s) 
5 Political Change in government funding  
policy 
Haynes, (2002). Case: National Air Traffic Services (NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003), the Melbourne City 
Link (Hodge, 2004), the London Underground (EC, 2002), the London Underground (EC, 2002) 
Political 
opposition/interferences  
Case: the Bangkok Elevated Road and Track System (The Work Bank, 1999), the Constanta Water 
Project (EC, 2004b), the Prescom in Targoviste. (EC, 2004b). 
Government discontinuity  Flyvbjerg et al., (2003). 
Lack of political support  Flyvbjerg, et al., (2003). Case: the Bangkok Elevated Road and Track System (The Work Bank, 
1999), the Constanta Water Project (EC, 2004b), the Prescom in Targoviste. (EC, 2004b), 
Political indecision Ruuska et al., (2009). Haynes, (2002). 
Project termination Case: the North-South Expressway (NSE) and the Kuala Lumpur-Karak Highway (The Work Bank, 
1999). 
Delay in obtaining 
consent/Approval; 
Case: National Air Traffic Services (NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003), the Water Infrastructure in Southern 
China (Lu, 2004). 
Legislative/regulatory changes Case: National Air Traffic Services (NAO, 2004b; PAC, 2003), the Melbourne City Link (Hodge, 
2004), the London Underground (EC,2002), 
Protectionism  Perminova et al., (2008)  
Delay in obtaining temporary 
Traffic Regulation Orders 
(TROs) 
Audit Scotland (2011) 
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2.4: Risk Management Process  
ISO 31000 defined risk management as the central part of the strategic management of 
any organisation. It is the process whereby organisations methodically address the risks 
attached to their activities. The focus of risk management is to assess significant risks so 
that suitable risk responses can be implemented to achieve maximum but sustainable 
value from all the activities of the organisation. Risk management enhances the 
understanding of the potential factors that affect an organisation. It increases the 
probability of success and reduces both the probability of failure and the level of 
uncertainty associated with achieving the objectives of the organisation.  
 
 
According to Arrow (2008), the practice of risk management began to evolve many 
decades ago in the insurance and financial sectors and has only become an integral part 
of the construction industry over the last few decades. Arrow emphasized that project 
risk management was recognized as a separate management function not until the 
1950s. This specialized methodology for risk management developed rapidly and has 
become a global standard of practice in a shorter frame of time due to rapid 
advancement of technology.   
 
 
Despite the coming of age of risk management as a profession, Baker et al., (1999) 
established that “there is no global (project risk management) industrial standard”. This 
implies that there is also a wide range of risk definitions (see Table 2.7), and risk 
management standards have been discussed in the literature and within the domain of 
project management since the mid-1990s.  Some of these standards (See Table 2.8) 
include the BS 31100:2011; BS ISO 31000:2009; BS EN 31010:2010; BS 6079 3:2000, 
BS IEC 73:2002 and the risk management standards published jointly by the 
Association of Insurance and Risk Managers (AIRMIC), the National Forum of Risk 
Management in the Public Sector (ALARM), the Institute of Risk management (IRM) 
(AIRMIC et al, 2002) and CIRIA guide to the systematic risk management for 
construction (Godfrey, 1996).   
 
The BS 31100:2011 recognizes the risk management process as “an essential part of 
good management” and defines it as the “effect of uncertainty upon objectives”. Risk 
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management is the “coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with 
regard to risk”.  
 
                                                  Table 2.7: Definitions of Risk 
Reference Year Definition 
BSI. 2011 The effect of uncertainty upon objectives 
HM Treasury 2004 The uncertainty of outcome, whether positive 
opportunity or negative threat of actions and events 
AIRMIC et al. 2002 The combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequences 
BSI, 2002 Uncertainty inherent in plans and the possibility of 
something happening (i.e., a contingency) that can affect 
the prospect of achieving business or project goals. 
BSI 2000 The combination of the probability of an event occurring 
and its consequences for project objectives 
Godfrey 1996 The chance of an adverse event 
ISO/IEC Guide 73  The combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequences. 
 
Royer (2000) emphasized that risk management for a megaproject must be of critical 
concern to project managers, as unmanaged or unmitigated risks can be disastrous and 
cause chronic project failure.  According to Schaufelberger (2005), “the current level of 
risk management is often driven by the capabilities of the available tools and 
techniques. Schaufelberger emphasized that  the depth of analysis could be improved by  
the use of advanced information technology capabilities to enable effective knowledge 
management and learning from experience, for example using artificial intelligence, 
expert systems or knowledge-based systems to permit new types of analysis”.  
 
In 2002, Del Cano and de-La Cruz established that the UK Ministry of Defence, British 
Standards Institution (BSI), US National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), US Department of Defence and US Department of Transport have adopted 
five iterative phases of risk management processes. The five phases which include 
initiation, identification, analysis, response planning and control, were also recognised 
by leading project risk management guides such as the Project Risks Analysis and 
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Management Guide (PRAM) and the Project Management Body of Knowledge 
(PMBOK). 
 
                                     Table 2.8: Definitions of Risk Management 
Reference Definition 
BSI, 2011 The coordinated activities to direct and control an organization 
with regard to risk 
AIRMIC et al, 2002 The process whereby organizations methodically address the 
risks attaching to their activities with the goal of achieving 
sustained benefit within each activity and across the portfolio 
of all activities. 
BSI, 2002 Systematic applications of policies, procedures, methods and 
practices to the task of identifying, analyzing, evaluating, 
treating and monitoring risk. 
PMI, 2004 The processes involved in identifying, analyzing and 
responding to risk. It includes maximizing the results of 
positive events and minimizing the consequences of adverse 
events 
HM Treasury, 2004 The structured approach to identifying, assessing and 
controlling risks that emerges during the course of the policy, 
programme or project life cycle. 
BSI, 2000 The systematic application of management policies, 
procedures and practices to the task of establishing the 
context, identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring 
and communicating risk. 
 
 More recently, researchers consider risk management from a broader perspective 
(Baldry, 1998; Chapman, 1997 and Williams, 1994) that incorporates opportunity 
management (Hillson, 2002; Olsson, 2007) and uncertainty management (Ward and 
Chapman, 2003; Perminova et al., 2008) to have better management and stakeholder 
buy-ins. Klein and Cork, 1998; Ward, 1999; Hendrickson, 1998; Baccarini and Archer, 
2001; Raz and Micheal, 2001; Dvir et al., 2003; Chapman and Ward, 2004; and Barber, 
2005 believed that these will provide effective relationships between project planning 
and project success.  
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Uher and Toakley (1999) as cited in Zou et al., (2007), also investigated various 
structural and cultural factors concerned with the implementation of risk management in 
the conceptual phase of a project life cycle and found that while most industry 
practitioners were familiar with risk management, its application in the conceptual 
phase was relatively low; qualitative rather than quantitative analysis methods were 
generally used; widespread adoption of risk management was impeded by a low 
knowledge and skill base, resulting from a lack of commitment to  training and 
professional development. Figure 2.3 indicates a simplified version of a systematic risk 
management process obtained from ISO 31000. 
 
Establish context
Risk identification
Risk analysis
Risk Evaluation
Risk assessment
Risk treatment
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
su
lt
at
io
n
M
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 a
n
d
 r
ev
ie
w
 
      Figure 2.3: Risk Management Process (ISO 31000, 2009) 
 
 
2.4.1: Establishement of Context 
Risk management context is a management process at the strategic level within 
organisations that follows specific context of project management processes and the 
internal and external environment of the organisations. Within the context, Project 
managers must: 
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- Ensure that the risk management strategy has been developed in accordance with 
best practice, including establishing criteria for risk evaluation. 
- Define proposal/project scope and objectives including key performance 
indicators 
- Develop the risk management methodology to be used for assessing the proposal 
or project 
- Define the objectives and expected benefits of the risk management process 
- Consult with key stakeholders (internal and external) to agree appropriate levels 
of materiality. 
 
2.4.2: Risk Assessment  
Risk assessment is the initial process before setting priorities and deciding on cost-
effective measures to control risks. To assess major risks effectively, the megaproject 
risk analyst must evaluate STEEP risks in two fundamental dimensions: (1) the 
magnitude of the potential critical outcomes, and (2) the probabilities attached to them. 
Risk assessment is not only limited to the analysis of a single worst case scenario. It can 
provide a global picture and may therefore be presented as a set of probability 
distributions over a full range of possibilities. The following is an overview of the 
approaches involved in risk assessment.  
 
 
2.4.2.1: Risk Identification  
The process of risk identification creates understanding of risks and their categories for 
an effective risk management system. BS 31100:2011 defines risk identification as the: 
“process of finding, recognising and describing risks” and recommends a systematic 
approach to risk identification as do other recognised standards (BSI, 2000, AIRMIC et 
al, 2002, Godfrey, 1996) such as risks that influence progress, health and safety, the 
natural environment, budget, schedule and quality of projects under development. The 
advantages and disadvantages demonstrated by these methods should always be taken 
into account when using them in corporate practice. These and other techniques have 
been used by academic researchers to identify various projects risks in the construction 
project management domain.  
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Due to the fact that these techniques are well-known and thoroughly-discussed in the 
scientific literature, this report does not provide detailed descriptions about them. 
Rather, the strengths and weaknesses of some of them are sourced from the Practice 
Standard for Project Risk Management and represented in Table 2.9. The advantages 
and disadvantages of these and other specific methods and techniques should always be 
taken into account, when managing megaprojects. Since every project is different, a 
decision on which a method is chosen and applied will depend on a situation and its 
specific needs and has to be made on a case-by-case basis. The methods listed in Table 
2.9 are just a few examples out of the many more comprehensive methods and 
techniques described in the literature (Marcinek et al., 2010).  
 
Additionally, there are other risk management methods that include consideration of 
risks to the natural environmental, social values, and as well as other factors such as the 
performance history of the development proponent. Within the risk management 
framework, Environmental Risk Assessment provides such assessment for determining 
the environmental and social risk aspects of the project under development. The 
assessment process, which is also called the Environmental and Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA), is the process of identifying, estimating and evaluating the 
environmental and social consequences of current or proposed project.  For construction 
projects, it is carried out to enable project planners to forecast and prevent negative 
environmental impacts, and to establish management mechanisms that will ensure 
compliance with regulatory standards and minimize the negative impacts on the natural 
and social environment (Ingold, 2000). Increasingly, there is a tendency to integrate the 
assessment of social impacts and benefits into EIAs to produce Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment (ESIAs) (Windsor and McVey, 2005). In some cases, Social 
Impact Assessments (SIAs) may be prepared separately from the EIA where a more 
detailed analysis of social impacts than can be achieved within an ESIA is required.  
 
Changes in the practice of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and advances in 
information technology have greatly expanded the range of tools available to the EIA 
practitioner (See Table 2.10). For example, map overlay methods, originally pioneered 
by McHarg (1971), have evolved into sophisticated Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS). Expert systems, a branch of artificial intelligence, have been developed to help in 
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screening, scoping, developing terms of reference (TOR), and conducting preliminary 
assessments. These systems use comprehensive checklists, matrices, and networks in 
combination with hundreds of impact rules developed by EIA experts. The global 
embrace of sustainable development has made the analysis of costs and benefits an 
integral part of EIA. This has forced the expansion of factors to be considered in 
traditional cost benefit analysis.  
 
From a company’s perspective, an ESIA with an appropriate socio-economic focus, 
based on State government decisions should not only satisfy regulatory requirements 
(Pearce, 1998), but also contribute to the improvement of its internal project design, 
construction and implementation activities as a means of minimizing negative impacts 
on both the society and the natural environment.  As indicated in Table 10, many of the 
ESIA processes of the risk management standards provide comprehensive approaches to 
decision making. However, their effectiveness in dealing with risks relies on the ability 
to cope with the multidimensional uncertainty of risks: likelihood, impact and 
occurrence from the projects external macro environment.  
 
Traditional tools are unable to address risks in megaproject construction. As a result, 
many megaproject developments fall short in achieving their intended cost and schedule 
objectives during construction. The problems and limitations identified call for further 
approaches supported by specialized tools and techniques as strategies for managing 
risks during megaproject development and construction. This is important not only in 
terms of the democratic process, but helps to identify what stakeholders perceive to be 
potential negative socio-economic impacts of a megaproject under development on 
them and the natural environment.  
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                                                                               Table 2.9: Risk Identification Tools and Techniques 
Technique Strengths Weaknesses CSFs for Effective Application 
Analytic  
Hierarchy  
Process  
  
 
-  Assists in developing a 
relative weighting for project 
objectives that reflects the 
organization’s priorities for 
time, cost, scope and quality 
for the project  
- Assists the creation of an 
overall project priority list of 
risks created from the risks’ 
priority with respect to 
individual objectives 
- Organisational decisions are often made by 
committees, and individuals may not agree on relative 
priority among objectives  
- Difficult to gather the information about pair-wise 
comparison of the objectives from high-level 
management 
- Expert facilitator in the process  
- Agreement by management that it is 
useful to develop a consistent set of 
priorities among objectives  
- Use of proper method or available AHP 
software 
Assumptions & 
Constraints 
Analysis 
 
- Simple structured approach 
- Can be based on 
assumptions & constraints 
already listed in project 
charter 
- Generates project specific 
risks 
- Implicit/hidden assumptions or constraints are often 
missed 
- Requires a comprehensive list of 
assumptions & constraints 
Brainstorming - Allows project participants 
contribute to the discussion 
- Can sometimes involve all 
key stakeholders 
- Generates creative ideas 
- Requires attendance of key stakeholders at a 
workshop, therefore can be difficult to arrange and 
expensive 
- Prone to Groupthink and other group dynamics 
- May produce biased results if dominated by a strong 
person (often management) 
- Often not well facilitated 
- Generates non-risks and duplicates, requires filtering 
- Attendance of representative group of 
stakeholders 
- Requires commitment, honesty & 
Preparation 
- Good facilitation 
- Use of structure (e.g. RBS) 
Cause and Effect 
Diagrams 
- Visual representation of 
project promotes structured 
thinking 
- Diagram can quickly become over-complex 
 
- Effective selection of critical impacts 
(e.g. by use of sensitivity analysis) 
Source: Based on: Practice Standard for Project Risk Management (2009). Project Management Institute, Inc., Newtown Square, pp.72-76. 
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Table 2.9: Risk Identification Tools and Techniques (Continued) 
Technique Strengths Weaknesses CSFs for Effective Application 
Check lists  
 
- Captures previous experience 
- Present detailed list of risks 
- Check list can grow to become unwieldy 
- Risks not on the list will be missed 
- Often only includes threats, misses opportunities 
- Regular maintenance is required 
- Use of structure can assist (e.g. RBS) 
Delphi technique  
 
 
- Captures input from technical 
experts 
- Removes sources of bias 
- Limited to technical risks 
- Dependent on actual expertise of experts 
- May take longer time than available due to 
iterations of the experts’ inputs 
- Effective facilitation 
- Careful selection of experts 
- Clear definition of scope 
Document review  
 
- Exposes detailed projects 
specific risks 
- Requires no specialist tools 
- Limited to risks contained in project documentation - Understanding of relevance of prior 
experience 
FMEA/Fault Tree 
Analysis 
 
- Structured approach, well 
understood by engineers 
- Produces an estimate of 
overall reliability using 
quantitative tools 
- Good tool support 
- Focuses on threats not so useful for opportunities 
- Requires expert tool not generally available to 
those except experts 
- Detailed description of the area being 
assessed 
- Statistically accurate data on fault 
probabilities for many events 
Force Field 
Analysis 
 
 
- Creates deep understanding of 
factors that affect project 
objectives 
- Time-consuming and complex technique 
- Usually only applied to a single objective, so does 
not provide whole-project view 
- Prioritized objectives 
Industry 
knowledge base 
 
 
- Captures previous experience 
- Allows benchmarking against 
external organizations 
- Limited to what has previously happened 
- Excludes project-specific risks 
- Access to relevant information 
Influence 
diagrams 
 
- Exposes key risk drivers 
- Can generate counterintuitive 
insights not available through 
other techniques 
- Requires disciplined thinking 
- Not always easy to determine appropriate structure 
- Identify key areas to address 
Source: Based on: Practice Standard for Project Risk Management (2009). Project Management Institute, Inc., Newtown Square, pp.72-76. 
60 
Table 2.9: Risk Identification Tools and Techniques (Continued) 
Technique Strengths Weaknesses CSFs for Effective Application 
Interviews  
 
 
- Addresses risks in detail 
- Generates engagement of 
stakeholders 
- Time consuming 
- Raises non-risks, concerns, issues, worries etc., so 
requires filtering 
- Good interviewing and 
questioning skills 
- Environment of trust, openness, 
confidentiality 
- Preparation 
- Open relationship between interviewer 
and interviewee 
Nominal Group 
Technique 
 
- Encourages and allows all 
participants to contribute 
- Allows for different levels of 
competence in common 
language 
- To a large extent, auto 
documenting 
- Provides ideal base for affinity 
diagramming (grouping by risk 
categories for use in the Risk 
Breakdown Structure and Root 
Cause Analysis) 
- Can lead to frustration in dominant members who 
feel it is moving slowly 
- Good briefing of all participant in the 
technique 
-  Strict facilitation 
Post-project 
reviews/Lessons 
learned/Historical 
Information 
 
- Leverages previous experience 
- Prevents making the same 
mistakes or missing the same 
opportunities twice 
- Enhances the Organizational 
Process Assets 
- Limited to those risks that have occurred previously 
- Information is frequently incomplete: details of past 
risks may not include details of successful resolution; 
ineffective strategies are rarely documented 
- Creative generation of ideas 
 
- Well-structured project lessons learned 
database 
- Participation of previous project team 
members (ideally including the project 
manager) 
Prompt Lists  
 
 
- Ensures coverage of all types of 
risk 
- Stimulates creativity 
- Topic can be too high level - Choice of list relevant to the project and 
its environment 
Source: Based on: Practice Standard for Project Risk Management (2009). Project Management Institute, Inc., Newtown Square, pp.72-76. 
61 
Table 2.9: Risk Identification Tools and Techniques (Continued) 
Technique Strengths Weaknesses CSFs for Effective Application 
Probability  
and Impact  
Matrix (P-I  
Matrix)  
  
  
 
- Allows the  organisation to 
prioritise the  project risks for  
further analysis  (e.g., 
quantitative)  or risk response  
- Reflects the  organisation’s level 
of risk tolerance 
-  Does not explicitly handle other factors such as 
urgency or  manageability that  may partly  
determine a risk’s ranking  
- The range of uncertainty in the assessment of a 
risk’s probability or impact may overlap a 
boundary 
- P×I matrix requires that the input data 
are clear and unambiguous in assigning 
levels of probability and impact  
- Effective estimation of impact and 
likelihood as outlined previously 
- Organizations should be careful to 
assess the combinations of probability 
and impact that qualify a risk as low, 
moderate or high risk so that the method 
used reflects the organisation’s risk 
attitude  
- Definitions used to designate the levels 
of impact (L,M,H) for each objective 
should represent the same level of 
impact as perceived by the 
organization’s management or project 
stakeholders as reflecting the 
organisation’s utility function 
Questionnaire  
 
- Encourages broad thinking to 
identify risks 
- Success depends on the quality of the questions 
- Limited to the topics covered by the questions 
- Can be a simple reformatting of a checklist 
- Clear and unambiguous questions 
- Detailed briefing of respondents 
Risk Breakdown 
structure (RBS) 
 
 
- Offers a framework for other risk 
identification techniques such as 
brainstorming 
- Ensures coverage of all types of 
risk 
- Test for blind spots or omissions 
- None - Requires a comprehensive RBS, often 
tailored to the project 
Source: Based on: Practice Standard for Project Risk Management (2009). Project Management Institute, Inc., Newtown Square, pp.72-76. 
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Table 2.9: Risk Identification Tools and Techniques (Continued) 
Technique Strengths Weaknesses CSFs for Effective Application 
Root-Cause 
Analysis 
 
 
- Allows identification of additional, 
dependent risks 
- Allows the organization to identify risks 
that may be related because of their 
common root causes 
- Basis for development of pre-emptive 
and comprehensive responses 
- Can serve to reduce apparent 
complexity 
- Most risk management techniques are 
organized by individual risk. This organization 
is not conducive to identifying the root causes 
- Can oversimplify and hide existence of other 
potential causes 
- There may be no valid strategy available for 
addressing the root cause once it has been 
identified 
- Ability to identify if a risk is an outcome 
of a more fundamental cause 
- Willingness by management to accept 
and address the root cause rather than 
adopting partial workarounds 
SWOT Analysis  
 
- Ensures equal focus on both threats and 
opportunities 
- Offers a structured approach to identify 
threats and opportunities 
- Focus on internal (organizational 
strengths and weaknesses) and external 
(opportunities and threats) 
- Focuses on internally generated risks arising 
from organizational strengths and weaknesses, 
excludes external risks 
- Tends to produce high level generic risks, not 
project-specific 
- Good facilitation 
- Strict adherence to the technique, to 
avoid confusing the four SWOT 
perspectives (i.e. between Strengths and 
Opportunities, or between Weaknesses 
and Threats) 
System 
Dynamics  
 
 
- Exposes unexpected interrelations 
between project elements (feedback and 
feed-forward loops) 
- Can generate counterintuitive through 
other techniques 
- Produces overall impacts of all included 
events and risks 
- Requires specialized software and expertise to 
build models 
- Focuses on impacts but difficult to include the 
concept of probability 
- Understanding of feedback 
- Competence in applying tools and 
understanding their output 
- Quality of the system model 
- Accuracy of input data collected for the 
specific project 
Source: Based on: Practice Standard for Project Risk Management (2009). Project Management Institute, Inc., Newtown Square, pp.72-76.
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                        Table 2.10: Tools and Measures for Environmental Management 
 
Tools and Measures Explanation, advantages and constraints 
Meteorological 
Forecast 
- Based on data, geophysical and oceanic factors, statistical techniques, and 
climate variability. Meteorological forecast is possible on a seasonal, 
monthly, weekly and daily basis. 
- Forecast can be utilized for weather-related disaster prediction, which can 
provide warnings and information to prevent damage and permit escape 
during hazard events. 
- Accurate and timely warnings and forecasts are expected, but uncertainty 
should always be taken into account. 
Geographic 
Information 
Systems (GIS) 
- Computer systems capable of combining layers of digital data from 
different sources, including satellite images, to create maps and data 
sources. 
- Maps and data can support land-use planning, risk and vulnerability 
assessment, disaster forecasting, and hazard management. 
- Cost, specialized expertise, and commitment of updating data may be 
constraints in using this system. 
Environmental 
Assessment (EA) 
- EA is a framework of environmental analysis, and includes Strategic 
Assessment, Impact Assessment, Management Program, and Auditing. 
- At project level, EA helps in avoiding or mitigating negative impacts, or 
finding alternatives, and improving project design. 
- There are checklists and guidelines available for assessment, but 
evaluation is subjective, and predicting all negative impacts is difficult. 
Social Assessment 
(SA) 
- SA is a framework of social analysis, which investigates socio-cultural 
and social variables systematically. 
- Indigenous population, gender, and involuntary resettlement are key 
issues of Social Assessment 
Institutional 
Building for 
Collaboration and 
Coordination 
- Networking and coordination provides diversity of skills, knowledge, and 
resources, and collaboration between public, private, NGOs, International 
organizations, and local community to ensure maximum results of 
development efforts. 
- Each stakeholder has different needs and interests, and the bureaucratic 
organization has an inflexible and paternalistic nature, which makes it 
difficult to collaborate with other stakeholders. 
Source: DAC/OECD Development Co-operation Report, (1993) 
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2.4.2.2: Risk Analysis and Evaluation 
The key purpose of risk analysis is to establish the relationship between the likelihood 
of a given event and consequences of its occurrence. In practice, a highly significant 
stage within the risk analysis is the selection of an analysis method, i.e. when project 
managers or risk analysts choose a method, which allows the management team to 
analyse the predefined risk (Husnan, 2000).  The main categories of risk analysis 
methods, which are used by companies, are presented in Table 2.11. 
 
                            Table 2.11:  Main Categories of Risk Analysis Methods 
Main  
category  
Type of  
analysis  
Description 
Simplified  
risk analysis  
  
 
Qualitative  
 
An informal procedure that establishes the risk picture 
using brainstorming sessions and group discussions. 
The risk might be presented on a coarse scale, e.g. low, 
moderate or high, making no use of formalised risk 
analysis methods. 
Standard risk  
analysis  
  
Qualitative or  
quantitative  
 
This is a more formalised procedure in which 
recognized risk analysis methods are used, such as 
ANP/AHP where risk matrices are often used to 
present the results. 
Model-based  
risk analysis  
Primarily  
quantitative 
This type of analysis makes use of techniques such as 
system dynamics, event tree analysis and fault tree 
analysis to calculate risk 
Source: Aven, T. (2008): Risk analysis - Assessing uncertainties beyond expected 
values and probabilities, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons Inc., p.4.  
 
The result of the risk analysis can be used to produce a risk profile that gives a rating of 
significance to each risk and provides a tool for prioritising risk treatment efforts. This 
ranks the relative importance of each identified risk. This process permits the identified 
risks to be mapped to the project area affected, conveys an idea to how control 
mechanisms can be put in place and to demonstrate where the level of investment in 
controls might be increased, decreased or reapportioned (Frame, 2003). 
The risk analysis activity assists the effective and efficient operation of the organisation 
by identifying those risks that require attention by management. This will facilitate the 
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ability to prioritise risk control actions in terms of their potential to benefit the 
organisation. The ranges of available risk response treatments include tolerate, treat, 
transfer and terminate. An organisation may decide that there is also a need to improve 
the control environment (PMI, 2000 and 2009).   
 
2.4.3: Risk Treatment 
Risk treatment is presented in ISO 31000 as the activity of selecting and implementing 
appropriate control measures (Risk Action Plans) to modify the risk. Risk treatment 
includes as its major element, risk control (or mitigation), but extends further to, for 
example, risk avoidance, risk transfer and risk financing. Any system of risk treatment 
should provide efficient and effective internal controls. Effectiveness of internal control 
is the degree to which the risk will either be eliminated or reduced by the proposed 
control measures. The cost effectiveness of internal control relates to the cost of 
implementing the control compared to the risk reduction benefits achieved.  
 
 
Compliance with laws and regulations is not an option. An organisation must 
understand the applicable laws and must implement a system of controls that achieves 
compliance. Risks responses in terms of broad risk management strategies like risk 
prevention (including risk avoidance), impact mitigation; risk sharing; insurance; and 
risk retention will be helpful in the response identification and assessment process to 
deal with risks. However, it should be recognised that some losses or elements of a loss 
may be uninsurable, such as uninsured costs and damage to employee morale and the 
reputation of the organisation.   
 
2.5: Summary  
This chapter has discussed some important generic issues regarding the significance of 
developing a new tool for assessing risks impact on megaproject performance during 
construction, especially, within the construction industry. While social, technical, 
economic, environmental and political (STEEP) risks were described as main 
contributors to project cost and time overruns and quality deficiency, it is observed that 
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the dynamic assessment of such risks using a new risk assessment tool is yet to be 
reflected in construction management practice in the real world. Although, the 
construction of megaprojects provides a key contribution to wider economies and serves 
as underlying driver of employment in many local and regional communities, questions 
still remain about the potential STEEP risks impacts on these projects and also the 
debate about the negative effects of such large projects on local and regional 
communities where construction occurs.  
 
 
As a result of the complex nature of these risks within global dimensions (Chen et al., 
2011), megaprojects were described as being (1) extremely complex, consisting of 
multiple interdependent components, (2) highly dynamic, (3) involving multiple 
feedback process, (4) having nonlinear relationships and (5) require both “hard” and 
“soft” data (Sterman, 1992). There are innumerable other risks that can be associated 
with megaproject construction but are beyond the scope of this research.   
 
 
Currently, in the construction management domain, potential risk impacts are assessed 
for megaprojects prior to commencement through many assessment procedures based 
on individual proposals. While these procedures remain important for the assessment of 
most new projects, they do not cover all impacts of megaprojects on regional 
communities. These and other unfavourable issues identified in current literature 
buttress the main motivation for much of the existing research and current studies on 
risks in megaprojects construction.  
 
Using the Edinburgh Tram Network (ETN) Project as a case study, it is intended to 
address these risks appropriately by developing an integrated ANP and a SD 
methodology to assess the impact they have on project cost, time and quality during 
construction. It is contended that ETNP offers an appropriate foundation for this study 
because of its considerable significance and the huge socio-economic interest it attracts. 
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       CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1: Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology adopted for the research. It involves the 
systemic procedures upon which the research is based and against which the data 
collected is interpreted and the findings evaluated. To ensure a formal discourse on this 
research, the key research questions are first discussed followed by the research strategy 
and a commentary on the choice of the method including the research instrument design 
and the ethical consideration for the data collection.  The data collection procedure is 
also described in this chapter. Subsequently, the relevant information on the 
respondents, the sampling frame and sample size are also presented. The chapter 
concluded on how data was collected and a summary of the methodology chapter. 
 
3.2: The Research Questions 
The key research questions in the introductory chapter 1, section 1.2 of this research and 
issues regarding risks in transportation megaproject discussed in the literature review 
(Chapter 2) are summarized in Table 3.1. The Deductive reasoning column explains the 
discussion about what issues have been resolved and remain unresolved. The Research 
gaps column indicates the unsolved issues and the corresponding research actions which 
are then converted into the research questions in order to arrive at a solution. 
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              Table 3.1: The Issues Learned from the Literature and their Corresponding Deductive Reasoning, Research Gaps and Questions7 
 
Issues learned from the literature The Deductive reasoning Research gaps Research questions 
1. Are risks in transportation 
megaprojects independent? 
How can the relationship of all 
risks be identified if they are not 
physically independent? 
As discussed in the literature review, risks in 
transportation megaprojects may not be 
independent in reality. 
There is a need to investigate 
which risks would have impact 
over project cost, time and 
quality during construction and 
how to model the dynamics of 
physical interaction effects of 
such risks on megaproject 
during construction stage for 
effective project delivery. 
1. What are the generic risk 
events inherent in 
transportation megaprojects 
during construction? 
3. How can risks 
interrelationships in 
transportation megaprojects be 
modelled? 
 
2. Is there a general failure in 
estimating performance risks 
in transportation megaproject 
in the construction phase? Are 
the tools used to evaluate such 
risks appropriate? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the estimation for 
risk impacts on transportation megaprojects is 
not well dealt with in general. The available 
risks evaluation tools in literature have been 
identified to have their own advantages and 
limitations. For example, the cost effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) tool used for cost minimization 
is useful for project screening and ranking 
(Watson, 2005). However, the CEA coupled 
with multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) is 
subjective and causes failure in practice when 
members of risks evaluation board make rating 
for each criterion (Lebo & Schelling, 2001). 
Also, there is a wide belief that the 
implementation of transportation megaprojects 
are mainly for positive economic impacts 
(Mackie et al., 2003). However, the challenge to 
develop appropriate tools to convert qualitative 
risk effects on project performance in the 
construction phase into quantitative effects is a 
new thing for researchers to consider. 
 
There is a need to convert 
qualitative risk into quantitative 
effects on project performance. 
 
2. How can the qualitative risk 
effects on project performance 
be quantified, prioritized and 
analyzed in transportation 
megaprojects? 
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Table 3.1: The Issues Learned from the Literature and their Corresponding Deductive Reasoning, Research Gaps and Questions (Continued) 
 
Issues learned from the literature The Deductive reasoning Research gaps Research questions 
3. What are the criteria and tools 
that are useful to evaluate, 
compare and assess risks 
holistically in transportation 
megaprojects under the current 
risks assessment and evaluation 
approaches? 
As discussed in the literature review 
(Chapter 2), the current risks assessment 
tools usually ignore outcomes of uncertainty. 
It ignores the outcomes dispersion and 
depends on deterministic outcomes only. 
Minor changes in the underlying assumption 
will cause the model to give completely 
different results (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, 
2005; Ye & Tiong, 2000). Therefore, the 
current tool in terms of risk assessment is so 
subjective that it can be easily manipulated 
(Shaoul, 2005). As a result, it is necessary to 
move from these assessment approaches to a 
more dynamic approach for transportation 
mega projects. (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005; 
Reilly, 2005; Reilly& Brown, 2004). 
There is a need to apply robust risk 
assessment methods that are able to deal 
with the dynamism of risk variables in 
transportation megaprojects during 
construction 
4. How can Project 
Managers assess the 
dynamics of risk effects in 
transportation 
megaprojects over time? 
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3.3: Research Strategy 
As indicated in Figure 3.1, researchers utilized multi-strategy research paradigms to 
combine with a single case study incorporated with quantitative and qualitative research 
strategies. The diagram indicates the relationship of comparative methodological 
choices to meta-theory for the overall research strategy in this study.  
 
Comparative 
research design
Many-country 
comparison
Few-country 
comparison
Single-country 
study
Comparative 
Strategy
General 
Methodology
Metatheory
Variable-oriented
Quantitative
Positivism
Case-oriented
Mixed 
methods
Qualitative
Postpositivsm Interpretivism
 
      Figure 3.1: Relationship of Comparative Methodological Choices to Meta-Theory 
Source: Lor (2011), chapter 4. P.6 
 
To remain within the iceberg metaphor, the diagram should be read from the bottom 
(the metatheoretical level) upwards. Roughly following the levels distinguished by 
Pickard (2007), the methodological level has been divided into three sublevels, those of 
general methodology, comparative strategy, and comparative research design. Section 
3.3.1 further explains the fundamental differences between the general strategies 
(research paradigms) adopted for the study, followed by research strategies for each 
research question in section 3.2.2. 
 
 
3.3.1 Research Paradigms 
Investigating megaproject risks dynamism requires a consideration of the overall 
research paradigm within which the research is to be undertaken, and the research 
methods that are appropriate within this paradigm. According to Pollack (2007), the 
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term paradigm generally refers to “a commonly shared set of assumptions, values and 
concepts within a community, which constitutes a way of viewing reality.”  As 
represented in Figure 3.1, there are two major paradigms in research. These are the 
qualitative paradigm (phenomenological or interpretive) and the quantitative paradigm 
(positivist). The quantitative paradigm (positivism) assumes that a social phenomenon 
obeys natural laws and can be subjected to quantitative logic while the qualitative 
paradigm (interpretivism) argues that a social phenomenon does not obey natural laws 
but is interpreted based on peoples’ conviction and/or understanding of the realism 
surrounding the phenomenon (Walliman, 2006).  
 
Table 3.2: Fundamental Differences between Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
Strategies 
Orientations Qualitative Quantitative 
Principal orientation to the role 
of theory in relation to research 
Inductive; 
Generation of theory 
Deductive; 
Testing of theory  
Epistemological orientation Interpretivism Positivism 
Ontological orientation Constructionism/constructivism  Objectivism 
 
Source: Adopted from Bryman, (2004) 
In practice, the fundamental difference between the two traditions (See Table 3.2) is 
influenced by the epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying the research 
(Keraminiyage et al, 2005). Epistemology is a theory of knowledge (Stacy and Miles, 
2007). It is used to define the knowledge through which a research process is 
investigated and developed (Smyth and Morris, 2007). On the other hand, ontology is a 
theory of the nature of social entities (Bryman, 2004).  Saunders et al., (2009) state that 
ontology is a theory concerning the nature of social phenomena as entities that are to be 
admitted to a knowledge system.  
 
By adopting positivism as the paradigm underpinning this study, the epistemological 
and ontological assumptions dictated that case studies, surveys and experiments would 
be most ideal as the research method. However, experiments in this research will not be 
an appropriate choice because such methods are carried out usually in a laboratory 
setting where the investigator can manipulate behaviour directly, precisely and 
systematically (Yin, 2009). In view of the nature of investigation associated with this 
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research, experiment was discounted as an appropriate option. In surveys, samples are 
examined through questionnaires while case studies involve an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary occurrence within a real life context (Yin, 2009). 
 
 
3.3.2. Research Strategies for Each Research Question 
Based on section 3.3.1, research strategies and methods for each key research question 
were produced in Table 3.3. 
  
Table 3.3: Cross-categorisation and matching of research question type and research 
strategy 
Strategy  Form of Research Question Is Control of 
behaviour required? 
Is there focus on 
contemporary events? 
Experiment How, Why? No Yes 
Survey  Who, What, Where. How 
many, How much? 
No Yes 
Archival 
Analysis 
Who, What, Where, How 
many, How much? 
No Yes/No 
History How, Why? No No 
Case study What, How, Why? No Yes 
Source: adopted from Yin (2009) 
 
The Table 3.3 indicates five major research strategies (experiments, surveys, archival 
analysis, histories and case studies) developed to determine when to use each research 
strategy (Yin, 2009). Table 3.3 further displays three conditions: (a) the type of research 
questions, (b) the extent of control a researcher has over actual behavioural events 
underlying each and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events, and shows how each is related to the five major research strategies. In column 1 
of table 3.3 (form of research question), the basic categorization of the types of research 
questions is a familiar series: “who, what, where, how and why” (Yin, 2003a).  Yin 
emphasised that two possibilities will arise if research questions focus on “what” 
questions. First, some types of what questions are exploratory, such as, “What can be 
learned from the study of risks in megaproject development?” This type of question can 
be justifiable when conducting an exploratory study to develop pertinent hypotheses and 
propositions for further inquiry. For the first type of what questions, any of the five 
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research strategies can be used, for example, an exploratory survey, an exploratory 
experiment, or an exploratory case study. The second type of “What” question is in the 
form of a “How much” or how many line of inquiry. Identifying such outcomes is more 
likely to favour survey or archival records analysis strategies than others.  
 
 
In column 2 of table 3.3 (requires control of behavioural events), “How” and “Why” 
questions become the focus of a research when further distinctions among various 
research strategies reflect the extent of the researcher’s control over behaviour and the 
degree of focus on contemporary events. Yin (2003a) emphasised that, histories will be 
preferred strategy for the “how” and “why” questions when there is virtually no access 
or control. This implies that, historical methods are for past events where there are no 
relevant people remaining alive from that historical period to testify. That also implies 
that, historical methods rely heavily on evidence from primary documents, secondary 
documents, cultural and physical artefacts.  
 
 
Also, the case study method is preferred in research when examining contemporary 
events, but when the relevant behaviour cannot be manipulated in any other manner. 
Case studies and history strategies can overlap. However, the case study method has 
much more advantages than the historical method when dealing with the full variety of 
evidence such as documents, artefacts, interviews and observations beyond what might 
be available in historical study. 
 
 
Yin (2003a and 2009) explained that the experiment strategy is done “when an 
investigator can manipulate behaviour directly, precisely, and systematically”. Yin 
(2003b) concluded that “even though each strategy has its distinctive characteristics, 
there are large overlaps among them.” To some extent; the various strategies are not 
mutually exclusive and as such can be applied as multiple strategies to any given study 
where necessary. For example, a survey can be applied within a case study or a case 
study within a survey. Based on Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, the researcher developed 
research strategies and methods for each research question. Table 3.4 explains further 
the rationales behind the use of a particular strategy and method for each research 
question. 
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                    Table 3.4: Research Strategies for Each Research Question10 
Research 
question one 
What are the generic risk events inherent in transportation megaprojects 
during construction? 
Research strategy  Qualitative research 
Research method  Literature survey incorporated with descriptive analysis 
Rationales This is a ‘What’ question to explore the phenomena of generic types of 
risk events that are currently inherent in transportation megaprojects. 
Current empirical studies have investigated this phenomenon by case 
studies, statistical and descriptive analyses. There is no researcher access 
to or control of actual phenomena. As indicated in Table 3.3, the survey 
and archival record analysis are preferred research strategies. However, to 
explain meanings of nature of generic risk events in transportation 
megaprojects is different across projects. Descriptive analyses of 
qualitative research strategy and literature survey are applicable to the 
research question. 
Generally, a literature survey was conducted to collect secondary data 
from previous empirical studies in order to explore and interpret 
recognized risk factors and events that affect transportation megaprojects 
during construction. 
The researcher reorganized and defined a set of the generic types of risk 
factors and events that affect project cost, time and quality of 
transportation megaproject during construction from the collected 
secondary data based on the researcher’s own rational interpretation. 
Research 
question two 
How can the qualitative risk effects on project time, cost and quality be 
quantified while using ANP to prioritized and analysed risks in 
transportation megaprojects? 
Research strategy  Quantitative  research 
Research method  Questionnaire survey with statistical analysis. 
Rationales This was a ‘How much’ question to measure the phenomenon of 
qualitative risk effects on project time, cost and quality. There was no 
researcher access to or control over actual phenomena. Since each 
megaproject considered in this research were very unique and different 
from project to project, their historical data obtained on the qualitative risk 
effects and probability were also different to some extent and inadequate. 
The phenomenon for qualifying qualitative risk effects and probability 
depended on the subjective belief, perception, experience, judgment and 
prediction of the experts who are experienced in the selected project cases 
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and practioners in transportation megaprojects development. 
In this regard, a decision group composed of academics, project managers, 
engineers, project stakeholders, and personnel in the selected case studies 
and some companies involved in the construction of Edinburgh tram 
network project were contacted through web based and mailed 
questionnaire surveys. The rationale was to obtain professional 
practioners’ opinion on the level of risks impact on megaproject objectives 
(cost, time and quality) during construction using the score of a Likert 
scale 1 to 5 for ranking qualitative risks quantitatively. With suitable 
statistical techniques, the quantitative results were measured and finally 
prioritized using the ANP methodology. 
Research 
question three 
How can risks interrelationships in transportation megaprojects be 
modelled? 
Research strategy  Qualitative and quantitative research 
Research method  Literature survey, questionnaire survey, experts’ opinion, computer aided 
modelling and statistical analysis. 
Rationales This is a ‘How’ question to explain the phenomena about the cause-effect 
for risks and their interactions over transportation megaproject during 
construction, and a ‘How much’ question used to measure the 
phenomenon of physical risk interaction effects. There was no researcher 
access to or control over actual phenomena. However, these phenomena 
were perceived to be dynamic, complex and very difficult to be directly 
observed, investigated, traced and explained by natural laws. Rather, they 
are able to be explored and processed from existing historical events of 
completed transportation megaprojects and practices. As indicated in 
Table 3.3, the preferred research strategies are case studies, historical 
analyses, archival records analyses, and surveys. Therefore, literature 
survey, questionnaire survey, experts’ opinions, computer-aided cause and 
effect modelling and statistical analysis are applicable to the research 
question. 
 
A literature survey was first conducted to obtain secondary data from 
previous empirical studies, which provided some form of physical 
interaction scenarios for transportation megaproject risk events. Since 
every project is unique, the secondary data about the risk 
interrelationships were not supposed to be so close to the reality of a 
particular megaproject under consideration for model demonstration. 
Therefore, the researcher used Edinburgh Tram Network Project (ETNP) 
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as a case study and inquired into the opinions of some senior project 
participants and experienced experts outside the case project by 
conducting interviews as a complementary approach for evidence 
convergence to reduce the gap between the investigated phenomena of 
secondary data and reality. Thereafter, data collected from both secondary 
means and experts were interpreted by causal loop diagrams to represent 
risk interrelationship over Edinburgh Tram Network Project in the 
construction phase. Finally, a statistical analysis was performed to 
formulate the interrelationships of physical risk. 
Research 
question four 
How can Project Managers assess the dynamism of risk effects in 
transportation megaprojects? 
Research strategy  Qualitative research 
Research method  Computer-aided modelling and simulation 
Rationales This was a ‘How much’ question to measure the phenomenon for overall 
compounding risk effects on the objectives of transportation megaprojects. 
The rationales for this question are generally the same as those for 
research question three. A computer-aided cause and effects modelling 
and simulation will be conducted to estimate the overall risks profile 
arising from the interactions among identified risks over transportation 
megaproject in the construction phase.  
 
 
3.4. The Research Methods 
In principle, there are many research methods needed to fulfil various research needs 
(Wilkinson and Birmingham, 2003). The irony is that while there are indeed many 
research methods, there is no option an excellence (Schultze and Miller, 2004). 
Nevertheless, some methods are better suited for tackling specific issues than others. In 
a good research, the argument is that the choice should be appropriate, reasonable and 
explicit (Denscombe, 2003). Ignoring these fundamentals can lead to very poor research 
and may open the research findings to criticisms and doubt (Denscombe, 2003). Figure 
3.2 illustrates the overall flow of the proposed framework for this study. 
 
3.4.1. The Qualitative Phase 
The qualitative paradigm, comprising such methodologies as action research, case 
studies, ethnographies, and grounded theory, has been strongly advocated for 
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construction management research by Seymour and Rooke (1995), Rooke and 
Kagioglou (2007), and in particular for research into risks in construction. The utility of 
this paradigm as explained by Seymour and Rooke (1995) lies in the deeper 
understanding of the values and beliefs of others that can be derived by focusing on the 
points of view of individual practitioners, whilst recognising that the researchers have 
values and beliefs of their own that cannot be entirely eliminated. Qualitative 
methodologies are explanatory in nature with the principal aim of trying to unearth 
answers to ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ questions (Bryman, 2001), or trying to develop themes 
from the data (Creswell and Clark, 2007). This approach is ideally suited to 
investigation of risks in megaproject construction and can be conceptualised as an 
ideational phenomenon (anthropological perspective) or as a root metaphor 
(organisational perspective). 
 
Integrated Framework
(New Methodology)
Analytical Network 
Process
System Dynamic Method
KBS (STEEP risks 
information)
Literature on STEEP Questionnaire survey Case study/Expert opinion
Qualitative Phase Quantitative Phase
 
            Figure 3.2: Proposed Framework for the Study. 
 
Based on the research objectives and the preceding chapters, it was considered prudent 
and logical to incorporate elements of the qualitative phase within this research, 
especially since this would yield greater insight into the dynamism of all risks during 
megaproject development. Additionally, the method will help to identify aspects or 
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dimensions of risks that were considered important from the construction practitioners’ 
point of view without imposing biases from literature. This phase of the research was 
thus exploratory in nature. 
 
3.4.1.1. Interviews 
Interviews also known as expert opinions in this research were adopted as one of the 
appropriate research methods to aid the qualitative data in this study. This phase was 
conducted to enable the exploration of detail risk phenomenon in transportation 
megaprojects under construction.  
 
 
Fundamentally, the interviews were to capture a sense of what major sources, from a 
practitioner point of view, cause project cost and time overruns and quality deficiencies 
in the construction phase of transportation megaprojects. The interviews were also to 
identify the fundamental risks areas that project managers, engineers, consultants and 
contractors have to deal with as construction proceeds in order to mitigate such risks. 
By conducting these interviews, it was possible to consider the relevance of the risk 
factors identified in literature as captured in Tables 2.4 and 2.6 of chapter 2.  As argued 
by Dvir et al., (1998), a priori risks dimensions, such as those presented in Tables 2.4 
and 2.6 of chapter 2 are only useful to the extent that they are sufficiently relevant and 
generic. The interviews were therefore an opportunity to test the relevancy and 
comprehensiveness of these dimensions.  
 
3.4.1.2. Case Studies 
Yin (2003b) defined case study as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”  Yin (2003a) identified case 
study as the preferred research strategy when the phenomenon and the context are not 
readily distinguishable. Dul and Hak (2008) defined case study as “a study in which (a) 
one case (single case study) or a small number of cases (comparative case study) in their 
real life context are selected and (b) scores obtained from these case are analysed in a 
qualitative manner.  
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Although case study research is more often associated with contemporary phenomena as 
highlighted in Yin’s, and Dul and Hak’s definitions, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) 
pointed out that case studies can also be historical. The definition put forward by Collis 
and Hussey (2009), also identified some of the possible characteristics of case study 
strategy. They defined case study as “a methodology that is used to explore a single 
phenomenon in a natural setting using a variety of methods to obtain in-depth 
knowledge”. Therefore, it can be said that case study research is capable of 
accommodating different research techniques and is normally used when it is required 
to obtain in-depth knowledge with regard to a particular phenomenon. Case study 
research, can accommodate both qualitative and quantitative data (Yin, 2003b; Gerring, 
2007), allowing the researcher to get a rich mix of data for the study.  
 
 
Whilst case study research is a distinctive research strategy which presents many 
advantages to a research study, and allows in-depth investigation of the issues at hand, it 
is not without criticism. Yin (2003b) identified lack of rigor, being bias, difficulty to 
generalise, and taking too long and producing hefty documents as some of the common 
criticisms of case study research. In response, it was noted that the quality of a case 
study can be enhanced by following the four tests that are common to empirical 
research; construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 
2003b; Fellows and Liu, 2008). These tests will be discussed subsequently.  
 
 
 Rationale for Selecting Case Study Research  
 
The rationale for selecting a case study to support the preferred research strategies 
adopted in this study are based on the following main factors: 
 
- Satisfying the criteria for selecting case study strategy  
As stated in section 3.3.2 (Chapter 3), Yin (2003a) recommended satisfying three 
conditions to decide upon a research strategy. These were: 
(a) Type of research questions posed,  
(b) The extent of control the researcher has over actual behavioural events, and  
(c) The degree of focus on contemporary issues.  
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Accordingly, case study was preferred when the research questions take the form of 
“how” and “why”. The doctoral research reported here was developed to answer the 
research questions of (1) what are the generic risk events inherent in transportation 
megaprojects during construction? (2) How can the qualitative risk effects on project 
time, cost and quality be quantified while using ANP to prioritize and analyse risks in 
transportation megaprojects? (3) How can risks interrelationships in transportation 
megaprojects be modelled and (4) How can Project Managers assess the dynamism of 
risk effects in transportation megaprojects? 
 
 
The second condition identified by Yin (2003b), is the degree of control the researcher 
has over actual behavioural events. In this research, the researcher did not have control 
over the behaviour of transportation megaproject construction or the risks that impact 
on them. The researcher was outside the “case”; and was an observer. Further, there was 
no possibility of manipulating the behaviour of the independent risk variables in the 
case project in order to investigate their impact on the dependent variables. Again, the 
issues being investigated were contemporary and about how time, cost and quality 
objectives of the project are affected, respond and cope with risks; satisfy the third 
condition for selecting case study research.  
 
 
- Appropriateness to investigate the research in hand  
The context of the study was to assess the dynamics of risk in megaprojects and as such, 
utilising case study research in this context will lead to the observation of new insights 
that would not have emerged through a strategy like a large survey. This was of 
particular importance to the research at hand, as the existing literature was limited with 
regard to response to generic problems such as STEEP risks in the case study 
megaproject. From a construction industry perspective, the likes of Flyvbjerg (2003), 
Jennings et al., (2011), Boateng et al., (2013), Poole (2011) and Priemus et al., (2008), 
just to mention a few among the lot have successfully used the case study method to 
study megaprojects development, suggesting the applicability of the strategy in studies 
involving construction of such large projects. 
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Proverbs and Gameson (2008) mentioned case study as highly relevant to an industry 
like construction, consisting of different types of businesses and organisations. It was 
further noted that application of case study research in the construction management 
domain remains low, and that there is significant scope for further application within the 
domain. Dainty (2008) identified quantitative methods as the dominant research 
paradigm within the construction management research, confirming the claim of 
Proverbs and Gameson (2008) that the application of case study research within the 
domain is limited.  
 
The above discussions point out that case study strategy has been and can be used 
successfully to conduct research on transportation megaprojects under construction. In 
fact, it can be argued that case study strategy, where in-depth knowledge can be 
obtained, suits the study of dynamic but complex projects like transportation 
megaprojects; where it is often difficult to make strong generalisations across all 
megaprojects under construction due to significant differences that exist between them.  
 
 
- Ability to accommodate different research techniques  
The objectives and the research questions investigated in this doctoral research 
informed the choice of different research techniques, in data collection and analysis. For 
instance, the objective of identifying and describing all significant risks of the partial or 
entire set of social, technical, economic, ecological and political (STEEP) problems for 
megaprojects construction and development favoured a questionnaire survey and 
observational approach in order to identify a range of such risks, whereas the objective 
of simulating and analysing interactions among all risks favoured a method that 
warranted in-depth analysis, hence expert opinions and semi-structured interviews were 
preferred. Adopting the case study strategy allowed the use of multiple sources of data 
collection and analysis, allowing the researcher to address the research objectives and 
answer the research questions satisfactorily. Ability to accommodate different research 
techniques, both qualitative and quantitative, is a salient feature of case study research 
(Yin, 2003b; Gerring, 2007). Accordingly, it was sought to use semi-structured 
interviews, questionnaire survey and document review as the data collection techniques, 
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whereas statistical analysis, content analysis, Computer-aided modelling and simulation 
and quantitative analysis were used for data analysis.  
 
 
It was thought that opting for a mixed method research design (See Figure 3.1) would 
also contribute towards methodological pluralism in construction management research, 
in which quantitative research is dominant, as identified by Dainty (2008). Dainty called 
for greater use of qualitative approaches and adoption of a diversity of approaches, 
shifting away from the traditional positivist viewpoint, in order to better understand the 
complex network of relationships present within the industry. Fellows (2010) concluded 
that such methods are gaining recognition within the construction management body of 
knowledge. 
 
- Compatibility with the philosophical viewpoint  
Based on the researcher’s underpinning philosophical views, the research was 
positioned within the philosophical viewpoint of a pragmatist. According to Saunders et 
al., (2009, p.109), pragmatism is based on the argument that “the most important 
determinant of the epistemology, ontology, and axiology a research adopts is the 
research question.”  Whilst the research was positioned and approached with a 
pragmatic viewpoint, the nature of the key research questions meant that the research 
was narrowed towards interpretivism, subjectivism and value-laden research on the 
philosophical spectrums of epistemology, ontology and axiology. Although case studies 
can be conducted by adopting a positivist approach (Rezgui and Miles, 2010), it is often 
associated with interpretivism/realism and pragmatism (Sexton and Barrett, 2003). 
Hence, supporting the case that case study is a preferred method to support the research 
strategy in this study.  
 
- Suitability of case study research, over other research strategies  
A research strategy like experiment was considered inapplicable to this study as the 
researcher did not have control over the phenomenon being studied. This was because 
experimental studies attempt to manipulate independent variables to observe behaviour 
of the dependent variables (Collis and Hussey, 2009), which was not possible to be 
achieved in this research. The survey strategy is associated with the deductive approach 
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(Saunders et al., 2009), and positivist philosophical positioning (Collis and Hussey, 
2009). As discussed previously, this research inclined towards postpositivism and 
interpretivism and undertook more adductive approaches.  
 
Another theory is the grounded theory. This theory seeks to develop a well-integrated 
set of concepts that provide a thorough theoretical explanation of phenomena under 
study (Charmaz, 2006). This theory is mostly derived from data, systematically 
gathered and analysed through the research process in an iterative process (Bryman, 
2008). Perhaps, grounded theory can be identified as the next best alternative for this 
research, due to the nature of research questions being asked. However, this research 
sought to explore and assess the dynamism of risks in transportation megaprojects under 
construction in a real-life context. As such, it was not purely attempting to generate 
theory out of data, but also sought to integrate and apply existing theory to risk 
assessment in megaproject construction. Hence, grounded theory was deemed less 
suitable, when compared to the case study strategy.  
 
- Opportunity presented by being part of a wider research study  
 
The doctoral research discussed here is part of the Megaproject Management research 
theme set up by Dr Zhen Chen in June 2012. It is a research unit based within the 
Centre of Excellence in Sustainable Building Design (formerly the Institute for Building 
and Urban Design (IBUD)) at Heriot-Watt University. The mission of the group is to 
promote and support innovation and progress in megaproject development and 
management across the world through multi-disciplinary practice oriented research. Its 
research focuses on proactive problem-solving solutions through a megaproject’s 
lifecycle with regard to stakeholders’ needs and professional standards related to the 
built environment. Through publications and presentations, the group offers rigorous 
independent research outputs that translate knowledge gained from research and 
development to inform decision making by major stakeholders in megaproject 
development and management. 
 
The study is also a part of initiatives of megaproject research project that is funded by 
the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST) through COST Action 
TU1003, which aims at the Effective Design and Delivery of Megaprojects in the 
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European Union. The Action is chaired by Professor Naomi Brookes in the School of 
Civil Engineering at the University of Leeds, and there are participants from over 20 
countries across Europe. Adopting a case study as part of the research strategy allowed 
the researcher to utilise his involvement in the above mentioned research projects 
towards the doctoral study and use some of the research methods to enhance the 
doctoral study without compromising the objectives, research questions or philosophical 
positioning of the doctoral research.  
 
 Validity and Reliability in Case study Research  
As case study research is subjected to criticism, it is vital that the validity and reliability 
of a case study research is established. The following four tests of construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity and reliability are adopted from Yin (2003, p.34) to 
test the trustworthiness of the case study research method in this research. Whilst it is 
not intended here to discuss these tests in detail, Table 3.5 highlights the case study 
tactics used and the stage of research in which each tactic occurs in this research to 
satisfy the aforementioned tests, and thereby ensure the validity and reliability of the 
research strategy used. 
                             Table 3.5: Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests 
Test Case Study Tactic  Phase of research in 
which tactic occurs 
Construct validity - Multiple sources of evidence 
- Review of draft case study reports by key 
informants 
- Data collection 
- Composition  
Internal validity - Explanation building 
- Use of (ANP/SD) models 
- Data analysis 
- Data analysis 
External validity - Use of theory in the single case study - Research design 
Reliability - Develop case study database (KBS) - Data collection 
Source: Adopted from Yin (2003, Chapter 2, p. 34) 
 
3.4.2: The Quantitative Phase  
The instrument for the quantitative phase comprises questionnaire (mailed and online). 
The approach was considered necessary because it provides stronger empirical research 
evidence for explaining phenomenon to enable the researcher to address the questions 
‘how much’ or ‘how many?’ More appropriately in the context of this investigation, this 
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kind of research phase enables the researcher to establish which variables are 
significant, and to what extent, in a scientific way so that the objective of explanatory 
assertions about the sample can be allowed, and by inference the target population can 
be achieved.  
 
 
3.4.3: The Knowledge Based System (KBS) 
The key components of any risk management process would include risk identification, 
assessment/analysis, evaluation, response, and monitoring. In order to perform adequate 
risk management, it is essential to link identification/assessment steps with their 
management actions through sufficient understanding (Hillson, 2002). As indicated in 
Table 2.3: risk identification tools and techniques (Chapter 2, p. 16), there are numerous 
techniques for identifying project risks. However, as a consolidated list of classified 
tools and techniques for risk identification, these techniques lack a definite organization 
of risks and do not help to structure identified risks in the most appropriate hierarchical 
way (Hillson, 2002). Therefore, the Knowledge Based System (KBS) is proposed in this 
research as a regulated way to assist project managers in understanding risk 
categorization in the construction phase of transportation megaprojects. As indicated in 
Figure 3.3, the KBS is structured such that it will provide an essential and standard 
strategy for risk presentation, understanding, communication, and management during 
megaproject execution phases.  
 
According to Tah and Carr (2000) and Hillson (2002), a structured KBS in hierarchical 
representation of risk sources is known as a hierarchal risk breakdown structure 
(HRBS). Hillson (2002) defined the HRBS as “a source-oriented grouping of risks that 
organizes and defines the total risk exposure of a project or business.” That means the 
HRBS can be used to structure and guide the risk management process. Another 
advantage of developing the HRBS within the KBS is that it serves as a basis for a 
formal model of risk assessment (Tah and Carr, 2000).  
 
 
For the purpose of this research, risk sources were grouped under criteria that describe 
the nature of risk. Hence, as indicated in Figure 3.3, the five risk categories (social, 
technical, economic, environmental and political) described in chapter 2 were used to 
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develop three levels of HRBS within the Knowledge base (KB) of the KBS. Through 
the process of knowledge acquisition, the knowledge that a project manager or project 
engineer has gained from experience and from other completed projects can be stored 
properly in the knowledge base (KB). This domain of specific knowledge of experts can 
be processed and categorized by type, sieved in the inference engine (IE) and sent back 
to the KB to be represented into macro layers (levels I and II) and micro layer (level 
III).  
 Questionnaire survey
 Data from ongoing project
 Knowledge from literature
 Interview with experts
 Data from source documents 
of past similar projects
Data Base (DB)
(Data on STEEP risks 
obtained from various 
sources)
Data Source (DS)
Knowledge Acquisition (KA)
Knowledge obtained through initial 
sieving and organization
Knowledge Base (KB)
(Three main layers)
 Level I: Macro layer
Knowledge base consisting of major 
problems about  past megaproject 
construction
 Level II: Macro layer
Detail information of broad causes of 
problems across megaprojects in the 
construction phase
 Level III: Micro layer
 Potential factors of each cause to 
risks in macro layer II.
Inference Engine (IE)
 Categorizing risks by type
 Sieving information
User Interface (UI)
Vensim DSS System 
dynamics software for risk 
analysis
Analytical Network Process 
for risk prioritization
Import and export knowledge between 
KB and UI for dynamic risk assessment
 
                 Figure 3.3: Proposed Framework for Risks Categorisation using KBS 
 
Once the potential risk factors for each cause of problems in the micro layer (level III) 
are organized, they can be imported into the user interface (UI) for dynamic risks 
assessment. With the support of a computer, the final risk factors can be prioritized by 
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the Analytical Network Process (ANP) and the results used as inputs into the System 
Dynamics (SD) modelling. The final information can then be made available to users 
(project analysts, project managers, engineers and contractors) when they consult the 
KB, IE and the UI to identify recurrence and the dynamics of the project risks impact on 
performance. Risk response actions can be initiated to control risks as construction 
proceeds when various simulation scenarios are performed to aid policy formulation and 
implementation. 
 
In addition, time and effort required to identify, assess and to develop risk response 
actions can be significantly reduced. Difficulty in interpreting the outcomes of a risk 
assessment process may be resolved since expert interpretations based on KB are used 
in analysing risk effects. Repeated uses of KBSs may also reduce the human and 
organizational resistance. 
 
 
3.4.4: The Analytical Network Process (ANP) 
Figure 3.4 is a schematic that describes the overall flow of the proposed framework for 
the Analytical Network Process (ANP). As shown in the diagram, risk prioritization 
originates from project client and managers’ requests. The data systems represent the 
KBS domain used to categorise and store information about STEEP risks in 
transportation megaprojects. Such information is used to facilitate the data transfer into 
the decision support system (DSS). The purpose of the DSS is to prioritize identified 
risks based on their relative importance. It is comprises two interfaces (decision and the 
prioritization).  
 
 
3.4.4.1. The decision/Software Interface 
The decision interface is composed of the experts’ decisions, the weighted quantitative 
score (WQS) method and the analytical network process. The experts’ decisions begin 
with the risk prioritization survey for selecting potentially “high risks” using a Likert 
type scale of 1 to 5 to score the level of STEEP risks impact on megaproject objectives 
(cost, time and quality) in the construction phase. The WQS is a method which 
translates expert decisions obtained during prioritization surveys into synthetic 
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numerical values to derive the mean scores of importance. The calculations were 
significantly distinguished based on participant’s experience, background and as well as 
their information in regard to a case study project (Edinburgh tram network project).  
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Figure 3.4: Proposed ANP Methodology for Risks Prioritization 
 
As indicated in Figure 3.4, the arrow between the WQS and the comparison matrices 
represents the correlation between the choices of the experts and the corresponding 
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comparison matrices (PRw). Likewise, the analytical network is directly correlated to 
the normalized criteria using the eigenvector algorithm according to ANP. Consensus is 
built by aggregating the normalized weights, and thus generating the risk prioritization 
indexes (RPIs). The analytical network process is a decision tool that allows structuring 
the decision into criteria, sub-criteria and options (Saaty, 2005). Its purpose is to 
categorize the decision model in a logical and intuitive tree to model the existing 
decision hierarchy and to adapt to emerging changes. The experts’ decisions are the 
preset choices made by the experts based on the options defined by the analytical 
network. These decisions are subject to verification and adjustment due to changing 
priorities.  
 
 
3.4.4.2: The Prioritization Interface 
The prioritization interface is the platform where the analytical framework is combined 
with the experts’ decisions to produce independent assessments on STEEP priorities 
without further input from the experts. The purpose of a prioritization interface is to 
aggregate experts’ decisions on risks impacts on project performance into single 
numerical values to represent a project's overall strategic importance when compared to 
one another. This single parameter is defined as the Risk Prioritization Index (RPI). The 
intent of using this figure is to help eliminate human biases during the priority 
assessment and put a sense of fairness in the evaluation process. Ranked results issued 
from the prioritization interface become the high risks and are conveyed into the system 
dynamics modelling for simulation. 
 
Four general procedures for multi-criteria decision-making processes were used to 
prioritize high risks at this stage. The procedures are: ANP network construction; paired 
comparisons; criteria normalization through super matrix calculation; and risk priority 
index (RPI) calculation (Saaty, 2005). The steps are laid out below in four sub sections.  
 
- ANP Network Model Construction 
In this step, the STEEP risks were structured and conceptualised into networks to 
determine the control hierarchies as well as the corresponding criteria of the system. 
According to Saaty (1996), the process allows dependencies both within a cluster (inner 
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dependence) and between clusters (outer dependence) so that variables on each level 
can be defined together with their relationships with other elements in the system. 
 
As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the ANP network model for prioritizing risk consists of three 
clusters: ‘Goal’, ‘Criterion’ and ‘Option.’ Cluster ‘Goal’ contains only one element as 
the statement of the purpose for risk prioritization within which the category of ‘High 
risks’ are listed according to the results from the pairwise comparison calculation. 
Cluster ‘Criterion’ consists of potential consequences of elements of potential risks on 
project cost, time and quality. The cluster ‘Options’ contains potential risks and a list of 
their potential variables. Detail explanation of these risks and their respective variables 
in this cluster has been discussed in (Chapter 2). The arrows indicate relationships 
between elements in one cluster against elements in other clusters. In cluster ‘Criterion’, 
there are inner dependencies because the elements in this cluster affect each other.  
 
Option: Potential Risks
Inner 
dependencies
SV1,Sv2…………..Svn
ENv1………..ENvn
TV1,TV2,……..... TVn, 
Social risks
PV1,PV2,………... PVn, EV1,EV2, ………EVn, 
Technical risks
Political risks  Economic risks
Environmental risks
List of high risks
Goal: Risk Prioritization
Criterion: Potential Consequences on:
 Cost Time Quality
 
                          Figure 3.5: ANP Network Model for Risk Prioritization 
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- Paired Comparisons 
In ANP, pairwise comparisons of the elements in each level are conducted with respect 
to their relative importance to their control criterion. The correlation matrices are 
prepared on a 1-9 ratio scale presented in Table 3.6 to determine the relative preferences 
for two elements of the hierarchy in the matrix. A score of 1 indicates that the two 
options have equal importance whereas a score of 9 indicates dominance of the 
component under consideration over the comparison component matrices.  
 
            Table 3.6: Fundamental Scale of Pairwise Judgment and Pair wiser Criteria 
Scales of pairwise judgment Comparisons of pair indicator scores
 
1= equal 1:1 
2= equally to moderately dominant 2:1, 3:2, 4:3, 5:4, 6:5, 7:6, 8:7, 9:8 
3= moderately dominant 3:1, 4:2, 5:3, 6:4, 7:5, 8:6, 9:7 
4= moderately to strongly dominant 4:1, 5:2, 6:3, 7:4, 8:5, 9:6 
5= strongly dominant 5:1, 6:2, 7:3, 8:4, 9:5 
6= strongly to very strongly dominant 6:1, 7:2, 8:3, 9:4 
7= very strongly dominant 7:1, 8:2, 9:3 
8= very strongly to extremely dominant 8:1, 9:2 
9= Extremely dominant 9:1 
 
If activity i has one of the above non-zero numbers assigned to it when compared with 
activity j, then j has the reciprocal value when compared with i. The results of the 
comparisons are represented by dimensionless quotients to measure the preference of 
one option over the other. A direct numerical appreciation is not required from the 
decision maker, but rather a relative appreciation. The results of each cluster are similar 
to the comparison matrix described in Equation (1), where PR is the potential risks and 
Rij, the comparison between risk variables i and j. 
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Once the pairwise comparison is completed for the whole network, the vector 
corresponding to the maximum eigenvalue of the constructed matrices is computed and 
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a priority vector is obtained. The priority value of the concerned element is found by 
normalizing this vector as described in equation 2. 
 
∑      
 
             (2) 
 
Where  ‘R’ is the matrix of pairwise comparison, 
 ‘w’ is the eigenvector, and 
‘    ’ is the maximum eigenvalue of [R] 
 
 
By substitution, the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) is calculated to derive a new matrix 
(W) by multiplying comparison matrix (R) with (wi). Finally, the (λmax) can be obtained 
by averaging the value. Computations of the process are listed in Equation (3) and 
Equation (4) respectively. 
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 In this assessment process, a problem may occur in the consistency of the pairwise 
comparisons. The consistency ratio provides a numerical assessment. If the calculated 
ratio is less than 0.10, consistency is considered to be satisfactory. The conceptual 
model is then imported into the ANP software, Super Decision (developed by Adams, 
W.J. and Satty, R.W.) for the pairwise comparison matrices to be solved. The aim of 
constructing pairwise matrices is to find out the relative weight of the potential risks. 
 
- Super Matrix Calculation 
There are three super- matrices: un-weighted super matrix, weighted super- matrix and 
the limit super matrix associated with the network. The un-weighted super matrix 
contains the local priorities derived from the pair-wise comparison throughout the 
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network. The weighted super matrix is obtained by multiplying all the elements in a 
component of the un-weighted super matrix by the corresponding weight. The limit 
super matrix is derived by raising the weighted super matrix to its powers and the 
multiplication process is discontinued when the number becomes the same for all 
columns. The three steps aim to form a synthesised super matrix to allow for the 
resolution of the effects of the interdependences that exists between the elements (nodes 
and clusters) of the ANP model. The reason is to obtain useful information for the 
assessment, thereby calculating super matrixes in three sub-steps, to transform initial 
super matrix to a weighted super matrix, and then to a synthesised super matrix. 
 
 
                        Table 3.7: Formation of Super Matrix and its Sub-Matrix 
 
 
The general form of the super-matrix is described in Table 3.7 where Cn denotes the Nth 
cluster, Nn(1~n) denotes the nth element in the nth cluster, and Wij is a block matrix 
consisting of priority weight vectors (W) of the influence of the elements in the ith 
cluster with respect to the jth cluster. If the ith cluster has no influence to the ith cluster 
itself (a case of inner dependence), Wij becomes zero. The super-matrix obtained in this 
step is called the initial super-matrix. The eigenvector obtained from cluster level 
comparison with respect to the control criterion is applied to the initial super-matrix as 
cluster weight. This result is the weighted matrix. 
 
 
 
 
Super Matrix Sub-Matrix 
          
      
WI.J =  
W1|I.J … W1|I.J 
W = 
W11 W12 W13 --- W1n 
W21 W22 W23 --- W2n W1|I.J … W1|I.J 
W31 W32 W33 --- W3n 
W41 W42 W43 --- W4n … … … 
W51 W52 W53 --- W5n Wi|I.J … Wi|I.J 
      
Cluster: C1 C2 C3 --- Cn … … … 
Node: N1(1~n) N2(1~n) N3(1~n) --- Nn(1~n) 
 
WnI1|I.J … WnI1|I.J 
Note: I is the index number of rows; and J is the index number of columns; both I and J 
correspond to the number of cluster and their nodes [I, J є (1,2, …, m)], NI is the total number of 
nodes in cluster I, n is the total number of columns in cluster I. Thus an m x m matrix is formed. 
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- Risk Priority Index (RPI) Calculation 
This step aims to calculate risk priority indexes (RPIs) to support final decision making. 
The criterion to make this selection is the weights of alternatives that can be taken from 
the synthesised super-matrix. Although the RPI can be performed manually with 
equation 5, it was performed by the Super Decisions software in this study. 
Computation priorities command was used to determine the priorities of all the nodes in 
the network 
 
      ∑       
 
      
Where 
 ‘RPIj’ represents the global priority of the risk options i, 
‘Wj,’ the weight of the criterion j with respect to project cost, time and quality, and 
‘Rij’, the local priority 
 
After computation, the RPIs can further be classified into five states of likelihood and 
consequence on project cost, time and quality and assessed by five-by five matrices to 
classify risks as either “very high”, “high”, “moderate”, “low” or “very low”.  
 
 Very High and High-Risk Events 
 
High-risk events can be so classified either because they have a very high likelihood of 
occurrence coupled with at least a high impact or they have a high impact with at least 
moderate likelihood. In either case, specific direct management action is warranted to 
reduce the probability of occurrence or the risk’s negative impact. 
 
 
 Moderate-Risk Events 
 
Moderate-risk events can either be high-likelihood, low consequence events or low-
likelihood, high-consequence events. An individual high-likelihood, low-consequence 
event by itself would have little impact on project cost, schedule and quality outcomes. 
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However, most projects contain myriad such risks (material prices, schedule durations, 
installation rates, etc.); the combined effect of numerous high-likelihood, low 
consequence risks can significantly alter project outcomes. 
 
 
Commonly, risk management procedures accommodate these high-likelihood, low-
consequence risks by determining their combined effect and developing cost and/or 
schedule and quality contingency allowances to manage their influence. Low-likelihood 
and high-consequence events, on the other hand, warrant individualized attention and 
management. At a minimum, low-likelihood and high consequence events should be 
periodically monitored for changes either in their probability of occurrence or in their 
potential impacts. Some events with very large, albeit unlikely, impacts may be actively 
managed to mitigate the negative consequences should the unlikely event occur. 
 
 
 Low and very Low-Risk Events 
 
Risks that are characterized as low and very low can usually be disregarded and 
eliminated from further assessment. As risk is periodically reassessed in the future, 
these low/very low risks are closed, retained, or elevated to a higher risk category. 
Although, there is no standard for estimating risk probability value, the study uses a 
likelihood ratings proposed by Cooper, et.al, (2005) as shown in Table 3.8,  
 
                                            Table 3.8: Likelihood Rating 
Rating  Likelihood description 
Almost  certain  Very high, occurs frequently 
Likely  High, (has before, will again) 
Possible  Possible, but not common 
Unlikely  Not possible (unlikely to occur) 
Rare  Very low (very unlikely to occur) 
 
 
Partially adapting from Cooper, et.al, (2005), the study uses a multi-attribute potential 
consequences based on the research objectives of five risk elements impacts i.e. Social 
technical, economic, environmental, and political issues. The expected output of this 
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filtering stage is a list of potential risks categorized into "high-risk". Finally, the 
numerical RPIs are fed into the simulation engine as numerical fields for exogenous 
variables and initial values for stocks to facilitate the dynamic simulation process.  
 
 
3.4.5: System Dynamics 
The systems dynamics (SD) methodology is adopted in this study. The SD methodology 
is a field created at MIT by computer pioneer Jay Forrester in mid 1950s for modelling 
and analyzing the behavior of complex social systems in an industrial context (Sterman, 
2000). It was designed to help decision-makers learn about the structure and dynamics 
of complex systems, to design high leverage policies for sustained improvement, and to 
catalyse successful implementation and change. In recent years, the SD has been used 
by researchers and project managers to understand various social, economic and 
environmental systems in a holistic view (Rodrigues, 1996; Towell, 1993; Sycamore, 
1999; Mawby, 2002; Love, 2002; Ogunlana, 2003, Williams, 2003 and Naseena, 2006).  
 
System Dynamics approach is primarily based on cause-effect relationship. This cause-
effect relationship is explained with the help of stock, flow and feedback loops. Stocks 
and flows are used to model the flow of work and resources through the project. 
Feedback loops are used to model decisions and project management policies. System 
Dynamics can be used to model processes with two major characteristics (1) those 
involving change over time, and (2) those that involve feedback (Ogunlana, 2003). 
 
 The central concept of System Dynamics is to understand how the parts in a system 
interact with one another and how a change in one variable affects the other variable 
over time (Senge, 1990), which in turn affects the original variable (See Figure 3.6). 
Systems can be modelled in a qualitative and quantitative manner. The models are 
constructed from three basic building blocks: positive feedback or reinforcing loops, 
negative feedback or balancing loops, and delays. Positive loops (called reinforcing 
loops) are self-reinforcing while negative loops (called balancing loops) tend to 
counteract change. Delays introduce potential instability into the system. 
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Figure 3.6a shows a reinforcing loop, which is a structure that feeds on itself to produce 
growth or decline. Reinforcing loops correspond to positive feedback loops in control 
theory. An increase in variable 1 leads to an increase in variable 2 (as indicated by the 
“+” sign) and that leads to an additional increase in variable 1 and so on. The “+” sign 
does not mean the values necessarily increase, only that variable 1 and variable 2 will 
change in the same direction (polarity). If variable 1 decreases, then variable 2 will 
decrease. In the absence of external influences, both variable 1 and variable 2 will 
clearly grow or decline exponentially. Reinforcing loops generate growth, amplify 
deviations, and reinforce change. 
 
                     Figure 3.6: The Three Components of System Dynamics Models. 
 
A balancing loop indicated in Figure 3.6b is a structure that changes the current value of 
a system variable or a desired or reference variable through some action. It corresponds 
to a negative feedback loop in control theory. A (-) sign indicates that the values of the 
variables change in opposite directions. The difference between the current value and 
the desired value is perceived as an error. An action proportional to the error is taken to 
decrease the error so that, over time, the current value approaches the desired value. The 
third basic element is a delay, which is used to model the time that elapses between 
cause and effect. A delay is indicated by a double line, as shown in Figure 3.6c. Delays 
make it difficult to link cause and effect (dynamic complexity) and may result in 
unstable system behaviour. In Systems Dynamics, verbal descriptions and causal loop 
diagrams are more qualitative; stock and flow diagrams and model equations are more 
quantitative ways to describe a dynamic situation. Since Systems Dynamics is largely 
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(a) A Reinforcing Loop
Desired Value of
Variable.
Error. Action.
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based on the soft systems thinking, (learning paradigm), it is well suited to be applied 
on those managerial problems which are ambiguous and require better conceptualization 
and insight (Sushi 1993). 
 
 
 System Dynamic Modeling Approaches 
Strictly speaking, there is no formal methodology process defined for the development 
of system dynamic (SD) models. Several authors in related literature, including 
Forrester (1961/71), Roberts (1964), Randers (1980b), Richardson and Pugh (1981), 
Bossel (1992), and Coyle (1996), suggested sequences of SD modelling steps.  
 
Problem Identification 
& definition
Policy analysis, Design 
Improvement & 
Implementation
Model Validation
Model Simulation
Final Model 
Development
Model Verification
Initial Model 
Development
Verification through 
Expert opinion
Model Formulation & 
Simulation
Problem 
Analysis
System 
Conceptualization
Validation through 
software tools & case 
studies
Implementation
Test not passed
Test 
passed
 
Figure 3.7: Basic Steps for SD Simulation Approach for Assessing Risks in 
Megaproject during Construction 
 
Although there are variations, modelling is entirely dependent on the nature of the 
problem and style of the modeller. With regard to this research, the process indicated in 
figure 3.7 provides six basic modelling steps adopted to model the dynamic of risk 
impact on the performance of transportation megaproject in the construction phase 
overtime. The steps are: 
 
i. Problem identification and definition  
ii. Initial model development 
iii. Model verification (expert opinion)  
iv. Final model development and simulation (Analysis of model behaviour) 
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vi. Model validation using software tools and a case study 
vii. Policy analysis, model use or implementation 
 
 
i. Problem Identification and Definition (Purpose) 
 
The purpose of this step is to study the dynamic problem of risks impact on megaproject 
performance (applied or theoretical). A large body of literature indicated that risks of 
cost and time overruns and quality deficiency are significant problems faced by 
megaproject owners and developers from the past until present. By discussing with 
experts, it was understood that problems related to STEEP risks’ impact on project 
performance is vital. They lead to prolonged delay, increase in project cost, and quality 
deficiency.  Since risks in the construction phase of megaprojects are complex and 
dynamic in nature, they need in-depth investigation for assessment. Therefore, to 
facilitate deep understanding of such problems, a case study method was applied to 
provide the opportunity to simulate the dynamics of such problems over time. Hence, 
Edinburgh Tram Network Project (ETNP) under construction in Scotland, UK is 
selected for case study.  
 
ii.  Initial Model Development and Verification  
 
Causal loop diagrams in the model were used to describe the conceptual model structure 
derived from a modeller’s understanding of system and show the dynamic of variables 
involved in the system (Park et al., 2004). Model boundary chart and subsystem 
diagram were drawn to provide the boundary and architecture of the model causal loop 
diagrams. The model causal loop diagrams indicate how the variables are related with 
each other in the system. Causal links can be established in ways such as direct 
observation, reliance on accepted theories, hypotheses, or assumptions, and statistical 
evidence (Coyle, 2000, cited in Park, 2004).  Stock and flow maps were emphasized by 
the underlying physical structure of causal loop diagrams.  
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iii.  Final Model Development and Simulation  
Once the causal loop diagram was formulated, a formal simulation model known as 
stock and flow diagram was created. Coyle (1996) mentioned that simulation model is 
another version of mental model or casual loop diagram, but written in equations and 
computer code. In the process of model behavior, computer simulation was used to 
determine how all the variables within the system behave over time. The formalization 
helped to recognize vague concepts and to resolve contradictions that went unnoticed 
during the conceptualization phase. Vensim DSS, a Windows based graphical system 
dynamics modelling package was used for the model development. It supports both 
flow diagrams and causal loop diagrams. After the model structure was defined, the 
underlying equations were entered to create the simulation model. Finally, the 
simulation models were tested for consistency with their purpose and boundary. 
 
 
iv.  Model Validation Using Software Tools and a Case Study 
 
Several SD tests were carried out in this research to validate the models. Among them 
was the test for robustness used to check the models for realistic behaviour when 
stressed to extreme conditions. Policies aimed at achieving desired goals or improving 
model behavior were then assessed to indicate how the real system can be modified 
(Ogunlana et al., 1998). The testing proved whether the models are consistent with the 
system behavior with respect to their purposes. Where tests failed, iterations were 
carried out in the modelling process to develop a valid model. 
 
 
v.  Policy Analysis, Design and Improvement 
 
Once the tests proved the validity of models, they were experimented for various 
practical consequences. The aim of the experiment was to identify the weakness in the 
existing risk management procedure and recommend some new policy to assess risks at 
the early stage of megaprojects development before construction commenced. 
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3.4.6. The Integrated Framework (SDANP) 
Figure 3.8 illustrated the combine methodologies for the research.  
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                     Figure 3.8: The Proposed SDANP Methodology for the Research 
 
In an attempt to develop the new methodology, the work of Tesfamariam and Lindberg 
(2005) was reviewed and used to achieve the objective four of this research as stated in 
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section 1.3. The motivation is that Tesfamariam and Lindberg in their research proposed 
the use of ANP/SD methodologies for a rapid and strategically consistent decision-
making in a manufacturing system design. This then informed the decision to use the 
integrated SD and ANP methodologies called SDANP method that complements both 
the qualitative and quantitative research strategies for assessing risks in megaprojects at 
the construction phase over time. As indicated in Figure 3.8 the new methodology 
comprises the System Dynamics modelling and the Analytical Network Process routes 
(SDANP). Within the combined approach, the risk priority indexes (RPIs) derived from 
the Analytical Network Process will be integrated into the System Dynamics stock and 
flow modelling at the risk simulation stage to analyse the behaviour and level of risks 
impact on project performance over time. Subsequently, simulation scenarios will be 
performed in order to experiment various practical consequences of the new 
methodology so that policies can be designed and recommended to project managers, 
contractors and consultants on STEEP risks at the early stage of megaprojects 
construction for effective risk assessment. 
 
 
3.5: Ethical Considerations 
According to a dictionary definition, to be ethical is to be in accordance with the 
accepted principles of right and wrong that govern the conduct of a profession. 
Therefore, all members of the Heriot-Watt University (HWU), including research 
students, are under an obligation to observe the highest standards of professional 
conduct. Failure to do so not only defeats the object of scholarly enquiry, but brings 
both the researcher and the entire university into disrepute. Hence, the need for 
researchers to comply with strict ethical guidelines is especially important to the 
university.  
 
In conforming to the established trend, the School of Built Environment (SBE) of the 
Heriot-Watt University (HWU) has put in place a rigorous ethical validation procedure 
to assist researchers conform to a reasonably accepted standard. Among others is the 
code designed by the SBE of the HWU to ensure that: 
- There is no interference with participant’s’ physical and psychological well-being. 
- The research procedure is not likely to be stressful or distressing 
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- The research materials are not sensitive, discriminatory or inappropriate 
- The research design is sufficiently well-grounded so that the potential participants’ 
time is not wasted during the data collection. 
 
 
The research instruments used for this study were submitted to the SBE of the HWU 
ethical research committee. In so doing, the following parameters in respect of the 
instrument had to be explained and justified where necessary: the rationale for and the 
expected outcome of the study; details of methods, materials, designs and procedures; 
details of how information would be held and disposed and details of how the results 
will be fed back to the participants. 
Having addressed and satisfied these criteria in a formal application, the ethics 
committee granted permission for the field work to commence. 
 
 
3.6: Pilot Study 
Prior to the major survey, a pilot survey was undertaken in Edinburgh (Scotland, UK). 
The pilot study is a trial run that can help the researcher to smooth out the survey 
instrument to ensure that the participants in the main survey experienced no difficulties 
in completing it (Moore and Abadi, 2005). The aim of the pilot study was to test the 
wording of the questionnaire, identify ambiguous questions, test the intended technique 
for data collection and measure the effectiveness of the potential response. 
 
 
Using purposive sampling techniques, 10 experts were identified for the pilot study.  
These experts include academic research staff within the School of Built Environment 
of Heriot-Watt University and experts involved in the European Cooperation of Science 
and Technology (ECOST) on Megaproject to test the intelligibility, ease to answer or 
ambiguity of the questions. It is worth noting that the 10 participants identified for the 
pilot study were thereafter not included in the main survey. The questionnaires were 
accompanied by a covering letter explaining the purpose of the pilot study. 
Subsequently, the respondents were asked to critically appraise the questions and 
provide feedback as to the relevance and sensitivity of the questions, length and time for 
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completing and suggestions for improvement. Within a period of three weeks, all 10 
completed questionnaires were retrieved.  
 
 
Valuable feedbacks were later received to improve the quality of the questionnaire and 
refinement. Generally the feedback was very helpful and suggested that the survey 
instrument was likely to work in the manner intended. A preliminary analysis of the 
data also gave the opportunity to test the intended technique for analysing the data and 
this was quite a useful exercise. 
 
 
3.7: Data Collection 
This section introduces issues relating to the collection of data and is grouped into two 
sub-sections. Section 3.7.1 addresses the sample frame and the potential respondents for 
the main survey. This is followed by a discussion of the method for choosing the 
appropriate sample size in section 3.7.2 and finally, a summary of the methodology 
chapter in section 3.8. 
 
 
3.7.1: The Sampling Frame and Survey Participants 
The sample frame and potential respondents for the study were drawn from Bilfinger-
Berger and Siemens (BBS) consortium involved in the Edinburgh Tram Infrastructure 
and Maintenance Contract (INFRACO) contract, its subcontracting firms, some 
members of the City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) and owners/employees of businesses 
along the tram routes. The primary business of the BBS consortium is to operate as a 
management contractor letting out packages to firms such as Barr, Graham, Raynesway, 
Bam Rail, Laing O’Rourke, MacKenzie, Crummock, Farrans and McKean 
corresponding to the sections of the works. Bilfinger-Berger is responsible for the civil 
engineering works whilst Siemens is in charge of the electrical works. 
 
 
Other companies from which survey participants were drawn from include Scottish 
Water (SW) and Turner and Townsend (T & T). T and T is a cost consultant brought in 
by CEC to replace Transport Initiative Edinburgh (TIE), the council-owned company 
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set up to deliver major transport projects after ETNP is over budget and behind 
schedule. The main duty of T&T is to ensure effective oversight and delivery of the 
project.  
 
 
As experts in the construction industry, these participants are believed to have detailed 
knowledge and understanding of risks in their respective sectors and should (based on 
their experience) be able to provide realistic answers to the survey questions and should 
be in a better position to provide relatively accurate responses to the interview to be 
conducted. Companies of participants and their respective organisations are provided 
Appendix (B). Due to the need to maintain strict confidentiality, the names and 
designation of interviewees were not disclosed. Consequently in establishing the 
sampling frame, a decision was also taken to exclude a few members whose telephone 
details were not available on the list provided. To this effect the sampling frame was 
eventually fixed at 400. 
 
 
3.7.2: Establishing an Appropriate Sample Size 
There is no definitive answer to what sample size is required for a survey. Usually, large 
samples with rigorous selection are more powerful as they will yield more accurate 
results, but data collection and analysis will be proportionately more time consuming 
and expensive. Essentially, the target sample size for a survey depends on three main 
factors: availability of resources, the aim of the study and the statistical quality needed 
for the survey. In this research, the sample size needed for the qualitative surveys such 
as interviews would be smaller than the quantitative survey data to be collected by the 
questionnaire. Sample size calculations and data analysis would be performed using an 
“analyse-it” add-on to Microsoft Excel for statistical analysis.  
 
 
Larger samples give a better estimate of the population but it is rare in this research that 
everyone asked to participate in the survey will reply. To ensure a sufficient number of 
responses, an estimated non-response rate of 5% was added to the sample size. Biases in 
response rates are real and as such can be misleading and only represent those who 
reply. Therefore, it is unwise to define a level above which a response rate is acceptable, 
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as this depends on many local factors; however, an achievable and acceptable rate is 
75% for interviews and 65% for self-completion postal questionnaires (Arber, 2011). 
Useful review methods to maximize response rates in postal survey can also be found in 
Edwards et al., (2002). 
 
 
Given that it is highly uncommon to achieve a survey response of 100%, an appropriate 
sample size would have to be adopted that would help achieve reasonable target as far 
as possible. Subsequently, drawing on typical response rates to surveys undertaken on a 
sensitive Edinburgh Tram Network Project in Scotland, UK, a 50% response rate was 
assumed. It was therefore decided to target up to 300 participants for the survey. 
 
 
3.8: Summary 
This chapter has introduced some important issues relating to the research methodology 
adopted for the study, in particular the epistemological and philosophical applications. 
A clear distinction has been made between research methodology and research methods. 
Drawing on the epistemological, ontological and axiological assumptions, both 
positivism and interpretivism were chosen as the appropriate paradigms. A review of 
the research methods revealed that survey and interviews were the most appropriate 
approaches for eliciting the relevant data to support the analytical network process and 
the system dynamics methodology for risk assessment. Subsequently the design of the 
survey instrument was described following a commentary on piloting of the 
questionnaires. 
 
 
The survey characteristics including the sampling frame and size and techniques for 
eliciting the relevant data have also been explained. The next chapter introduces a 
description of the case study for this research. 
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     CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY 
{The Edinburgh Tram Network (ETN) Project}  
 
4.1. Introduction  
Following the results of chapter two, which provided the theoretical basis of risks in 
transportation megaprojects in the construction phase, this chapter provides an overview 
of ETN project as the main case study for this research. The objective for selecting ETN 
project is to deliver a critical review of the entire project and to identify at the 
construction phase mistakes and pitfalls which led to risks of project cost and time 
overruns and quality deficiency.  The chapter starts with the background of the case 
project followed by a summarised detail of risks encountered in the project at the 
construction phase. 
 
4.2. Background to the Project 
4.2.1. The 1871 to 1956 Era 
Originally, ETN project can be traced back to the 1870s when Edinburgh had trams of 
various design running through city streets between 1871 and 1956. In November 1871, 
Edinburgh Street Tramways Company ran the very first horse-drawn tram from 
Haymarket in the west of Edinburgh, to Bernard Street in the heart of Leith. In January 
1888, the Northern Tramways company in Edinburgh launched the first cable-pulled (or 
cable hauled) trams to run in Edinburgh. By the year 1894 most tram lines were 
operated by Edinburgh and District Tramways, and by 1920 Edinburgh Corporation had 
taken control of all of Edinburgh’s trams, including Leith which had electric trams 
running. The rest of Edinburgh city gained electric trams in 1922, with the very last 
cable-hauled tram operating in Edinburgh in June of 1923. By 1954, tram service ceased 
in Musselburgh. However, the electric trams continued to serve the people in other parts 
of Edinburgh until November 1956. The Edinburgh Corporation operated trams with the 
red and white colours still used by Lothian buses in Edinburgh today. A tramcar from 
1948 has been preserved with these colours and can be seen in the National Tramway 
Museum in Derbyshire (“History of Trams in Edinburgh” (2012). Available at 
(http://www.edinburgh-history.co.uk/edinburgh-trams.html)  
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4.2.2. The New Edinburgh Tram Network 
In January 2004, a proposal was submitted to the Scottish Parliament to reintroduce a 
tram network to Edinburgh which received Royal Assent in spring 2006 (Edinburgh 
Tram Line One and Two Act 2006). As indicated in Figure 4.1, the proposed tramline 
consisted of three lines. Phase 1a incorporated the construction of an 18.5-kilometre line 
from Newhaven to Edinburgh Airport through Princes Street, combining parts of lines 1 
and 2. Phase 1b involved the construction of a 5.6-kilometre line from Haymarket to 
Granton Square via Crewe Toll, comprising most of the remainder of line 1. Phase 2 
linked Granton Square and Newhaven together, completing the line 1 loop. Phase 3 
would have the airport line extended to Newbridge, completing line 2. It can also be 
noted on Figure 4.1 that, the line one of the trams involved a circular route running 
around the northern suburbs, while the other two formed radial routes running out to 
Newbridge in the west and to Newcraig hall in the south (Trams facts 8-CEC, 2006). 
All lines were designed to run through the City Centre of Edinburgh.  
 
 
After extensive scrutiny, the Scottish parliament passed the tram bills in March 2006 
(Edinburgh Tram Line One and Two Act 2006). However, funding the construction of 
the entire network  (three phases) was impossible, and for this reason, only two of the 
line one with physical dimensions of 18.5km for line 1a and 5.5 km of line 1b received 
parliamentary permission. In 2007, the Final Business Case for the tram network was 
passed by the City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) (The Scotsman: 22 December 2007, 
retrieved 21 November 2011). Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (TIE), a private limited 
company, wholly owned subsidiary by the CEC was formed in 2002 to deliver the tram 
system and other major transport projects for the CEC. Contracts to build the network 
were concluded in April/May 2008 (The Scotsman: 25 October 2007, retrieved 21 June 
2012) and construction was due to be originally completed in summer 2011 with an 
estimated completion cost of £545 million. 
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                            Figure 4.1: Proposed Route of the Edinburgh Trams  
                              Source: The City of Edinburgh Council, 2013. 
 
Due to funding issues, changes were made to the delivery of the original route (See 
Figure 4.1). For instance in April 2009, Phase 1b consisting of the tram line between 
Roseburn and Granton Square was postponed due to the economic downturn (Johnson, 
2008 and BBC News: 24 April 2009, retrieved 11 January 2012). Delays, cost overruns, 
contractual disputes between TIE and BB & S and funding problems had caused further 
changes to the route. In September 2011, the City Council voted for the first phase of 
the tram route to go from the city’s airport to the York Place, a location near St. 
Andrews Square and took direct control of the project. While legislative approval was 
obtained for all three phases of the project, only Phase 1a is currently being progressed. 
 
 
For details of the entire project, a summary of its basic information is presented in Table 
4.1. Stakeholder Relationship Map in Figure 4.2 and original tram project board of 
governance in Figure 4.3. It is intended that the project would support and promote a 
growing local economy for Edinburgh and create a healthy, safe and sustainable 
environment when completed (Audit Scotland, 2007). According to CEC, the trams will 
carry large volumes of passengers, quickly along their route and will not be hampered 
by general traffic when completed. The new modern tram system, they said, will offer 
an environmental friendly future as they are electrically powered, so there will be no 
vehicle emissions. They will create a fast and high capacity service that has proven 
popular and successful in many European cities.  The tram is expected to be operational 
in 2014. 
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                 Table 4.1: Basic Information of Edinburgh Tram Network Project 
Project Title Edinburgh Tram Network (ETN) Project  
Location  Scotland, UK  
Purpose  -  To support the local economy by improving accessibility. 
-  To promote sustainability and reduce environmental damage caused 
by traffic. 
- To reduce traffic congestion. 
-  To make the transport system safer and more secure. 
-  To promote social benefits.  
Scope  The Tramline will be double track to:  
-  Connect Edinburgh Airport to the City Centre 
-  Link with development areas in North and West Edinburgh  
Contractual 
Framework  
The key contracts are as follows: 
- Development Partnering and Operating Franchise Agreement 
(DPOFA); 
- System Design Services (SDS); 
- Joint Revenue Committee (JRC); 
- Multi Utilities Diversion Framework Agreement (MUDFA); 
- Infrastructure provider and maintenance (Infraco); and 
- Vehicle supply and maintenance (Tramco).  
Relevant 
Physical 
Dimensions  
Total length: 24 km in two phases 
- Phase 1a: 18.5km,  is being developed (Case study)  
- Phase 1b: 5.5 km, to be developed later  
Cost 
(£ million)  
 
- Planned project budget   =   545 
- Validated budget             =  776 
- Cost variation                  =  231 
Year of 
completion 
- Original planned date  was 2011 
- Expected new date is 2014 
Source: Edinburgh Tram Project, the City of Edinburgh Council report no. CEC/41/11-12/CE 
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Table 4.1: Basic Information of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (Continued)  
Stakeholders  Category  Bodies Involved 
In
tern
al  
Supply 
Side  
Client  City of Edinburgh Council (CEC)  
Financiers  Transport Scotland (TS) and City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) 
Sponsors  Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (Tie) and Transport Edinburgh Limited (TEL)  
Client’s Customers  UK Tram, Edinburgh Trams 
Client’s Owners  Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (Tie), Transport Edinburgh Limited (TEL), Lothian Buses (LB)  
Other internal 
supply side 
categories  
Category  Case-Study  
Tram Project Board  (TPB)  A formal sub-committee of TEL. Delegated authority to  monitor the 
delivery of the trams project  
Council Audit Committee (PAC)  Project Audit  
MPs/ Ministers  Parliamentary & political parties representatives  
Demand 
Side 
Main Contractor  Bilfinger Berger Siemens (BBS) - Responsible for infrastructure construction (INFRACO).  
First Tier 
Contractors  
Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles SA (CAF) - Responsible for tram vehicle construction (TRAMCO).  
Alfred McAlpine Infrastructure Services/Carillion-Responsible for utilities diversion work  
Parsons Brinkerhoff/Halcrow - SDS provider to facilitate the early identification of utility diversion works, land 
purchase requirements and traffic regulation requirements and the completion of design drawings.  
Second Tier 
Consultants  
Faithful & Gould: Construction cost management consultants responsible for risk management procedures.  
Hg Consulting - Independent Certifier with a duty of care to CEC 
Steer Davies Gleave (SDG) – Assessed economic costs and benefits of the Trams project in December, 2007.  
Professional 
Services Providers  
Transdev- was appointed as the tram operator in May 2004 to assist planning of an integrated service network 
with TEL. Transdev was later cancelled in December 2009 as a cost saving measure.  
Other internal 
supply side 
categories  
Category Case-Study 
Financial, Commercial and Legal Committee 
(FCL)  
Financial management - Reporting, control, audit, risk 
management, insurance; and Contract management – 
Reporting, compliance, interface with delivery, claims and 
variations.  
Source: Edinburgh Tram Project, the City of Edinburgh Council report no. CEC/41/11-12/CE 
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Table 4.1: Basic Information of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (Continued) - Stakeholder Identification (External) 
Stakeholders Category  Bodies Involved  
E
x
tern
al  
Public  Regulatory Agencies  SEPA, Scottish Water, Parliament, Planning, Road  & aviation authority,  Network rail, Historic 
Scotland,  Building Standards  
Local Government  City of Edinburgh Council (CEC)  
National Government  Scottish Government  
Other internal supply-side 
categories  
Category  Case-study  
CEC councillors & officials,  CEC representatives 
Private  Local residents  Edinburgh residents (Randolph Crescent, Queen Street, Moray Feu, Blenheim, Shandwick, Picardy , 
Leith Walk, Forth Ports etc..)  
Local Landowners   
Environmentalists  SEPA, Friends of the Earth Scotland; Sustainable Scotland Network; Lothian & Edinburgh 
Environmental Partnership; Scottish Environment Link; Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH). Scottish 
Executive’s Countryside and Natural Heritage Unit (CANHU).  
Conservationists   
Archaeologists  Headland Archaeology (UK) Limited; City Council Archaeologists –Edinburgh, Glasgow 
University Archaeological Research Division (GUARD)  
Other External Private 
stakeholders  
Category  Case study  
B.A.A Edinburgh Airport;  Henderson Global Investors (St. James 
Centre); Forth Ports; Edinburgh Business Forum; Essential Edinburgh; 
Federation of small businesses- Scotland; Edinburgh Chamber of 
Commerce; and representatives of local communities impacted by the 
Trams.  
Key business and other 
stakeholders  
 
Source: Edinburgh Tram Project, the City of Edinburgh Council report no. CEC/41/11-12/CE 
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Table 4.1: Basic Information of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (Continued)  
External Stakeholder  External Stakeholder’s 
Attitude to this Project  
External Stakeholder’s 
Influence on project  
Impact of Project on 
External Stakeholder  
B.A.A Edinburgh Airport  Positive  High  Low  
Henderson Global Investors (St. James Centre)  Positive  High  High  
Forth Ports  Positive  High  Low  
Edinburgh Business Forum  Positive  High  High  
Essential Edinburgh  Positive  Low  High  
Federation of small businesses- Scotland  Positive  Low  High  
Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce  Positive  High  Low  
Representatives of local communities impacted by the Trams.  Positive  Low  High  
 
 
Table 4.1: Basic Information of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (Continued) - Project Organisation 
Client Project Team Size & Structure  350 
Contractor Project Team Size and Structure  3000 
Sub-Contractor Project Team Involvement  n/a 
Project Tools and Techniques Life-Cycle Costing Approaches ,  Stakeholder Involvement, Building Information Modelling (BIM), 
Project Management Software,   Relationship Management Tools,  Project Knowledge Management 
Tools,  Project Knowledge Management Tools,  Team Building Tools,             
Source: Edinburgh Tram Project, the City of Edinburgh Council report no. CEC/41/11-12/CE 
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Table 4.1: Basic Information of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (Continued) 
Political Project Environment  The political project environment for ETNP varies in 
influence according to the number of political seats 
or elected members within the City of Edinburgh 
Council (CEC).  
Legal and Regulatory Project 
Environment (regionally, nationally 
and Europe wide)  
ETNP is governed by the following Legal and 
Regulatory frameworks (regionally, nationally and 
Europe wide) 
-  Edinburgh Tram Acts 
- New Roads and Street Works Act (NRSWA)  
-  Code of Construction Practice (Buildings, 
Roads, Bridges)  
- The Road Traffic Regulation for the tram 
- The Local Authorities' Traffic Orders 
(Procedure) (Scotland) Regulations 1999 as 
amended. 
- Environmental Impact Assessment (Scotland) 
Regulations (covering: Traffic and Transport, 
Land Use, Geology, Soils and Contaminated 
Land, Landscape and Visual Impacts, Ecology 
and Nature Conservation, Water Quality, 
Cultural Heritage, Socio Economic Effects, 
Noise and Vibration, Air Quality). 
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EU) 
Regulations.  
Economic Project  Environment  Economic Project  Environment for ETN project is 
based on the following economic benefits: 
-    Reduction of travel time. 
-    Economic efficiency.  
-    Employment development. 
-    Employment generation. 
-    Residential development 
-    Economic growth.  
Source: Edinburgh Tram Project, the City of Edinburgh Council report no. CEC/41/11-12/CE 
 
115 
Funding Authority
Transport Scotland (TS)
The Council
Project Audit Committee
The Council/TS/Elected Member Reps 
Project Sponsor
City of Edinburgh Council
(Project Director)
External Stakeholder 
Group
(Key business & other 
stakeholders)
Joint Project Delivery 
Group
Joint Project Forum
Strategic Direction & 
Control
Council Chair
Senior responsible Officer
Council/Tie/TS/BB&S/CAF/
Tram Operator
Employing Audit Scotland 
Best Value Advanced 
Practice Toolkits
Independent Certifier
Risk
Design
Consents
Programme
Jointly Appointed 
Independent Adjudicator
(Engineering Experts)
BB & S
CAF
CONTRACTS
Traffic Management (CEC)
Approvals
Design (Approvals/Consents/Management)
Contract Variation
Construction Progress Reporting
Valuation/Cost
Land Acquisitions & Compensation
Remedial Works
Tram Vehicle Delivery & Integration
Communications
Health & Safety/The Railways & Other guided 
Transport Systems Safety Regulations
Project Actor Project Relationship- -
Key:
 
 
         Figure 4.2: Stakeholder Relationship Map for Edinburgh Tram Network Project 
Source: Audit Scotland (2011). 
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City of Edinburgh Council
Director of City Development
Transport Scotland
Director of Rail Delevery
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Chief Executive
Tie
 Executive Chair
Sub-Committee
 Design, procurement and delivery
Sub-Committee
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commercials
Tram Project Director
 and team
TEL Team
 Planning, integration and commercial
Tram Project Board
Chaired by TEL Chair
 
 
                   Figure 4.3: Original Tram Project Board Governance Structure 
Source: Audit Scotland (2011) 
 
4.2.2.1. Tram Network Construction and Civil Engineering Works 
Until August 2011, the construction of ETNP was overseen by Transport Initiatives 
Edinburgh (TIE), a company wholly owned by CEC who were responsible for project-
managing the construction of the tramway (Henderson, 2009). The construction involved 
new bridges, retaining walls, viaducts, the tram depot and control centre, electrical sub 
stations to provide current to the overhead lines at 750 volts, track laying and tram stops. 
 
In July 2007, work to divert utilities (See Exhibit 1) along the tram route started under 
the Multi-Utilities Framework Agreement (MUDFA) to pave way for track-laying in 
Leith (BBC News, 9 July 2007). These works were followed by the System Design 
Services (SDS), which was jointly led by Parsons Brinckerhoff and Halcrow Group 
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Limited. In May 2008, the final contracts to build the tram system were awarded to 
a consortium of Bilfinger Berger and Siemens  (BB&S) and Spanish tram builder 
Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles (CAF) (Rowson, 2008).  
 
             Exhibit 1: Utility Diversions for Edinburgh Trams Network Construction 
 
Leith Walk
West End -Princes Street
West Maitland Street & Haymarket
 
 Source: The City of Edinburgh Council, 2013. 
 
As part of the project, 12 new bridges were built at - Balgreen Road Bridge, Balgreen 
Road Access Bridge (Network Rail); Carrick Knowe Bridge; Depot Access Bridge; 
Edinburgh Park Station bridge; Gogarburn Bridge; Roseburn Street Bridge; Russell Road 
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Bridge; South Gyle Access Bridge and the Water of Leith Bridge. A tunnel under the A8 
near the Gogar roundabout was also built (See Exhibit 2) while the Murrayfield Viaduct 
was adapted for trams to pass under it (Railway-technology, 2013). Some demolishing 
works such as buildings listed to fall under Category C(S) in the former Caledonian 
Alehouse on Haymarket Terrace (Edinburgh Tram Line One Bill of Environmental 
Statement) were carried out to allow the building of a tram interchange at Haymarket 
station. Table 4.2 presents the bridges built and their individual lengths and widths in 
metres. 
 
                      Table 4.2: Bridges Built to accommodate Edinburgh Tram 
Bridge Length (M) Width (M) 
Balgreen Road bridge 25 9 
Balgreen Road - Network Rail access Bridge 9 4 
Carrick Knowe Bridge 32 12 
Depot Access Bridge 28 20 
Edinburgh Park Station Bridge 232 10 
Gogarburn bridge 17 10 
Roseburn Street Bridge 34 11 
Russell Road Bridge 16 20 
Haymarket Viaduct 55 13 
Haymarket Depot Access Bridge 12 10 
South Gyle Access Bridge 43 10 
Water of Leith Bridge 63 10 
Source: The City of Edinburgh Council, 2013. 
 
Also, sections of some on-street track were laid into a special foundation with cobbled 
road surfacing designed to be sympathetic with the existing style of the streets in 
Edinburgh. However, this cobbled road surfacing was taken off in many places due to 
oppositions from cyclists (CEC: Prior Approval 12/00915/PA at York Place).   
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 Tracks over the Carrick Knowe Bridge
Completed Tram Bridge over Roseburn 
Street leading to Murray field tram stop
A8 Roadway TunnelSouth Gyle Access Bridge
Water of Leith Bridge situated between Balgreen road 
and Murray field tram stops
Russell Road Bridge Murray field Viaduct under construction
 
                                     Exhibit 2: Edinburgh Trams Bridge Photos 
Source: The City of Edinburgh Council, 2013. 
In late 2011, Transport Initiatives Edinburgh (TIE) was released from managing the 
ETNP.  Turner & Townsend, a project management consultant was brought in by CEC to 
ensure effective oversight and delivery of the project. Work in 2012 continued smoothly 
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on schedule with a new governance structure indicated in Figure 4.4 under the 
management of Turner and Townsend.  
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 Figure 4.4: Governance Structure for Edinburgh Tram Network Project as at June 2013 
 
Source: The City of Edinburgh Council, 2013. 
 
 However, in May 2013, it was revealed that more than 150 metres of concrete track bed 
was not laid to the correct specifications between Shandwick Place and Haymarket and 
as a result, needed replacement (See Exhibit 3). The City of Edinburgh Council (CEC) 
issued assurances that this would not affect the original deadline of the project (The 
Scotsman, 31 May 2013). BB & S later admitted the deficiency with regard to the 
concrete track bed and began to remedy it. This led to further disruption of Shandwick 
Place and Haymarket, which was intended to be free of track works by September 2013 
(The Scotsman, 9 August 2013). In June 2013, overhead electric wires were installed on 
the city centre portion of the route (See Exhibit 4). This has been considered the “last 
major step” in the construction process (RailStaff, 21 June 2013) 
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Concrete bed stripped offCracks in tram track bed
Concrete bed re-laid in progress Concrete re-laid
 
Exhibit 3: Relaying of concrete bed for tram track between Shandwick Place and 
Haymarket. 
 
Source: Miller, D. (2013). Edinburgh News (09 August 2013)  
 
The trams are powered by overhead cables attached to purposely-built poles and some 
mounted to the sides of buildings (The Scotsman, 10 August 2013). Out of nine electrical 
sub-stations (underground and above-ground) proposed for the line to Newhaven, only 
five are in place due to the truncation of the tramline to York Place (BBC News, 24 April 
2008).  
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                    Exhibit 4: Overhead Electric wire installation on the Princes Street 
Source: The City of Edinburgh Council, 2013. 
 
Talks between the Scottish Government and Edinburgh Council revealed on the 17 
September 2013 that works on the tram scheme were running two months ahead of 
schedule, and would be opened by May 2014 (BBC News, 17 September 2013). In 
October 2013, all tram and road works were completed (BBC News, 18 October 
2013). On 8 October 2013, testing of the trams began between the depot and Edinburgh 
Park. This was followed by the energising of tram wires from Bankhead tram stop to 
York Place in November 2013, marking the first time that the route was completely 
energised (City of Edinburgh Council, 19 November 2013). Testing along the full length 
of the route is scheduled to begin by December 2013 (Edinburgh Evening News, 9 
October 2013 and 17 September 2013). The network will be operated from a depot 
at Gogar, close to the A8 roundabout, just north of the Gyle tram stop (Barr Construction, 
2011). 
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4.2.2.2. Contractual Disputes 
Until February 2011, contractual disputes (See Figure 4.4) and further utility diversion 
works resulted in significant delays to the project beyond the originally planned 
programme (See Figure 4.5).  
 
816 notices of claims 
received
139 withdrawn677 continued with
426 estimates 
submitted
198 settled at cost of £23.8 
million compared to £44.0 
million claimed (54 per cent)
228 rejected or 
not settled
20 settled through formal 
dispute resolution process. 
£11.2 million paid compared 
to £24.0 claimed (47 per cent)
178 settled through informal 
means. £12.6 million paid 
compared to £20.0 million 
claimed (63 per cent)
Seven resolved through 
negotiation. £3.7 million paid 
compared to £8.1 million 
claimed (45 per cent)
Two resolved through external 
mediation. £3.5 million paid 
compared to £7.0 million 
claimed (50 per cent)
11 resolved through 
adjudication. £4.0 million paid 
compared to £8.9 million 
claimed (45 per cent)
 
 
                  Figure 4.4: Disputes and Changes in Edinburgh Tram Network Project  
 
Source: Audit Scotland (2011) 
 
To the end of December 2010, BB&S has submitted 816 notices to claim of which 139 
were later withdrawn. BB&S has submitted cost estimates in respect of 426 out of the 
remaining 677 notices to claim. TIE and BB&S have settled 198 of these claims with the 
others either rejected or not yet agreed. The cost to TIE of those settled has been £23.8 
million compared to the £44.0 million claimed by BB&S (54 per cent). Included within 
the 198 settled are 20 which have been settled through formal dispute resolution 
procedures, as allowed for in the contract. These have reduced BB&S’s claims for 
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additional payment from £24.0 million to £11.2 million (47 per cent). A further five cases 
being resolved through dispute resolution procedures have been referred for external 
adjudication or negotiation is in progress. TIE considers these adjudications have helped 
clarify some of the contractual issues which were in dispute with BB&S. 
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                               Figure 4.5: Project Delivery against Key Milestones 
Source: Audit Scotland, 2007 
 
4.2.2.3. Risks  
 Social Issues 
Although extensive consultations and involvement of stakeholders were carried out on 
ETNP, impacts by the project during its construction phases on the social environment 
have generated controversy and/or opposition. Delays in the tram works caused many 
grievances and criticisms by local businesses along the tram routes, who claimed that 
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their income has been adversely affected by long-term road closures in the centre of 
Edinburgh since 2008 (BBC News, 29 April 2008) and by Edinburgh residents who have 
expressed displeasure over the delays (BBC News, 29 April 2008).  CEC and the 
developer were further criticized when construction works were delayed in 2009 causing 
obstruction across the city during the Edinburgh Festival and Fringe (McIntosh, 2009). 
Further obstruction occurred in January 2010, when construction was suspended due to 
unexpected freezing temperatures during winter (Edinburgh Evening News, 9 January 
2010). 
 
 
 Technical Issues 
Disruptions from tram works were also a concern to Edinburgh residents. For example, 
cycling groups in the city voiced safety concerns after some cyclists suffered accidents 
when their bicycle wheels became caught in tram tracks. Road surfaces around the tracks 
in some parts of the city were also reported to be crumbling, raising further safety 
problems. In response, TIE carried out road repairs while Edinburgh Trams agreed to 
fund special training for local cyclists (BBC News, 7 December 2009). Further safety 
concerns were raised in 2010 by residents along the tram routes about the suspension of 
overhead electric cables from residential buildings, with some property owners refusing 
to give permission for the cables to be attached (Marshall, 4 March 2010). 
 
In September 2011, Princes Street was again closed to all traffic for around 10 months to 
allow repairs on the crumbling tarmac around the tram lines before they had been used 
(The Scotsman News, 09 March 2011; BBC News, 17 September 2011). In just after two 
months, the city centre residents filed a complaint with the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee in 
December 2011, arguing that traffic diversions through residential streets during the 
protracted construction of the tramline has resulted in environmental (increased pollution 
and noise) and social (health issues) risks impacts on residents. The Council countered 
that monitoring was on-going and no sites data breached EU limits (BBC News, 13 
December 2011). 
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However, motorists and commuters in the capital continued to face new disruption in 
January 2012 when the project entered its critical phase. On January 7, 2012, St Andrew 
Street, near Waverley Station and Edinburgh's bus interchange, were closed to traffic to 
allow work  to begin on the route which was expected to last throughout 2012, while 
Shandwick Place, west of the city centre, was also closed a week later, with work due to 
be completed by spring 2013. 
 
 Environmental Issues 
 
In December, 2003, the full Environmental Statement (ES) of ETNP line one was 
published. This was done in accordance with the standing orders of the Scottish 
Parliament and determinations by the Presiding Officer, which require that projects 
approved by private Act of Parliament must be subjected to Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) and under the scope of the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(Scotland) Regulations 1999 (the EIA Regulations). Since the proposals for Line One of 
the ETNP exceeded the threshold of EIA Regulations (more than one hectare), the 
project’s characteristics during development were considered likely to have significant 
environmental effects. This resulted in TIE commissioning Environmental Resource 
Management (ERM) to undertake an assessment of the proposals.  
 
 
The assessment by the ERM considered the potential environmental impacts of the tram 
proposals on people, property, the natural and cultural heritage, including effects of the 
permanent development of land and structures for the scheme, short term, and temporary 
impacts during construction, and long term effects resulting from tram operations.  Hence 
the Environmental Statement (ES) for Edinburgh Tram Line One was produced in 
accordance with the requirements of the EIA Regulations. Prior to preparation of the ES, 
a scoping study was undertaken early in the EIA process, and an Environmental Scoping 
Report was prepared following consultations with statutory and non-statutory 
environmental organisations indicated in Table 4.3 as an important part of the EIA 
process. The first was undertaken early in the process to identify key issues and to guide 
the scope of the EIA. The findings of this part of the EIA process were reported in an 
Environmental Scoping Report. 
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      Table 4.3:  Organisations and Groups consulted during the EIA for ETNP Line one. 
Statutory Authorities and Agencies Non Statutory Groups and Organisations 
- City of Edinburgh Council (Planning and 
Strategy; Archaeology; Environmental & 
Consumer Services; Biodiversity). 
- Health and Safety Executive 
- Historic Scotland 
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency 
(SEPA), East Region 
- Scottish Executive Environment and Rural 
Affairs Department 
- Scottish Executive Development 
Department, Planning Division 
- Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) 
- Scottish Water 
- Architectural Heritage Society of Scotland 
- Cockburn Association 
- Cyclists Touring Club 
- Edinburgh and Lothian Badger Group 
- Edinburgh Architectural Association 
- Edinburgh World Heritage Trust 
- Friends of the Earth Scotland 
- Lothian Bat Group 
- National Trust for Scotland 
- Royal Fine Art Commission for Scotland 
- Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds(RSPB) Scotland 
- Scottish Civic Trust 
- Scottish Enterprise Edinburgh & Lothian 
- Scottish Rights of Way and Access Society 
- Scottish Wildlife Trust 
- SPOKES Lothian Cycle Campaign 
- Sustrans 
- VisitScotland 
                          Source: Edinburgh Tram line one environmental statement (2003) 
 
In addition to the specific consultations, a programme of public consultations was held 
from 14 May 2003 to 10 July 2003 for the EIA. These included leaflet distribution; press 
launches; touring exhibitions at a series of locations; a static city centre exhibition; a 
series of public meetings; and consultations with a range of third parties including 
community groups, political parties, business and tourism groups, disability and transport 
groups. In all, many published information leaflets were delivered to over 100,000 homes 
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and businesses to raise awareness of the tram proposals and its effects on both the society 
and the environment. 
 
 
Despite the numerous consultations and environmental impact awareness creation, a visit 
to ETNP sites during the early 2011 and mid-2013, revealed environmental related track 
repair works on the Princes Street and the Haymarket respectively. The repairs were 
believed to have been caused by the extreme weather conditions suffered in 2009 and 
2010 which both the contractors and project owners had no control over. This points out 
to the fact that significant risks of project time and cost overruns and quality deficiency 
in the project are largely related to environmental problems. 
 
 
 Political Issues 
 
As in any major national project, the Edinburgh Tram Network Project had been marred 
with political issues from the early stages of the project's life. Political disputes between 
the Scottish National Party (SNP) on one side, who have opposed the project and other 
political parties including Labour, Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and Green Party on 
the other who have generally backed the scheme, had been on the increase. 
 
 
The SNP councillors did not see themselves bound to support the project and as such lost 
some opportunities in tackling the project even though they were part of the 
administration sponsoring it. The political disagreement was stronger and ran through the 
middle of the ruling coalition on CEC until the Scottish Government cancelled the 
Edinburgh Airport Rail Link in favour of making the trams the means of linking the City 
Centre and the main line rail network to the airport. The Scottish Government later 
committed itself to building a new station on the Edinburgh-Fife/Aberdeen line at Gogar 
to link with the trams and the airport. 
  
 
Road closures for the MUDFA contract generated grievances, anger, bitterness and a 
feeling of displeasure for the new tram project from the public as the disruption 
increased. This was not helped by some inaccurate media reports in the local press and 
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comments by some opposition politicians. Certainly, public opinion during early 
consultation indicated support for the project before construction commenced and will 
certainly be in favour of it during operation. However, the never-ending road works and 
street closures with barriers in place in the City Centre forced some political affiliated 
Edinburgh residents and some politicians to oppose and contend against one another. 
 
4.3: Summary 
This chapter presents the case study adopted for the research. It summarizes the 
background of the ETNP starting from its history through to the risk issues that caused 
changes in the project performance between the initial estimate of time, cost and scope to 
the current project completion time, cost and scope. The changes in performance (usually 
delays, over budget and quality deficiency) that caused a shift in the estimated midpoint 
of construction were identified to be attributed to specific social, technical, economic, 
environmental and political risks present in the project environment. While it is not 
practical to discuss the full implications of all the risks identified in the project, Tables 
4.4 and 4.5 demonstrate a summary of specific risks impacting on the project 
environment and the specific technical risks impacting on the social and natural 
environments respectively.  
 
 
                      Table 4.4: Specific Risks Impacting on the Project Environment 
Specific risks  Risk type References 
Social  Social grievances BBC News, ( 29 April 2008); The Scotsman, (22 
December 2009); McIntosh, (2009); BBC News, (7 
December 2009) 
Multi-level decision 
making bodies 
Transport Initiatives Edinburgh, (2007). 
Disputes Henderson, (2010a); Dalton, (2010); Aitken (2009). 
Legal Actions Henderson, (2010a); Gilbert, (2008). 
Stakeholder's 
criticism/pressure 
Marshall, (2010); BBC News, (7 December 2009) 
Social Issues BBC News, (29 April 2008); The Scotsman (22 
December 2009); McIntosh (2009); BBC News (7 
December 2009). 
Source: Desktop Search and Field Survey 2013. 
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Table 4.4: Specific Risks Impacting on the Project Environment (continued) 
Specific risks  Risk type References 
Technical  Project scope changes  BBC News, (17 September 2011);Ferguson, 
(2010), 
Ground conditions on given 
project sites 
Severin (2011)     
Inadequate project complexity 
analysis 
BBC News, (17 September 2011) 
Modification to project 
specification 
The Scotsman, (31 May 2013)  
Technical difficulties in utilities 
diversions 
Audit Scotland (2007) 
Engineering and design change BBC News, (17 September 2011) 
Project quality deficiency The Scotsman, (9 March 2011); BBC News, (17 
September 2011); The Scotsman, (31 May 2013); 
The Scotsman, (9 August 2013) 
Supply chain breakdown Mumford (2011) 
Rework The Scotsman, (31 May 2013); The Scotsman, (9 
August 2013) 
Project time overruns Millet (2009); Henderson, (2010b); Henderson, 
(2009); Marshall, (2010); STV News, (10 March 
2010); Wright, (2010).  
Project cost overruns Severin, (2011); Marshall, (2011); Ferguson, 
(2010); Wright, (2010);  BBC News, (19 August 
2011) 
Economic Incorrect project cost estimate Severin, (2011); Marshall, (2011); Ferguson, 
(2010); Wright, (2010); Leask, (2010);  BBC 
News, (19 August 2011) 
Incorrect project time estimate Henderson, (2010a); Gilbert, (2008); STV News, 
(10 March 2010) 
Wage inflation Wright, (2010);  BBC News, (20 June 2012) 
Global economic recession  Johnson, (2008), BBC News, (2009) 
Cost and delays due to utilities 
diversions 
Henderson, (2009); Marshall, (2010); Wright, 
(2010).   
Changes in inflation as 
construction works proceed  
BBC News, (2 September 2011); The Scotsman, 
(23 June 2010). 
Funding problems Audit Scotland, (2007); Severin, (2011); BBC 
News (30 August 2011)   
Environmental  Freezing temperatures Mumford, (2011); The Scotsman, (9 January 
2010). 
Pollution (water, air, noise etc.) BBC News, (13 December 2011) 
Political  Lack of political support 
(opposition) 
Audit Scotland, (2007); BBC News (30 August 
2011)   
Lack of partner support Audit Scotland (2007), BBC News, (30 August 
2011)   
Political indecision BBC News, (30 August 2011)   
Project termination Millet (2009), 
Contractual disputes  Henderson, (2010a); Dalton (2010); Aitken 
(2009). 
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Source: Desktop Search and Field Survey 2013. 
 Table 4.5: Specific Technical Risks Impacting on the Social and Natural Environments 
Project phase Source of impacts Potential impacts 
Environmental Social  
Construction - Drilling/piling 
operations 
- Demolishing works 
- Earthworks  
- Concrete works 
- Machine operation 
(Heavy duty 
vehicles and 
equipment) 
- Vibration 
- Disturbances 
- Vegetation loss 
- Damage to ecosystem 
- Contamination of the 
local environment 
- Damage to cultural 
heritage 
- Pollution (Air, noise 
etc.) 
- Habitat changes 
- Effects on air quality 
- Footprint impacts to 
habitats/flora 
- Disturbance of fauna 
- Noise impacts on 
animals  
- Temporary/ permanent 
loss of habitat.  
- Vibration 
- Noise 
- Disturbances 
- Health problems 
- Property loss 
- damage to 
structures 
- traffic 
congestions 
- loss of income 
- decreased 
recreational 
activities 
- Loss of rent 
value 
- Clean-up cost 
 
Source: Desktop Search and Field Survey 2013. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the first part of the data analysis. Having concluded the research 
introductory, the relevant literature review and the research methodology chapters, a 
preliminary analysis is undertaken as a prelude to the substantive analysis which led to 
the development of the MegaDS model for the assessment of risks in transportation 
megaprojects. This distinction was considered important so as to develop a better 
understanding of the data and also to reduce it to a manageable size. In this respect, the 
analyses presented here are based on respondents’ perception towards risk factors 
impacting on project time, cost and quality of transportation megaprojects during 
construction. 
 
 
Data analysis is based on the structure of both the questionnaire surveys and opinions 
from professionals in the construction industry. The demographic data for both the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches is analysed using descriptive statistics 
(specifically percentages) while the dependent risk variables are analysed using Weighted 
Quantitative Score (WQS) method, the Analytical Network Process for pairwise 
comparison and subsequently system dynamics modelling. WQS is first implemented to 
reduce the results of the potential risk variables to a manageable value and size towards 
the subsequent development of the ANP models. 
 
 
5.2. Results and Discussions 
As noted in Section 5.1, qualitative and quantitative approaches were employed to 
understand the perception of construction professionals towards risk factors influencing 
project time, cost and quality of transportation megaprojects in the construction phase. 
The aim was to seek experts’ opinions through interviews and the administration of 
questionnaire surveys on a transportation megaproject under construction in Edinburgh 
(UK). Accordingly, data was collected between April 2013 and July 2013. Results of the 
data collected and detailed preliminary analysis are discussed in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. 
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5.2.1. The Qualitative Approach  
In all, 20 experienced personnel, who are involved in transportation megaproject 
development in the UK, were interviewed. Although, interviewees varied in their trade, 
they were selected randomly. Due to the need to maintain strict confidentiality, the names 
and designation of interviewees will not be disclosed. The structure and format of the 
interviews is illustrated in Appendix (B).  The interviewer was free to ask additional 
questions that focused on issues arising during the course of the interview. The freedom 
to follow the interviewee, to ask for clarifications, and to focus on specific risks and other 
issues impacting on project performance made the interviews insightful. 
 
 
As Table 5.1 indicates, interviewees had extensive experience in the construction 
industry ranging from 12 years to 23 years. The total professional experience of the 20 
interviewees is 309 years and an average of 15.45 years. Interviewees chosen are seniors 
in their respective companies. They are more directly related to the construction 
environment and their positions interact with the organizational policies and practice. As 
such, respondents have enough technical background and experience in dealing with risk 
issues in megaproject development at the construction phase. 
 
 
Respondents were asked to identify the generic risk events inherent in transportation 
megaprojects that affect project performance during construction. For contractors, 
consultants and project engineers, the responses fell generally into two categories. First 
and most often cited was that contractual disputes, funding issues, tight environmental 
regulations and political interference in the project impact on megaproject development. 
Second, technical difficulties such as ground condition problems, utility diversion issues 
and archaeological finds in certain portions of the project during construction result in 
added delays and extra cost to the main contractors.   
 
Further to the generic risk events, other issues identified as most important by nearly all 
respondents was the source of funding and its stability for a megaproject development. 
Owners emphasized the criticality of ensuring that the business case and the economic 
model of a megaproject are realistically aligned. Owners were also concerned with 
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potential problems with unnecessary claims from contractors, social unacceptability at 
some points, and issues of security and safety. They also noted the importance of dealing 
with reputable and qualified contractors. 
 
                             Table 5.1: Summary of Interviewees Profile and Demography 
Type of 
organisation 
Type of project Size of 
project (£) 
Designation Interviewee (i) 
Number 
(N) 
Year of 
experience 
(Ye) per (i)  
Total 
(N*Ye)  
Client  Building  > 0.5 billion Site manager 4 13 52 
Consultant  Building  0.5-1 billion Project manager 3 15 45 
Contractor  Transportation  0.5-1billion Project engineer  4 23 92 
Consultant  Utility 
diversion 
< 0.5 billion Project manager 5 12 60 
Contractor  Build-Infra >1 billion Project engineer 4 15 60 
Total = 20 64 309 yrs. 
Average experience = ∑ (N*Ye) per (i) / N = 248 /20 = 15. 45 years  
 
When asked about how the qualitative risk effects on the project performance can be 
quantified and analyzed to reduce under performances in megaproject construction,  
almost all of those interviewed, reported that every organization on the project had 
specific requirements and a set down process used to identify, assess, and manage risks. 
A third of the respondents noted that a number of firms undertook risk assessments on an 
ad hoc basis where location or sub contract type and size dictate whether an assessment 
or analysis would take place. It appeared that larger projects had a much greater chance 
of quantifying risks to the project management team for a formal assessment. 
 
 
Some of the project management team representatives interviewed were noted to be very 
familiar with the use and applications of quantitative and financial risk modelling 
techniques for assessing the impact of risk on megaprojects. However, they expressed the 
difficulties with transforming the results to risk management strategies for project 
managers or for use on specific projects. These organizations were very knowledgeable 
of risk management theory, concepts, and principles but noted the difficulties of 
determining the relevance of issues and what risks are of most significant for their own 
concerns as well as for other project participants.  
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Respondents were further asked to judge the effectiveness of their risk assessment 
practices for megaprojects during construction. Only three respondents noted that their 
current process and practices were completely adequate and effective in identifying and 
assessing interrelationships of the portfolio of risks for the megaprojects they had 
participated in. The majority of respondents identified the on-going risk assessment 
practices as only fairly adequate/inadequate and less effective as a mechanism to identify 
and prioritize and assess risks. Many interviewees described their procedures as either 
too subjective or too quantitative, and most noted that analysis results could not be used 
across projects. About a third of the respondents reported the use of quantitative methods 
to assess project risk, with the majority relying on subjective judgment. This revealed 
disparities between decision makers and project personnel that can affect the project 
outcomes. 
 
 
In summary, it can be concluded from the interview results that there is no standard and 
effective technique or practice specifically targeted for assessing risks in megaproject 
construction. However, there is a variety of techniques and practices existing to identify 
and assess risks that occur on megaprojects during construction. The results further 
revealed that decisions on country-specific risks were often made by top management 
and separated from other business, technical and operation risks of the project. Few 
project participants have a complete understanding of the generic risks that happen on the 
project, especially at the construction phase. As such, categorizing risks occurs when 
participants only identify, assess and/or manage risks using a specific perspective. 
Megaprojects are often noted to be organized and managed in ways that create 
information and communication disconnects. 
 
 
For a transportation project like ETNP, contracts and contract language are often viewed 
as the most important method to control and allocate project risks, but only few project 
participants understand how risks should be allocated by contract. Misconceptions and 
assumptions about who owns and controls the risk also seemed to be common in this 
project. As a result, interviewees were receptive to the development of a structured risk 
identification, assessment, and management process that gives consideration to the entire 
life cycle of megaprojects. 
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5.2.2. The Quantitative Approach 
Edwards P et al., (2002) advises that in a study of this nature, the method used for the 
main survey should not be significantly different from the method used in the pilot 
survey otherwise the logic of the research method might be defeated. Given that the 
method used for the pilot survey proved reliable and successful, the same method was 
employed for the main survey. Subsequently, the survey instruments were (as in the pilot 
survey) distributed manually to construction professionals working on Edinburgh Tram 
Network Project (ETNP) in Scotland (UK). Nevertheless, notification was sent to two of 
the main contractor’s offices in Haymarket and Gyle Centre in Edinburgh regarding the 
intended purpose of the research and how the data obtained would be handled. The 
information was sent in person by the researcher in the latter part of April 2013. The 
main objective was to inform the potential respondents so that they can be prepared to 
participate in the survey. Indications are that such methods can help improve response 
rates in surveys.  
 
  
Two weeks after sending the prior notification, the survey instruments were despatched 
manually and others by email as attachments. As in the pilot survey, the instruction to 
residents and businesses along the routes of ETNP was delivered and retrieved in person. 
This decision to distribute the greater part of the questionnaires and to retrieve them in 
person was taken for two reasons; first, to ensure that the survey instruments got to the 
intended recipients and secondly, to help improve the response rate.  
 
 
Out of the 400 research questionnaires intended for the survey, only about 300 fully 
addressed instruments, each with a covering letter (see Appendix A) were successfully 
distributed due to lack of adequate number of target groups on the case study project. It 
turned out that some of the potential respondents (Contractors, Engineers, Project 
managers and Client’s representatives), albeit on the ETNP list used in drawing up the 
sampling frame, had ceased operations and/or could not be traced. While the fieldwork 
was on-going, random phone calls were made to some of these respondents in other parts 
of UK to establish progress. A period of up to four weeks was allowed for the fieldwork 
and all completed survey questionnaires were retrieved latest by the first quarter of June 
2013. After several efforts to help improve the response rate, especially when the four 
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week period projected had expired, survey questionnaires that were not retrieved by mid 
July 2013 were declared non-responsive. That is, within a six-week period, all survey 
questionnaires retrieved were put together as indicate in Table 5.2 for analysis. 
 
 
Out of the 300 instruments delivered, 145 completed questionnaires were successfully 
retrieved representing a 48.30% response rate. Of the 145 completed research 
instruments, 5 were partially answered and as a result, were screened out for data 
analysis. Hence, 140 were actually used in developing the substantive ANP models, 
described in chapter six. 
 
                                     Table 5.2: Summary of Survey conducted 
Parameters Values 
Number of questionnaires distributed  300 
Number of responses received 145 
Number of invalid responses 5 
Number of valid responses 140 
Percentage of responses received 48.30 
Percentage of valid responses 46.60 
Source: Field work (2013) 
  
5.2.2.1. Descriptive Quantitative Results and Analysis 
To generate confidence in the credibility of data collected, Table 5.3 was produced to 
indicate a summary of the descriptive results and the analysis for the questionnaire 
survey. The aim is to provide an understanding of the profile of the respondents and the 
role they play in the case study project. As Table 5.3 indicates, the majority of the 
respondents (98) representing 70% are working with the contractor organisations 
followed by others who did not provide their company designation (24) and the 
consultant organisations (18) representing 17.14% and 12.86% respectively. 
 
 
Out of the 140 valid respondents, 99 representing 70.71% play a role as contractors’ team 
member (Project engineer, Project manager, Site engineer, etc.), 17, representing 12.14% 
as consultant’s team member, 16, representing 11.43% as Client’s team member while 8 
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representing 5. 75% did not provide any detail regarding the role they play in the case 
study project. About 132 (94.29%) of the respondents involved in infrastructure related 
works such as earthworks, demolishing works, concrete/masonry works, track laying and 
steel works while 6 (4.29%) and 2 (1.42%) involved in utility diversions and 
administrative support works respectively. A majority of 71 (50.71%) respondents 
worked on ETNP between 3-5 years, 60 representing 42.86% for 1-2 years, 4 
representing 2.86% for less than a year while 5 respondents representing 3.57% worked 
on the ETNP for more 5 years.  
 
 
   Table 5.3: Summary of Descriptive Results and Analysis for the Questionnaire Survey 
Parameter  Frequency  Percentage  Cumulative  
Company Designation 
Client 00 0.00 0.00 
Consultant 18 12.86 12.86 
Main Contractor  98 70.00 82.86 
Other  24 17.14 100.00 
Role in the project 
Client’s team member  16 11.43 11.43 
Consultant’s team member 17 12.14 23.57 
Contractor’s team member  99 70.71 94.28 
Other  8 5.72 100.00 
Type of works 
Infrastructure  132 94.29 94.29 
Utility diversion 6 4.29 98.58 
Others (Administrative support) 2 1.42 100.00 
Years Worked on the project  
Less than 1 year 4 2.86 2.86 
1-2 years 60 42.86 45.72 
3-5 years 71 50.71 96.43 
More than 5 years 5 3.57 100.00 
Procurement Approach 
Traditional lump sum competitive tendering 6 4.29 4.29 
Partnering 11 7.86 12.15 
Management contracting 72 51.43 63.58 
Construction Management 48 34.29 97.87 
Other  (Tri-Party Agreement with *CEC) 3 2.14 100.00 
* refers to the City of Edinburgh Council 
 
Further indications on Table 5.3 revealed that companies involved in ETNP adopted 
various procurement approaches for several work packages within the project. A 
significant number (51.43%) adopted management contracting; 34.29% revealed 
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construction management; 7.86% reported partnering; 4.29% for traditional lump sum 
competitive tendering and 2.14% indicated tri-party agreement approach with the City of 
Edinburgh Council for the utility diversion works. All of this information summarised in 
Table 5.3 indicates that respondents were competent enough and capable of participating 
in the survey. A plausible conclusion therefore is that the respondents are sufficiently 
well vested in the construction of the case study project (ETNP) to provide data which is 
credible. 
 
 
5.2.2.2. Standardised Quantitative Results and Analysis 
As part of the data collection, it was deemed necessary to establish from the respondents 
what their perception was on project performance for Edinburgh Tram Network Project 
and the level of impact of social; technical; economic; Environmental and political 
(STEEP) risks on project cost, time and quality. It was considered that knowledge of this 
kind would provide some basis to have an insight into how the respondents view the 
performance of ETNP with regard to risk effects in the current construction climate in the 
UK. Subsequently the respondents were asked to rate the level of STEEP risks impact on 
project cost, time and quality from very low to very high, where 1 represents very low; 2 
= low; 3 = average or moderate; 4 = High and 5 = very high so that their opinions can be 
standardized to provide a fair idea of what could be the perceived levels of risk impacts 
on the objectives of ETNP.  
 
 
 Adjustments of Participants’ Opinions 
To standardize the results gained from each participant of the questionnaire survey, 
STEEP risks and their respective potential risk variables were tabulated, coded and 
summarized into clusters and risk type. With the help of a Weighted Quantitative Score 
(WQS) method, Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance (RMSI) were calculated and 
the results summarised into a manageable form to aid the Analytical Network Process 
(ANP) pairwise calculations. The RMSI calculations were significantly distinguished 
based on participant’s experience, background and as well as their information in regard 
to the case study. (See Appendix C for detailed results on how the RMSI was performed 
for potential STEEP risks). The steps for performing the RMSI for risk variables are the 
same as the steps involved for the potential STEEP risks and as a result, were not 
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included in this appendix due to the large volume). In this regard, the results achieved by 
WQS are derived by the following equation: 
 
   
 
 
(∑        
 
   
) 
Where 
MV - Indicates the value of mean scores of importance for each criteria/sub-criteria 
calculated by WQS 
E  - Refers to the experimental WQS for each sub/criteria expressed as a percentage 
year of experience multiplied by each participant’s score of importance  
ic - Is the participant’s score of importance for each sub/criteria with respect to cost 
it - Is the participant’s score of importance for each sub/criteria with respect to time 
iq - Is the participant’s score of importance for each sub/criteria with respect to quality 
n - Is the total number of participants in this research (n = 140) 
 
 
Table 5.4: Summary of Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Project Objectives 
Project 
objectives (Po) 
®Mean Values (       
 
(∑         
 
   ) 
 
 
Po Cost Time Quality 
Rounded MVs  
Formulae 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
C: Cost MVp0(C) =  4.9    5  
T: Time MVp0(T) =   4.8   5  
Q: Quality MVp0(Q)=    5.0  5  
®Refer to Appendix (C) for detailed results 
 
 
 
       Table 5.5: Summary of Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Risk Clusters 
Risk Cluster (PR) ®Mean Values (MVRC) = 
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   ) 
Po Cost Time Quality Rounded MVs 
 
Formulae 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) Cost Time Quality 
PR1:Social risks MV PR1  =  4.2 3.6 2.4 4 4 2 
PR2:Technical risks MV PR2    =  4.7 4.7 4.6 5 5 5 
PR3:Economic risks MV PR3    =  4.7 4.6 4.4 5 5 4 
PR4:Environmental risks MV PR4    =  4.1 4.1 4.0 4 4 4 
PR5:Political risks MV PR5   =  4.5 4.0 3.4 5 4 3 
®Refer to Appendix (C) for detailed results 
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                                                          Table 5.6: Summary of Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Risk Variables 
Risk Cluster Type of risks under each Cluster ®Mean Values (MVRisks)  = 
 
 
(∑         
 
   ) 
Po Cost Time Quality Rounded MVs 
Formulae  
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) Cost Time Quality 
PR1: 
Social risks 
SV1:   Social grievances MV SV1 =  5.42 4.51 2.69 5 5 3 
SV2: Multi -level decision making bodies MV SV2 = 9.14 7.88 5.51 9 8 6 
SV3:   Disputes MV SV3 = 9.04 7.81 6.10 9 8 7 
SV4:   Legal Actions MV SV4 = 8.84 7.77 5.85 9 8 6 
SV5:   Stakeholder's pressure MV SV5 = 7.50 6.13 3.81 8 6 4 
SV6:  Treats to person & asset security MV SV6 = 4.35 2.92 2.77 4 3 3 
SV7:   Social Issues MV SV7 = 2.76 2.35 2.43 3 2 3 
PR2: 
Technical risks 
TV1:   Ambiguity of project scope/ Scope change  MV TV1 = 8.22 7.33 4.27 8 7 4 
TV2:   Ground conditions on given project sites MV TV2 = 7.15 6.50 2.80 7 7 3 
TV3:   Inadequate project complexity analysis MV TV3 = 8.91 7.52 5.15 9 8 5 
TV4:   Unforeseen modification to project MV TV4 = 7.73 6.86 4.25 8 7 4 
TV5:   Inaccurate project cost estimate MV TV5 = 8.84 6.92 4.44 9 7 4 
TV6:   Failure to meet specified standards MV TV6 = 8.97 7.03 7.95 9 7 8 
TV7:   Technical difficulties in utilities diversions MV TV7 = 9.08 8.51 3.97 9 9 4 
TV8:   Engineering and design change MV TV8 =  6.32 5.68 3.35 6 6 3 
TV9:   Supply chain breakdown MV TV9 =  5.09 7.13 2.46 5 7 2 
TV10:   Project time overruns MV TV10=  9.25 8.18 4.62 9 8 5 
TV11:   Project cost overruns MV TV11=  9.03 7.34 4.53 9 7 5 
TV12: Inadequate site investigation MV TV12=  8.91 8.22 5.55 9 8 6 
®Refer to Appendix (C) for detailed results 
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    Table 5.6: Summary of Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Risk Variables (Continued) 
Risk Cluster Type of risks under each Cluster ®Mean Values (MVRisks)  = 
 
 
(∑         
 
   ) 
Po Cost Time Quality Rounded MVs 
Formulae  
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) 
 
 
(∑     
 
   
) Cost Time Quality 
PR3: 
Economic risks 
EV1:   Change in government funding policy;  MV EV1 =  8.51 7.18 6.31 9 7 6 
EV2:   Taxation changes; MV EV2 =  3.90 2.41 2.42 4 2 2 
EV3:  Change in government;  MV EV3 =  7.01 6.81 5.84 7 7 6 
EV4:   Wage inflation;  MV EV4 =  3.38 2.34 2.35 3 2 2 
EV5:   Local inflation change;  MV EV5 =  2.91 2.08 2.03 3 2 2 
EV6:   Foreign exchange rate;  MV EV6 =  2.81 2.25 2.17 3 2 2 
EV7:  Material price changes; MV EV7 =  6.65 4.59 4.58 7 5 5 
EV8:   Economic recession;  MV EV8=  5.34 3.44 3.02 5 3 3 
EV9:   Energy price changes;  MV EV9 =  5.70 3.42 2.90 6 4 3 
EV10:   Catastrophic environmental effects;  MV EV10=  7.12 6.82 5.57 7 7 6 
EV11: Project technical difficulties  MV EV11=  8.00 7.34 5.50 8 7 6 
 EV12    Project delays of all forms MV EV12=  8.50 7.64 5.59 9 8 6 
PR4: 
Environmental 
risks 
ENV1: Environmental issues from works (Pollution) MVENV1=  4.66 4.05 2.63 5 4 3 
ENV 2:     Unfavourable climate conditions (Snow, rain, wind etc.) MV ENV2=  8.78 7.27 6.13 9 7 6 
PR5: 
Political risks 
PV1:   Change in government funding  policy; MV PV1 =  8.56 7.12 6.01 9 7 6 
PV2:   Political opposition;  MV PV2 =  7.49 6.03 4.03 7 6 4 
PV3:   Government discontinuity;  MV PV3=  7.50 7.04 5.77 8 7 6 
PV4:   Lack of political support;  MV PV4 =  8.17 7.27 5.49 8 7 5 
PV5:   Political indecision; MV PV5=  8.76 7.99 6.01 9 8 6 
PV6:   Project termination;  MV PV6=  5.99 5.59 4.17 6 6 4 
PV7:  Delay in obtaining consent/Approval; MV PV7 =  6.41 6.29 3.25 6 6 3 
PV8:   Legislative/regulatory changes; MV PV8 =  5.80 4.35 2.66 6 4 3 
PV9: Protectionism  MV PV9=  3.20 3.57 2.48 3 4 3 
PV10: Delay in obtaining temporary Traffic Regulation Orders 
(TROs) 
MV PV10 =  6.36 6.22 2.93 6 6 3 
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Apart from the values of the respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance, Tables 5.4 to 5.6 
further indicate approximation (Rounded MVs) of the experimental Weighted 
Quantitative Scores (WQS) percentages to be input into the ANP calculation. This was 
done in order to accomplish ANP pairwise and super-matrix comparison of each node. 
 
 
5.3. Summary  
This chapter has presented the preliminary analysis of the data. The analysis undertaken 
included descriptive statistics on the demographic data and the standardised quantitative 
analysis with a Weighted Quantitative Score (WQS) method to calculate Respondent’s 
Mean Scores of Importance (RMSI). The demographic results suggest that the 
respondents have reasonable experience in the construction phase of the case study 
project, which should give credence to the data collected. Thereafter, the RMSI was 
performed so that respondents’ opinion on the level of impact of the risk on project 
performance is reduced to a manageable size for ANP pairwise comparison calculation.  
 
 
In the next chapter, the development of the ANP models for STEEP risks will be 
described. The rounded mean values of the Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance 
(RMSI) calculated by the Weighted Quantitative Score (WQS) method would further be 
used to generate a single value called Risk Priority Index (RPI) for each potential risk 
variables for further analysis in this report.  
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             CHAPTER SIX:  ANP MODEL 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Following the preliminary analysis presented in chapter five, this chapter now addresses 
the development of the substantive ANP models for the potential risks considered in this 
research. As already explained in chapter three of this thesis, the ANP model is 
developed for the “construction phase” of the megaproject lifecycle. 
 
 
Drawing from the Quantitative Weighted Score (QWS) analysis, mean values were 
derived for the level of risk impact on project cost, time and quality for risk clusters and 
potential risk variables. This was necessary to help provide a basis for converting the 
broad range of respondents’ scores for each risk variable into a single score so that the 
requirements of ANP to prioritize risks through construction of hierarchical risk 
structures for elements affecting management decisions and pairwise comparison 
analysis can be met. Saaty (2005a) emphasized the fact that a hierarchic structure is 
beneficial to a decision maker. It provides an overall view of the complex relationships 
inherent in a situation and in a judgment process and also allows the decision maker to 
assess whether he or she is comparing issues of the same order of magnitude. 
 
 
The chapter concludes with the Risk Priority Index (RPI) calculation as a project 
ranking method for all risks and a summary of the relevancies of using the ANP for risk 
prioritization in the research. 
 
 
6.2. Risk Prioritization  
6.2.1. Network Model Construction 
In this section, a network structure on ETNP was first constructed to create influence 
among project objectives, risk clusters and variables. The framework of ANP network 
process for all risks is shown in Figure 6.1. As indicated in Figure 6.1, there is an outer 
dependency between different clusters and an inner dependency within each member 
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cluster of risks in the risk prioritization structure. Indirect dominance comparison of 
variables in set SV1-7, TV1-12, EV1-12, ENV1-2, and PV1-10 was carried out according to their 
influence on project cost, time and quality respectively. PR1, PR2, PR3, PR4 and PR5 were 
considered as primary standards while sub variables SV1-7, TV1-12, EV1-12, ENV1-2, and PV1-
10 as secondary standards to construct judgment matrices.  
 
Option: Potential Risks (PR)
Inner 
dependencies
SV1,Sv2, Sv3,  Sv4 
Sv5,  Sv6,  Sv7  
ENV1, ENV2
TV1,TV2,TV3,TV4,TV5,
TV6,TV7,TV8,TV9,
TV10,TV11,TV12,
PR1:Social risks
PV1,PV2,PV3,PV4,
PV5,PV6,PV7,PV8,
PV9,PV10,
EV1,EV2,EV3,EV4,EV5,
EV6,EV7,EV8,EV9,
EV10,EV11,EV12,
PR2:Technical risks
PR5:Political risks  PR3:Economic risks
PR4:Environmental 
risks
List of high risks
Goal: Risk Prioritization
Criterion: Potential Consequences on:
 Cost Time Quality
 
              Figure 6.1: The Overall ANP Network Model for Risk Prioritization 
 
Subsequently, the overall network model was decomposed into sub network models as 
indicated in Figure 6.2.  These include ANP Network models for (a) Project Objectives, 
(b) STEEP clusters (c) Social risk cluster, (d) Technical risk cluster, (e) Economic risk 
cluster, (f) Environmental risk cluster and (g) Political risk cluster. These network 
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structures illustrate how the project objectives (Criterion) and the potential risks 
(Options) fed up through the system to give synthesized priority values in section 6.2.2. 
 
 
Prioritization of Project 
Objectives
Goal
Time CostOptions Quality
 
 
    (a) ANP Network Model for Project Objectives 
 
 
Potential Risks Prioritization Goal
Time Cost
PR2:Technical RisksPR1: Social risks PR5: Political risks
PR4: Environmental 
risks
PR3: Economic risksOptions
Criterion Quality
 
 
(b) ANP Network Model for STEEP Clusters 
 
 
Social Risks PrioritizationGoal
Time Cost
SV2SV1 SV7SV6SV5SV4SV3Options
Criterion Quality
 
(c) ANP Network Model for Social Risks Prioritization 
                             Figure 6.2 ANP Sub Network Prioritization Models 
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Technical Risks PrioritizationGoal
Time Cost
TV1Options
Criterion Quality
TV12TV11TV10TV9TV8TV7TV6TV5TV4TV3TV2
 
(d) ANP Network Model for Technical Risks Prioritization 
 
 
 
Economic Risks PrioritizationGoal
Time Cost
EV1Options
Criterion Quality
EV12EV11EV10EV9EV8EV7EV6EV5EV4EV3EV2
 
        (e) ANP Network Model for Economic Risks Prioritization 
 
 
Environmental Risks PrioritizationGoal
Time Cost
ENV2ENV1Options
Criterion Quality
 
 
(f) ANP Network Model for Environmental Risks Prioritization 
 
Figure 6.2 ANP Sub Network Prioritization Models (Continued) 
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Political Risks PrioritizationGoal
Time Cost
PV2PV1 PV7PV6PV5PV4PV3Options
Criterion Quality
PV8 PV9 PV10
 
       (g) ANP Network Model for Political Risks Prioritization 
               Figure 6.2 ANP Sub Network Prioritization Models (Continued) 
 
 
6.2.2. Pairwise Comparison Matrices  
Once the ANP hierarchy is built, its various elements were evaluated systematically and 
compared to one another in pairs. In making the comparisons, the rounded mean values 
derived from the QWS in chapter five were used against the ANP fundamental pairwise 
judgment scale in Table 6.1 for judgments about the elements’ relative meaning and 
importance. It is the essence of the ANP that human judgments, and not just the 
underlying information, can be used in performing the assessments. The ANP converts 
these evaluations to numerical values that can be processed and compared over the 
entire range of the problem.  
 
 
The new values were then inserted into multi criteria decision software called the Super 
Decision to evaluate relationships among criterion and option.  A numerical weight or 
priority is derived for each element of the hierarchy, allowing diverse and often 
incommensurable elements to be compared to one another in a rational and consistent 
way. This capability distinguishes the ANP from other decision making techniques. In 
the final step of the process, numerical priorities were derived for each of the decision 
alternatives. To reflect the interdependencies on the ANP Network Models in Figure 
6.1, pairwise comparisons for project objectives and potential risks were performed. The 
comparison matrices and their results are represented in sections 6.2.2.1to 6.2.2.7.  
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           Table 6.1: Fundamental Scale of Pairwise Judgment and Pairwiser Criteria 
 
Scales of Pairwise Judgment 
a 
Comparisons of Pair Indicator Scores 
b 
1 = equal 1:1 
2 = equally to moderately dominant 2:1, 3:2, 4:3, 5:4, 6:5, 7:6, 8:7, 9:8 
3 = moderately dominant 3:1, 4:2, 5:3, 6:4, 7:5, 8:6, 9:7 
4 = moderately to strongly dominant 4:1, 5:2, 6:3, 7:4, 8:5, 9:6 
5 = strongly dominant 5:1, 6:2, 7:3, 8:4, 9:5 
6 = strongly to very strongly dominant 6:1, 7:2, 8:3, 9:4 
7 = very strongly dominant 7:1, 8:2, 9:3 
8 = very strongly to extremely dominant 8:1, 9:2 
9 = Extremely dominant 9:1 
a 
Saaty, 1996. 
b 
Scores of indicators used to judge the relative meaning and importance of risk variables 
 
 
 
6.2.2.1. Pairwise Comparison Matrix for Project Objectives 
Table 6.2 represents the priority matrix for the project objectives (  ) of the case study 
project. It was created using equation 6.1 where the element        represents the 
relative importance of the ith option of the matrix with respect to the jth option. 
 
      ⁄ , 
 
      ⁄  and 
 
      ⁄  represent the inverse of        and are symmetrical with 
respect to the diagonal to the matrix (   ; (i) and (j) = 1, 2…..n. Where ‘n’ = the 
number of options. 
 
 
   ||
             
 
      ⁄        
 
      ⁄
 
      ⁄  
||   (6.1) 
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                 Table 6.2: Matrix for Project Objectives with respect to Decision Goal 
Pairwise Comparison of 
Project Objective 
Criterion                  MV 
po(C) po(T) po(Q) TPV NPV IPV Ranking 
The consistency 
test 
po(C): Cost                   5 1 1     1     0.33 0.333 1.00 2 λmax = 3.00  
CI   = 0.00  
RI   = 0.52 
CR  = 0.00 
po(T): Time                  5 1 1     1     0.33 0.333 1.00 3 
po(Q): Quality              5 1 1     1     0.33 0.333 1.00 1 
∑      
 
       =   0.999    
Legend: TPV = Total priority value, NPV = Normal priority value, IPV = Ideal priority value  
Inconsistency = 0.00   
 
 
Based on the rounded mean scores of importance, the pairwise comparison in each 
option was performed with the Supper Decisions software to derive the eigenvectors or 
the normalised priority value (NPV), total priority value (TPV) and the ideal priority 
value (IPV). It can be observed from the pairwise comparisons results that cost, time 
and quality indicate equal synthesized priority weights of {Po = (po(C), po(T), po(Q)) = (0.33, 
0.33, 0.33)} per the ANP computation. This suggests that they are the appropriate 
project objectives according to respondents’ view for the development of the case study 
project. Further analysis of the results suggests that respondent’s answers to the 
prioritization on project objectives during the survey are consistent. Otherwise, the 
evaluation could have been re-considered by an expert team. It can therefore be 
concluded that the project cost, time and quality are the appropriate project objectives 
for the specific development.  
 
 
6.2.2.2. Consistency Test 
The Consistency Ratio (CR) is a widely used consistency test method in both AHP and 
ANP. The CR is used to check the consistencies of the values obtained according to the 
pairwise comparison. In the ANP method, survey participants and decision makers or 
experts who make judgments or preferences must go through the consistency test. 
Reasons are because the final risk assessment and decision analysis could be inaccurate 
if the priority values are calculated from the inconsistent comparison matrix. Therefore, 
the consistency of each comparison matrix has to be tested before the comparison 
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matrices are used to assess risk and analyse a decision. If the consistency test for the 
comparison matrix failed, the inconsistent elements in the comparison matrix have to be 
identified and revised; otherwise, the result of risk assessment and decision analysis 
would be unreliable.  
 
 
To determine the consistency of respondents’ judgment on the level of STEEP risk 
impacts on Edinburgh Tram Network Project, a consistency ratio (CR) of the 
comparison matrices are calculated using the process in Figure 6.3. 
 
 
 
 
                                  Figure 6.3: Calculation Process for the CR Method 
 
Step 1: Calculate the maximum eigenvalue         of one comparison matrix.  
Step 2: Calculate the value of Consistency Index (CI)  
Step 3: Calculate the CR using the formula          and Table 6.3.  
Step 4: Compare the value of CR with the consistency threshold 0.1 to judge whether 
the comparison is consistent. 
 
Step 1: Calculate the maximum eigenvalue         of one comparison matrix.  
 
After a comparison matrix has been formed, the normalized priority of the element can 
be compared by the computation of eigenvalue and eigenvectors with the Equation 2. 
 
 
∑      
 
             (2) 
 
Where  A is the matrix of pair-wise comparison, 
 w is the eigenvector, and 
      is the maximum eigenvalue of [A] 
Calculate max Calculate CI Calculate CR Judge CR < 0.1
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By substitution, the maximum eigenvalue (λmax) is calculated to derive a new matrix 
(W) by multiplying comparison matrix (A) with (wi). Finally, the (λmax) can be obtained 
by averaging the value. Computations of the process are listed in Equation (3) and 
Equation (4) respectively. 
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Step 2: Calculating the value of CI  
 
In order to determine the consistencies of respondents’ judgments, the consistency 
ratios (CR) of the comparison matrices are calculated using the formula: 
 
   
      
   
         (5) 
 
Where CI = Consistency Index 
      = the maximum eigenvalue 
 n = the order of matrix [A]. 
If CI = 0, means respondents’ judgments satisfy the consistency. 
If CI > 0, means the experts have conflicting judgments. 
If CI ≤ 0.1, means there is reasonable level of consistency. 
 
 
Step 3: Calculating the Consistency Ratio (CR)  
 
CR is the most widely used consistency index when conducting traditional consistency 
test. Based on various matrix sizes, the CR for each matrix was calculated using the 
formula: 
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        (6) 
 
Where RI is a random index as shown in Table 6.3 
When CR ≤ 0.1, it means the evaluation process satisfies the consistency 
 
                                        Table 6.3: The Average Random Index 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 1.59 
 
 
Step 4: Judging the consistency  
 
This is done by comparing the value of CR with the consistency threshold of 0.1 to 
judge whether the comparison is consistent. If CR ≤ 0, it means respondents’ judgments 
satisfy the consistency. If not, then that means the experts have conflicting judgments. 
The inconsistent elements in the comparison matrix have to be identified and revised; 
otherwise, the result of risk assessment and decision analysis is unreliable. If CR ≤ 0.1, 
means there is reasonable level of consistency. 
 
6.2.2.3. Inner Dependency Matrix for Cluster ‘Potential Risks’ 
There are five scenarios of pairwise comparison in this cluster. One scenario is with 
respect to clusters “Potential consequences on cost, time and quality” and “Goal”, while 
the rest are with respect to the element in the cluster “Potential risks”. For example, 
with respect to “Goal: risk prioritization”, what element in cluster “Potential risks” is 
more risky than the others? Table 6.4 summarizes the results of the pairwise 
comparison. As indicated in Table 6.4a, potential risks listed in column 3 were 
compared with each other listed in the row on top as to which one has more impact on 
project cost, time and quality to select the most risky one. Thereafter, the priorities for 
each of these potential risks are calculated from the matrix of comparisons for cost, time 
and quality with the rankings given against them. 
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As shown in the Table 6.4a, for example, Technical risks (25%), Economic risks (25%) 
and Political Risks (25%) are judged to be more risky and therefore have higher level of 
impact on project cost than the Social risks (13%) and the Environmental Risks (13%).  
 
                       Table 6.4: Pairwise Comparison Matrices for Potential Risks 
 
               Table 6.4a: Comparison Matrices with respect to Cost, Time and Quality 
Project 
objective 
MVR 
Potential 
Risks 
PR1 PR2 PR3 PR4 PR5 TPV Priorities R 
Cost 
λmax = 5.00 
CI   = 0.00 
RI   = 1.11 
CR  = 0.00 
4 PR1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 0.13 0.13 4 
5 PR2 2 1 1 2 1 0.25 0.25 1 
5 PR3 2 1 1 2 1 0.25 0.25 1 
4 PR4 1 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 0.13 0.13 5 
5 PR5 2 1 1 2 1 0.25 0.25 1 
Total priority weights with respect to cost ( ∑       
 
    )     1.01 1.01 
Time 
λmax = 5.00 
CI   = 0.00 
RI   = 1.11 
CR  = 0.00 
4 PR1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 0.14 0.14 3 
5 PR2 2 1 1 2 2 0.29 0.29 1 
5 PR3 2 1 1 2 2 0.29 0.29 1 
4 PR4 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 0.14 0.14 3 
4 PR5 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 0.14 0.14 3 
Total priority weights with respect to time ( ∑       
 
    )     1.00 1.00 
Quality 
λmax = 5.08 
CI   = 0.02 
RI   = 1.11 
CR  = 0.02 
3 PR1 1 1/3 1/2 1/2 1 0.11 0.11 4 
5 PR2 3 1 2 2 3 0.37 0.37 1 
4 PR3 2 1/2 1 1 2 0.21 0.21 2 
4 PR4 2 1/2 1 1 2 0.21 0.21 2 
3 PR5 1 1/3 1/2 1/2 1 0.11 0.11 4 
Total priority weights with respect to quality ( ∑       
 
    )     1.01 1.01 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency 
ratio, TPV = Total priority value, NPV = Normal priority value, IPV = Ideal priority value R = Ranking  
 
 
Similarly, priorities with respect to project time indicate that, Technical risks (29%) and 
Economic risks (29%) are judged to have high level of impact on project time than the 
Social risks (14%), the Environmental Risks (14%) and the Political risks (14%). With 
respect to project quality, Technical risks (37%) are judged as the most risky, followed 
by Economic risks (21%) and the Environmental risks (21%) with the least being the 
Social and Political risks with values of 11% each. 
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6.2.2.4. The Super Matrix Calculation 
After completing the pairwise comparisons, the next step is to build the supermatrix. As 
discussed in section 3.4.4.2.3 of chapter 3, the super matrices are computed in three 
steps. In the first step the unweighted supermatrix is created directly from all local 
priorities of the potential risks as indicated in Table 6.4b. In the second step, the 
weighted supermatrix (See Table 6.4c) is calculated by weighing the local priority 
indexes or the unweighted supermatrix with their affiliated priorities for project cost, 
time and quality as their parent criterion to obtain the global priority indexes.  
 
                           Table 6.4b:  Unweighted Super Matrix for Potential Risks 
   Project Objective Potential  Risks 
  Goal Cost  Time  Quality  PR1 PR2 PR3 PR4 PR5 
 Goal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Project 
Objective 
Cost 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Time 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Quality 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Potential 
Risks 
PR1 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR2 0.00 0.25 0.29 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR3 0.00 0.25 0.29 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR4 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR5 0.00 0.25 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
                                 Table 6.4c: Weighted Super Matrix for Potential Risks 
   Project Objective Potential  Risks 
  Goal Cost  Time  Quality  PR1 PR2 PR3 PR4 PR5 
 Goal 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Project 
Objective 
Cost 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Time 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Quality 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Potential 
Risks 
PR1 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR2 0.00 0.25 0.29 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR3 0.00 0.25 0.29 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR4 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PR5 0.00 0.25 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Finally, the weighted supermatrix is raised to a limiting power in order to converge and 
to obtain a stable set of weights that represents the final priority vector. Stabilization is 
achieved when all the columns in the supermatrix corresponding to any node have the 
same values. In this report, the Limit Supermatrix of the risk hierarchies will show same 
result as the hierarchic composition.  A summary of the final modes decision making 
priorities for the potential risks are further explained and represented in Table 6.4d.  
 
Table 6.4d: Results of Final Mode ANP Decision Making Priorities for Potential Risks 
Potential Risks  Priorities for Potential Risks  Final 
Priorities 
 
Local risk priority 
index  (RPIL) 
Global risks priority 
index (RPIG) 
Synthesized 
results 
 
Cost 
(0.33) 
Time
(0.33) 
Qualit
y(0.33) 
Cost Time Quality TRPI IRPI R 
PR1:Social                  0.13 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.05  0.04 0.13 0.43 5 
PR2:Technical           0.25 0.29 0.37 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.30 1.00 1 
PR3: Economic         0.25 0.29 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.25 0.83 2 
PR4: Environmental    0.13 0.14 0.21 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.53 4 
PR5:Political              0.25 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.17 0.56 3 
Total    1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01   
Legend: TRPI = Total risk priority index, IRPV = Ideal risk priority indexes and R = Ranking 
 
As indicated in Table 6.4d, the globalized priorities under each objective in each row 
were then summed up to obtain synthesised results; in this case, the total risk priority 
indexes (TRPI). Finally, the TRPIs were expressed in ideal forms known as Ideal Risk 
Priority Indexes (IRPIs) by dividing each TRPI by the largest value. For example, in 
Table 6.4b, the IRPI for potential risk PR1 will be as follows: 
 
IRPIPR1 = TRPIPR1 ÷ TRPImax  
That is IRPIPR1= 0.13 ÷ 0.30 
 = 0.43 (in approximation) 
 
Where IRPIPR1 is the Ideal Risk Priority Index for Social Risks (0.43) and represented 
by a code (PP1); TRPIPR1 is the Total Risk Priority Index for Social Risks (0.13) while 
TRPImax representing the maximum value (0.30) among the Total Risk Priority Indexes 
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for the potential risks. The effect of this normalisation is to make each potential risk the 
ideal one with others in proportionate value. A decision maker may then interpret the 
results to mean that the impacts of social risks, economic risks, environmental risks and 
political risks on the objectives of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (ETNP) are about 
43%, 83%, 53% and 56% respectively as risky as that of technical risks. 
 
  
6.2.2.5. Risk Ratings Mode 
In this section, rating categories for each potential risk were established and prioritized 
by pairwise comparing them for preference. Potential risks as alternatives were 
evaluated by selecting the appropriate rating category on their level of impacts on each 
criterion (objectives) as Very high (5), High (4), Medium or Moderate (3), Low (2) and 
Very low (1). They were compared for preference using a pairwise comparison matrix 
in the usual way as given in Table 6.4a to obtain the idealised priorities. These priorities 
are further normalised by dividing each priority by the largest of the priorities. The 
idealised priorities are therefore used in range for risks rating. For example, a priority 
value greater than 0.62 is classified as having a very high risk impact on the project 
objectives and so on. The rating categories for the five scales are established in Table 
6.5a. Finally, Table 6.5b provides the verbal ratings of how the five potential risks as 
alternatives on each covering criterion and their corresponding numerical ratings from 
Table 6.4b were rated. 
 
                                 Table 6.5: Risks Rating Priority Calculation 
                              
                                 Table 6.5a: Deriving Priorities for Risks Ratings 
Risks rating for 
megaproject 
construction 
VH H M L VL Normalised 
priorities  
Idealised 
priorities 
Numerical risks 
rating (%) 
Very High  VH 1 2 3 4 5 0.42 1.00 > 62 
High  H 1/2 1 2 3 4 0.26 0.62 38-61 
Moderate  M 1/3 1/2 1 2 3 0.16 0.38 24-37 
Low  L 1/4 1/3 ½ 1 2 0.10 0.24 14-23 
Very Low  VL 1/5 1/4 1/3 1/2 1 0.06 0.14 < 14 
Total priorities 1.00   
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                                 Table 6.5b: Verbal Ratings for Potential Risks 
Potential Risks  Ideal Synthesized risk priority 
indexes (IRPI %) 
Verbal ratings 
PR1:Social                  43 High  
PR2:Technical           100 Very high 
PR3: Economic         83 Very high 
PR4: Environmental    53 High   
PR5:Political              56 High  
Risk ratings: Very high = (>62%), High = (38%-61%), Medium = (24%-37%), Low = (14%-37%) and 
Very low = (<14%) 
 
 
 
6.2.2.6. Pairwise Comparison Matrices for Variables in the Potential Risks Cluster 
Based on the individual ANP Network Models for the social, technical, economic, 
environmental and political risks prioritization indicated in Figure 6.2, pairwise 
comparison matrices were produced for elements under each potential risks with respect 
to their impact on project objectives (cost, time and quality). The total priority value 
(TPV), Normalized priority value (NPV), Idealized priority value (IPV) and the risk 
rankings were all derived from the super decisions software.  
 
 
By using the same procedure described in section 6.2.2.3, final modes ANP Decision 
Making Matrices were also produced for the Variables in the Potential Risks Cluster. 
The values obtained represent risk impact priority indexes (RPIs) that Project Managers 
and risk analysts may need in identifying which risk variables to tackle urgently during 
the decision making process. Finally, ratings are performed for the priority values as in 
section 6.2.2.3. 
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                                   Table 6.6: Pairwise Matrix for Social Risks 
                                   Table 6.6a: Pairwise Comparison for Social Risk Variables 
Pairwise 
comparison 
against Project 
objectives 
MV
R 
Risk 
Code 
SV1 SV2 SV3 SV4 SV5 SV6 S
V7 
TPV NPV IPV R 
Cost 
λmax = 7.10 
CI   = 0.02 
RI   = 1.35 
CR  = 0.01 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.000 ) 
5 SV1: 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/4 2 3 0.06 0.06 0.24 5 
9 SV2: 5 1 1 1 2 6 7 0.24 0.24 1.00 1 
9 SV3: 5 1 1 1 2 6 7 0.24 0.24 1.00 1 
9 SV4: 5 1 1 1 2 6 7 0.24 0.24 1.00 1 
8 SV5: 4 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 5 6 0.15 0.15 0.63 4 
4 SV6: 1/2 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/5 1 2 0.04 0.04 0.16 6 
3 SV7: 1/3 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/6 1/2 1 0.03 0.03 0.11 7 
Total =   ∑         
 
    = 1.00 1.00 4.14  
Time 
λmax = 7.20 
CI   = 0.03 
RI   = 1.35 
CR  = 0.02 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.002 ) 
5 SV1: 1 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/2 3 3 0.07 0.07 0.29 5 
 8 SV2: 4 1 1 1 3 6 7 0.25 0.25 1.00 1 
 8 SV3: 4 1 1 1 3 6 7 0.25 0.25 1.00 1 
 8 SV4: 4 1 1 1 3 6 7 0.25 0.25 1.00 1 
 6 SV5: 2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1 4 5 0.11 0.11 0.44 4 
 3 SV6: 1/3 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/4 1 2 0.04 0.04 0.15 6 
 2 SV7: 1/3 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/5 1/2 1 0.03 0.03 0.11 7 
Total =   ∑         
 
   = 1.00 1.00 3.99  
Quality 
λmax = 7.08 
CI   = 0.01 
RI   = 1.35 
CR  = 0.00 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.001 ) 
3 SV1: 1 1/4 1/5 1/4 1/2 1 1 0.05 0.05 0.16 5 
6 SV2: 4 1 1/2 1 3 4 4 0.21 0.21 0.64 2 
7 SV3: 5 2 1 2 4 5 5 0.33 0.33 1.00 1 
6 SV4: 4 1 1/2 1 3 4 4 0.21 0.21 0.64 2 
4 SV5: 2 1/3 1/4 1/3 1 2 2 0.09 0.09 0.27 4 
3 SV6: 1 1/4 1/5 1/4 1/2 1 1 0.05 0.05 0.16 5 
3 SV7: 1 1/4 1/5 1/4 1/2 1 1 0.05 0.05 0.16 5 
Total =   ∑            
 
   = 0.99 0.99 3.03  
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency 
ratio, TPV = Total priority value, NPV = Normal priority value, IPV = Ideal priority value R = Ranking, 
MVR= Rounded mean value.  
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Table 6.6b: Results of Final Mode ANP Decision Making Priorities for Social Risk 
Variables 
Risk 
Code  
Priorities for Social Risk Variables  Final priorities  
Local risk priority index  
(RPIL) 
Global risks priority index 
(RPIG) 
Synthesized results  
Cost 
(0.33) 
Time 
(0.33) 
Quality 
(0.33) 
Cost Time Quality TRPI IRPI R 
SV1:   0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.20 5 
SV2: 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.85 2 
SV3:   0.24 0.25 0.33 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.27 1.00 1 
SV4:   0.24 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.85 2 
SV5:   0.15 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.40 4 
SV6:  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15 6 
SV7:   0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01
 
0.01 0.02 0.04 0.15 6 
Total   1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99   
 Legend: TRPI = Total risk priority index, IRPV = Ideal risk priority indexes and R = Ranking 
 
 
 
                               Table 6.6c: Verbal Ratings for Social Risk Variables 
Risk 
Code 
Social risk variables Ideal Synthesized risk 
priority indexes (IRPI %) 
Verbal ratings 
SV1:   Social grievances 20 Low  
SV2: Multi -level decision making bodies 85 Very high 
SV3:   Disputes 100 Very high 
SV4:   Legal Actions 85 Very high 
SV5:   Stakeholder's pressure 40 High  
SV6:  Treats to person & asset security 15 Low   
SV7:   Social Issues 15 Low  
Risk ratings: Very high = (>62%), High = (38%-61%), Medium = (24%-37%), Low = (14%-37%) and 
Very low = (<14%) 
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                                                                               Table 6.7: Pairwise Matrix for Technical Risks 
                                                                   Table 6.7a: Pairwise Comparison for Technical Risk Variables 
Project 
Objective 
MVR 
Risk 
Code 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6 TV7 TV8 TV9 TV10 TV11 TV12 Priorities  Ranking 
Cost 
 
λmax =12.11 
CI   = 0.01 
RI   = 1.54 
CR = 0.01 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.00 ) 
8 TV1 1 2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 3 4 1/2 1/2 1/2 0.06 8 
7 TV2 1/2 1 1/3 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3 2 3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0.04 10 
9 TV3 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 1 0.11 1 
8 TV4 1 2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 3 4 1/2 1/2 1/2 0.06 8 
9 TV5 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 1 0.11 1 
9 TV6 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 1 0.11 1 
9 TV7 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 1 0.11 1 
6 TV8 1/3 1/2 1/4 1/3 1/4 1/4 1/4 1 2 1/4 1/4 1/4 0.03 11 
5 TV9 1/4 1/3 1/5 1/4 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/2 1 1/5 1/5 1/5 0.02 12 
9 TV10 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 1 0.11 1 
9 TV11 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 1 0.11 1 
9 TV12 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 4 5 1 1 1 0.11 1 
Total =   ∑         
 
    = 0.98 
Time 
 
λmax = 12.07 
CI   = 0.01 
RI   =1.54 
CR = 0.00 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.001) 
7 TV1 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/3 2 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.06 5 
7 TV2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/3 2 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.06 5 
8 TV3 2 2 1 2 2 2 1/2 3 2 1 2 1 0.12 2 
7 TV4 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/3 2 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.06 5 
7 TV5 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/3 2 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.06 5 
7 TV6 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/3 2 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.06 5 
9 TV7 3 3 2 3 3 3 1 4 3 2 3 2 0.19 1 
6 TV8 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/4 1 1/2 1/3 1/2 1/3 0.04 12 
7 TV9 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/3 2 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.06 5 
8 TV10 2 2 1 2 2 2 1/2 3 2 1 2 1 0.12 2 
7 TV11 1 1 1/2 1 1 1 1/3 2 1 1/2 1 1/2 0.06 5 
8 TV12 2 2 1 2 2 2 1/2 3 2 1 2 1 0.12 2 
Total =   ∑         
 
    = 1.01 
 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency ratio 
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Table 6.7a: Pairwise Comparison for Technical Risk Variables (Continued) 
Project 
Objective 
MVR 
Risk 
Code 
TV1 TV2 TV3 TV4 TV5 TV6 TV7 TV8 TV9 TV10 TV11 TV12 Priorities  Ranking 
Quality 
 
λmax = 12.23 
CI   = 0.02 
RI   = 1.54 
CR = 0.01 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.00 ) 
4 TV1 1 2 1/2 2 2 1/5 1 2 3 1/2 1/2 1/3 0.06 6 
3 TV2 1/2 1 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/6 1/2 1 2 1/2 1/2 1/4 0.03 10 
5 TV3 2 3 1 2 2 1/4 2 3 4 1 1 1/2 0.09 3 
4 TV4 1/2 2 1/2 1 1 1/5 1 2 3 1/2 1/2 1/3 0.05 7 
4 TV5 1/2 2 1/2 1 1 1/5 1 2 3 1/2 1/2 1/3 0.05 7 
8 TV6 5 6 4 5 5 1 5 6 7 4 4 3 0.28 1 
4 TV7 1 2 1/2 1 1 1/5 1 2 3 1/2 1/2 1/3 0.05 7 
3 TV8 1/2 1 1/3 1/2 1/2 1/6 1/2 1 2 1/3 1/3 1/4 0.03 10 
2 TV9 1/3 1/2 1/4 1/3 1/3 1/7 1/3 1/2 1 1/4 1/4 1/5 0.02 12 
5 TV10 2 2 1 2 2 1/4 2 3 4 1 1 1/2 0.09 3 
5 TV11 2 2 1 2 2 1/4 2 3 4 1 1 1/2 0.09 3 
6 TV12 3 4 2 4 3 1/3 3 4 5 2 2 1 0.15 2 
Total =   ∑            
 
    = 0.99 
 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency ratio 
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Table 6.7b: Results of Final Mode ANP Decision Making Priorities for Technical Risk 
Variables 
Risk 
Code 
Priorities for Technical Risk Variables Final priorities  
Local risk priority index  
(RPIL) 
Global risks priority index 
(RPIG) 
Synthesized 
results 
 
Cost 
(0.33) 
Time 
(0.33) 
Quality 
(0.33) 
Cost Time Quality TRPI IRPI R 
TV1 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.40 8 
TV2 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.27 10 
TV3 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.73 4 
TV4 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.40 8 
TV5 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.53 7 
TV6 0.11 0.06 0.28 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.15 1.00 1 
TV7 0.11 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.80 3 
TV8 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.20 12 
TV9 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.27 10 
TV10 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.73 4 
TV11 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.60 6 
TV12 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.87 2 
Total   1.00 1.00 0.99  1.02   
Legend: TRPI = Total risk priority index, IRPV = Ideal risk priority indexes and R = Ranking 
 
 
 
                           Table 6.7c: Verbal Ratings for Technical Risk Variables 
Risk 
code  
 Technical Risk Variables  Ideal Synthesized risk 
priority indexes (IRPI %) 
Verbal 
ratings 
TV1 Ambiguity of project scope/ Scope change  40 High   
TV2 Ground conditions on given project sites 27 Medium  
TV3 Inadequate project complexity analysis 73 Very high 
TV4 Unforeseen modification to project 40 High 
TV5 Inaccurate project cost estimate 53 High 
TV6 Failure to meet specified standards 100 Very high 
TV7 Technical difficulties in utilities diversions 80 Very high 
TV8 Engineering and design change 20 Low  
TV9 Supply chain breakdown 27 High  
TV10 Project time overruns 73 Very high  
TV11 Project cost overruns 60 High 
TV12 Project delays of all forms 87 Very high  
Risk ratings: Very high = (>62%), High = (38%-61%), Medium = (24%-37%), Low = (14%-37%) and 
Very low = (<14%) 
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                                                                             Table 6.8: Pairwise Matrix for Economic Risks 
                                                                Table 6.8a: Pairwise Comparison for Economic Risk Variables 
Project 
Objective 
MVR 
Risk 
Code 
EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV8 EV9 EV10 EV11 EV12 Priorities  Ranking 
Cost 
 
λmax = 12.49 
CI   = 0.04 
RI   = 1.54 
CR = 0.03 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.00) 
9 EV1 1 6 3 7 7 7 3 5 4 3 2 1 0.20 1 
4 EV2 1/6 1 1/4 2 2 2 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 0.03 9 
7 EV3 1/3 4 1 5 5 5 1 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 0.09 4 
3 EV4 1/7 1/2 1/5 1 1 1 1/5 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 0.02 10 
3 EV5 1/7 1/2 1/5 1 1 1 1/5 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 0.02 10 
3 EV6 1/7 1/2 1/5 1 1 1 1/5 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 0.02 10 
7 EV7 1/3 4 4 5 5 5 1 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 0.09 4 
5 EV8 1/5 2 2 3 3 3 1/3 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 0.04 8 
6 EV9 1/4 3 3 4 4 4 1/2 2 1 1/2 1/3 1/4 0.06 7 
7 EV10 1/3 4 4 5 5 5 1 3 2 1 1/2 1/3 0.09 4 
8 EV11 1/2 5 5 6 6 6 2 4 3 2 1 1/2 0.14 3 
9 EV12 1 6 6 7 7 7 3 5 4 3 2 1 0.20 1 
Total =   ∑         
 
    = 1.00 
Time 
 
λmax = 12.35 
CI   = 0.03 
RI   = 1.54 
CR = 0.02 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.00) 
7 EV1 1 6 1 6 6 6 3 5 4 1 1 1/2 0.14 4 
2 EV2 1/6 1 1/6 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/6 1/6 1/7 0.02 9 
7 EV3 1 6 1 6 6 6 3 5 4 1 1 1/2 0.14 4 
2 EV4 1/6 1 1/6 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/6 1/6 1/7 0.02 9 
2 EV5 1/6 1 1/6 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/6 1/6 1/7 0.02 9 
2 EV6 1/6 1 1/6 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/6 1/6 1/7 0.02 9 
5 EV7 1/3 4 1/6 4 4 4 1 3 2 1/5 1/5 1/4 0.06 6 
3 EV8 1/5 2 1/5 2 2 2 1/3 1 1/2 1/5 1/5 1/6 0.03 8 
4 EV9 1/4 3 1/4 3 3 3 1/2 2 1 1/4 1/4 1/5 0.05 7 
7 EV10 1 6 1 6 6 6 5 5 4 1 1 1/2 0.15 2 
7 EV11 1 6 1 6 6 6 5 5 4 1 1 1/2 0.15 2 
8 EV12 2 7 2 7 7 7 4 6 5 2 2 1 0.21 1 
Total =   ∑         
 
    = 1.01 
 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency ratio 
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Table 6.8a: Pairwise Comparison for Economic Risk Variables (Continued) 
 
Project 
Objective 
MVR 
Risks 
Code 
EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV8 EV9 EV10 EV11 EV12 Priorities  Ranking 
Quality 
 
λmax = 12.20 
CI   = 0.02 
RI   = 1.54 
CR = 0.01 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.00) 
6 EV1 1 5 1 5 5 5 2 4 4 1 1 1 0.14 1 
2 EV2 1/5 1 1/5 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/5 1/5 1/5 0.03 9 
6 EV3 1 5 1 5 5 5 2 4 4 1 1 1 0.14 1 
2 EV4 1/5 1 1/5 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/5 1/5 1/5 0.03 9 
2 EV5 1/5 1 1/5 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/5 1/5 1/5 0.03 9 
2 EV6 1/5 1 1/5 1 1 1 1/4 1/2 1/2 1/5 1/5 1/5 0.03 9 
5 EV7 1/2 4 1/2 4 4 4 1 3 3 1/2 1/2 1/2 0.09 6 
3 EV8 1/4 2 1/4 2 2 2 1/3 1 1 1/4 1/4 1/4 0.04 7 
3 EV9 1/4 2 1/4 2 2 2 1/3 1 1 1/4 1/4 1/4 0.04 7 
6 EV10 1 5 1 5 5 5 2 4 4 1 1 1 0.14 1 
6 EV11 1 5 1 5 5 5 2 4 4 1 1 1 0.14 1 
6 EV12 1 5 1 5 5 5 2 4 4 1 1 1 0.14 1 
Total =   ∑            
 
    = 0.99 
 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency ratio R = Ranking 
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Table 6.8b: Results of Final Mode ANP decision Making Priorities for Economic Risks 
Variables 
 
Risk Code Priorities for Economic Risk Variables  Final priorities  
Local risk priority index  
(RPIL) 
Global risks priority index 
(RPIG) 
Synthesized 
results 
 
Cost 
(0.33) 
Time 
(0.33) 
Quality 
(0.33) 
Cost Time Quality TRPI IRPI R 
EV1 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.17 1.00 1 
EV2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.18 8 
EV3 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.76 4 
EV4 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.18 8 
EV5 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.18 8 
EV6 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.18 8 
EV7 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.47 6 
EV8 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.18 8 
EV9 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.29 7 
EV10 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.76 4 
EV11 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.88 3 
EV12 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.19 1.00 1 
Total   1.00 1.01 0.99  1.05   
 Legend: TRPI = Total risk priority index, IRPV = Ideal risk priority indexes and R = Ranking 
 
 
 
                            Table 6.8c: Verbal Ratings for Economic Risk Variables 
Risk 
code  
 Risks  Ideal Synthesized risk 
priority indexes (IRPI %) 
Verbal 
ratings 
EV1 Change in government funding policy;  100 Very high 
EV2 Taxation changes; 018 Low 
EV3 Change in government;  076 Very high 
EV4 Wage inflation;  018 Low 
EV5 Local inflation change;  018 Low 
EV6 Foreign exchange rate;  018 Low 
EV7 Material price changes; 047 High  
EV8 Economic recession;  018 Low  
EV9 Energy price changes;  029 Medium  
EV10 Catastrophic environmental effects;  076 Very high  
EV11 Project technical difficulties  088 Very high 
EV12 Project delays of all forms 100 Very high  
Risk ratings: Very high = (>62%), High = (38%-61%), Medium = (24%-37%), Low = (14%-37%) and 
Very low = (<14%) 
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                           Table 6.9: Pairwise Matrix for Environmental Risks 
 
                  Table 6.9a: Pairwise Comparison for Environmental Risk Variables 
Project Objective MVR 
Risk 
Code 
ENV1 ENV2 Priorities  Ranking 
The 
consistency test 
Cost  
 
5 ENV1 1 1/5 0.17 2 λmax = 2.00 
CI   = 0.00 
RI   = 0.00 
CR = 0.00 
9 ENV2 5 1 0.83 1 
Total =   ∑         
 
    1.00 
Time  
 
4 ENV1 1 1/4 0.20 2 λmax = 2.00 
CI   = 0.00 
RI   = 0.00 
CR = 0.00 
7 ENV2 4 1 0.80 1 
Total =   ∑         
 
    1.00 
Quality 
 
3 ENV1 1 1/4 0.20 2 λmax = 2.00 
CI   = 0.00 
RI   = 0.00 
CR = 0.00 
6 ENV2 4 1 0.80 1 
Total =   ∑            
 
    1.00 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency 
ratio 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.9b: Results of final mode ANP decision making priorities for Environmental 
Risk Variables 
Risk 
Code 
Priorities for ETNP Objectives  Final priorities  
Local risk priority index  
(RPIL) 
Global risks priority index 
(RPIG) 
Synthesized 
results 
 
Cost 
(0.33
) 
Time 
(0.33) 
Quality 
(0.33) 
Cost Time Quality TRPI IRPI R 
ENV1 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.25 2 
ENV2 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.79 1.00 1 
Total   1.00 1.00 1.00  0.99   
Legend: TRPI = Total risk priority index, IRPV = Ideal risk priority indexes and R = Ranking 
 
 
 
                           Table 6.9c: Verbal Ratings for Environmental Risk Variables 
Risk 
code  
 Environmental Risk Variables  Ideal Synthesized risk 
priority indexes (IRPI %) 
Verbal 
ratings 
ENV1 Environmental issues from works (Pollution) 025 Medium  
ENV2 Unfavourable climate conditions (Snow, rain, etc.) 100 Very high 
Risk ratings: Very high = (>62%), High = (38%-61%), Medium = (24%-37%), Low = (14%-37%) and 
Very low = (<14%) 
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                                                                                Table 6.10: Pairwise Matrix for Political Risks 
                                                                   Table 6.10a: Pairwise Comparison for Political Risk Variables 
Project 
Objective 
MVR 
Risk 
Code 
PV1 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5 PV6 PV6 PV8 PV9 PV10 Priorities  Ranking 
Cost 
 
λmax = 10.19 
CI   = 0.02 
RI   = 1.49 
CR = 0.01 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.00) 
9 PV1  1 3 2 2 1 4 4 4 7 4 0.21 1 
7 PV2 1/3 1 1/2 1/2 1/3 2 2 2 5 2 0.08 5 
8 PV3 1/2 2 1 1 1/2 3 3 3 6 3 0.13 3 
8 PV4 1/2 2 1 1 1/2 3 3 3 6 3 0.13 3 
9 PV5 1 3 2 2 1 4 4 4 7 4 0.21 1 
6 PV6 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/4 1 1 1 4 1 0.05 6 
6 PV7 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/4 1 1 1 4 1 0.05 6 
6 PV8 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/4 1 1 1 4 1 0.05 6 
3 PV9 1/7 1/5 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/4 1/4 1/4 1 1/4 0.02 10 
6 PV10 1/4 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/4 1 1 1 4 1 0.05 6 
Total =   ∑                              
 
    = 0.98 
Time 
 
λmax = 10.00 
CI   = 0.00 
RI   = 1.49 
CR = 0.00 
(Inconsistency 
= 0.00) 
7 PV1 1 2 1 1 1/2 1 1 4 4 2 0.12 4 
6 PV2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 1 3 3 1 0.08 5 
7 PV3 1 2 1 1 1/2 2 2 4 4 2 0.14 2 
7 PV4 1 2 1 1 1/2 2 2 4 4 2 0.14 2 
8 PV5 2 3 2 2 1 3 3 5 5 3 0.22 1 
6 PV6 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 1 3 3 1 0.08 5 
6 PV7 1 1 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 1 3 3 1 0.08 5 
4 PV8 1/4 1/3 1/4 1/4 1/5 1/3 1/3 1 1 1/3 0.03 9 
4 PV9 1/4 1/3 1/4 1/4 1/5 1/3 1/3 1 1 1/3 0.03 9 
6 PV10 1/2 1 1/2 1/2 1/3 1 1 3 3 1 0.08 5 
Total =   ∑                               
 
    = 1.00 
 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency ratio 
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Table 6.10a: Pairwise Comparison for Political Risk Variables (Continued) 
Project objectives 
MVR 
Risk 
Code 
PV1 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV5 PV6 PV6 PV8 PV9 PV10 Priorities  Ranking 
Quality 
 
λmax = 10.08 
CI   = 0.01 
RI   = 1.49 
CR = 0.01 
(Inconsistency = 
0.00) 
6 PV1  1 3 1 2 1 3 4 4 4 4 0.19 1 
4 PV2 1/3 1 1/3 1/2 1/3 1 2 2 2 2 0.07 5 
6 PV3 1 3 1 2 1 3 4 4 4 4 0.19 1 
5 PV4 1/2 2 ½ 1 1/2 2 3 3 3 3 0.12 4 
6 PV5 1 3 1 2 1 3 4 4 4 4 0.19 1 
4 PV6 1/3 1 1/3 1/2 1/3 1 2 2 2 2 0.07 5 
3 PV7 1/4 1/2 ¼ 1/3 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 0.04 7 
3 PV8 1/4 1/2 ¼ 1/3 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 0.04 7 
3 PV9 1/4 1/2 ¼ 1/3 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 0.04 7 
3 PV10 1/4 1/2 ¼ 1/3 1/4 1/2 1 1 1 1 0.04 7 
Total =   ∑                                  
 
    = 0.99 
 
Legend: λmax = maximum eigenvalue, CI = Consistency Index, RI = Random Index, CR = Consistency ratio 
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Table 6.10b: Results of Final Mode ANP Decision Making Priorities for Political Risk 
Variables 
Risk 
Code 
Priorities for Political Risk Variables  Final priorities  
Local risk priority index  
(RPIL) 
Global risks priority index 
(RPIG) 
Synthesized 
results 
 
Cost 
(0.33
) 
Time 
(0.33) 
Quality 
(0.33) 
Cost Time Quality TRPI IRPI R 
PV1  0.21 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.81 2 
PV2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.38 5 
PV3 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.71 3 
PV4 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.62 4 
PV5 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.21 1.00 1 
PV6 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.33 6 
PV7 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.29 7 
PV8 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.19 9 
PV9 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.14 10 
PV10 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.29 7 
Total   1.00 1.01 0.99  1.00   
 Legend: TRPI = Total risk priority index, IRPV = Ideal risk priority indexes and R = Ranking 
 
 
                         Table 6.10c: Verbal ratings for Political Risk Variables 
Risk 
code  
 Political Risk Variables  Ideal Synthesized risk 
priority indexes (IRPI %) 
Verbal 
ratings 
PV1  Change in government funding  policy 81 Very high 
PV2 Political opposition 38 High  
PV3 Government discontinuity 71 Very high 
PV4 Lack of political support 62 Very high 
PV5 Political indecision 100 Very high 
PV6 Project termination 33 Medium  
PV7 Delay in obtaining consent/Approval 29 Medium 
PV8 Legislative/regulatory changes 19 Low  
PV9 Protectionism 14 Low  
PV10 Delay in obtaining temporary Traffic 
Regulation Orders (TROs) 
29 Medium   
Risk ratings: Very high = (>62%), High = (38%-61%), Medium = (24%-37%), Low = (14%-37%) and 
Very low = (<14%) 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2.7. Risk Priority Index (RPI) as a Project Ranking Method for all Risks 
The developed RPIs can be used to prioritize transportation megaprojects from a risk 
perspective during construction. For example, if STEEP risks are considered as risks 
that a developer is to assess with respect to project time, cost and quality, the RPI will 
provide a value to prioritize them. The higher the RPI, the higher the rank of the risks 
associated with the project.  
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       Table 6.11: Summary of Final ANP Decision Making Priority Results for all Risks 
 
   Risk priorities 
Potential Risk  Cluster 
priorities 
Risk 
Code 
Local  Synthesized 
Ranking 
 
 (W)  Cost Time Quality Cost Time Quality Total 
   (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (w(C)) (w(T)) (w(Q)) (T) 
         w(c) w(t) w(q) 
0.33* 
w(c) 
0.33* 
w(t) 
0.33* 
w(q) 
∑          
PR1: Social  0.13 SV1 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 5 
SV2 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.23 2 
SV3 0.24 0.25 0.33 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.27 1 
SV4 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.23 2 
SV5 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.12 4 
SV6 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 6 
SV7 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01
 
0.01 0.02 0.04 6 
PR2: Technical  
 
0.30 TV1 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 8 
TV2 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 10 
TV3 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.11 4 
TV4 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 8 
TV5 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.08 7 
TV6 0.11 0.06 0.28 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.15 1 
TV7 0.11 0.19 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.12 3 
TV8 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 12 
TV9 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 10 
TV10 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.11 4 
TV11 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.09 6 
TV12 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.13 2 
PR3: Economic  
 
0.25 EV1 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.17 1 
EV2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 8 
EV3 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13 4 
EV4 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 8 
EV5 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 8 
EV6 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 8 
EV7 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.08 6 
EV8 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 8 
EV9 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 7 
EV10 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13 4 
EV11 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 3 
EV12 0.20 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.19 1 
PR4: 
Environmental  
0.16 ENV1  0.17 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.20 2 
ENV2 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.79 1 
PR5: Political  
 
0.17 PV1  0.21 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.17 2 
PV2 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 5 
PV3 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.15 3 
PV4 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.13 4 
PV5 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.21 1 
PV6 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 6 
PV7 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 7 
PV8 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 9 
PV9 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 10 
PV10 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.06 7 
 
 
Therefore, technical risk has the first priority because it has the highest RPI (30%) as 
shown in table 27. STEEP risks effects on project cost, time and quality can be assessed 
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in order, based on the level of impacts as follows: technical risks, economic risks, 
political risks, environmental risks and social risks because they have RPIs of 30%, 
25%, 17%, 16% and 13% respectively. 
 
Consequently, the transportation megaproject developer has the flexibility to re-
categorize and select the appropriate risks under each risk cluster based on the situation 
in a geographical setting and the type of project being executed. The developed RPIs 
attract a developer’s attention to the potential risks that have the highest level of impacts 
on project objectives and to consider appropriate risk management procedures.  
 
6.3. Summary 
This section of the study proposes the use of ANP methodology to prioritize risks in 
transportation megaprojects under construction. Risk sources were identified in 
literature, from experts’ opinions, source documents of past and existing megaprojects 
under construction and accordingly were categorised into clusters. A model for 
calculating Risk Priority Indexes (RPIs) was designed and its components were 
explained and discussed in detailed throughout this section. The developed models were 
applied to five risk areas (social, technical, economic, environmental and political) to 
evaluate their level of impact on project cost, time and quality. 
 
Prioritization results revealed that technical risks have the highest average effect score 
(0.30) in the hierarchy risks areas considered in this research. The results further show 
that economic risks have the second highest effects score (0.25) followed by political 
risks (0.17), environmental risks (0.16) and social risks (0.13). 
 
Based on the ANP RPIs, the results suggest that a developer that pursues transportation 
megaprojects needs to consider seriously technical risks in the construction phase of the 
project life cycle. Additionally, the interactions of all risks in the emerging economic, 
political and social environments of a developed nation can be very critical to 
developers to deal with. Therefore, the developed model can be implemented to 
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facilitate a company’s decision on risk management based on the level of STEEP risks 
impact on project performance. 
 
The relevancies of this section are that: 
i. It provides practitioners with a tool to evaluate and prioritize risk impact levels in a 
megaproject in the construction phase and  
ii. It provides researchers with risk areas and sub areas, a model to evaluate and 
prioritize risks and a methodology to quantify the qualitative effects of risks factors.   
 
These conclusions are limited to the data collected. However, if the data set is extended 
to cover more transportation megaprojects and risk areas, it might truly represent the 
level of STEEP risks impact in megaprojects and so general conclusions can be drawn.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: SD MODEL 
7.1: Introduction 
Following the ANP model construction in chapter six, this chapter introduces the 
development of the initial System Dynamics (SD) models that underpins the research 
focus. The model structure and the initial model development are described to reflect 
the construction phase of a transportation megaproject’s lifecycle. Based on case 
scenarios, risk interdependencies (cause-effect interrelationships) in transportation 
megaprojects are addressed by causal loop diagrams. The chapter concludes with the 
verification of the initial model development. The explanation for this distinction is 
provided in the course of the discussion. 
 
7.2: The Model Structure 
To start with, a high level causal diagram for the entire system at the construction phase 
is constructed for the case study project (ETNP) and given in Figure 7.1. Variables in 
the high level causal diagram are causally related in the form of loops and may either 
have no influence or have a positive or negative influence on another factor. By and 
large, everything is dependent on everything else, directly or indirectly.  
As a result of many system variables (entities) and loops in Figure 7.1, transportation 
megaprojects can be said to belong to the class of complex dynamic systems that, 
according to Sterman (1992), exhibit the following characteristics:  
- They are complex and consist of multiple components.  
- They are highly dynamic.  
- They involve multiple feedback processes.  
- They involve non-linear relationships and  
- They involve both “hard” and “soft” data.  
 
In this model, hard data such as cost would be measurable while soft data such as social 
uncertainties would be intangible. For simplicity, Figure 7.1 is modelled into five sub 
systems: (a) social risks system (b) technical risks system, (c) economic risks system; 
(d) environmental risks system and (e) political risks system. Each of these risk sub 
systems is simulated to reveal their respective level of impacts on project cost, time and 
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quality during construction over time. In the end, the sub models are combined to form 
a generic MegaDS risk stock model to assess the overall impact of all risks on ETNP as 
a transportation megaproject. This way, the model structure would be clear for ease of 
management, especially when observing the risk value changes within the system. 
Further details of what are in the risk sub systems are discussed in section 7.1.3. 
 
 
                         Figure 7.1: Causal Loop Diagram for STEEP Risks on ETNP 
(See the attached sheet for clarity) 
 
7.2.1. Model Causality 
For each entity in the STEEP risks causal loop model, two different causality trees can 
be drawn. The first, called “causes tree” represents the entity in question as the end of 
the tree and includes all the variables (entities) that influence it. The second tree-like 
diagram, called “uses tree” has the entity in question at its head, and shows all other 
entities influenced by it. For example, Figure 7.2 shows the “causes” tree for technical 
uncertainties while Figure 7.3 shows respectively the “uses” tree for the same entity 
technical uncertainties. 
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                Figure 7.2: Causes Tree Diagram for Technical Uncertainties Entity 
 
 
                   Figure 7.3: Uses Tree Diagram for Technical Uncertainties Entity 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Causality of Technical Uncertainties 
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Considering the relation of technical uncertainties variable in Figure 7.1, by pure logic, 
project participants can associate and represent both the causes and uses tree diagrams 
in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 as shown in Figure 7.4 and Table 7.1 respectively.  
 
                                  Table 7.1: Technical Uncertainties Influence 
Technical uncertainties 
Influence by Influence on 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
- Inadequate site investigation  
- Technical risks 
- Project complexity  
- Engineering & design problems 
- Supply chain breakdown 
- Technical 
certainties 
- Technical risks 
 
- Technical 
certainties 
 
 
In all causal tree diagrams entities in parenthesis, that is (Technical uncertainties) 
indicated in Figure 7.3, denote that this entity appears at least twice in the tree, and are 
therefore contained in a loop, as indeed can be seen in the causal loop model presented 
in Figure 7.1. In the same way, the high level causal diagrams for the entire system and 
sub systems were developed.  It can also be observed that the high level causal diagram 
represented in Figure 7.1 contains several risk variables and loops which indicate cause-
effect interrelationships for the entire STEEP risks.  
 
 
7.3. Initial Model Development 
The initial model defines the dynamic hypothesis of each STEEP risk systems 
considered in this research. The dynamic hypothesis is a statement that can be proved 
right or wrong after a thorough research based investigation. Ranganath and Rodrigues 
(2008) stated in system dynamics theory and case studies that a dynamic hypothesis can 
be proposed in the form of a statement, a causal loop diagram, or stock and flow 
diagram. According to Ranganath and Rodrigues, it basically expresses the model in a 
systematic term for conducting simulation by deciding on the factors of study. 
Refinement and revision can be made on this dynamic hypothesis, as and when 
required, because no model can be perfect in all respects.  
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As mention in chapter 3 (Section 3.4), details of the dynamic hypothesis are derived 
from the literature review, interviews conducted with academic staff, consultants, 
project managers, engineers and other top level management staff involved in 
megaproject development and through the modeller’s interaction with industry 
practitioners in the United Kingdom. These hypotheses behave dynamically and are 
based on the interactions of risk variables within the overall model illustrated in Figure 
7.1. This suggests that various variables which cause risks are interrelated within a 
chain of cause and effect loops. According to Yeganli et al., (2011), each cause 
influences the latter one in a closed loop of cause and effects making a domino. Tables 
7.2 to 7.6 in section 7.3.1 represent the system boundaries for each sub system within 
the MegaDS model while Sections 7.3.2 to 7.3.6 provide detail representations of the 
five dynamic hypotheses under each sub system. 
 
 
7.3.1. System Boundaries 
In order to show a complete picture of the level of STEEP risk variables impacting on 
project time, cost and quality in the construction phase, description of the system 
boundary is required. Tables 7.2 to 7.6 indicate consolidated risk variables obtained 
during literature search, case studies and interviews which are used to formulate the 
system boundaries for the MegaDS system models. The endogenous risk variables are 
those whose behaviours are generated within each STEEP model while the exogenous 
variables are considered as essentially parameters with values coming from the ANP 
Risk Priority Indexes (RPIs), and can usually be considered as constants. The 
boundaries of the MegaDS system models contain risk variables that are required to 
generate the problem behaviour on project performance (time, cost and quality) at the 
construction phase for transportation megaprojects only.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 
                       Table 7.2: System Boundary for Social Risks System 
 
Risk Code Risk Type 
Type I: Endogenous Variables 
PR1 Social risks 
SV1 Social grievances;  
SV2 Multi-level decision making bodies involvement 
SV3 Disputes  
SV4 Legal/Community actions 
SV5 Pressure to modify project scope 
SV6 Threats to personnel  and  asset security 
SV8 Cost of dispute resolution 
SV9 De-escalation to grievances 
SV10 Error generation 
SV11 Escalation to grievances 
SV12 Escalation to project cost overrun 
SV13 Escalation to project time overrun 
SV14 Project quality deficiency 
SV15 Risks of cost overrun. 
SV16 Risks of time overrun 
SV17 Social certainties 
SV18 Social uncertainties 
SV19 Worksite coordination problems 
 Type II: Exogenous Variable 
SV7 Social Issues 
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                      Table 7.3: System Boundary for Technical Risks System 
 
Risk Code Risk Type 
Type I: Endogenous Variables 
PR2 Technical risks  
TV2:   Ground conditions problem at a given project site 
TV3:   Project complexity  
TV6:   Modification to project design & specification 
TV7:   Technical difficulties in utilities diversions 
TV10:   Risks of project time overrun 
TV11:   Risks of project cost overrun 
TV13:   Cost of delay in utility diversion 
TV14:   Cost of rework 
TV15:   Error generation 
TV16:   Project quality deficiency 
TV17:   Project scope. 
TV18:   Escalation to project cost overrun 
TV19:   Escalation to  project time overrun 
TV20:   Rework 
TV21:   Technical certainties 
TV22:   Technical uncertainties 
TV23:   Time to divert underground utilities 
TV24:   Work to do 
TV25:   Worksite coordination problems 
 Type II: Exogenous Variables 
TV1:   Ambiguity of project scope/ Scope change  
TV4:   Project modification  
TV5:   Project cost estimate problems 
TV8:   Engineering and design change 
TV9:   Supply chain breakdown 
TV12:   Inadequate site investigation 
   Type III: Excluded Variables  
xTV1:   Buildability  
xTV2:   Constructability  
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                      Table 7.4: System Boundary for Economic Risks System 
Risk Code Risk Type 
Type I: Endogenous Variables 
PR3 Economic risks 
EV1: Change in government funding policy  
EV2: Taxation  
EV4: Wage inflation;  
EV5: Local inflation  
EV6: Foreign exchange   
EV7: Material price  
EV9: Energy price 
EV12: Project delays of all forms 
EV13: Cost of delays 
EV14: Cost of resolution 
EV15: Disputes 
EV16: Economic certainties 
EV17: Economic uncertainties 
EV18: Error generation 
EV19: Escalation to project cost overrun 
EV20: Escalation to project time overrun 
EV21: Material price hike 
EV22: Project quality deficiency 
EV23: Risks of project cost overrun 
EV24: Risks of project time overrun 
EV25: Worksite coordination problems 
 Type II: Exogenous Variables 
EV3:   Government discontinuity (change) 
EV8:   Economic recession 
EV10:   Catastrophic environmental effects;  
EV11:   Project technical difficulties  
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                   Table 7.5: System Boundary for Environmental Risks System 
Risk Code Risk Type 
Type I: Endogenous Risk Variables 
PR4: Environmental risks 
ENV3: Cost of legal action 
ENV4: Disputes 
ENV5: Environmental regulation enforcement 
ENV6: Environmental certainties 
ENV7: Environmental uncertainties 
ENV8: Error generation 
ENV9: Escalation to project cost overrun 
ENV10: Escalation to project time overrun 
ENV11: Legal action 
ENV12: Multi decision making bodies involvement 
ENV13: Project quality deficiency 
ENV14: Risks of project cost overrun 
ENV15: Risks of project time overrun 
ENV16: Social issues 
ENV17: Social grievances 
ENV18: Worksite coordination problems 
 Type II: Exogenous 
ENV1:   Environmental issues from works  
ENV2: Unfavourable climate conditions  
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                      Table 7.6: System Boundary for Political Risks System 
Risk Code Risk Type 
Type I: Endogenous 
PR5 Political risks  
PV1:   Government funding  policy 
PV4:   Political support 
PV5:   Political indecision (decision) 
PV6:   Project termination 
PV7:   Delay in obtaining consent/approval; 
PV8:   Legislative & regulatory changes  
PV9:   Cost of delays 
PV10:   Cost of legal & dispute resolution 
PV11:   Disputes 
PV12:   Error generation 
PV13:   Escalation to project cost overrun 
PV14:   Escalation to project time overrun. 
PV15:   Legal actions 
PV16:   Political certainties 
PV17:   Political debates on the project 
PV18:   Political harmony 
PV19:   Political interferences in the project 
PV20:   Political uncertainties 
PV21:   Project quality deficiency 
PV22:   Risks of project cost overrun. 
PV23:   Risks of project time overrun 
PV24:   Social acceptability. 
PV25:   Worksite coordination problems 
 Type II: Exogenous 
PV2:   Political opposition 
PV3:   Government discontinuity 
PV9:   Protectionism 
PV10:   Delay in obtaining temporary Traffic 
Regulation Orders (TROs) 
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7.3.2: The Social Risks System 
The social risks system is the first sub model within the Megaproject dynamics 
simulation (MegaDS) system models. The model is called Social Risks Model (SoRM) 
as it basically captures the dynamics of the social risks impacting on project 
performance at the construction phase. Its key parameters include variables such as 
those indicated in Table 7.2: System Boundary for Social Risks System. These 
parameters define the boundary of the social risks system and are grouped into 
endogenous and exogenous variables in order to understand how the system behaves 
and what their properties are. 
 
                    Figure 7.5: Causal Loop Diagram for Social Risks System 
(See the attached sheet for clarity) 
The dynamic hypothesis (cause-and-effect diagram) indicated in Figure 7.5 defines the 
interrelations between different causes which lead to occurrence of social risks in the 
system. This interconnecting chain of cause-and-effect loops makes risk variables a 
network of dynamic behaviours. 
Social grievances.
*Social
issues
Pressure to modify
project scope
Threat to personal &
asset security
+
+
+
Cost of legal actions &
dispute resolution+
**Mult level decision
making bodies
involvement
+
-
Social risks.
Social
uncertainties.
Project quality
deficiency.
Risks of project
cost overrun
Risks of project
time overrun.
Escalation to project time
overrun.
Escalation to project
cost overrun. +
+
Worksite coordination
problems.
+
Error generation.
+
++
+
+
Social
certainties.
-
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
R6
. .. A causal relationship
Legend:
+ (-) signs at the arrowheads indicate that the effect is positively (negatively) related to the cause.
R denotes reinforcing (positive) loop
+
R7
-
R8+
+
Legal actions.
Disputes.
+
+
+
+
* refers to Traffic, Need to relocate, Pedistran & bicycle safety,Choice of travel mode,Land & property values, Linkage
between residence & job, Accessibility difficulties to families, friends & community resources and Pollution
** refers to Regulatory & environmental bodies (local, national & Europe wide) and Stakeholders (internal & external).
B1
B2
Escalation to
grievances
-
+
B denotes balancing (negative) loop
<**Mult level decision
making bodies
involvement>
+
+
+
<Risks of project
time overrun.>
<Disputes.>
+
+
+
<Cost of legal
actions & dispute
resolution>
+
+
<Legal
actions.><Social
uncertainties.>
+
+
+ +
+
<Project quality
deficiency.>
+
+
R9
De-escalation to
social grievances
-
185 
Developing such a model shed light into the systematic nature of risk behaviour which 
may possibly be neglected in the traditional ways of dealing with social risks during 
megaproject development. Since the dynamic behaviours of social risks are very 
difficult to understand and control in any business including megaproject development, 
the framework of the proposed social risks model illustrated in Figure 7.5 is limited 
only to the variables specified in the system boundary presented in Table 7.2.  The 
SoRM contains two vicious cycles: the vicious cycle of reinforcing or positive loops 
(represented by R1 to R8) and the vicious cycle of balancing or negative loops (denoted 
by B1 and B2). Details of these vicious cycles are further explained in sections 7.3.2.1 
and 7.3.2.2. 
 
 
7.3.2.1: The Vicious Cycle of Social Risks Generation 
The positive or reinforcing feedback loops R1 to R8 operate as vicious cycles that can 
drag transportation megaprojects under construction into time and cost overruns and 
quality deficiency. As indicated in the feedback loop R1, social issues cause an increase 
in escalation to grievances which in turn increase the level of social grievances in the 
system. Social grievances further reinforce escalation to grievances to form the loop R1. 
 
 
In feedback loops R2, increases in social uncertainties increase the level of social risks 
impact in the system but decreases social certainties on the project. Increase in social 
risks increases legal actions which also increases social uncertainties to form a loop. 
The basis of the loop R2 is that the sources of social uncertainties such as social issues 
and grievances may cover a range of impacts a project may have in the social 
environment. The social environment encompasses local people with norms, beliefs and 
ways in which they live and interact with their environment and economy.  All these 
may have been considered during planning and early consultation stages and still be 
affected directly or indirectly by project activities. Since communities in the project area 
may have characteristics, objectives and requirements that need to be considered, the 
dynamics of their behaviours toward the project, especially during execution stages may 
change with time. This may lead to unexpected legal actions as indicated in feedback 
loop R2 and cause further escalation to project time overrun and to reinforce risks of 
project time overrun to cause an increase in worksite coordination problems, error 
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generation and back to escalate project time overrun as indicated by vicious cycles 
(feedback loops) R8, R7 and R6. Also, legal actions, disputes and error generation may 
cause delays in the system resulting in further escalation to project time overruns and 
then to risks of project time overrun. Likewise, risks of project time overrun, cost of 
legal actions and dispute resolution and quality deficiencies may escalate project cost to 
resort to risks of project cost overrun. Other feedback loops which reinforce risks within 
the system are loops R4 and R5. Both these feedback loops tend to increase the level of 
project quality deficiency in the project. 
 
 
7.3.2.2: The Vicious Cycle of Grievance Prevention  
It can be observed on Figure 7.5 that social issues and grievances covered a range of 
impacts a megaproject development may face in the social environment.  In feedback 
loops B1 and B2, social complaint or issues raised by an individual or a group within 
communities affected by company operations can result from concerns such as traffic 
issues, need to relocate, pedestrian and bicycle safety, choice of travel modes, reduction 
in land and property values, linkage between residence and jobs, accessibility 
difficulties to families, friends and community resources and pollution (water, soil, air 
etc.).  The difference between the amount of concern and or a complaint may be in a 
specific rate of time to resort to social grievance. The term “grievance” implies that 
there may be varying problems that communities and businesses along the routes of the 
project may want to bring to a company’s attention. Project developers should keep in 
mind that unanswered questions or ignored requests for information have the potential 
to increase threats to personnel and asset security and disputes, which will then lead to 
legal actions and social uncertainties if grievances are not addressed promptly and 
satisfactorily. 
 
 
Based on the level of grievances, pressure will be mounted on both the developer and 
the project owner by the communities in the project area to modify the project scope, 
through the involvement of multi decision making bodies such as regulatory and 
environmental bodies (local, national and regional), and stakeholders (internal and 
external) to balance the inflow of social grievances into the system as indicated by the 
vicious cycles B1 and B2. Complexity will evolve and progress will be at stake when 
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multi – decision making bodies exceed the expected level to convey what they think the 
main contractor must do to reduce the rate of inflow of grievances. It will be a good 
practice for developers at this stage to intensify responses to community feedback 
through the relevant pillars of community engagement, such as disclosure, consultation, 
and participation in project monitoring as construction proceeds.  
 
7.3.2.3: Causalities for Social Risk Stock Variables 
Causalities for the main risk factors within the SoRM namely social grievances; social 
risks; risks of project time overrun, risks of project cost overrun and quality deficiency 
are given in the causes tree diagrams in Figure 7.6.   
 
 
 
Figure 7.6a: Causes tree for social grievances 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6b: Causes tree for social risks 
                   Figure 7.6: Causes Tree Diagrams for Social Risks Model 
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Figure 7.6c: Causes tree for risks of project time overrun 
 
 
Figure 7.6d: Causes tree for risks of project cost overrun 
 
 
Figure 7.6e: Causes tree for project quality deficiency 
Figure 7.6: Causes Tree Diagrams for Social Risks Model (Continued) 
 
The causes’ tree diagrams 7.6a to 7.6e depict the causal relation between system 
variables. It can be observed that social grievances are influenced mainly by two system 
variables, namely escalation and de-escalation to social grievances. Similarly, social 
risks are influenced by two system variables viz., social uncertainties and social 
certainties. Additionally, risks of project time overrun and risks of project cost overrun 
are influenced by escalation to project time overrun and escalation to project cost 
overrun respectively.  The last stock or level is the project quality deficiency. This is 
also influenced mainly by just one system variable (error generation).  
 
 
On the other hand, the uses trees indicated in Figure 7.7 have the system variables in 
question at the head, and show all other risk variables influenced by it for the social 
grievances, social risks, risks of project time overrun, risks of project cost overrun and 
project quality deficiency entities. 
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Figure 7.7a: Uses Tree Diagram for the Social Grievances Entity 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7b: Uses Tree Diagram for the Social Risks Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.7c: Uses Tree Diagram for the Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7d: Uses Tree Diagram for the Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
 
                     Figure 7.7: Uses Tree Diagrams for the Social Risks Model 
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Figure 7.7e: Uses Tree Diagram for the Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
 
Figure 7.7: Uses Tree Diagrams for the Social Risks Model (Continued) 
 
 
There may be other influencing system variables which are beyond the scope of this 
research and further work is needed to identify some more variables to modify the social 
risks model developed in this research.  Also, it must be noted that  the level of impacts 
of social risks described in this model applies to the construction phase of the life cycle 
of transportation megaproject development and may vary depending on geographical 
location of the project components and the type of social environment setting in which 
the project is executed.  
     
 
7.3.3: The Technical Risks System 
The technical risks model (TeRM) is the second model under the MegaDS system 
models. The elements of TeRM are not easily characterized. They are often problematic 
in megaproject development in that they are dependent on people and environment, as 
well as the laws of science. Some of these are known, and some are unknown at any 
point in time. Because of the dependability involved, actions to comprehend and 
mitigate the nature of such risks are interrelated through the laws of science, patterns of 
rational processes, and the personalities of people involved. That is to say, technical 
risks are very complex and dynamic in nature during megaproject development. 
 
 
One way to deal with this type of risk is to perform a purely subjective analysis by 
modelling their causes and effects as indicated in Figure 7.8. In this approach, the key 
elements, factors or variables of the entire sub system, are related through a network 
map, which becomes a model system in which connections between the system 
variables represent physical flows or knowledge flows. Typically, managing work to be 
Project quality deficiency.
Escalation to project cost overrun. Risks of project cost overrun
Escalation to project time overrun. Risks of project time overrun.
Worksite coordination problems. Error generation.
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done in vicious cycle (R4) must involve a project group such as consultants, contractors, 
specialists, the staff of the project owner and the project control team itself. A typical 
situation is where a unit or person in a particular division will tend to show allegiance to 
two higher authorities, the project manager and his “home” department or firm. This 
dual reporting relationship is often a problem with a “matrix” project organisation 
structure and accounts for most of the project scope increases and further complexity 
problems that project managers face during megaproject development. This implies that 
the higher the complexity of a project, the higher its technical uncertainties will be. 
Apparently, the inherent complexity uncertainty and technical risk of the project may 
increase if the size of the total project and cost estimate relative to the average cost of 
the organization’s projects is large.  
 
 
On the other hand, unforeseen modifications to the project in the construction phase 
such as engineering design and specification changes can trigger an increase in the 
project uncertainties. For instance, changes in a civil engineering design specification of 
a highway project and a tunnel design that includes many geotechnical, structural, 
environmental, and safety elements (Ruuska et al., 2009) as the construction proceeds 
can pose additional technical challenges in the system. Also, inadequate site 
investigations and supply chain breakdown can further be added factors to project 
complexity. All of these will increase the rate at which technical risks will impact on the 
project and verse versa. Technically, the higher the level of risks impact in the system, 
the more errors will be generated to create reworks. This implies that the process of 
correcting errors can further increase the volume of work that needs to be done in order 
to fix the original problem, or can increase the work volume required because fixing the 
errors can take more effort than doing the original work. These phenomena will 
however create a reinforcing feedback loop to increase the level of technical risks in the 
vicious cycle (feedback loop) R3.    
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      Figure 7.8: Causal Loop Diagram for Technical Risks System 
 
7.3.3.1: Causalities for Technical Risk Stock Variables 
Causalities for the main risk factors within the TeRM namely work to do; technical 
risks; risks of project time overrun, risks of project cost overrun and quality deficiency 
are given in causes tree diagrams in Figures 7.9.   
 
 
Figure 7.9a: Causes Tree for Work to do Entity 
               
                    Figure 7.9: Causes Tree Diagrams for Technical Risks Model 
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Figure 7.9b: Causes Tree for Technical Risks Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.9c: Causes Tree for Risks of Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.9d: Causes Tree for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
  Figure 7.9e: Causes Tree for Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
Figure 7.9: Causes Tree Diagrams for Technical Risks Model (Continued). 
 
It can be observed that work to be done and risks of project cost overrun are each 
influenced mainly by project scope and inflow of project cost overrun in the causes trees 
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indicated in Figure 7.9a and Figure 7.9e respectively. Additionally, technical risks and 
project quality deficiency are each being influenced by two risk factors viz., technical 
certainties and technical uncertainties, and risk of project cost overrun and error 
generation respectively. 
 
 
Similarly, the uses trees indicated in Figure 7.10 have the system variable in question at 
the head, and show all other risk variables influenced by it for the same variables 
considered for the causes trees diagrams in Figures 7.9.  
 
 
Figure 7.10a: Uses Tree Diagram for Work to do Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.10b: Uses Tree Diagram for Technical Risks Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.10c: Uses Tree Diagram for Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
                  Figure 7.10: Uses Tree Diagrams for Technical Risks Model 
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Figure 7.10d: Uses Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.10e: Uses Tree Diagram for Risk of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
 
Figure 7.10: Uses Tree Diagrams for Technical Risks Model (Continued). 
 
It must be noted that, the level of impacts of technical risks on the system described in 
this model is in the construction phase of the life cycle of the case study megaproject 
(ETNP) during development. Risk variables used for developing this model may vary 
depending on the geographical location of the project components and the type of 
technical environment in which the project is executed.      
 
7.3.4: The Economic Risks System 
In this section of the report, the economic risks model (EcRM) sets out to describe the 
interactions of system variables within the economic risk model to generate risks of 
project time and cost overruns and project quality deficiency at the construction phase 
of transportation megaproject development. The key issue considered within the EcRM 
is what is the magnitude of the economic risks impacts on transportation megaproject 
construction activity during construction?  
 
 
Often times, transportation megaproject construction activities can act as a reliable 
bellwether for economic performance yet they are complex developments that can be 
affected by a number of different economic factors. Unexpected changes in interest 
rates, exchange rates, material prices, energy prices and changes in inflation and 
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recession may have considerable impacts on the budget costs of such megaprojects 
during construction. For example, rising interest rates can affect the debt service cost 
component of a megaproject development. Also, shortages of materials, fuel (energy) 
and skilled labour which often characterize periods of rapid economic growth are likely 
to have consequential economic impacts on project time, cost and quality. 
 
 
Although process and project contingencies may have been included in estimates to 
account for unknown costs that are omitted or unforeseen due to a lack of complete 
project definition and engineering, contingencies are added because experience has 
shown that such costs are likely, and expected, to be incurred even though they cannot 
be explicitly determined at the time the estimate is prepared. However, in many 
instances capital cost contingencies do not cover the uncertainties or risks associated 
with scope changes, changes in labour availability or productivity, delays in equipment 
deliveries, changes in regulatory requirements, unexpected cost escalation and plant 
performance (e.g availability, efficiency) after start up. Beyond the economic factors, 
there are events that are impossible to predict but can also have a major bearing on both 
the level of construction activity and the cost entailed in delivering schemes.  
 
 
Additionally, the deregulation of financial institutions and risks linked with the 
economic indicators of a country will further generate unanticipated problems related to 
the financing of megaprojects under construction. For instance, rising fuel (energy) 
costs will basically affect the price of almost everything from lunches to construction 
materials. Thus, increased energy prices induce wage inflation and building material 
prices increase to give high impact on the construction industry (See Figure 7.11), 
which is one of the country’s engines of growth, and consequently, it may experience 
slowdown for the rest of the year. For example, a hike in energy prices will affect all 
levels of the value chain from building materials such as steel bars, sand, cement, 
concrete and roofing materials to logistics. Prices of many construction related 
materials, machinery and transportation costs will also be increased substantially. Thus, 
price increases of fuel needed to operate trucks and heavy machinery which rely on 
large amounts of diesel required to transport steel bars, cement, sand and stones from 
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ports/plants to construction sites reinforce the economic uncertainty to the megaproject 
development and affect construction time and cost. 
 
House prices, food and transport may also increase and affect employees’ wages and 
hinder sections of work packages under the developer’s plan reaching specific targets. 
Some of the highly skilled employees such as engineers, schedulers, assistant project 
managers and even subcontractors and suppliers will tend to reject certain offers for 
their respective jobs because of lack of profit to be made due to local inflation, high cost 
of living and high prices of building materials. This will cause further delay in the 
megaproject developer’s programs and even the country’s other infrastructure projects. 
Whereby, the construction of affordable housing, including low and medium cost units, 
may no longer be feasible. 
 
 
Furthermore, increases in the prices of building materials severely impact both 
developers and contractors. Contractors would definitely want to re-negotiate contract 
prices. They are likely to ask for variation orders (VOs) to cover the rise in raw material 
prices. If contractors are unable to obtain VOs, especially those sub-contractors with 
low financial strength to absorb higher raw material prices, the possibility of projects 
being abandoned will be high. Even large contractors would be making losses from 
projects. Contractors cannot proceed with such projects and would have to return their 
tenders. 
 
Although there is no certainty regarding what might happen in the months ahead, the 
difficulties that a transportation megaproject developer or contractor faces from 
economic risks will inevitably impact the construction phase of projects. However, the 
continuous increase in energy and construction material prices, taxation and government 
funding policy change and wage inflation is proving to be an ordeal and it is hoped that 
the construction industry will be able to overcome these challenges. The key to success 
lies in having a positive and dynamic system mind-set to enhance both efficiency and 
productivity in the whole construction value chain. 
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                  Figure 7.11: Causal Loop Diagram for Economic Risks System 
 
7.3.4.1: Causalities for the Economic Risks Stock Variables 
Causalities for system variables within the economic sub model follow the same 
principle as those described for social and technical sub model. Therefore, the causes 
and uses trees for the economic risks  model indicated in Figure 7.12 and 7.13 have the 
risk variables in question at the head, and show all other risk variables influenced by it 
for the same risk variables considered for the causes and uses tree diagrams in Figures 
7.9 and 7.10.  
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Figure 7.12a: Causes Tree Diagram for Material Price Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.12b: Causes Tree Diagram for Economic Risks Entity 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12c: Causes Tree Diagram for Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12d: Causes Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
                Figure 7.12: Causes Tree Diagrams for Economic Risks Model 
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Figure 7.12e: Causes Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
Figure 7.12: Causes Tree Diagrams for Economic Risks Model (Continued) 
 
 
 
Figure 7.13a: Uses Tree Diagram for Material Price Entity 
 
 
 
Figure 7.13b: Uses Tree Diagram for Economic Risks Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.13c: Uses Tree Diagram for Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
 
                  Figure 7.13: Uses Tree Diagrams for Economic Risks Model 
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Figure 7.13d: Uses Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.13e: Uses Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
Figure 7.13: Uses Tree Diagrams for Economic Risks Model (Continued) 
 
Again, it must be noted that, the impact of the economic risks described in this model is 
in the construction phase of the life cycle of ETNP during development. System 
variables used for developing this model may vary depending on geographical location 
of the project components and the type of economic environment in which the project is 
executed.      
 
7.3.5: The Environmental Risks System 
The fourth system within the Megaproject dynamics simulation (MegaDS) model 
systems is the environmental risks model (EnRM). It specifically defines the 
interrelations between different environmental variables which lead to project quality 
deficiency, time and cost overruns in the system. The boundary within which the model 
is constructed together with the dynamic hypothesis for this sub system is indicated in 
Table 7.5 and Figure 7.14 respectively. A description of the system vicious cycles 
(feedback loops) is required to show a complete picture of interactions of risk variables 
affecting project performances in this sub model.  
 
As represented in Figure 7.14, the vicious cycles suggest that the level of impact of 
environmental issues from work (pollution of soil, water, air, noise and traffic from 
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construction activities) and unfavourable climatic conditions will negatively influence 
the financial performance of businesses, residents along the project development routes 
and the contractors involved in the project. As the vicious cycle (feedback loop) R1 
indicates, the causal relations between the environmental issues and the environmental 
uncertainties will generate environmental risks and various public concerns or issues 
that could sometimes result to social grievances, disputes and legal actions or even work 
stoppages and could successively cause time and cost overruns and quality deficiencies 
in the system.  
 
 
Conversely, companies perceived to have low impacts of environmental risks from 
works may be assumed to have a lower probability of being fined, sued, or publicly 
criticized. In contrast, if the public perceives that a firm is overly exposed to such risks, 
the firm may face greater scrutiny from regulatory agencies and be a more attractive 
target for lawsuits and take-over. Additionally, unfavourable climatic conditions (heavy 
rain, cold, snow etc.) can severely impact construction activities leading to significant 
deviations from project time schedule. Although project planners may estimate the 
potential impacts of such conditions, the severities of such conditions beyond estimated 
values will consequently result to late delivery of the project. In this regard, the 
combined effects of both phenomena (environmental issues from works and the 
unfavourable climatic conditions) will cause worksite coordination problems which will 
then cause non-achievement of project quality as results of overdue time on project 
delivery and error generations in the system leading to risks of project time and cost 
overruns.  
 
 
Since time and cost are typically used as key criteria for examining project performance 
in the construction industry (e.g., Love et al., 2002; Nguyen and Ogunlana 2005; Ng et 
al., 2001), any problem relating to them will reflect poor performance, which is quite 
relevant to the political, legal, technical, and managerial reasons that commonly arise 
from failed megaprojects (Seung et al., 2009). 
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               Figure 7.14: Causal Loop Diagram for Environmental Risks System 
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In the case of the TGV project in France, monuments and archaeological sites on the 
proposed high speed line and serious environmental protests against it caused delays in 
its planning phases. Apparently, the French Minister of Transport was compelled to 
delay the final announcement of the final routes for almost a year in the 1990s (New 
Scientist Newspaper article, 1990) to decide the location of the main line through more 
than 2000 meetings. Although the plan of the TGV was successfully adjusted, actual 
construction started in September 1995, three years after the public announcement of 
the plan was made in October 1992.   
 
 
In the case of ETNP, working in a World Heritage Site was always a challenge. The 
complexities of dealing with issues such as severe weather conditions and the rerouting 
of underground pipes caused major time and physical cost overruns to the project. A 
visit to ETNP sites during the early 2011 and mid-2013, revealed tracks repair works on 
Princes Street and Haymarket respectively. The repairs were believed to have been 
probably caused by the weight of traffic and possibly, the extreme weather conditions 
suffered in 2009 and 2010. This emphasised the fact that significant risks of project time 
and cost overruns and quality deficiency in transportation projects in Europe cases are 
largely related to environmental problems. 
 
 
7.3.5.1: Causalities for Environmental Risks Stock Variables 
Causalities for environmental risks stock variables also follow the same principle as 
those described for the previous three sub-models. The causes and uses trees for this 
sub-model are indicated in Figure 7.15 and 7.16 and have the stock variable in question 
at the head to show how all other system variables within the model are influenced by it.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.15a: Causes Tree Diagram for Environmental Risks Entity 
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Figure 7.15b: Causes Tree Diagram for Project Quality Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.15c: Causes Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.15d: Causes Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
 
              Figure 7.15: Causes Tree Diagrams for Environmental Risks Model 
 
 
 
Figure 7.16a: Uses Tree Diagram for Environmental Risks Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.16b: Uses Tree Diagram for Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
 
               Figure 7.16: Uses Tree Diagrams for Environmental Risks Model 
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Figure 7.16c: Uses Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.16d: Uses Tree Diagram for Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
 
Figure 7.16: Uses Tree Diagrams for Environmental Risks Model (Continued) 
 
Again, it must be noted that the level of impacts of environmental risks described in this 
model is in the construction phase of the life cycle of ETNP during development. 
System variables used for developing this model may vary depending on geographical 
location of the project components and the type of natural and ecological environments 
in which the project is executed.     
 
 
7.3.6: The Political Risks System 
The political risks model (PoRM) is the last model within the MegaDS systems. It can 
be defined as a potential harm to a business operation arising from political behaviour 
(McKellar, 2010 pp. 3). It involves the possibility that political authorities in the host 
political jurisdiction might interfere with the timely development of a project or 
business (Finnerty, 2007 pp.82). The relevance of the political risks model in this 
research is to understand the interactions of its variables within an environment which 
serve as a common language for businesses and political actors to impact project 
performances negatively.   
 
 
According to McKellar (2010), managers and investors across all business sectors share 
a very specific language and mind-set oriented around market share, growth, margin, 
and return on investment objectives, while political actors are concerned with the social 
organisation and its underlying ideals. The common language of political actors consists 
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of authority, ideology, political culture and identity, the social goods and the levers of 
power to influence these. This distinction alone makes political risk a unique challenge 
to megaprojects developers who need to understand the basics of a very different 
language and mind-set in order to address it.  
 
 
In addition, businesses occur in a framework set by political authority and social 
consensus and, as a result, there is nowhere in the political realm that businesses are 
unaffected by the laws of a state. Generally, there is consensus across the global 
political spectrum that infrastructure is critical to economic development, job creation, 
national security and competitiveness, but a lack of harmony in the political process and 
between contractors may limit the ability of project owners (nations) to accomplish their 
infrastructure dreams in time. This implies that each source of political risk in a system 
can exacerbate the others and they work together to generate a range of political risks 
which cannot necessarily be attributed to a single source. For example, in feedback 
loops R1 and R2 of Figure 7.17, political support for the project reinforces when 
political harmony and social acceptability intensify which reinforces the need to 
increase government funding policy for the project.  
 
 
By contrast, political opposition to the project and government discontinuity impede 
political harmony. Government discontinuity is a critical political risk which often 
impacts significantly on megaproject schedules. Political appointees overseeing state 
funded projects tend to have shorter time horizons than the estimated project completion 
time and as such, are usually replaced when the initiating government is changed 
through national elections. Such a change may tighten legislation; contribute to project 
time overruns, cost overruns, and project quality deficiency as indicated in feedback 
loops R8 to R13. Such change will further bring about project termination or reduction 
in government funding the project even if the project is regarded as desirable or 
necessary to the new regime.  
 
 
The project’s social acceptability depends mainly on the development of a sound 
agreement with actors (landlords and businesses owners) within the project area. Most 
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of the residents in the communities where the transportation megaproject is to pass may 
have known the practical implications of the construction activities on them and their 
businesses in the early planning and consultation stages and the important benefits the 
project may bring to them. However, others will still be concerned with the impact that 
such large projects may cause on their environment and the economy of the area. 
Therefore, different positions may be formed in the public opinion in the areas when 
actual construction is about to start with a number of people supporting, others 
encouraging in a conditional way, and still others opposing implementation of the 
project in their territory.  
 
 In each area, the different positions may be dependent on several local factors, 
including socio-economic conditions, cultural background, and individual or group 
interests. Most frequently, individual and collective attitudes towards project 
development usually change with time as the project reaches the construction stage, 
when heavy equipment and plant are involved. Indeed, undesirable effects may result 
from these activities on: i) ecosystem (air, land, flora, fauna, and superficial and 
underground water); ii) human health (from water pollution, noise, and gas emission); 
and iii) economy (detrimental impact on some business activities and tourism, and 
damage to crops and private properties). Moreover, iv) reaction often grows against 
landscape modifications and alteration of natural features of cultural or religious 
interest, caused by civil and industrial works, and by changes in the use of public areas 
resulting from project activities.  
 
 
Depending on the nature of the effects from the project activities and on the type of 
measures adopted by the main contracting firm to prevent their occurrence, such effects 
may either increase or reduce political risks on the project. In general, political 
harmony, support and social acceptability for the project will be high when the adverse 
effects are minimal.  As such, opposition by residents and political opponents in the 
project area, political interferences and debates on the project will often be reduced as 
construction proceeds.  
Conversely, no transportation megaproject development initiative exists without a slight 
possibility of impact on the natural environment (ecosystem) and people of the area 
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concerned even when initiatives of wide interest are involved. In a modern society, 
political interferences and indecision evolve when a debate begins among politicians, 
public administrators, economic lobbies, “green” groups, and indigenous communities, 
on whether or not, and in the affirmative on how, such a project should be carried out. 
That is to say, realization of any transportation megaproject depends, in many instances, 
on its socio-political acceptance in the project area.  
 
 
 Figure 7.17: Causal Loop Diagram for Political Risks System 
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Therefore, political support and social acceptability are important requisites for the 
smooth execution of megaprojects, especially those for transportation megaprojects. As 
earlier mentioned, the three main conditions to reduce political risks and win project 
acceptance by politicians and communities residing in the project area are minimization 
of environmental impact; avoidance of adverse effects on people's health; and the 
creation of direct benefits for local populations. To meet these conditions, the project 
developer must be prepared to bear specific burdens in the form of external costs, whose 
amounts will be dependent on the site, type, and size of the project activity. This will in 
turn allow for the project to proceed in the fastest way possible, reduce disputes, legal 
actions, quality deficiency, risks of time and cost overruns and result eventually in 
considerable external benefits for the megaproject developer, consisting mainly of 
saving of labour, reduction of passive interests on bank loans, and shortening of pay-
back time.  
 
7.3.6.1: Causalities for Political Risks Stock Variables 
Causalities for the main risk variables within the PoRM namely political support; 
political risks; risks of project time overrun, risks of project cost overrun and quality 
deficiency are given in the causes and uses tree diagrams in Figure 7.18 and 7.19.   
 
 
Figure 7.18a: Causes Tree Diagram for Political Support Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.18b: Causes Tree Diagrams for Political Risks Entity 
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Figure 7.18c: Causes Tree Diagrams for Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
 
Figure 7.18d: Causes Tree Diagrams for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.18e: Causes Tree Diagrams for Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
 
                   Figure 7.18: Causes Tree Diagrams for Political Risks Model 
 
 
 
Figure 7.19a: Uses Tree Diagrams for Political Support Entity 
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Figure 7.19b: Uses Tree Diagrams for Political Risks Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.19c: Uses Tree Diagrams for Project Quality Deficiency Entity 
 
 
Figure 7.19d: Uses Tree Diagrams for Risks of Project Time Overrun Entity 
 
 
             Figure 7.19e: Uses Tree Diagrams for Risks of Project Cost Overrun Entity 
 
                      Figure 7.19: Uses Tree Diagrams for Political Risks Model  
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7.4. Model Verification 
In Chapter 2, the researcher discussed the fact that megaprojects are usually unique and 
have unprecedented historical data on cost and time overruns, especially for 
transportation megaprojects. However, it is necessary to elicit further information from 
project experts who have knowledge and expertise in risks assessment in transportation 
megaprojects during construction. Some researchers argue that experts’ judgment tends 
to have cognitive limitations as a result of the potential biases associated with the 
individual subjective views (Akintoye et al., 2003, Ayyub, 2001 and Cooke, 1991). It is 
still necessary to incorporate the views of experts into this research to aid the 
application of the system dynamics and statistical techniques for assessing subjective 
data in a systematic way, thus reducing subjective bias. 
 
For consistent decision, the initial models were sent to seven participants (a group of 
risk experts and consultants) to criticise. The principal role of the verification in the first 
(qualitative) stage of modelling is to identify risks of inconsistency within the causal 
loop diagrams (CLDs) and to obtain sufficient information for the final model 
construction and for model simulation. Participants in the verification process include a 
project manager, a project engineer, a departmental stakeholder, a technical consultant 
and an operational manager involved in the ETNP. Others include an insurer, and a 
financial and legal adviser who are experienced in many facets of large-scale 
transportation infrastructure projects. 
 
 
The breadth of the model verification was to build confidence in the models. Although 
there is no single verification method in literature, verification by the experts mentioned 
in this report improved confidence gradually as the models were constructively 
criticised by these experts as new points of correspondence between the models and the 
identified empirical reality. From the stand point of verification, a number of errors 
were identified in the initial model development. Application of verification ideas were 
then used to refine the initial models. It suffices to say that the process helped to 
establish confidence in the soundness and usefulness of the final models with respect to 
their purposes. 
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7.5. Summary 
This chapter has presented the initial system dynamics modelling. Causal loop diagrams 
were developed using the Vensim software and were explained in detail throughout the 
chapter. The developed models were applied to five risk areas (social, technical, 
economic, environmental and political) to establish their cause and effects relationship 
based on risk information obtained through questionnaire surveys and interviews 
conducted on ETNP. The chapter concluded with the model verification process. In the 
next chapter, the development of the final model development for STEEP risks will be 
described. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SDANP MODEL 
8.1: Introduction 
Following the initial model (causal loop diagram) presented in chapter seven, this 
chapter describes the final model development of the substantive SDANP models for 
the STEEP risks considered in this research to reflect the construction phase of 
transportation megaproject. 
 
 
Drawing from the causal loop diagrams (CLDs), qualitative risks causal loop diagrams 
are converted into quantitative MegaDS system models to evaluate the physical 
interactions of risk variables in the entire system. Thereafter, the risk priority indexes 
(RPIs) derived from the ANP are incorporated into the stock and flow diagrams to 
simulate the dynamics of risk effects and impacts on project cost, time and quality 
during construction overtime using Vensim DSS software. The explanation for this 
distinction is provided in the course of the discussion. 
 
 
8.2: Final Model Development  
Based on the verified causal loop diagrams in chapter seven, a high level stock and flow 
diagram was developed for the construction phase of the case study transportation 
megaproject (ETNP). The entire graph also known as the MegaDS stock and flow 
diagram was finalised in October 2013, after a last meeting between experts (Kitzen, 
Cole, Bailey and Claire, 21-22 October 2013). The MegaDS diagram is illustrated in 
Figure 8.1 with several parameters removed for clarity.  
 
 
It must be noted that modelling the dynamics of each of the STEEP risks system in 
disaggregation will not neglect emergent properties between systems. The researcher 
implicitly assumed that all risk impacts on megaproject performance and as such a 
project manager may want to selectively identify risk of different classes and their level 
of impacts in order to maximize mitigation strategies. This may help the project 
manager to capitalize on differentials in the risk impact levels that are higher or lower.  
A model of the different risk systems such as STEEP cohorts in megaproject 
216 
construction would require that risk analysts disaggregate the stocks and flows of the 
entire MegaDS system into different risk system classes and introduce risk specific 
modelling and simulation to extract impact levels on project performance. This idea of 
disaggregating stocks into sub groups or systems of individuals STEEP risks are used to 
model the dynamics of risk impacts on megaproject performance in this chapter. Each 
of the five STEEP risk systems makes up part of the entire “MegaDS stock and flow 
model” illustrated in Figure 8.1.  
 
  
                       Figure 8.1: Stock and Flow Diagram for the MegaDS Model 
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As indicated in Figure 8.1, the final MegaDS stock and flow diagram consists of five 
interconnected STEEP risk models. The model (PR1) represents the “social risks” 
system; (PR2) represents the “Technical risks” system; (PR3) represents the 
“Environmental risks” system; (PR4), the “Economic risks” system and (PR5), the 
“Political risks” system. All of these models feed into project quality deficiency via 
worksite coordination problems and error generation, risks of project time overruns via 
the escalation to project time overruns entity and risks of project cost overruns via the 
escalation to project cost overruns entity. 
 
In total, the MegaDS system models contained over 5000 feedback loops, 112 variables, 
and hence, 112 model equations. Among the 112 model variables, 24 were of the type 
‘Stock or Level’ (See Table 8.1 for the list of the stock or level variables). As a result of 
the large number of the model components and parameters, it is impossible to present 
the MegaDS models as a single graph with larger fonts in this thesis. As such, in the 
subsequent sections, each STEEP system is modelled separately and illustrated in detail 
to ensure that all legends are legible.  
 
                                Table 8.1: Stock Variables for the MegaDS Model 
System Model Code  Variable Type Status   
SoRM PR1 Social risks Level  
SV1 Social grievances Level 
TeRM PR2 Technical risks Level 
TV24 Work to do  Level 
EcRM PR3 Economic risks Level 
EV7 Material price Level 
EnRM PR4 Environmental risks Level 
PoRM PR5 Political risks Level 
PV4 Political support Level 
All models 
SV13, TV16, EV22, ENV13, PR21 Project quality deficiency Level 
SV14, TV18, EV23, ENV14, PR22 Risks of project cost overrun Level 
SV15, TV19, EV24, ENV15, PR23 Risks of project time overrun Level 
 
8.3: Integrated SDANP Model  
The casual loop diagrams for social, technical, economic, environmental and political 
risks systems illustrated in Figures 7.5, 7.8, 7.11, 7.14, and 7.17 provide the foundation 
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to develop the integrated stock and flow diagrams. The stocks as well as the flows 
(inflows and outflows) for these systems are illustrated in Figure 8.1.  
 
8.3.1: Model Equation Formulation, Testing and Simulation 
To have the model equations formulated in system dynamics, full structural stock and 
flow diagrams for individual integrated stock and flow system models are assessed 
structurally.  Thereafter, formulation of equations for risk variables (endogenous 
variables) for each risk system model is performed. This sets a good foundation to 
enable consistency checks to be performed on all the system variables that must appear 
in the equations and to provide a good starting point to conduct simulation.  Various 
tests performed for the integrated system models are further explained in detail in 
chapter nine of this thesis. In order to capture the meaning of the relationships depicted 
in the models properly, equations used and their respective units in left hand side (LHS) 
must balance with the right hand side (RHS).  
 
With regard to model simulation, its primary objective is to study the critical variables 
which have influence on project time, cost and quality within each risk system model. 
Simulation is the only practical way to test the MegaDS system models. Typical 
conceptual models such as the type shown in Figure 7.1, page 173 and those for the 
individual system models are too large and complex to simulate mentally. As a result, 
simulation becomes the only reliable way to test hypotheses and evaluate the likely 
effects of policies to mitigate risk impacts on project time, cost and quality. Sections 
8.3.2 to 8.3.6 provide detail commentary on the respective stock diagrams, equations 
and simulation results to the integrated MegaDS system models in this report. 
 
8.3.2: Integrated Stock and Flow Model for the Social Risks System 
This model is mainly controlled by social issues, i.e. concerns from environmental 
issues from works (pollution, traffic, noise, need to relocate, pedestrian and bicycle 
safety, choice of travel mode, reduction in land and property values along the project 
routes, linkage between residence and job difficulties and accessibility difficulties to 
families, friends and community resources) and sometimes political ideology which are 
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transferred through transfer parameters from the environmental and political sub-
models. 
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        Figure 8.2: Integrated Stock and Flow Diagram for Social Risks System Model 
 
It is important to note that quantifying risks in this model on an absolute scale is a 
difficult proposition compared to measurement of vectors as force in newtons. 
However, in system dynamics it is always the trend and the pattern of variation that is of 
significance and not the accuracy of the numbers and absolute units. It can be observed 
from Figure 8.2 that the rate variables viz., escalation to grievances and de-escalation to 
grievances, social uncertainties and social certainties, escalation to project time overrun, 
escalation to project cost overrun and error generation are influenced by parameters as 
related in the causal loop diagram illustrated in Figure 7.5 (See Chapter 7). 
 
8.3.2.1: Model Equation Formulation for the Social Risks System Model 
After the integrated stock and flow diagram for the social risks sub-model is constructed 
and structurally assessed, mathematical models (equations) for the individual system 
variables (endogenous variables) for the model are formulated as indicated in Table 8.1. 
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        Table 8.2: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Social Risks System Model 
Code  System Variables Equations  Measurement 
    
PR1 Social risks INTEG ((Social uncertainties-Social 
certainties), Social risks priority 
index from ANP) 
Dimensionless 
SV1 Social grievances;  INTEG (Escalation to grievances- 
De-escalation to grievances, ANP’s 
RPI for SV1) 
Dimensionless 
SV2 Multi-level decision making 
bodies involvement 
Pressure to modify project scope Dimensionless 
SV3 Disputes  Social grievances Dimensionless 
SV4 Legal/Community actions (Social risks*"Threat to personal & 
asset security" + Disputes*Social 
grievances) 
Dimensionless 
SV5 Pressure to modify project 
scope 
"Threat to personal & asset security" 
* Social grievances 
Dimensionless 
SV6 Threats to person  and  
asset security 
Social grievances Dimensionless 
SV7 Social issues Constant (ANP’s RPI for SV7) Dimensionless 
SV8 Cost of dispute resolution Disputes*Social grievances*Legal 
actions 
Dimensionless 
SV9 De-escalation to 
grievances 
Social grievances per Unit time Dimensionless
/Year 
SV10 Error generation (Worksite coordination problems * 
"Risks of project cost overrun") per 
Unit time 
Dimensionless
/Year 
SV11 Escalation to grievances ((Social grievances*Social 
Issues)/Multi level decision making 
bodies involvement) per Unit time 
Dimensionless
/Year 
SV12 Escalation to project cost 
overrun 
(Risks of project time overrun + 
Project quality deficiency*Cost of 
dispute resolution) per Unit time 
Dimensionless
/Year 
SV13 Escalation to project time 
overrun 
(Legal actions*Disputes/Unit time) + 
"Social uncertainties" + Error 
generation * Project quality 
deficiency 
Dimensionless
/Year 
SV14 Project quality deficiency INTEG (Error generation, 0) Dimensionless 
SV15 Risks of cost overrun. INTEG (Escalation to project cost 
overrun, 0) 
Dimensionless
/Year 
SV16 Risks of time overrun INTEG (Escalation to project time 
overrun, 0) 
Dimensionless 
Table 8.2: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Social Risks System Model 
 (Continued) 
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Code  System Variables Equations  Measurement 
SV17 Social certainties (Multi-level decision making bodies 
involvement/Social risks) per Unit 
time 
Dimensionless/Year 
SV18 Social uncertainties ((Social grievances*Social 
Issues*Legal actions +Risks of 
project time overrun)*Multi level 
decision making bodies 
involvement) per Unit time 
Dimensionless/year 
SV19 Worksite coordination 
problems 
(Social risks*Project quality 
deficiency + Risks of project time 
overrun) 
Dimensionless 
 
 
 
 
8.3.2.2: Model Tests for the Social Risks System Model 
Evaluation of the model is done in the following way. A dimensional consistency test is 
conducted by the Vensim’s built-in function. As indicated in Figure 8.3, the message 
from Vensim shows that the level (stocks), auxiliaries, constants, units and their speed 
are dimensionally consistent. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3a: Structural Assessment Test for Social Risks Stock and Flow Model 
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Figure 8.3b: Dimensional consistency checks for the social risks stock and flow model 
 
                            Figure 8.3: Evaluation Tests for the Social Risks Model 
 
 
8.3.2.3: Dynamic Simulation Results for Social Risks System Model 
The interaction of risks in the social risks sub system is analysed quantitatively by a 
dynamic simulation model. The most outstanding feature of the dynamic simulation 
model is its effectiveness in simulating scenarios where several social risk system 
variables interact. The feedback nature of the simulation model ensures that the cross 
impacts of different risks on project cost, time and quality are captured and the direct 
and indirect impacts of risks quantified by switching on/ off procedures in two ways. 
 
 
First, the critical risk entity which is the ‘social issues’ is switched off to zero value by 
simulating a risk free scenario and the resulting behaviour patterns for social grievances, 
social risks, risks of project time and cost overruns and quality deficiency are used as 
base runs. Figure 8.4 illustrates graphs of the simulated risk free patterns for the social 
risks sub model.  
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Figure 8.4: Dynamic Risk-Free Simulation Patterns for Social Risks System Model 
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Figure 8.4: Dynamic Risk-Free Simulation Patterns for Social Risks System Model 
(Continued) 
 
From the analysis results in Figure 8.4, it can be observed that, when social issues are at 
0% influence level, the simulated pattern of social grievances declined steadily from the 
original risk priority value of 0.06 (6%) at year 2008 when physical construction works 
of ETNP commenced to 0% in the second quarter of year 2013 when major construction 
works were completed (See Figure 8.4a). It can further be observed on Figures 8.4c and 
8.4d that, at 0% of social issues, simulated patterns for risks of project time and cost 
overruns and project quality deficiency also fell below 0% level of influence on the 
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ETNP at the construction stage. However, in Figure 8.4b, the behaviour pattern of social 
risks declined steadily to 0% within the last quarter of 2010 and continued to decline in 
values until the first quarter of 2013. Between the first and second quarters of 2013, the 
simulated pattern rose sharply to more than 0% before declining to values below zero 
for the rest of the simulated periods.   
 
 
Second, the ‘social issues’ entity is switched on and its value (RPI) input into the 
system. Simulations are performed at 0.01, 0.02, 0.03 and 0.04 (at 25% intervals of the 
ANP value (RPI) for the social issues entity) to represent scenarios 1 to 4 of risk impact 
levels on project performance to enable the resulting behaviour patterns obtained to be 
evaluated and compared with the simulated base run patterns. The objective of this 
process is to study the influence of the social issues on project time, cost and quality. It 
is also to reveal the level of impacts of risk variables which generate social risks in the 
system in physical values so that measures can be proposed to mitigate such issues.  
 
 
DSBP = Dynamic simulation behaviour pattern 
a: Dynamic simulation scenario graphs for social grievances 
                
                 Figure 8.5: Dynamic Scenario Graphs for the Social Risks System Model  
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DSBP = Dynamic simulation behaviour pattern 
b: Dynamic simulation scenario graphs for social risks  
 
 
DSBP = Dynamic simulation behaviour pattern 
c: Dynamic simulation scenario graphs for risks of project time overrun 
 
Figure 8.5: Dynamic Scenario Graphs for the Social Risks System Model (Continued)  
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DSBP = Dynamic simulation behaviour pattern 
d: Dynamic simulation scenario graphs for risks of project cost overrun 
 
 
DSBP = Dynamic simulation behaviour pattern 
e: Dynamic simulation scenario graphs for project quality deficiency 
 
   Figure 8.5: Dynamic Scenario Graphs for the Social Risks System Model (Continued) 
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To reveal the dynamics of the level of impact of social risks in the system over time, 
simulations are performed on the entire social risks system model to study the influence 
of the social risk system variables on project time, cost and quality.  Simulated 
behaviour patterns of scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4 were generated and compared to the base 
run patterns. As indicated in Figure 8.5,  the simulated graphs for the four scenarios 
reveal the patterns of time and cost overruns and quality deficiency over 6 years 
simulation time.  
 
 
Also, detailed results of all variables within the social risks sub model are generated by 
the system and tabulated in Table 8.3. The advantages of such dynamic results in aiding 
risks assessment are that all risk variables within the social risks model are quantified 
and represented in physical values that can be compared with real values. That is to say, 
statistical values generated helped to understand the effects of social risk factors on 
project performance at different stages within the construction phase. Secondly, 
scenarios just as those indicated in Figure 8.5 and sensitivity analysis can easily be 
performed by adjusting various parameters during policy making through various 
design mechanisms to realize preferred risks levels affecting the project outcome, where 
the designed measures in the form of model parameters can be recommended to 
management. 
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                                                                    Table 8.3: Dynamic Simulation Results for Social Risks System 
Time 
(Year) 
ANP Inputs*(%) SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
SV7 PR1 SV1 SV2 SV3 SV4 SV5 SV6 SV8 SV9 SV10 SV11 SV12 SV13 SV14 SV15 SV16 SV17 SV18 SV19 
2008.000 04 13 06 00 06 01 00 06 00 06 00 67 00 00 00 00 00 03 00 00 
2008.125  13 14 02 14 04 02 14 00 14 00 29 00 00 00 00 00 15 00 00 
2008.250  11 16 02 16 04 02 16 00 16 00 26 00 01 00 00 00 22 00 00 
2008.375  08 17 03 17 04 03 17 00 17 00 24 00 01 00 00 00 35 00 00 
2008.500  04 18 03 18 04 03 18 00 18 00 23 00 01 00 00 00 86 00 00 
2008.625  -07 18 03 18 02 03 18 00 18 00 22 00 01 00 00 00 -47 00 00 
2008.750  -01 19 04 19 03 04 19 00 19 00 21 00 01 00 00 00 -2.68 00 00 
2008.875  32 19 04 19 10 04 19 00 19 00 21 00 02 00 00 00 11 00 00 
2009.000  31 19 04 19 10 04 19 00 19 00 21 01 02 00 00 01 12 00 01 
2009.125  29 19 04 19 10 04 19 00 19 00 21 01 02 00 00 01 13 00 01 
2009.250  28 20 04 20 09 04 20 00 20 00 02 01 02 00 00 01 14 00 01 
2009.375  26 20 04 20 09 04 20 00 20 00 02 01 02 00 01 01 15 00 01 
2009.500  24 20 04 20 09 04 20 00 20 00 02 02 02 00 01 02 16 00 02 
2009.625  22 20 04 20 08 04 20 00 20 00 02 02 02 00 01 02 18 00 02 
2009.750  20 20 04 20 08 04 20 00 20 00 02 02 02 00 01 02 02 00 02 
2009.875  17 20 04 20 07 04 20 00 20 00 02 02 02 00 01 02 23 00 02 
2010.000  14 20 04 20 07 04 20 00 20 00 02 02 01 00 02 02 27 00 02 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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Table 8.3: Dynamic Simulation Results for Social Risks System (Continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
 SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
SV7 PR1 SV1 SV2 SV3 SV4 SV5 SV6 SV8 SV9 SV10 SV11 SV12 SV13 SV14 SV15 SV16 SV17 SV18 SV19 
2010.125  11 20 04 20 06 04 20 00 20 00 20 03 01 00 20 03 36 00 03 
2010.250  07 20 04 20 05 04 20 00 20 00 20 03 01 00 20 03 61 00 03 
2010.375  -01 20 04 20 04 04 20 00 20 00 20 03 01 00 03 03 -3.91 00 03 
2010.500  48 20 04 20 14 04 20 01 20 00 20 03 03 00 03 03 08 00 03 
2010.625  47 20 04 20 13 04 20 01 20 00 20 03 03 00 03 03 09 00 03 
2010.750  46 20 04 20 13 04 20 01 20 00 20 04 03 00 04 04 09 00 04 
2010.875  45 20 04 20 13 04 20 01 20 00 20 04 03 00 04 04 09 00 04 
2011.000  44 20 04 20 13 04 20 01 20 00 20 04 03 00 05 04 09 00 05 
2011.125  43 20 04 20 13 04 20 01 20 00 20 05 03 00 05 05 09 00 05 
2011.250  41 20 04 20 12 04 20 00 20 00 20 05 03 00 06 05 10 00 05 
2011.375  40 20 04 20 12 04 20 00 20 00 20 05 03 00 07 05 10 00 06 
2011.500  39 20 04 20 12 04 20 00 20 00 20 06 03 00 07 06 10 00 06 
2011.625  38 20 04 20 12 04 20 00 20 01 20 06 03 00 08 06 11 00 06 
2011.750  36 20 04 20 11 04 20 00 20 01 20 06 03 00 09 06 11 00 07 
2011.875  35 20 04 20 11 04 20 00 20 01 20 07 02 00 10 07 11 00 07 
2012.000  34 20 04 20 11 04 20 00 20 01 20 07 02 01 10 07 12 00 07 
2012.125  32 20 04 20 10 04 20 00 20 01 20 07 02 01 11 07 12 00 08 
2012.250  31 20 04 20 10 04 20 00 20 01 20 08 02 01 12 08 13 00 08 
2012.375  29 20 04 20 10 04 20 00 20 01 20 08 02 01 13 08 14 00 08 
2012.500  28 20 04 20 10 04 20 00 20 01 20 08 02 01 14 08 15 00 09 
2012.625  26 20 04 20 09 04 20 00 20 01 20 09 02 01 15 09 16 00 09 
2012.750  24 20 04 20 09 04 20 00 20 01 20 09 02 01 16 09 17 00 09 
2012.875  22 20 04 20 08 04 20 00 20 02 20 09 02 01 17 09 18 00 09 
2013.000  20 20 04 20 08 04 20 00 20 02 20 09 02 02 19 09 20 00 10 
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Table 8.3: Dynamic Simulation Results for Social Risks System (Continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
SV7 PR1 SV1 SV2 SV3 SV4 SV5 SV6 SV8 SV9 SV10 SV11 SV12 SV13 SV14 SV15 SV16 SV17 SV18 SV19 
2013.125  17 20 04 20 07 04 20 00 20 02 20 10 02 02 20 10 23 00 10 
2013.250  14 20 04 20 07 04 20 00 20 02 20 10 02 02 21 10 28 00 10 
2013.375  11 20 04 20 06 04 20 00 20 02 20 10 02 02 22 10 37 00 10 
2013.500  06 20 04 20 05 04 20 00 20 02 20 10 02 03 23 10 66 00 10 
2013.625  -02 20 04 20 04 04 20 00 20 03 20 10 01 03 25 10 -1.87 00 10 
2013.750  21 20 04 20 08 04 20 00 20 03 20 11 02 03 26 11 19 00 11 
2013.875  19 20 04 20 08 04 20 00 20 03 20 11 02 04 27 11 21 00 12 
2014.000  16 20 04 20 07 04 20 00 20 03 20 11 02 04 29 11 24 00 12 
2014.125  13 20 04 20 07 04 20 00 20 04 20 11 02 05 30 11 30 00 12 
2014.250  10 20 04 20 06 04 20 00 20 04 20 12 02 .05 32 12 41 00 12 
2014.375  05 20 04 20 05 04 20 00 20 04 20 12 02 05 33 12 88 00 12 
2014.500  -06 20 04 20 03 04 20 00 20 04 20 12 01 06 34 12 -63 00 12 
2014.625  02 20 04 20 04 04 20 00 20 04 20 12 02 06 36 12 2.62 00 12 
2014.750  -31 20 04 20 -02 04 20 00 20 04 20 12 00 07 38 12 -13 00 10 
2014.875  -29 20 04 20 -02 04 20 00 20 04 20 12 00 08 39 12 -14 00 10 
2015.000  -28 20 04 20 -02 04 20 00 20 04 20 13 01 08 41 13 -14 01 10 
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       Table 8.4: Summary of the Simulation Results for the Social Risks System Model 
 
Code  System Variables  ANP/SD Simulation Results (%) 
   ANP Inputs* 
SV1 Social grievances     06   
SV7 Social Issues    04   
PR1 Social risks     13   
   SD Simulation Outputs 
   Min Max Mean Median StDev (Norm) 
PR1 Social risks  -31 48 19 20 18 96 
SV1 Social grievances   06 20 19 20 02 11 
SV2 MLDMB  00 04 04 04 01 16 
SV3 Disputes   06 20 19 20 02 11 
SV4 Legal/Community actions  -02 14 08 08 04 51 
SV5 Pressure to modify project scope  00 04 04 04 01 16 
SV6 TPAS  06 20 19 20 02 11 
SV8 Cost of dispute resolution  00 01 00 00 00 54 
SV9 De-escalation to grievances  06 20 19 20 02 11 
SV10 Error generation  00 04 01 00 01 1.21 
SV11 Escalation to grievances  20 67 21 20 06 29 
SV12 Escalation to project cost overrun  00 13 06 06 04 71 
SV13 Escalation to project time overrun  00 03 02 02 01 42 
SV14 Project quality deficiency  00 08 01 00 02 1.48 
SV15 Risks of cost overrun.  00 41 12 07 12 1.03 
SV16 Risks of time overrun  00 13 06 06 04 71 
SV17 Social certainties  -3.91 2.62 06 14 81 14.23 
SV18 Social uncertainties  00 01 00 00 00 71 
SV19 Worksite coordination problems  00 12 06 06 04 70 
Base runs Time (Year) for social risks system variables = 2008 to 2015, * Refer to Table 6.11: Summary 
of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169, MDMBI - Multi-level decision 
making bodies involvement, PMPS - Pressure to modify project scope, TPAS - Threats to person & asset 
security 
 
 
 
 
 Analysis of the Simulation Results for the Level of Risk Impact on Project 
Objectives 
 
The findings of the dynamic simulation results for social risks are explored in relation to 
the level of impact of such risks on the objectives of transportation megaprojects 
identified as being mainly risks of project time and cost overruns and project quality 
deficiency. Table 8.5 presents a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the social 
risks impact on project time, cost and quality. The aim of the one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) is to explore whether one particular project objective experiences 
more of the social risks impact than those of other project objectives when using an 
alpha of .001. If so, what will be the nature of these distinctions and if not, what will be 
the form of the similarities. 
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Table 8.5: One-Way Analysis of Variance: The Level and Extent to which Social Risks 
affect the Objectives of Transportation Megaproject during construction 
Project objectives Level of Social Risks Impacts on Project Objectives (%) 
Mean Std. deviation 
Time 06 04 
Cost 12 12 
Quality 01 02 
Variance  The Extent to which Social Risks Have Impacts on Project 
Performance  (Time, Cost and Quality) 
Sum of squares Degrees of 
freedom (df). 
Mean 
square 
F P 
Between project objectives 3712.642 2 1856.321 30.890 .000 
Within project objectives 10095.936 168 60.095   
Total  13808.578 170    
Source: Field Survey 2013 
 
 
As indicated on Table 8.5, the one-way analysis of variance reveals that project time, 
cost and quality of the case study transportation megaproject are all impacted by social 
risks. The mean scores indicate that project cost (12%) is affected most, followed by the 
project time (6%) and then the project quality (1%). Subjecting the results to one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), the F (obtained) is 30.890 which far exceeds the F-
critical value of 7.41 for this test when using an alpha of .001. Correspondingly, the 
observed p-value of .000 is well below the chosen alpha of .001. By either standard, it 
implies that the difference between the levels of social risks impact on the objectives of 
the cases study project is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
8.3.3: Integrated Stock and Flow Model for the Technical Risks System 
Figure 8.6 illustrates the integrated technical risks stock and flow diagram. It is 
developed based on the validated causal loop diagram illustrated in Figure 7.8. As 
indicated in Table 8.6, mathematical equations are formulated for each of the 
endogenous system variables within the model. Following the mathematical models 
(equation formulation), model structural assessment and the dimensional test are 
234 
performed using the Vensim’s built-in function. Figure 8.7 illustrates messages from the 
Vensim’s built-in function indicating that the structural assessment and dimensional test 
are consistent.  
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       Figure 8.6: Integrated Stock and Flow Diagram for Technical Risks System Model 
 
Finally, simulations (current runs) are performed on the entire technical risks system 
model to reveal the patterns of risk influences on project time, cost and quality under 
the following time steps: 
i. The initial time for the simulation = 2008, Units: Year 
ii. The final time for the simulation= 2015, Units: Year and 
iii. The time step for the simulation = 0.125, Units: Year 
 
 
 
           Table 8.6: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Technical Risks System Model 
Code System Variables Equations  Measurement  
PR2 Technical risks  INTEG (Technical uncertainties-
Technical certainties, 0.3) 
Dimensionless 
TV1:   Ambiguity of project scope  Constant (ANP value (RPI) for TV1) Dimensionless 
TV2:   Ground conditions problems  Inadequate site investigation Dimensionless 
TV3:   Project complexity  Work to do+(Ambiguity of project 
scope*Unforeseen modification to 
project) 
Dimensionless 
TV4:   Project modification  Constant (ANP value (RPI) for TV4) Dimensionless 
TV5:   Project cost estimate problems Constant (ANP value (RPI) for TV5) Dimensionless 
Source: Field Survey 2013 
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Table 8.6: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Technical Risks System Model 
(Continued) 
Code System Variables Equations  Measurement  
TV6:   Modification to 
project design & 
specification 
(Ground conditions problem at a given 
site*Technical uncertainties)*Unit Time 
Dimensionless 
TV7:   Technical difficulties 
in utilities diversions 
Ground conditions problem at a given site Dimensionless 
TV8:   Engineering and 
design change 
Constant (ANP value (RPI) for TV8) Dimensionless 
TV9:   Supply chain 
breakdown 
Constant (ANP value (RPI) for TV9) Dimensionless 
TV10:   Risks of project time 
overrun 
INTEG (Escalation to project time overrun, 0) Dimensionless 
TV11:   Risks of project cost 
overrun 
INTEG (Escalation to project cost overrun, 0) Dimensionless 
TV12:   Inadequate site 
investigation 
Constant (ANP value (RPI) for TV12) Dimensionless 
TV13:   Cost of delay in 
utility diversion 
Time to divert underground utilities Dimensionless 
TV14:   Cost of rework Rework Dimensionless 
TV15:   Error generation (Technical risks*Worksite coordination 
problems+ (Cost estimation problems + 
Modification to project design & 
specification)*Risks of project cost overrun) 
per Unit Time 
Dimensionless/
Year 
TV16:   Project quality 
deficiency 
INTEG (Error generation, 0) Dimensionless 
TV17:   Project scope. ((Work to do + Rework) * (Project 
complexity*Ambiguity of project scope)) per 
Unit Time 
Dimensionless/
Year 
TV18:   Escalation to project 
cost overrun 
((Risks of project time overrun +Project 
quality deficiency)+(Cost of delay in utility 
diversion +Cost of rework)) per Unit Time 
Dimensionless/
Year 
TV19:   Escalation to  project 
time overrun 
((Error generation*Time to divert underground 
utilities + Project quality deficiency/Unit Time 
+ Technical uncertainties)*"Supply chain 
breakdown) 
Dimensionless/
Year 
TV20:   Rework Error generation*Unit Time Dimensionless  
TV21:   Technical certainties Technical risks*Escalation to project time 
overrun 
Dimensionless/
Year  
TV22:   Technical 
uncertainties 
Technical risks *Project complexity * (Supply 
chain breakdown + Engineering & design 
changes) per Unit Time 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
TV23:   Time to divert 
underground utilities 
(Error generation*Technical difficulties in 
utility diversion)*Unit Time 
Dimensionless 
TV24:   Work to do INTEG ("Project scope" ,0) Dimensionless  
TV25:   Worksite 
coordination 
problems 
Project quality deficiency*Technical risks * 
Risks of project time overrun 
Dimensionless  
Source: Field Survey 2013 
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Figure 8.7a: Structural Assessment Test for Technical Risks Stock and Flow Model 
 
 
Figure 8.7b: Dimensional Consistency Check for Technical Risks Stock and Flow 
Model 
                       Figure 8.7: Evaluation Tests for the Technical Risks Model 
 
 
8.3.3.1: Dynamic Simulation Results for Technical Risks System System 
The simulated dynamic trajectories of technical risks system variables on megaproject 
performance in the construction phase constitute predictions on the basis of risk 
interrelation and connectivity. Their interrelation and connectivity, as formalized by the 
technical risks model, will need empirical validation once the appropriate data on 
perceptions of risk are available. Empirical validation (or calibration) normally requires 
the gathering of data on the dynamic processes that the simulation model aims to 
represent: does the simulation match relevant real-world data?  
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In general, the level of anticipated correspondence between model outputs and empirical 
data depends to a great extent on the purpose of the model and hence on the model 
specification and structure as dictated by the dynamic hypothesis (causal loop diagram 
for technical risks sub model) employed in its construction. In modelling complex 
technical processes, such as the formation of risk perceptions on project time, cost and 
quality, the richness of the theoretical approaches required to adequately formalize 
dynamic processes makes a simple approach to empirical validation extremely difficult. 
However, it is of paramount importance in this research to establish the internal validity 
of the model (its logic and consistency). Before calibrating the technical risks model, its 
inner validity was first checked and verified to ensure that the model produces outputs 
which behave as postulated by the reality of technical risks impacts on ETNP.  
 
 
As Figure 8.8 illustrates, three simulation scenarios were performed for this model, the 
current (Actual), base run scenario 1 and base run scenario 2. Risk Priority Indexes 
(RPIs) for technical risks system variables derived from the ANP methodology were 
employed as data inputs for the simulations runs. It must be noted that simulations were 
performed basically to study the influence of change of the level of impact the 
exogenous risk variables have on the system, and hence their risk priority indexes 
(RPIs) used for the current (Actual) run were reduced to 25% for base run scenario 1.  
 
 
Similarly, the RPIs for exogenous system variables were increased by 25% making 
125% of the actual value to perform the simulation base run scenario 2.   Results of the 
three simulation scenarios (Current, scenarios 1 and 2) allow the modeller to explore the 
dynamics of the level of technical risks influences on ETNP in the construction phase 
based upon the integrated stock and flow diagram deduced from the hypothesized causal 
loop diagram. The simulations have been run for a period of approximately seven years 
(2008-2015). The dynamic simulation patterns for the main levels (stocks) within the 
model namely work to do, technical risks, risks of project time and cost overruns and 
project quality deficiency are represented in Figure 7.27.   
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a. Dynamic simulation graph for technical risks 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Dynamic simulation graph for work-to-do 
Figure 8.8: Dynamic Simulation Behaviour Patterns for Stocks in the Technical Risk 
System Model 
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c. Dynamic simulation graph for risks of project time overrun 
 
d. Dynamic simulation graph for risks of project cost overrun 
 
e. Dynamic simulation graph for project quality deficiency. 
Figure 8.8: Dynamic Simulation Behaviour Patterns for Stocks in the Technical Risk System 
Model (Continued) 
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As indicated in Figure 8.8a, the actual behaviour pattern of technical risks reveals that 
the influences of risk variables within the system led to gradual exponential growth of 
0.3 (30%) from 2008 to 0.5569 (55.69%)  by 2015. This implies that, more rework will 
be carried out and hence increase in work to do as depicted by the dynamic pattern in 
Figure 8.8b.  As illustrated in Figures 8.8c and d, growths observed in the technical 
risks and work to do cause dramatic impacts on project time, cost and quality and as 
such contributed amplified effects to the level of risks of project time and cost overruns 
and quality deficiency. 
 
 
Table 8.7 provides detailed dynamic results of all risk variables within the technical 
risks system model generated by Vensim’s built-in function.  The results have added 
advantages for the project manager during risk assessment in transportation 
megaprojects in the construction phase such that they can be compared with real values 
generated during the course of construction. Where risk levels try to exceed expected 
levels, proactive mitigation can be implemented to reduce such risks. This implies that 
statistical values generated by the SDANP approach can help to understand the effects 
of technical risk factors on project performance at different stages within the 
construction phase over time before construction begins. Summaries of the dynamic risk 
results on the performance of ETNP are indicated in Table 8.7 and Table 8.8 
respectively.  
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                                                                  Table 8.7: Dynamic Simulation Results for Technical Risks System  
Time 
(Year) 
ANP Inputs*(%) TV1 TV4 TV5 TV8 TV9 TV12 
06 06 08 03 04 13 
SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
PR2 TV2 TV3 TV6 TV7 TV10 TV11 TV13 TV14 TV15 TV16 TV17 TV18 TV19 T20 TV21 TV22 TV23 TV24 TV25 
2008.000 30* 13 100 0.27 13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.03 2.11 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2008.125 30 13 101 0.28 13 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.11 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.03 2.14 0.00 100.75 0.00 
2008.250 31 13 102 0.28 13 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.21 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.03 2.18 0.00 101.52 0.00 
2008.375 31 13 103 0.29 13 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.30 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.03 2.21 0.00 102.29 0.00 
2008.500 31 13 103 0.29 13 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.40 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.03 2.25 0.00 103.08 0.00 
2008.625 31 13 104 0.30 13 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.50 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.03 2.29 0.00 103.88 0.00 
2008.750 32 13 105 0.30 13 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.60 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.03 2.33 0.00 104.69 0.00 
2008.875 32 13 106 0.31 13 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.70 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.03 2.37 0.00 105.52 0.00 
2009.000 32 13 107 0.31 13 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.81 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.03 2.41 0.00 106.35 0.00 
2009.125 33 13 108 0.32 13 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.92 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.03 2.45 0.00 107.21 0.00 
2009.250 33 13 108 0.32 13 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 7.03 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.03 2.49 0.00 108.07 0.00 
2009.375 33 13 109 0.33 13 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 7.15 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.03 2.53 0.00 108.95 0.00 
2009.500 33 13 110 0.34 13 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 7.26 0.15 0.10 0.01 0.03 2.58 0.00 109.84 0.00 
2009.625 34 13 111 0.34 13 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 7.38 0.17 0.11 0.01 0.04 2.62 0.00 110.75 0.00 
2009.750 34 13 112 0.35 13 0.17 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 7.51 0.18 0.11 0.01 0.04 2.67 0.00 111.67 0.00 
2009.875 34 13 113 0.35 13 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 7.63 0.20 0.11 0.01 0.04 2.72 0.00 112.61 0.00 
2010.000 35 13 114 0.36 13 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 7.76 0.22 0.11 0.02 0.04 2.77 0.00 113.57 0.00 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169 
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Table 8.7: Dynamic Simulation Results for Technical Risks System (continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
ANP Inputs*(%) TV1 TV4 TV5 TV8 TV9 TV12 
06 06 08 03 04 13 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
PR2 TV2 TV3 TV6 TV7 TV10 TV11 TV13 TV14 TV15 TV16 TV17 TV18 TV19 T20 TV21 TV22 TV23 TV24 TV25 
2010.125 35 13 115 0.37 13 0.21 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 7.90 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.04 2.82 0.00 114.54 0.00 
2010.250 35 13 116 0.37 13 0.22 0.24 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 8.03 0.26 0.12 0.02 0.04 2.87 0.00 115.52 0.00 
2010.375 36 13 117 0.38 13 0.23 0.27 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 8.17 0.28 0.12 0.02 0.04 2.93 0.00 116.53 0.00 
2010.500 36 13 118 0.39 13 0.25 0.31 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 8.32 0.30 0.12 0.03 0.04 2.98 0.00 117.55 0.00 
2010.625 37 13 119 0.40 13 0.26 0.35 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 8.47 0.32 0.12 0.03 0.04 3.04 0.00 118.59 0.00 
2010.750 37 13 120 0.40 13 0.28 0.38 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 8.62 0.34 0.12 0.03 0.05 3.10 0.00 119.65 0.00 
2010.875 37 13 121 0.41 13 0.30 0.43 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 8.77 0.36 0.13 0.04 0.05 3.16 0.00 120.73 0.00 
2011.000 38 13 122 0.42 13 0.31 0.47 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 8.93 0.39 0.13 0.04 0.05 3.22 0.01 121.82 0.00 
2011.125 38 13 123 0.43 13 0.33 0.52 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 9.10 0.42 0.13 0.04 0.05 3.28 0.01 122.94 0.00 
2011.250 38 13 124 0.44 13 0.35 0.57 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 9.27 0.44 0.14 0.05 0.05 3.35 0.01 124.08 0.00 
2011.375 39 13 126 0.44 13 0.36 0.63 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 9.44 0.47 0.14 0.05 0.05 3.42 0.01 125.23 0.00 
2011.500 39 13 127 0.45 13 0.38 0.69 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06 9.62 0.50 0.14 0.06 0.06 3.49 0.01 126.41 0.00 
2011.625 40 13 128 0.46 13 0.40 0.75 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.06 9.80 0.53 0.14 0.06 0.06 3.56 0.01 127.62 0.00 
2011.750 40 13 129 0.47 13 0.42 0.82 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.07 9.99 0.56 0.15 0.07 0.06 3.63 0.01 128.84 0.00 
2011.875 41 13 130 0.48 13 0.44 0.89 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.08 10.19 0.60 0.15 0.08 0.06 3.71 0.01 130.09 0.00 
2012.000 41 13 132 0.49 13 0.45 0.96 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.09 10.39 0.63 0.15 0.08 0.06 3.78 0.01 131.37 0.00 
2012.125 42 13 133 0.50 13 0.47 1.04 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.10 10.60 0.67 0.16 0.09 0.07 3.87 0.01 132.66 0.00 
2012.250 42 13 134 0.51 13 0.49 1.13 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.11 10.81 0.71 0.16 0.10 0.07 3.95 0.01 133.99 0.00 
2012.375 42 13 136 0.52 13 0.52 1.22 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.12 11.03 0.75 0.17 0.10 0.07 4.03 0.01 135.34 0.00 
2012.500 43 13 137 0.54 13 0.54 1.31 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.14 11.25 0.79 0.17 0.11 0.07 4.12 0.01 136.72 0.00 
2012.625 43 13 138 0.55 13 0.56 1.41 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.15 11.49 0.84 0.17 0.12 0.08 4.21 0.02 138.12 0.00 
2012.750 44 13 140 0.56 13 0.58 1.52 0.02 0.13 0.13 0.16 11.73 0.89 0.18 0.13 0.08 4.31 0.02 139.56 0.00 
2012.875 45 13 141 0.57 13 0.60 1.63 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.18 11.98 0.94 0.18 0.14 0.08 4.41 0.02 141.03 0.00 
2013.000 45 13 143 0.59 13 0.63 1.75 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.20 12.23 0.99 0.19 0.15 0.08 4.51 0.02 142.52 0.00 
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Table 8.7: Dynamic Simulation Results for Technical Risks System (continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
ANP Inputs*(%) TV1 TV4 TV5 TV8 TV9 TV12 
06 06 08 03 04 13 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
PR2 TV2 TV3 TV6 TV7 TV10 TV11 TV13 TV14 TV15 TV16 TV17 TV18 TV19 T20 TV21 TV22 TV23 TV24 TV25 
2013.125 46 13 144 0.60 13 0.65 1.87 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.22 12.50 1.04 0.19 0.16 0.09 4.61 0.02 144.05 0.00 
2013.250 46 13 146 0.61 13 0.68 2.00 0.02 0.17 0.17 0.24 12.77 1.10 0.20 0.17 0.09 4.72 0.02 145.61 0.00 
2013.375 47 13 148 0.63 13 0.70 2.14 0.02 0.18 0.18 0.26 13.05 1.16 0.20 0.18 0.10 4.83 0.02 147.21 0.00 
2013.500 47 13 149 0.64 13 0.73 2.29 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.28 13.34 1.22 0.21 0.20 0.10 4.95 0.03 148.84 0.00 
2013.625 48 13 151 0.66 13 0.76 2.44 0.03 0.21 0.21 0.31 13.64 1.29 0.21 0.21 0.10 5.06 0.03 150.51 0.00 
2013.750 49 13 153 0.67 13 0.78 2.61 0.03 0.23 0.23 0.33 13.96 1.36 0.22 0.23 0.11 5.19 0.03 152.21 0.00 
2013.875 49 13 154 0.69 13 0.81 2.78 0.03 0.24 0.24 0.36 14.28 1.43 0.23 0.24 0.11 5.32 0.03 153.96 0.00 
2014.000 50 13 156 0.71 13 0.84 2.96 0.03 0.26 0.26 0.39 14.61 1.51 0.23 0.26 0.12 5.45 0.03 155.74 0.00 
2014.125 51 13 158 0.73 13 0.87 3.15 0.04 0.27 0.27 0.42 14.96 1.59 0.24 0.27 0.12 5.59 0.04 157.57 0.00 
2014.250 51 13 160 0.74 13 0.90 3.35 0.04 0.29 0.29 0.46 15.32 1.67 0.25 0.29 0.13 5.73 0.04 159.44 0.00 
2014.375 52 13 161 0.76 13 0.94 3.56 0.04 0.31 0.31 0.49 15.69 1.76 0.25 0.31 0.13 5.88 0.04 161.35 0.00 
2014.500 53 13 164 0.78 13 0.97 3.79 0.04 0.33 0.33 0.53 16.07 1.86 0.26 0.33 0.14 6.03 0.04 163.32 0.00 
2014.625 53 13 166 0.80 13 1.00 4.02 0.05 0.35 0.35 0.57 16.47 1.95 0.27 0.35 0.14 6.19 0.05 165.32 0.00 
2014.750 54 13 168 0.83 13 1.04 4.27 0.05 0.38 0.38 0.62 16.88 2.06 0.28 0.38 0.15 6.35 0.05 167.38 0.00 
2014.875 55 13 170 0.85 13 1.08 4.53 0.05 0.40 0.40 0.66 17.31 2.17 0.29 0.40 0.16 6.53 0.05 169.49 0.00 
2015.000 56 13 172 0.87 13 1.12 4.81 0.06 0.42 0.42 0.71 17.76 2.28 0.30 0.42 0.17 6.71 0.06 171.66 0.00 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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Table 8.8: Summary of Dynamic Simulation Results for Technical Risks System Model 
 
ANP/SD Simulation Results 
Code Risk factor *ANP inputs (%) 
TV1:   Ambiguity of project scope/ Scope change  06 
TV4:   Project modification  06 
TV5:   Project cost estimate problems 08 
TV8:   Engineering and design change 03 
TV9:   Supply chain breakdown 04 
TV12:   Inadequate site investigation 13 
PR2:   Technical risks  30 
  SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
  Min Max Mean Median StDev (Norm) 
PR2 Technical risks  30.00 55.69 40.48 39.28 7.41 18.31 
TV2:   Ground conditions problems  13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 0.00 0.00 
TV3:   Project complexity  100.36 172.02 129.94 126.77 20.69 15.92 
TV6:   Modification to project design  0.27 0.87 0.49 0.45 0.17 34.47 
TV7:   Technical difficulties in utilities diversions 13.00 13.00 13.00 13.00 0.00 0.00 
TV10:   Risks of project time overrun 0.00 1.09 0.43 0.38 0.31 71.90 
TV11:   Risks of project cost overrun 0.00 4.76 1.24 0.69 1.35 108.70 
TV13:   Cost of delay in utility diversion 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 110.46 
TV14:   Cost of rework 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.06 0.12 110.46 
TV15:   Error generation 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.06 0.12 110.46 
TV16:   Project quality deficiency 0.00 0.71 0.15 0.06 0.20 128.29 
TV17:   Project scope. 6.02 17.76 10.37 9.62 3.40 32.21 
TV18:   Escalation to project cost overrun 0.00 2.28 0.71 0.50 0.63 89.64 
TV19:   Escalation to  project time overrun 0.08 0.30 0.16 0.14 0.06 37.94 
TV20:   Rework 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.06 0.12 110.46 
TV21:   Technical certainties 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.04 56.56 
TV22:   Technical uncertainties 2.11 6.71 3.79 3.49 1.31 34.47 
TV23:   Time to divert underground utilities 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 110.46 
TV24:   Work to do 100.00 171.66 129.58 126.41 20.69 15.97 
TV25:   Worksite coordination problems 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 167.24 
Current simulation runs Time (Year) for technical risk model = 2008 to 2015, * Refer to Table 6.11: 
Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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 Analysis of the Simulation Results for the Level of Risk Impact on Project 
Objectives 
 
The level of technical risk impacts on the objectives of the case study transportation 
megaprojects are described as being mainly risks of project time and cost overruns and 
project quality deficiency. As indicated on Table 8.9, the level and extent to which 
technical risks affect the objectives of transportation megaproject during construction 
are presented using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the technical risks 
impact on project time, cost and quality. The aim of the one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) is to explore whether one particular project objective experiences more 
technical risk impact than those of other project objectives when using an alpha of .001. 
If so, what will be the nature of these distinctions and if not, what will be the form of 
the similarities. 
 
 
Table 8.9: One-Way Analysis of Variance: The Level and Extent to which Technical 
Risks Affect the Objectives of the Case Study Megaproject during Construction 
Project objectives Level of Technical Risks Impact on Project Objectives (%) 
Mean Std. deviation 
Time 0.43 0.31 
Cost 1.24 1.35 
Quality 0.15 0.20 
Variance  The Extent to which Technical Risks Impact on Project 
Objectives (Time, Cost and Quality) 
Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom (df). 
Mean 
square 
F P 
Between project objectives 36.720 2 18.360 27.242 .000 
Within project objectives 113.227 168 0.674   
Total 149.947 170    
Field Survey 2013 
 
 
As presented in Table 8.9, the one-way analysis of variance reveals that project time, 
cost and quality of transportation megaprojects are impacted by technical risks. The 
mean scores reveal that project cost (1.24%) is affected most, followed by the project 
time (0.43%) and then the project quality (0.15%). Subjecting the results to one-way 
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analysis of variance (ANOVA), the F (obtained) is 27.242 which far exceeds the F-
critical value of 7.41 for this test when using an alpha of .001. Correspondingly, the 
observed p-value of .000 is well below the chosen alpha of .001. By either standard, it 
implies that the difference between the levels of technical risks impact on the objectives 
of the cases study project is statistically non-significant. 
 
 
8.3.4. Integrated Stock and Flow Model for the Economic Risks System 
Economic risk is taken into account in any field, with consequences which cannot 
always be foreseen or anticipated. An important objective of this section is the 
understanding of a megaproject’s full risk exposure to potential financial risk factors, 
and how the project has to mitigate such risks. Project finance relies on asset and 
counterparty performance, but social, political, environmental and technical events can 
excuse performance by parties when they are confronted with unanticipated events 
outside their control. That is to say, project finance is subject to strong political 
influence and contradictory technical opinions about the project’s economic feasibility 
and its associated social and environmental impacts. 
 
 
This section of the report therefore does not intend to bring new facts or technical data 
to feed the debate. However, its contribution stems from deep analysis of the broad 
material already produced in literature review, through questionnaire survey and 
through interviews conducted with experts involved in megaproject development. The 
approach strives to translate available information on social, technical, political and 
environmental risks into economic risks, using the following steps: 
 
i. Integrated stock and flow diagram construction  
ii. Model equations formulation  
iii. Model testing- structural assessment and dimensional consistency  
iv. Dynamic simulation results and discussion  
v. Analysis of dynamic simulation results for project objectives 
 
 Integrated Stock and Flow Diagram: The integrated stock and flow diagram for the 
economic risks sub system illustrated in Figure 8.9 is developed based on the 
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validated causal loop diagram indicated in Figure 7.11 (See Chapter 7). It is 
developed with material price, economic risks, risk of project time overrun, risk of 
project cost overrun and quality deficiency on the focus. 
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                    Figure 8.9: Integrated economic risks stock and flow diagram 
 
 
It can be observed from Figure 8.9 that the economic recession, local inflation rate and 
material price have direct influence on the controlling system variable material price 
hike which stocks material price. The stock ‘Economic risks’ is in turn influenced by 
several other variables through the economic uncertainties as shown. Further, it has to 
be noted that economic risks is affected by economic certainties. Similarly, risks of 
project time and cost overruns are influenced by escalation to project time overrun and 
escalation to project cost overrun to stock risks of project time and cost overruns 
respectively. Further consideration shows that a number of variables influence risks of 
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project time and cost overruns through escalations to project time and cost overruns as 
detailed in the stock and flow diagram represented in Figure 8.9.  
 Model Equation Formulation: The governing equations used to calculate the 
system parameters for this model are given in Table 8.10. 
 
 
        Table 8.10: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Economic Risks System Model 
Code System Variables Equations  Measurement  
PR3 Economic risks INTEG (Economic uncertainties-
Economic certainties, 0.25) 
Dimensionless 
EV1: Government funding policy  Government discontinuity*Initial 
ANP value (RPI) for EV1 (0.17) 
Dimensionless 
EV2: Taxation  Government discontinuity* Initial 
ANP value (RPI) for EV2 per Unit 
time 
Dimensionless  
EV3:   Government discontinuity  Initial ANP value (RPI) for EV3 
(Constant) 
 
EV4: Wage inflation;  0.03*((Energy price +Foreign 
exchange +Local inflation 
rate)+(Material price per unit 
time)) 
Dimensionless/Year 
EV5: Local inflation  (Economic risks/Unit 
time)+Energy price +Foreign 
exchange 
Dimensionless /Year 
EV6: Foreign exchange   (Material price*0.03) per Unit 
time 
Dimensionless /Year 
EV7: Material price  INTEG (Material price change 
hike, 0.08) 
Dimensionless  
EV8:   Economic recession Initial ANP value (RPI) for 
EV8(Constant) 
Dimensionless 
EV9: Energy price Economic recession*0.05 Dimensionless 
EV10:   Catastrophic environ. 
effects  
Initial ANP value (RPI) for EV10 
(Constant) 
Dimensionless 
EV11:   Project technical 
difficulties  
Initial ANP value (RPI) for EV11 
(Constant) 
Dimensionless 
EV12: Project delays of all forms Government funding policy * 
Government discontinuity*0.19 
Dimensionless  
EV13: Cost of delays Delay of all forms  Dimensionless  
EV14: Cost of dispute resolution Disputes Dimensionless 
EV15: Disputes Government funding policy Dimensionless  
EV16: Economic certainties (Risks of project time overrun * 
Economic risks) per unit time 
Dimensionless/Year 
Field Survey 2013 
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Table 8.10: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Economic Risks System Model 
(Continued) 
 
Code System Variables Equations  Measurement  
EV17: Economic uncertainties (Economic risks +Government 
funding policy)*((Local inflation 
rate +Taxation 
+Wage inflation)-(Energy price + 
Material price/unit time)) 
Dimensionless/Year 
EV18: Error generation Error generation= (Risks of project 
cost overrun*Worksite coordination 
problems) per unit time 
Dimensionless/Year 
EV19: Escalation to project cost 
overrun 
((Escalation to project time 
overrun*Error generation)*unit 
time)+ (Project quality deficiency 
/unit time) + ((Cost of delays +Cost 
of resolution)/ unit time)) 
Dimensionless /Year 
EV20: Escalation to project time 
overrun 
((Error generation +Economic 
uncertainties) + (Disputes/unit 
time)) + ((Catastrophic 
environmental effects* Project 
technical difficulties)*"Delay of all 
forms (Utilities diversion, Design 
changes, obtaining consents & legal 
actions))/unit time 
Dimensionless /Year 
EV21: Material price hike ((Material price)*(Local inflation 
rate + Economic recession)) per 
unit time 
Dimensionless /Year 
EV22: Project quality deficiency INTEG ((Error generation, 0) Dimensionless  
EV23: Risks of project cost 
overrun 
INTEG (Escalation to project cost 
overrun, 0) 
Dimensionless  
EV24: Risks of project time 
overrun 
INTEG (Escalation to project time 
overrun, 0) 
Dimensionless  
EV25: Worksite coordination 
problems 
(Risks of project time 
overrun*Project quality deficiency 
+Economic risks) 
Dimensionless  
Field Survey 2013 
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 Model Testing- Structural Assessment and Dimensional Consistency 
 
The next step was to conduct the structural assessment and dimensional consistency 
tests on the stock and flow model. As illustrated in Figure 8.10, messages from 
Vensim’s built-in function indicate that the structural assessment and dimensional tests 
conducted on the economic risks model are consistent.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.10a: Structural Assessment Test for Economic Risks Stock and Flow Model 
 
 
Figure 8.10b: Dimensional Consistency Check for Economic Risks Stock and Flow 
Model 
                      Figure 8.10: Evaluation Tests for the Economic Risks Model 
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 Dynamic Simulation Results and Discussion:  
 
Simulation parameters support the dynamic hypothesis (stock and flow diagram) by 
given them real values, which are necessary for conducting simulation. It is to be noted 
that, in system dynamics simulation, it is the trend analysis which is given importance 
and numbers do not have much significance, however, the numbers should be, as far as 
possible, close to the real life situations. In the context of the economic risks modeling, 
Table 8.11 has been produced to indicate the model parameters, ANP inputs and the 
dynamic simulation outputs under the following time bounds:  
 
i. The initial time for the simulation = 2008, Units: Year 
ii. The final time for the simulation= 2015, Units: Year  
iii. The time step for the simulation = 0.125, Units: Year 
 
 
Basically, the dynamic simulation was performed to study the influences of exogenous 
parameters (economic recession, government discontinuity, catastrophic environmental 
effects and project technical difficulties) on economic risks, risks of project time and 
cost overruns and project quality deficiency and hence, the values are fixed as 0% for no 
influence and 100% for current (actual) risk priority index level obtained from the ANP 
pairwise calculations. Figure 8.11 shows the dynamic simulation patterns of the stock 
variables indicating the behaviour trends for material price, economic risks, risks of 
time and cost overruns and project quality deficiency. The dynamic simulation outputs 
for all system variables within the economic risks model are also represented in Tables 
8.11 and 8.12 respectively. 
 
 
With no influence from the exogenous system variables in the system, the initial 
dynamic pattern (base run) in Figure 8.11a turns to increase steadily. However, when 
the values change to the actual ANP risk priority indexes, it can be observed that after 
two years, the material price stabilized between the fourth quarter of 2011 and the first 
quarter of 2012 before declining slowly from the first quarter of 2012 till the end of 
2014. This is so because as no works commenced; higher will be the time period for 
material prices to be stabilized from the developer’s point of view. But when 
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construction proceeds, the larger will be the volume of works completed as a result, 
lower will be the material price level when contractor-supplier relations improved. 
 
 
a: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for material price 
 
 
 
  
b: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for economic risks 
 
Figure 8.11: Dynamic Simulation Patterns for Stock Entities in the Economic Risks 
Model  
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c: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for risks of project time overrun 
 
 
 
 
 
d: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for risks of project cost overrun 
 
Figure 8.11: Dynamic Simulation Patterns for Stock Entities in the Economic Risks 
Model (Continued) 
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e: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for project quality deficiency 
 
Figure 8.11: Dynamic Simulation Patterns for Stock Entities in the Economic Risks 
Model (Continued) 
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                                                            Table 8.11: Dynamic Simulation Results for the Economic Risks System 
 
Time 
(Year) 
*ANP Inputs (%) 
Risk code PR3 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV8 EV9 EV10 EV11 EV12 
Risks priority index (%)  25 17 03 13 03 03 03 08 03 05 13 15 19 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
PR3 EV1 EV2 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV9 EV12 EV13 EV14 EV15 EV16 EV17 EV18 EV19 EV20 EV21 EV22 EV23 EV24 EV25 
2008.000 25.00 2.21 0.39 1.01 25.39 0.24 8.00 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 0.00 5.07 0.00 2.26 7.28 2.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.0 
2008.125 25.63 2.21 0.39 1.04 26.03 0.25 8.28 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 0.23 5.30 0.07 2.27 7.58 2.41 0.00 0.28 0.91 25.6 
2008.250 26.27 2.21 0.39 1.07 26.67 0.26 8.58 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 0.49 5.52 0.15 2.29 7.88 2.55 0.01 0.57 1.86 26.3 
2008.375 26.90 2.21 0.39 1.10 27.31 0.27 8.90 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 0.76 5.75 0.23 2.31 8.19 2.70 0.03 0.85 2.84 26.9 
2008.500 27.52 2.21 0.39 1.13 27.95 0.28 9.24 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.06 5.97 0.31 2.35 8.49 2.86 0.06 1.14 3.87 27.5 
2008.625 28.13 2.21 0.39 1.16 28.57 0.29 9.60 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.39 6.18 0.40 2.40 8.80 3.03 0.10 1.43 4.93 28.1 
2008.750 28.73 2.21 0.39 1.19 29.18 0.30 9.98 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.73 6.38 0.50 2.46 9.09 3.21 0.15 1.73 6.03 28.7 
2008.875 29.31 2.21 0.39 1.22 29.77 0.31 10.38 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 2.10 6.57 0.60 2.53 9.38 3.40 0.21 2.04 7.17 29.3 
2009.000 29.87 2.21 0.39 1.25 30.35 0.32 10.80 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 2.49 6.75 0.70 2.62 9.66 3.60 0.28 2.36 8.34 29.9 
2009.125 30.41 2.21 0.39 1.28 30.89 0.34 11.25 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 2.90 6.90 0.82 2.72 9.93 3.81 0.37 2.68 9.55 30.4 
2009.250 30.90 2.21 0.39 1.31 31.41 0.35 11.73 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 3.33 7.03 0.94 2.83 10.18 4.04 0.47 3.02 10.79 31.0 
2009.375 31.37 2.21 0.39 1.34 31.88 0.37 12.23 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 3.78 7.13 1.06 2.97 10.40 4.27 0.59 3.38 12.06 31.4 
2009.500 31.78 2.21 0.39 1.37 32.32 0.38 12.77 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 4.25 7.19 1.20 3.11 10.60 4.51 0.72 3.75 13.36 31.9 
2009.625 32.15 2.21 0.39 1.40 32.70 0.40 13.33 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 4.72 7.22 1.34 3.28 10.77 4.76 0.87 4.14 14.68 32.3 
2009.750 32.47 2.21 0.39 1.43 33.03 0.42 13.93 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 5.20 7.20 1.48 3.47 10.90 5.02 1.04 4.55 16.03 32.6 
2009.875 32.72 2.21 0.39 1.45 33.30 0.44 14.55 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 5.69 7.14 1.64 3.67 10.99 5.28 1.23 4.98 17.39 32.9 
2010.000 32.90 2.21 0.39 1.48 33.50 0.46 15.21 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 6.17 7.02 1.80 3.89 11.04 5.55 1.43 5.44 18.77 33.2 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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      Table 8.11: Dynamic Simulation Results for the Economic Risks System (continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
*ANP Inputs (%) 
Risk code PR3 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV8 EV9 EV10 EV11 EV12 
Risks priority index (%) 25 17 03 13 03 03 03 08 03 05 13 15 19 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
PR3 EV1 EV2 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV9 EV12 EV13 EV14 EV15 EV16 EV17 EV18 EV19 EV20 EV21 EV22 EV23 EV24 EV25 
2010.125 33.0 2.21 0.39 1.50 33.6 0.48 15.9 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 6.65 6.85 1.98 4.14 11.0 5.83 1.66 5.93 20.15 33.3 
2010.250 33.0 2.21 0.39 1.53 33.7 0.50 16.6 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 7.11 6.63 2.15 4.40 11.0 6.10 1.90 6.44 21.53 33.4 
2010.375 33.0 2.21 0.39 1.55 33.6 0.52 17.4 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 7.55 6.34 2.34 4.69 10.9 6.38 2.17 6.99 22.90 33.5 
2010.500 32.8 2.21 0.39 1.57 33.5 0.55 18.2 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 7.96 6.00 2.53 5.00 10.7 6.64 2.46 7.58 24.26 33.4 
2010.625 32.6 2.21 0.39 1.59 33.3 0.57 19.0 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 8.34 5.60 2.73 5.33 10.5 6.91 2.78 8.21 25.61 33.3 
2010.750 32.2 2.21 0.39 1.61 33.0 0.60 19.9 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 8.68 5.14 2.93 5.69 10.3 7.16 3.12 8.87 26.92 33.1 
2010.875 31.8 2.21 0.39 1.62 32.6 0.62 20.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 8.97 4.64 3.14 6.07 9.99 7.39 3.49 9.58 28.21 32.8 
2011.000 31.3 2.21 0.39 1.64 32.1 0.65 21.7 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.20 4.09 3.35 6.47 9.65 7.61 3.88 10.3 29.46 32.4 
2011.125 30.6 2.21 0.39 1.65 31.4 0.68 22.7 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.39 3.50 3.56 6.90 9.27 7.80 4.30 11.2 30.66 31.9 
2011.250 29.9 2.21 0.39 1.66 30.7 0.71 23.6 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.51 2.88 3.77 7.34 8.87 7.97 4.75 12.0 31.82 31.4 
2011.375 29.0 2.21 0.39 1.66 29.9 0.74 24.6 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.56 2.25 3.98 7.82 8.44 8.11 5.22 12.9 32.93 30.8 
2011.500 28.1 2.21 0.39 1.67 29.1 0.77 25.7 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.56 1.61 4.18 8.31 8.01 8.22 5.71 13.9 33.99 30.1 
2011.625 27.1 2.21 0.39 1.67 28.1 0.80 26.7 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.49 0.98 4.38 8.83 7.57 8.29 6.24 15.0 34.99 29.3 
2011.750 26.1 2.21 0.39 1.67 27.1 0.83 27.7 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.37 0.35 4.58 9.38 7.14 8.33 6.79 16.0 35.93 28.5 
2011.875 24.9 2.21 0.39 1.67 26.0 0.86 28.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 9.19 -0.24 4.76 9.94 6.73 8.33 7.36 17.2 36.83 27.7 
2012.000 23.8 2.21 0.39 1.67 24.8 0.89 29.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 8.95 -0.80 4.94 10.5 6.36 8.28 7.95 18.5 37.67 26.8 
2012.125 22.6 2.21 0.39 1.67 23.6 0.92 30.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 8.67 -1.31 5.11 11.1 6.01 8.21 8.57 19.8 38.46 25.8 
2012.250 21.3 2.21 0.39 1.66 22.4 0.96 31.9 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 8.35 -1.77 5.28 11.8 5.71 8.09 9.21 21.2 39.21 24.9 
2012.375 20.0 2.21 0.39 1.66 21.2 0.99 32.9 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 8.00 -2.18 5.43 12.4 5.46 7.94 9.87 22.7 39.93 24.0 
2012.500 18.8 2.21 0.39 1.65 19.9 1.02 33.9 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 7.62 -2.53 5.58 13.1 5.26 7.76 10.6 24.2 40.61 23.0 
2012.625 17.5 2.21 0.39 1.64 18.7 1.04 34.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 7.22 -2.81 5.72 13.8 5.12 7.55 11.2 25.8 41.27 22.1 
2012.750 16.2 2.21 0.39 1.63 17.5 1.07 35.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 6.81 -3.03 5.86 14.5 5.04 7.32 12.0 27.6 41.91 21.3 
2012.875 15.0 2.21 0.39 1.63 16.3 1.10 36.7 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 6.38 -3.20 6.00 15.3 5.01 7.07 12.7 29.4 42.54 20.4 
2013.000 13.8 2.21 0.39 1.62 15.1 1.13 37.6 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 5.96 -3.30 6.14 16.0 5.04 6.80 13.4 31.3 43.16 19.6 
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Table 8.11: Dynamic Simulation Results for the Economic Risks System (continued) 
 
Time 
(Year) 
*ANP Inputs (%) 
Risk code PR3 EV1 EV2 EV3 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV8 EV9 EV10 EV11 EV12 
Risks priority index  25 17 03 13 03 03 03 08 03 05 13 15 19 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
PR3 EV1 EV2 EV4 EV5 EV6 EV7 EV9 EV12 EV13 EV14 EV15 EV16 EV17 EV18 EV19 EV20 EV21 EV22 EV23 EV24 EV25 
2013.125 12.7 2.21 0.39 1.61 14.0 1.15 38.4 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 5.54 -3.36 6.28 16.8 5.13 6.51 14.2 33.3 43.8 18.9 
2013.250 11.5 2.21 0.39 1.60 12.9 1.18 39.2 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 5.13 -3.37 6.44 17.6 5.28 6.23 15.0 35.4 44.4 18.2 
2013.375 10.5 2.21 0.39 1.60 11.8 1.20 40.0 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 4.73 -3.34 6.62 18.4 5.48 5.93 15.8 37.6 45.1 17.6 
2013.500 9.47 2.21 0.39 1.59 10.8 1.22 40.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 4.34 -3.28 6.81 19.3 5.75 5.64 16.6 39.9 45.8 17.1 
2013.625 8.52 2.21 0.39 1.58 9.91 1.24 41.5 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 3.96 -3.19 7.04 20.2 6.06 5.35 17.5 42.3 46.5 16.6 
2013.750 7.62 2.21 0.39 1.58 9.04 1.26 42.1 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 3.60 -3.08 7.31 21.1 6.44 5.07 18.4 44.8 47.3 16.3 
2013.875 6.79 2.21 0.39 1.57 8.22 1.28 42.8 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 3.26 -2.95 7.62 22.1 6.88 4.80 19.3 47.5 48.1 16.1 
2014.000 6.01 2.21 0.39 1.57 7.46 1.30 43.4 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 2.94 -2.80 7.99 23.1 7.40 4.54 20.2 50.2 48.9 15.9 
2014.125 5.30 2.21 0.39 1.56 6.76 1.32 43.9 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 2.64 -2.65 8.43 24.2 7.99 4.29 21.2 53.1 49.8 15.9 
2014.250 4.63 2.21 0.39 1.56 6.12 1.33 44.5 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 2.36 -2.50 8.96 25.3 8.67 4.05 22.3 56.1 50.8 16.0 
2014.375 4.03 2.21 0.39 1.56 5.53 1.35 45.0 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 2.09 -2.35 9.59 26.6 9.45 3.83 23.4 59.3 51.9 16.2 
2014.500 3.47 2.21 0.39 1.56 4.99 1.36 45.5 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.84 -2.20 10.4 27.9 10.4 3.63 24.6 62.6 53.1 16.5 
2014.625 2.97 2.21 0.39 1.56 4.49 1.38 45.9 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.61 -2.05 11.3 29.4 11.4 3.44 25.9 66.1 54.4 17.1 
2014.750 2.51 2.21 0.39 1.56 4.05 1.39 46.3 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.40 -1.91 12.4 31.1 12.7 3.27 27.3 69.8 55.8 17.8 
2014.875 2.09 2.21 0.39 1.56 3.65 1.40 46.7 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.20 -1.78 13.7 33.1 14.2 3.11 28.8 73.7 57.4 18.7 
2015.000 1.72 2.21 0.39 1.56 3.29 1.41 47.1 0.15 0.05 0.05 2.21 2.21 1.02 -1.65 15.4 35.3 16.0 2.96 30.6 77.8 59.2 19.8 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
258 
Table 8.12: Summary of the Dynamic Simulation Results for the Economic Risks 
System Model 
 
ANP/SD Simulation Results  
Code System Variables *ANP Inputs (%)  
EV3:   Government discontinuity (change)  13   
EV8:   Economic recession  03   
EV10:   Catastrophic environmental effects;   13   
EV11:   Project technical difficulties   15   
  SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
  Min Max Mean Median StDev Norm 
PR3 Economic risks 1.72 33.0 21.51 26.07 10.73 49.86 
EV1: Change in government funding policy  2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.00 0.00 
EV2: Taxation  0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 
EV4: Wage inflation;  1.01 1.67 1.50 1.57 0.19 12.41 
EV5: Local inflation  3.29 33.7 22.46 26.67 10.37 46.17 
EV6: Foreign exchange   0.24 1.41 0.80 0.77 0.39 49.42 
EV7: Material price  8.00 47.1 26.58 25.65 13.14 49.42 
EV9: Energy price 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 
EV12: Project delays of all forms 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 
EV13: Cost of delays 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 
EV14: Cost of dispute resolution 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.00 0.00 
EV15: Disputes 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.00 0.00 
EV16: Economic certainties 0.00 9.56 5.13 5.13 3.06 59.58 
EV17: Economic uncertainties -3.4 7.22 1.82 1.61 4.19 230.7 
EV18: Error generation 0.00 15.4 4.56 4.18 3.61 79.23 
EV19: Escalation to project cost overrun 0.02
3 
0.35 0.115 0.083 9.29 80.49 
EV20: Escalation to project time overrun 5.01 16.0 8.59 8.67 0.0244 28.42 
EV21: Material price hike 2.27 8.33 5.54 5.55 1.94 35.03 
EV22: Project quality deficiency 0.00 30.6 8.88 5.71 8.90 100.3 
EV23: Risks of project cost overrun 0.00 77.8 22.36 13.91 21.85 97.72 
EV24: Risks of project time overrun 0.00 59.2 30.74 33.99 17.02 55.35 
EV25: Worksite coordination problems 15.9 33.5 25.62 26.90 6.29 24.56 
Current simulation runs Time (Year) for the economic risks model = 2008 to 2015, * Refer to Table 6.11: 
Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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 Analysis of the Simulation Results for the Level of Risk Impact on Project 
Objectives 
Up to this point, dynamic simulations have been performed to reveal the level of 
economic risks impacts on project performance, hence risks of project time and cost 
overruns and quality deficiency. However, does one particular project objective 
experience more of economic risks impact than those of other project objectives? If so, 
what is the nature of these distinctions and if not, what is the form of the similarities? 
To provide answers to these questions, one-way analysis (ANOVA) was used to explore 
these distinctions using an alpha of .001. 
 
 
Table 8.13: One-Way Analysis of Variance: The Level and Extent to which Economic 
Risks Affect the Objectives of the Case Study Megaproject during Construction 
Project Objectives Level of Economic Risks Impact on Project Objectives (%) 
Mean Std. Deviation 
Time  30.74 17.02 
Cost  22.36 21.84 
Quality  8.88 8.90 
Variance  The Extent to which Economic Risks Impact on Project 
Objectives 
Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom (df). 
Mean 
square 
F P 
Between project objectives 13862.771 2 6931.386 24.143 .000 
Within project objectives 48232.202 168 287.096   
Total  62094.974 170    
Field Survey 2013. 
 
As presented in Table 8.13, the one-way analysis of variance reveals that project time, 
cost and quality of the case study transportation megaprojects are impacted by economic 
risks. The mean scores reveal that project time (30.74%) is affected most, followed by 
the project cost (22.36%) and then the project quality (8.88%). Subjecting the results to 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), the F (obtained) is 24.143 which far exceeds 
the F-critical value of 7.41 for this test when using an alpha of .001. Correspondingly, 
the observed p-value of .000 is well below the chosen alpha of .001. By either standard, 
it implies that the difference between the levels of economic risks impact on the 
objectives of the cases study project is statistically non-significant. 
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8.3.5. Integrated Stock and Flow Model for Environmental Risks System 
 
The main line of approach in this section is to focus on the environmental risk impact 
generated by transportation megaprojects in the construction phase and the resulting 
effects such as environmental risks, risks of project time and cost overruns and project 
quality deficiency. We restricted ourselves to two main areas of environmental issues 
from works and unfavourable climatic conditions. The variables under each of these 
areas considered have been grouped from the ANP risk priority index weighting 
viewpoint, by strictly maintaining the combination of effect and respondents’ categories 
and age of working experiences based on a questionnaire survey and interviews 
conducted with professionals on Edinburgh Tram Network project.  The level of 
influence the case study megaproject under construction has in relation to these two 
main areas is represented in Figure 8.12. It was developed with environmental risks, 
risks of project time overrun, risks of project cost overrun and project quality deficiency 
on the focus and was constructed based on the validated causal loop diagram indicated 
in Figure 7.14. The parameters which are currently deemed useful for the environmental 
risks model are provided in Table 7.5.  
 
 
The approached devised to assess risks in this subsystem is based on the following 
steps: 
 
i. Integrated stock and flow diagram construction  
ii. Model equations formulation  
iii. Model testing- structural assessment and dimensional consistency 
iv. Dynamic simulation and discussion  
v. Analysis of dynamic simulation results for project objectives 
 
 
 Integrated Stock and Flow Diagram Construction: As illustrated in Figure 8.12, 
the environmental risks and unfavourable climatic conditions have direct influence 
on the controlling variable environmental uncertainties which stocks environmental 
risks, while environmental issues from works have influence on both social issues 
and environmental uncertainties. It can be noted that the stock ‘environmental risks’ 
and the inflow environmental uncertainties form a feedback loop wich reinforces the 
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risk effects in the system. Further, it has to be noted that environmental risks are 
affected by environmental certainties.  
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    Figure 8.12: Integrated Stock and Flow Diagram for Environmental Risks System  
 
 
Similarly, risks of project time and cost overruns are influenced by escalation to project 
time overrun and escalation to project cost overrun to stock risks of project time and 
cost overruns respectively. Further consideration shows that a number of the system 
variables such as legal actions, error generation and others influence risks of project 
time and cost overruns through escalations to project time and cost overruns as detailed 
in the stock and flow diagram illustrated in Figure 8.12.  
 
 Model Equation Formulation: The governing equations used to calculate the 
system parameters for the environmental risks model are given in Table 8.14. 
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        Table 8.14: Mathematical model for integrated environmental risks system model 
Code System Variables Equations  Measurement  
PR4: Environmental risks INTEG (Environmental uncertainties-
Environmental certainties, 
Environmental risks cluster priority 
index from ANP) 
Dimensionless 
ENV1: Environmental Issues Constant (Initial ANP value  for ENV1)  
ENV2: Climatic conditions   
ENV3: Cost of legal action Legal action Dimensionless 
ENV4: Disputes Social grievances*Social issues* Initial 
ANP value  for ENV4  
Dimensionless 
ENV5: Environmental 
regulation enforcement 
Social issues Dimensionless 
ENV6: Environmental 
certainties 
(Risks of project time 
overrun*Environmental risks) per Unit 
Time 
Dimensionless/
Year 
ENV7: Environmental 
uncertainties 
((Environmental risks)*(Unfavourable 
climatic conditions*Environmental 
issues from works)) per Unit Time 
Dimensionless/
Year 
ENV8: Error generation (Worksite coordination problems*Risks 
of project cost overrun) per Unit Time 
Dimensionless/
Year 
ENV9: Escalation to project 
cost overrun 
(Escalation to project time overrun * 
Error generation* Unit Time Project 
quality deficiency 
+Cost of legal action) per Unit Time 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
ENV10: Escalation to project 
time overrun 
(Error generation*Legal action + 
Environmental 
uncertainties)+(Multilevel decision 
making bodies involvement) per Unit 
Time 
Dimensionless/
Year 
ENV11: Legal action Disputes Dimensionless  
ENV12: Multi decision making 
bodies involvement 
Environmental regulation enforcement* 
Initial ANP value  for ENV12 
Dimensionless  
ENV13: Project quality 
deficiency 
INTEG (Error generation, 0) Dimensionless  
ENV14: Risks of project cost 
overrun 
INTEG (Escalation to project cost 
overrun, 0) 
 
Dimensionless  
ENV15: Risks of project time 
overrun 
INTEG (Escalation to project time 
overrun, 0) 
Dimensionless  
ENV16: Social issues Environmental issues from works+0.04 Dimensionless 
ENV17: Social grievances (Social issues)/(Multilevel decision 
making bodies involvement)*0.06 
Dimensionless 
ENV18: Worksite coordination 
problems 
(Risks of project time overrun*Project 
quality deficiency + Environmental 
risks) 
Dimensionless 
 
 Model Testing: Tests conducted on the environmental risks model before 
simulations are performed are illustrated in Figure 8.13.  As shown in Figure 8.13, 
the messages from the Vensim’s built-in function indicate that the structural 
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assessment and dimensional tests conducted on the environmental risks model are 
consistent.  
 
 
 Figure 8.13a: Structural Assessment Test for the Environmental Risks Stock Model 
 
 
Figure 8.13b: Dimensional Consistency Check for the Environmental Risks Stock 
Model 
 
                      Figure 8.13: Evaluation Tests for the Environmental Risks Model 
 
 
 Dynamic Simulation Results and Discussion: The trend of the dynamic simulation 
patterns of the various stocks in the environmental risks sub-model is discussed in 
this section. The focus of the discussion is on the analysis of the SD output graphs in 
Figure 8.14. However, physical numbers generated by Vensim’s built-in functions 
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which indicate the minimum, maximum, mean, median and standard deviation 
values for the model parameters were also discussed. Summaries of the dynamic 
results are presented in Tables 8.15 and 8.16 respectively.  
 
 
a: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for environmental risks 
 
 
b: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for risks of project time overrun 
 
     Figure 8.14: Dynamic Patterns for Stock Entities in the Environmental risks model 
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c: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for risks of project cost overrun 
 
d: Baserun and actual scenario simulation patterns for project quality deficiency 
 
Figure 8.14: Dynamic Patterns for Stock Entities in the Environmental risks model 
(Continued) 
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risk impact level for unfavorable climatic conditions and 20% risk impact level for 
environmental issues from works. Simulating with the initial 0% risk impact level is 
based on experts’ responses during an interview conducted on ETNP which revealed 
that there were favorable climatic conditions at the time physical construction 
commenced.  With such good climatic conditions and a 20% impact level for 
environmental issues from works such as noise from heavy construction machinery and 
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equipment, traffic and road diversion, the dynamic pattern (base run) in Figure 8.14a 
turns to decay gradually. But when values of ANP’s RPI for both unfavorable climatic 
conditions (79%) and the environmental issues from works (20%) were used for the 
dynamic simulation, the environmental risks pattern turns to exponential form until after 
27 months (2008 to 2010.25) before declining steadily. 
 
 
In Figure 8.14b, 8.14c and 8.14d, the level of impacts of environmental issues from 
works on the public or people living along the project routes will compel involvement 
of environmental regulatory bodies (local and regional) and other decision making 
bodies to enforce environmental laws and to prevent further damages to the public, eco-
system and the natural environment. Where the impacts seem to be serious, contractors 
may be faced by various disputes and be compelled to halt activities through legal 
means which will lead to risks of project time and cost overruns and quality deficiency.  
 
 
As indicated in Figures 8.14b, 8.14c and 8.14d, the dynamic patterns suggest that risks 
of project time and cost overruns and project quality deficiency turn to exponential 
forms as a result of impacts of environmental issues from works and unfavourable 
climatic conditions which interact with variables like social issues, disputes, 
environmental regulatory involvement, multi-level decision making bodies 
involvement, legal actions , worksite coordination problems and error generation within 
the system to affect project time, cost and quality. The level of impacts generated by 
these parameters over the period of seven years (2008-2015) are summarized and 
indicated in Table 8.15 and 8.16 respectively. 
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                                                     Table 8.15: Dynamic Simulation Results for Environmental risks System 
Time 
(Year) 
*ANP Inputs (%) 
Risk code    PR4 ENV1 ENV 2 ENV12  ENV16 ENV 17 
Risks priority index (%)     16 20 79 23 04 06 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
 PR4 ENV3 ENV4 ENV5 ENV6 ENV7 ENV8 ENV9 ENV10 ENV11 ENV12 ENV13 ENV14 ENV15 ENV16 ENV17 ENV18 
2008.000  16.0 1.69 1.69 24 0.00 2.53 0.00 1.69 8.05 1.69 5.52 0.00 0.00 0.0 24.0 26.1 16.0 
2008.125  16.3 1.69 1.69 24 0.16 2.58 0.03 1.69 8.10 1.69 5.52 0.00 0.21 1.0 24.0 26.1 16.3 
2008.250  16.6 1.69 1.69 24 0.34 2.63 0.07 1.70 8.15 1.69 5.52 0.00 0.42 2.0 24.0 26.1 16.6 
2008.375  16.9 1.69 1.69 24 0.51 2.67 0.11 1.71 8.19 1.69 5.52 0.01 0.64 3.0 24.0 26.1 16.9 
2008.500  17.2 1.69 1.69 24 0.70 2.71 0.15 1.73 8.24 1.69 5.52 0.03 0.85 4.1 24.0 26.1 17.2 
2008.625  17.4 1.69 1.69 24 0.89 2.75 0.19 1.75 8.28 1.69 5.52 0.04 1.07 5.1 24.0 26.1 17.4 
2008.750  17.7 1.69 1.69 24 1.08 2.79 0.23 1.78 8.31 1.69 5.52 0.07 1.28 6.1 24.0 26.1 17.7 
2008.875  17.9 1.69 1.69 24 1.28 2.82 0.27 1.81 8.35 1.69 5.52 0.10 1.51 7.2 24.0 26.1 17.9 
2009.000  18.1 1.69 1.69 24 1.48 2.85 0.31 1.85 8.38 1.69 5.52 0.13 1.73 8.2 24.0 26.1 18.1 
2009.125  18.2 1.69 1.69 24 1.69 2.88 0.36 1.89 8.41 1.69 5.52 0.17 1.96 9.3 24.0 26.1 18.3 
2009.250  18.4 1.69 1.69 24 1.89 2.91 0.40 1.94 8.43 1.69 5.52 0.21 2.20 10.3 24.0 26.1 18.4 
2009.375  18.5 1.69 1.69 24 2.10 2.92 0.45 1.99 8.45 1.69 5.52 0.26 2.44 11.4 24.0 26.1 18.5 
2009.500  18.6 1.69 1.69 24 2.31 2.94 0.50 2.05 8.47 1.69 5.52 0.32 2.69 12.4 24.0 26.1 18.7 
2009.625  18.7 1.69 1.69 24 2.52 2.95 0.55 2.12 8.48 1.69 5.52 0.38 2.95 13.5 24.0 26.1 18.7 
2009.750  18.7 1.69 1.69 24 2.73 2.96 0.60 2.19 8.49 1.69 5.52 0.45 3.21 14.5 24.0 26.1 18.8 
2009.875  18.8 1.69 1.69 24 2.93 2.97 0.66 2.27 8.50 1.69 5.52 0.53 3.49 15.6 24.0 26.1 18.9 
2010.000  18.8 1.69 1.69 24 3.13 2.97 0.71 2.36 8.50 1.69 5.52 0.61 3.77 16.7 24.0 26.1 18.9 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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Table 8.15: Dynamic Simulation Results for Environmental risks System (continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
*ANP Inputs (%) 
Risk code    PR4 ENV1 ENV 2 ENV12  ENV16 ENV 17 
Risks priority index (%)     16 20 79 23 04 06 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
 PR4 ENV3 ENV4 ENV5 ENV6 ENV7 ENV8 ENV9 ENV10 ENV11 ENV12 ENV13 ENV14 ENV15 ENV16 ENV17 ENV18 
2010.125  18.8 1.69 1.69 24 3.33 2.96 0.77 2.46 8.50 1.69 5.52 0.70 4.07 17.7 24.0 26.1 18.9 
2010.250  18.7 1.69 1.69 24 3.52 2.96 0.83 2.56 8.49 1.69 5.52 0.80 4.37 18.8 24.0 26.1 18.9 
2010.375  18.6 1.69 1.69 24 3.70 2.95 0.88 2.66 8.48 1.69 5.52 0.90 4.69 19.8 24.0 26.1 18.8 
2010.500  18.6 1.69 1.69 24 3.88 2.93 0.94 2.78 8.47 1.69 5.52 1.01 5.03 20.9 24.0 26.1 18.8 
2010.625  18.4 1.69 1.69 24 4.05 2.91 1.00 2.90 8.45 1.69 5.52 1.13 5.37 22.0 24.0 26.1 18.7 
2010.750  18.3 1.69 1.69 24 4.21 2.89 1.07 3.03 8.43 1.69 5.52 1.25 5.74 23.0 24.0 26.1 18.6 
2010.875  18.1 1.69 1.69 24 4.36 2.86 1.13 3.17 8.40 1.69 5.52 1.39 6.12 24.1 24.0 26.1 18.5 
2011.000  17.9 1.69 1.69 24 4.51 2.83 1.19 3.32 8.37 1.69 5.52 1.53 6.51 25.1 24.0 26.1 18.3 
2011.125  17.7 1.69 1.69 24 4.64 2.80 1.26 3.47 8.34 1.69 5.52 1.68 6.93 26.2 24.0 26.1 18.2 
2011.250  17.5 1.69 1.69 24 4.76 2.77 1.33 3.63 8.31 1.69 5.52 1.83 7.36 27.2 24.0 26.1 18.0 
2011.375  17.3 1.69 1.69 24 4.87 2.73 1.39 3.81 8.27 1.69 5.52 2.00 7.82 28.3 24.0 26.1 17.8 
2011.500  17.0 1.69 1.69 24 4.97 2.68 1.46 3.98 8.23 1.69 5.52 2.17 8.29 29.3 24.0 26.1 17.6 
2011.625  16.7 1.69 1.69 24 5.06 2.64 1.53 4.17 8.18 1.69 5.52 2.36 8.79 30.3 24.0 26.1 17.4 
2011.750  16.4 1.69 1.69 24 5.14 2.59 1.60 4.37 8.14 1.69 5.52 2.55 9.31 31.3 24.0 26.1 17.2 
2011.875  16.1 1.69 1.69 24 5.20 2.54 1.67 4.57 8.09 1.69 5.52 2.75 9.86 32.4 24.0 26.1 17.0 
2012.000  15.7 1.69 1.69 24 5.25 2.49 1.74 4.79 8.04 1.69 5.52 2.96 10.43 33.4 24.0 26.1 16.7 
2012.125  15.4 1.69 1.69 24 5.29 2.43 1.82 5.01 7.98 1.69 5.52 3.17 11.03 34.4 24.0 26.1 16.5 
2012.250  15.0 1.69 1.69 24 5.32 2.38 1.89 5.24 7.93 1.69 5.52 3.40 11.65 35.4 24.0 26.1 16.2 
2012.375  14.7 1.69 1.69 24 5.33 2.32 1.97 5.48 7.87 1.69 5.52 3.64 12.31 36.4 24.0 26.1 16.0 
2012.500  14.3 1.69 1.69 24 5.34 2.26 2.05 5.73 7.81 1.69 5.52 3.88 12.99 37.3 24.0 26.1 15.7 
2012.625  13.9 1.69 1.69 24 5.33 2.20 2.12 6.00 7.75 1.69 5.52 4.14 13.71 38.3 24.0 26.1 15.5 
2012.750  13.5 1.69 1.69 24 5.31 2.14 2.21 6.27 7.69 1.69 5.52 4.41 14.46 39.3 24.0 26.1 15.2 
2012.875  13.1 1.69 1.69 24 5.28 2.07 2.29 6.55 7.63 1.69 5.52 4.68 15.24 40.3 24.0 26.1 15.0 
2013.000  12.7 1.69 1.69 24 5.24 2.01 2.37 6.84 7.57 1.69 5.52 4.97 16.06 41.2 24.0 26.1 14.8 
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Table 8.15: Dynamic Simulation Results for Environmental risks System (continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
*ANP Inputs (%) 
Risk code    PR4 ENV1 ENV 2 ENV12  ENV16 ENV 17 
Risks priority index (%)     16 20 79 23 04 06 
SD Simulation Outputs (%) 
 PR4 ENV3 ENV4 ENV5 ENV6 ENV7 ENV8 ENV9 ENV10 ENV11 ENV12 ENV13 ENV14 ENV15 ENV16 ENV17 ENV18 
2013.125  12.3 1.69 1.69 24 5.19 1.95 2.46 7.14 7.51 1.69 5.52 5.26 16.92 42.2 24.0 26.1 14.5 
2013.250  11.9 1.69 1.69 24 5.13 1.88 2.55 7.45 7.44 1.69 5.52 5.57 17.81 43.1 24.0 26.1 14.3 
2013.375  11.5 1.69 1.69 24 5.06 1.82 2.64 7.78 7.38 1.69 5.52 5.89 18.74 44.0 24.0 26.1 14.1 
2013.500  11.1 1.69 1.69 24 4.99 1.75 2.74 8.11 7.32 1.69 5.52 6.22 19.71 44.9 24.0 26.1 13.9 
2013.625  10.7 1.69 1.69 24 4.90 1.69 2.84 8.46 7.26 1.69 5.52 6.56 20.73 45.9 24.0 26.1 13.7 
2013.750  10.3 1.69 1.69 24 4.81 1.63 2.95 8.82 7.20 1.69 5.52 6.92 21.78 46.8 24.0 26.1 13.5 
2013.875  9.9 1.69 1.69 24 4.72 1.56 3.06 9.19 7.13 1.69 5.52 7.29 22.89 47.7 24.0 26.1 13.4 
2014.000  9.5 1.69 1.69 24 4.61 1.50 3.18 9.58 7.07 1.69 5.52 7.67 24.04 48.6 24.0 26.1 13.2 
2014.125  9.1 1.69 1.69 24 4.50 1.44 3.31 9.99 7.02 1.69 5.52 8.07 25.23 49.4 24.0 26.1 13.1 
2014.250  8.7 1.69 1.69 24 4.39 1.38 3.44 10.41 6.96 1.69 5.52 8.48 26.48 50.3 24.0 26.1 13.0 
2014.375  8.4 1.69 1.69 24 4.27 1.32 3.59 10.85 6.90 1.69 5.52 8.91 27.78 51.2 24.0 26.1 12.9 
2014.500  8.0 1.69 1.69 24 4.15 1.26 3.74 11.30 6.84 1.69 5.52 9.36 29.14 52.0 24.0 26.1 12.9 
2014.625  7.6 1.69 1.69 24 4.03 1.20 3.92 11.78 6.79 1.69 5.52 9.83 30.55 52.9 24.0 26.1 12.8 
2014.750  7.3 1.69 1.69 24 3.91 1.15 4.10 12.28 6.74 1.69 5.52 10.31 32.02 53.8 24.0 26.1 12.8 
2014.875  6.9 1.69 1.69 24 3.78 1.09 4.31 12.81 6.69 1.69 5.52 10.83 33.56 54.6 24.0 26.1 12.8 
2015.000  6.6 1.69 1.69 24 3.65 1.04 4.53 13.36 6.64 1.69 5.52 11.37 35.16 55.4 24.0 26.1 12.9 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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Table 8.16: Summary of the Dynamic Simulation Results for Environmental Risks 
System 
ANP/SD simulation results 
Code System Variables *ANP inputs (%) 
ENV1: Environmental issues from works   20 
ENV2: Unfavourable climatic conditions   79 
ENV12: Multi decision making bodies involvement 23 
ENV16: Social issues 04 
ENV17: Social grievances 06 
PR4: Environmental risks 16 
  SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
  Min Max Mean Median StDev (Norm) 
PR4: Environmental risks 6.59 18.78 14.86 14.86 16.39 3.85 
ENV3: Cost of legal action 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 0.00 
ENV4: Disputes 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 0.00 
ENV5: Environmental regulation enforcement 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 0.00 
ENV6: Environmental certainties 0.00 5.34 3.72 3.72 4.27 1.61 
ENV7: Environmental uncertainties 1.04 2.97 2.35 2.35 2.59 0.61 
ENV8: Error generation 0.00 4.53 1.67 1.67 1.46 1.24 
ENV9: Escalation to project cost overrun 1.69 13.36 5.17 5.17 3.98 3.42 
ENV10: Escalation to project time overrun 6.64 8.50 7.90 7.90 8.14 0.59 
ENV11: Legal action 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 0.00 
ENV12: Multi decision making bodies involvement 5.52 5.52 5.52 5.52 5.52 0.00 
ENV13: Project quality deficiency 0.00 11.37 3.35 3.35 2.17 3.34 
ENV14: Risks of project cost overrun 0.00 35.16 11.42 11.42 8.29 9.88 
ENV15: Risks of project time overrun 55.4 28.7 29.3 16.5 57.6 55.4 
ENV16: Social issues 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 0.00 
ENV17: Social grievances 26.09 26.09 26.09 26.09 26.09 0.00 
ENV18: Worksite coordination problems 12.81 18.89 16.34 16.34 16.90 2.14 
Current simulation runs Time (Year) for environmental risks model = 2008 to 2015, * Refer to Table 
6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
 
Source: Field Work 2013 
 
 
 
 Analysis of Dynamic Simulation Results for Project Objectives:  
 
The findings of the dynamic simulation results are explored in relation to the level of 
impacts of environmental risks on the objectives of transportation megaprojects 
identified as being mainly risks of project time and cost overruns and project quality 
271 
deficiency. Table 8.17 presents a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the level of 
environmental risks impact on project time, cost and quality. The aim of the one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) is to explore whether one particular project objective 
experience more of environmental risks impact than those of other project objectives 
using an alpha of .001. If so, what will be the nature of these distinctions and if not, 
what will be the form of the similarities. 
 
 
Table 8.17: One-Way Analysis of Variance: The Level and Extent to which 
Environmental Risks Affect the Objectives of the Case Study Megaproject during 
Construction 
Project Objectives Level of Environmental Risks Impact on Project Objectives 
Mean Std. deviation 
Time 29.3 57.6 
Cost 11.42 8.29 
Quality 3.35 2.17 
Variance  The Extent to which Environmental Risks Impact on Project 
Objectives 
Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom (df). 
Mean 
square 
F P 
Between project objectives 19106.609 2 9553.304 73.678 .000 
Within project objectives 21783.508 168 129.664   
Total  40890.116 170    
Filed Survey 2013 
 
 
As presented in Table 8.17, the one-way analysis of variance reveals that project time, 
cost and quality of transportation megaprojects are all impacted by the environmental 
risks. The mean scores reveal that project time (29.3%) is affected most, followed by 
the project cost (11.42%) and then project quality (3.35%). Subjecting the results to 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), the F (obtained) is 73.678 which far exceeds 
the F-critical value of 7.41 for this test when using an alpha of .001. Correspondingly, 
the observed p-value of .000 is well below the chosen alpha of .001. By either standard, 
it implies that the difference between the levels of environmental risks impact on the 
objectives of the cases study project is statistically non-significant. 
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8.3.6. Integrated Stock and Flow Model for Political Risks System  
Generally, political risk can be viewed as the use of political authority in a way that 
threatens a megaproject company’s value. Two types of political risks are relevant to 
companies doing business internationally: industry- or firm specific political risk and 
country-specific political risk. Mass anti-government protests may not pose a political 
threat to a firm if they do not affect: (a) Government policies towards the megaproject 
development and (b) the company’s current or future operations or value. However, 
changes in the legal framework governing contracts could have a significant negative 
impact on the company. 
 
 
Regardless of the source, a megaproject developer attempting to understand potential 
political risk must recognize the difference between (a) political issues that can affect 
corporate performance, and (b) dramatic situations that have no financial impact on the 
company. In addition, the megaproject developers should understand the potential 
reputation damage, and associated costs, related to political risk. 
For a better understanding of this section of the report, the under listed approach were 
used to translate available information on political risks into an integrated SDANP stock 
and flow model using the following steps: 
 
i. Integrated stock and flow diagram construction  
ii. Model equations formulation  
iii. Model testing- structural assessment and dimensional consistency  
iv. Dynamic simulation results and discussion 
v. Analysis of dynamic simulation results for project objectives 
 
 Integrated Stock and Flow Diagram Construction: Figure 8.15 illustrates the 
integrated political risks stock and flow diagram. It was developed based on the 
validated cause-effective (Dynamic hypothesis) diagram presented in Figure 7.17 
and with political support, political risks, risk of project time overrun, risk of project 
cost overrun and quality deficiency as the focus. As illustrated in Figure 8.15, the 
model parameters represent only some of the most critical political risk factors 
facing the developer of the case study megaproject (Edinburgh Tram Network 
Project) at the time of this research. Although the model boundary chart presented in 
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Table 7.6: System boundary for political risks sub-system did not try to list all risks, 
the wide variety of political risk factors  it included provides the relevant issues 
facing the developer of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (ETNP). 
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      Figure 8.15: Integrated Stock and Flow Diagram for the Political Risks Model 
 
The notation of the model follows the methodology of Forrester (1961). There are three 
different entities on the model: levels, rates and auxiliaries. Levels are indicated by the 
rectangular boxes, rates are noted by the signal flow meters and auxiliaries are shown 
without boxes. The sources and sinks of risks are shown as ‘pools’. The straight and 
curved solid lines indicate information flow among the various components of the 
system.  
 
  
As Figure 8.15 indicates, four exogenous parameters with ANP RPIs represented in 
hexagonal boxes influence the level of risks in the system. The first parameter ‘TROs’ 
refers to the percentage of change to traffic management and related restrictions placed 
to road usage or even part of it. ‘Government discontinuity’ refers to the degree of 
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change to political actors representing the megaproject owner when discontinuities of 
governmental or sovereign authorities of the national government occur in office. 
‘Political opposition’ refers to instinctive opposition to the project as a result of lack of 
full knowledge of the project and its associated safety risks.  ‘Protectionism’ is the 
economic policy of restraining trade between nations, through methods such as tariffs 
on imported goods, restrictive quotas, a variety of other government regulations 
designed to discourage imports and to prevent foreign take-over of native markets and 
companies. The result of this could either be unfair bidding or competitiveness.  
 
 
It can be observed from Figure 8.15 that, government discontinuity; political opposition 
and social acceptability have direct influence on the controlling factor ‘political 
harmony’ which stocks political support. The stock ‘political risks’ is in turn influenced 
by variables such as political interference, and political indecision through the political 
uncertainties as shown. Further, it has to be noted that ‘political risks’ is affected by its 
outflow ‘political certainties’.  
 
 
Similarly, risks of project time and cost overruns are influenced by escalation to project 
time overrun and escalation to project cost overrun to stock risks of project time and 
cost overruns respectively. Further consideration showed that a number of variables 
influence risks of project time and cost overruns through escalations to project time and 
cost overruns as detailed in the stock and flow diagram presented in Figure 8.15.  
 
 
• Model Equation Formulation: The next step of the SD methodology is the 
development of the model equation (mathematical model); usually presented as a stock-
flow diagram that captures the model structure and the interrelationships among the 
system variables (Sterman 2000). The integrated stock-flow diagram is translated to a 
system of differential equations, which is then solved via Vensim’s built-in simulation 
functions to support the analysis. The embedded mathematical equations are divided 
into two main categories: stock equations, relating the accumulations within the system 
to the net flow rates, and rate equations, defining the flows among the stocks as 
functions of time. All equations of the political risk sub model are deduced from Figure 
8.15: and presented in Table 8.18. 
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The entire mathematical model is a non-linear model of fifth order. The initial values 
for the stock parameters are equal to zero apart from the initial value of political support 
and political risks which are based on the Risk Priority Indexes derived from the ANP’s 
pairwise calculation. 
 
            Table 8.18: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Political Risks Model 
Code System Variables Equations  Measurement  
PR5 Political risks  INTEG (Political uncertainties-
Political certainties, Initial ANP 
value  for PR5) 
Dimensionless 
PV1:   Government funding  
policy 
(Social acceptability + Political 
support) / Government 
discontinuity 
Dimensionless 
PV2:   Political opposition Constant  Dimensionless 
PV3:   Government discontinuity Constant  Dimensionless 
PV4:   Political support Political support.= INTEG 
(Political harmony, Initial ANP 
value  for PV4) 
Dimensionless 
PV5:   Political indecision 
(decision) 
Social acceptability / (Political 
interferences in the 
project*Political debates on the 
project + Political risks) 
Dimensionless 
PV6:   Project termination Government discontinuity * 
Political indecision 
Dimensionless 
PV7:   Delay in obtaining consent "Legislative & regulation changes" Dimensionless 
PV8:   Legislative/regulatory 
changes  
Government discontinuity 
*Government funding policy 
Dimensionless 
PV9:   Cost of delays Delay in obtaining consent*TROs Dimensionless 
PV10:   Cost of legal/dispute 
resolution 
Disputes +Legal actions Dimensionless 
PV11:   Disputes Legislative & regulation changes * 
Political risks 
Dimensionless 
PV12:   Error generation (Worksite coordination problems * 
Risks of project cost overrun) per 
Unit time 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
Source: Field Survey 2013 
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Table 8.18: Mathematical Model for the Integrated Political Risks Model (Continued) 
Code System Variables Equations  Measurement  
PV13:   Escalation to project cost 
overrun 
Risks of project time overrun* 
Project quality deficiency*(Cost of 
delays /Unit time) + (Cost of legal & 
dispute resolution+ Project 
termination)/Unit time 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
PV14:   Escalation to project time 
overrun. 
((Project quality deficiency*Political 
risks) per Unit time)) + 
((Government discontinuity* 
Disputes) per Unit time)) + Project 
termination per Unit time 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
PV15:   Legal actions Disputes Dimensionless  
PV16:   Political certainties Social acceptability / Risks of project 
time overrun + Political risks 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
PV17:   Political debates on the 
project 
((Project quality deficiency) / 
(Political support + Social 
acceptability))*Unit time 
Dimensionless  
PV18:   Political harmony (Social acceptability / (Government 
discontinuity + Political opposition)) 
per Unit time 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
PV19:   Political interferences in 
the project 
(Political opposition + Government 
discontinuity) - (Political support per 
Unit time) 
Dimensionless 
PV20:   Political uncertainties (Political interferences in the project 
+ Political indecision) per Unit time 
Dimensionless 
/Year 
PV21:   Project quality deficiency INTEG (Error generation, 0) Dimensionless 
PV22:   Risks of project cost 
overrun. 
INTEG (Escalation to project cost 
overrun, 0) 
Dimensionless 
PV23:   Risks of project time 
overrun 
INTEG (Escalation to project time 
overrun, 0) 
Dimensionless  
PV24:   Social acceptability. Political support * Protectionism Dimensionless 
PV25:   Worksite coordination 
problems 
Risks of project time overrun + 
Project quality deficiency + Political 
risks 
Dimensionless 
Source: Field Survey 2013 
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 Model Testing: Tests conducted on the political risks model before simulations 
were performed are illustrated in Figure 8.16.  As the Figure 8.16 indicates, the 
messages from Vensim’s built-in function show that the structural assessment and 
dimensional tests conducted on the environmental risks model are OK and hence, 
consistent. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.16a: Structural assessment test for political risks stock and flow model 
 
 
 
Figure 8.16b: Dimensional Consistency Check for the Political Risks Stock Model 
 
                       Figure 8.16: Evaluation Tests for the Political Risks Model 
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 Dynamic Simulation Results and Discussion: This section presents the trend of a 
series of dynamic simulation patterns for political support, political risks, risks of 
project time overrun, risks of project cost overrun and project quality deficiency 
under two assumptions. First, simulation is performed by using the RPIs obtained 
from ANP’s pairwise calculations and second, parameter values for exogenous 
system variables are set to different values so that variation in the values of the 
system parameters can cause a change in the dynamic behaviour of the model (in 
this case,  +/- 50% to the ANP RPIs). The simulation results indicating the 
behaviour patterns of the stock risk entities are therefore shown in Figure 8.17.   
 
 
Note: Letters ‘A and B’ represent years 2010 and 2012.25 respectively 
a: Scenario simulation patterns for political risks 
Figure 8.17: Dynamic Simulation Patterns for Stock Entities in the Political Risks 
Model 
 
 
As Figure 8.17a indicates, the state of the system for the ‘Current (Actual)’ run 
(represented in red line) for the political risks graph grows exponentially until the year 
2012.25 before declining gradually to the end of year 2014. The pattern for the base run 
(less than 50% risk impact level) represented as a green line also grows gradually until 
year 2010 before declining (exponential decay) until the end of year 2014. The 
exponential decay of political risks at this point suggests that the net level of political 
support will increase as indicated in Figure 8.17b.   Similarly, an observed mode of 
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behaviour for the base run (more than 50% risk impact level) indicated by the blue line 
grows exponentially. As direct consequences of that growth, the level of political 
support to the project falls as indicated in Figure 8.17b. 
   
b: Scenario simulation patterns for political support 
 
 
c: Scenario simulation patterns for risks of project time overrun 
Figure 8.17: Dynamic Simulation Patterns for Stock Entities in the Political Risks 
Model (Continued) 
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  d: Scenario simulation patterns for risks of project cost overrun 
 
 
e: Scenario simulation patterns for project quality deficiency 
 
Figure 8.17: Dynamic Simulation Patterns for Stock Entities in the Political Risks 
Model (Continued) 
 
Despite the dynamic characteristics of political support, there is not, at any moment, a 
limit to the risks of project time and cost overruns and quality deficiencies as illustrated 
in Figures 8.17c to 8.17e which if improved causes risks of time and cost overruns to 
fall and project quality to improve. The behaviour patterns of these three risks arise 
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through the nonlinear interactions of political risk variables with one another within the 
system. This suggests that decision making concerning project delays, budget overruns 
and quality deficiencies for the case study megaproject at the construction phase must 
be focused by the project managers on nonlinearities of political risk interactions within 
the project environment. As indicated by the simulated patterns in Figure 8.17 and the 
results represented in Tables 8.19 and 8.20, even if there is a significant level of 
political support to the case study megaproject, there is still the need for dynamic 
political risk assessment to reduce such risks. 
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                                                               Table 8.19: Dynamic Simulation Results for Political Risks System 
Time 
(Year) 
 *ANP Inputs (%)  
Risk code        PR5 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV9 PV10  
Risks priority index         17 8 15 13 3 6  
 SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
PR5 PV1 PV4 PV5 PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9 PV10 PV11 PV12 PV13 PV14 PV15 PV16 PV17 PV18 PV19 PV20 PV21 PV22 PV23 PV24 PV25 
2008.000 17.0 89.2 13.0 2.29 0.34 13.4 13.4 0.80 4.55 2.28 0.00 0.34 0.69 2.3 2.29 0.00 1.70 10.0 12.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 17.00 
2008.125 18.3 90.7 13.2 2.17 0.33 13.6 13.6 0.82 4.97 2.48 0.01 0.33 0.70 2.5 2.16 0.00 1.72 9.79 12.0 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.40 18.34 
2008.250 19.5 92.2 13.4 2.07 0.31 13.8 13.8 0.83 5.39 2.69 0.02 0.32 0.71 2.7 2.05 0.01 1.75 9.57 11.6 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.40 19.65 
2008.375 20.7 93.7 13.7 1.98 0.30 14.1 14.1 0.84 5.81 2.91 0.03 0.31 0.73 2.9 1.96 0.02 1.78 9.35 11.3 0.00 0.12 0.26 0.41 20.94 
2008.500 21.9 95.2 13.9 1.90 0.29 14.3 14.3 0.86 6.24 3.12 0.04 0.31 0.76 3.1 1.87 0.04 1.81 9.13 11.0 0.01 0.16 0.35 0.42 22.21 
2008.625 23.0 96.8 14.1 1.84 0.28 14.5 14.5 0.87 6.68 3.34 0.05 0.31 0.78 3.3 1.80 0.07 1.84 8.91 10.7 0.01 0.20 0.45 0.42 23.45 
2008.750 24.1 98.4 14.3 1.78 0.27 14.8 14.8 0.89 7.11 3.56 0.06 0.31 0.80 3.6 1.74 0.11 1.87 8.68 10.5 0.02 0.24 0.55 0.43 24.67 
2008.875 25.2 100 14.6 1.73 0.26 15.0 15.0 0.90 7.56 3.78 0.07 0.31 0.83 3.8 1.69 0.16 1.90 8.44 10.2 0.02 0.28 0.65 0.44 25.87 
2009.000 26.3 102 14.8 1.69 0.25 15.2 15.2 0.91 8.00 4.00 0.09 0.31 0.86 4.0 1.64 0.22 1.93 8.20 9.89 0.03 0.32 0.75 0.44 27.04 
2009.125 27.3 103 15.0 1.65 0.25 15.5 15.5 0.93 8.45 4.23 0.10 0.32 0.89 4.2 1.60 0.28 1.96 7.96 9.61 0.04 0.36 0.86 0.45 28.19 
2009.250 28.3 105 15.3 1.62 0.24 15.7 15.7 0.94 8.91 4.45 0.12 0.33 0.93 4.5 1.57 0.36 1.99 7.72 9.34 0.06 0.40 0.97 0.46 29.32 
2009.375 29.3 107 15.5 1.59 0.24 16.0 16.0 0.96 9.36 4.68 0.13 0.34 0.96 4.7 1.54 0.44 2.03 7.47 9.06 0.07 0.44 1.09 0.47 30.42 
2009.500 30.2 108 15.8 1.57 0.23 16.3 16.3 0.98 9.82 4.91 0.15 0.35 1.00 4.9 1.51 0.54 2.06 7.22 8.78 0.09 0.48 1.21 0.47 31.50 
2009.625 31.1 110 16.0 1.54 0.23 16.5 16.5 0.99 10.3 5.14 0.17 0.37 1.04 5.1 1.48 0.64 2.09 6.96 8.50 0.11 0.52 1.33 0.48 32.55 
2009.750 32.0 112 16.3 1.53 0.23 16.8 16.8 1.01 10.7 5.37 0.19 0.39 1.08 5.4 1.46 0.76 2.13 6.70 8.22 0.13 0.57 1.46 0.49 33.58 
2009.875 32.8 114 16.6 1.51 0.23 17.1 17.1 1.02 11.2 5.60 0.21 0.41 1.12 5.6 1.44 0.89 2.16 6.43 7.94 0.15 0.62 1.59 0.50 34.58 
2010.000 33.7 116 16.8 1.50 0.22 17.3 17.3 1.04 11.7 5.84 0.24 0.43 1.16 5.8 1.43 1.03 2.20 6.16 7.66 0.18 0.67 1.73 0.51 35.56 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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Table 8.19: Dynamic Simulation Results for Political Risks System (continued) 
Time 
(Year) 
 *ANP Inputs (%)  
Risk code        PR5 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV9 PV10  
Risks priority index         17 8 15 13 3 6  
 SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
PR5 PV1 PV4 PV5 PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9 PV10 PV11 PV12 PV13 PV14 PV15 PV16 PV17 PV18 PV19 PV20 PV21 PV22 PV23 PV24 PV25 
2010.125 34.4 118 17.1 1.5 0.2 17.6 17.6 1.06 12.1 6.07 0.26 0.45 1.21 6.1 1.41 1.18 2.23 5.89 7.37 0.21 0.72 1.88 0.51 36.51 
2010.250 35.2 119.4 17.4 1.5 0.2 17.9 17.9 1.07 12.6 6.30 0.29 0.48 1.25 6.3 1.40 1.35 2.27 5.61 7.09 0.24 0.78 2.03 0.52 37.44 
2010.375 35.9 121.4 17.7 1.5 0.2 18.2 18.2 1.09 13.1 6.53 0.32 0.51 1.30 6.5 1.39 1.52 2.31 5.32 6.80 0.28 0.84 2.19 0.53 38.35 
2010.500 36.6 123.4 18 1.5 0.2 18.5 18.5 1.11 13.5 6.76 0.35 0.54 1.35 6.8 1.39 1.72 2.34 5.04 6.51 0.32 0.90 2.35 0.54 39.22 
2010.625 37.2 125.4 18.3 1.5 0.2 18.8 18.8 1.13 14.0 7.00 0.39 0.57 1.40 7.0 1.38 1.92 2.38 4.74 6.21 0.36 0.97 2.52 0.55 40.08 
2010.750 37.8 127.4 18.6 1.5 0.2 19.1 19.1 1.15 14.5 7.22 0.43 0.61 1.46 7.2 1.37 2.15 2.42 4.44 5.91 0.41 1.04 2.69 0.56 40.91 
2010.875 38.4 129.5 18.9 1.5 0.2 19.4 19.4 1.17 14.9 7.45 0.47 0.65 1.52 7.5 1.37 2.39 2.46 4.14 5.61 0.46 1.12 2.88 0.57 41.71 
2011.000 38.9 131.6 19.2 1.5 0.2 19.7 19.7 1.18 15.4 7.68 0.51 0.69 1.58 7.7 1.37 2.64 2.50 3.83 5.31 0.52 1.20 3.07 0.57 42.49 
2011.125 39.4 133.8 19.5 1.5 0.2 20.1 20.1 1.20 15.8 7.90 0.56 0.74 1.64 7.9 1.37 2.92 2.54 3.52 5.00 0.5 1.28 3.26 0.58 43.24 
2011.250 39.9 135.9 19.8 1.5 0.2 20.4 20.4 1.22 16.3 8.12 0.61 0.79 1.70 8.1 1.37 3.21 2.58 3.20 4.69 0.65 1.38 3.47 0.59 43.97 
2011.375 40.3 138.1 20.1 1.5 0.2 20.7 20.7 1.24 16.7 8.34 0.66 0.84 1.77 8.3 1.37 3.53 2.62 2.88 4.38 0.73 1.48 3.68 0.60 44.67 
2011.500 40.6 140.4 20.5 1.5 0.2 21.1 21.1 1.26 17.1 8.56 0.72 0.89 1.84 8.6 1.38 3.86 2.67 2.55 4.06 0.81 1.58 3.90 0.61 45.35 
2011.625 41 142.7 20.8 1.5 0.2 21.4 21.4 1.28 17.5 8.77 0.78 0.95 1.91 8.8 1.38 4.22 2.71 2.22 3.74 0.90 1.69 4.13 0.62 46.00 
2011.750 41.3 145.0 21.1 1.5 0.2 21.8 21.8 1.31 18.0 8.98 0.84 1.01 1.99 9.0 1.39 4.60 2.75 1.88 3.41 1.00 1.81 4.37 0.63 46.64 
2011.875 41.5 147.4 21.5 1.6 0.2 22.1 22.1 1.33 18.4 9.18 0.92 1.08 2.07 9.2 1.40 5.0 2.80 1.54 3.09 1.11 1.94 4.62 0.64 47.24 
2012.000 41.7 149.8 21.8 1.6 0.2 22.5 22.5 1.35 18.8 9.38 0.99 1.15 2.15 9.4 1.40 5.43 2.85 1.19 2.75 1.22 2.07 4.88 0.65 47.83 
2012.125 41.9 152.2 22.2 1.6 0.2 22.8 22.8 1.37 19.1 9.57 1.07 1.22 2.24 9.6 1.41 5.88 2.89 0.83 2.42 1.34 2.22 5.15 0.67 48.39 
2012.250 42.0 154.7 22.5 1.6 0.2 23.2 23.2 1.39 19.5 9.75 1.16 1.30 2.32 9.8 1.42 6.37 2.94 0.47 2.08 1.48 2.37 5.43 0.68 48.93 
2012.375 42.1 157.2 22.9 1.6 0.2 23.6 23.6 1.42 19.9 9.93 1.25 1.38 2.42 99. 1.44 6.8 2.99 0.10 1.73 1.62 2.53 5.72 0.69 49.44 
2012.500 42.1 159.8 23.3 1.7 0.3 24 24 1.44 20.2 10.1 1.35 1.47 2.51 10.1 1.45 7.42 3.04 -0.3 1.39 1.78 2.70 6.02 0.70 49.94 
2012.625 42.1 162.4 23.7 1.7 0.3 24.4 24.4 1.46 20.5 10.3 1.46 1.55 2.61 10.3 1.46 8.00 3.08 -0.7 1.04 1.95 2.89 6.33 0.71 50.42 
2012.750 42.1 165.0 24.0 1.7 0.3 24.8 24.8 1.49 20.8 10.4 1.57 1.65 2.72 10.4 1.48 8.60 3.14 -1.0 0.68 2.13 3.08 6.66 0.72 50.87 
2012.875 42 167.7 24.4 1.8 0.3 25.2 25.2 1.51 21.1 10.6 1.69 1.74 2.82 10.6 1.50 9.24 3.19 -1.4 0.32 2.33 3.29 7.00 0.73 51.31 
2013.000 41.8 170.5 24.8 1.8 0.3 25.6 25.6 1.53 21.4 10.7 1.81 1.84 2.93 10.7 1.5 9.92 3.24 -1.8 0.0 2.54 3.51 7.35 0.74 51.72 
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Table 8.19: Dynamic Simulation Results for Political Risks System (continued) 
 
Time 
(Year) 
 *ANP Inputs (%)  
Risk code        PR5 PV2 PV3 PV4 PV9 PV10  
Risks priority index         17 8 15 13 3 6  
 SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
PR5 PV1 PV4 PV5 PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9 PV10 PV11 PV12 PV13 PV14 PV15 PV16 PV17 PV18 PV19 PV20 PV21 PV22 PV23 PV24 PV25 
2013.125 41.6 173 25.2 1.8 0.3 26 26 1.56 21.6 10.8 1.95 1.95 3.05 10.8 1.53 10.6 3.29 -2.2 -0.4 2.76 3.74 7.72 0.76 52.12 
2013.250 41.4 176 25.6 1.9 0.3 26.4 26.4 1.58 21.9 10.9 2.09 2.06 3.17 10.9 1.55 11.4 3.34 -2.6 -0.8 3.01 3.98 8.10 0.77 52.51 
2013.375 41.1 179 26.1 1.9 0.3 26.8 26.8 1.61 22.0 11.0 2.24 2.17 3.29 11.0 1.58 12.2 3.4 -3.1 -1.1 3.27 4.24 8.50 0.78 52.87 
2013.500 40.8 182 26.5 2.0 0.3 27.3 27.3 1.64 22.9 11.1 2.40 2.28 3.41 11.1 1.60 13.0 3.45 -3.5 -1.5 3.55 4.51 8.91 0.79 53.22 
2013.625 40.4 185 26.9 2.0 0.3 27.7 27.7 1.66 22.4 11.2 2.57 2.40 3.54 11.2 1.62 13.9 3.51 -3.9 -1.9 3.85 4.79 9.33 0.81 53.56 
2013.750 39.9 186 27.4 2.1 0.3 28.2 28.2 1.69 22.5 11.3 2.74 2.52 3.67 11.3 1.65 14.8 3.57 -4.4 -2.3 4.17 5.09 9.77 0.82 53.88 
2013.875 39.5 191 27.8 2.2 0.3 28.6 28.6 1.72 22.6 11.3 2.93 2.64 3.80 11.3 1.68 15.8 3.63 -4.8 -2.7 4.51 5.41 10.2 0.83 54.20 
2014.000 38.9 194 28.3 2.2 0.3 29.1 29.1 1.75 22.6 11.3 3.13 2.77 3.93 11.3 1.71 16.8 3.69 -5.3 -3.0 4.88 5.74 10.7 0.85 54.50 
2014.125 38.3 197 28.7 2.3 0.4 29.6 29.6 1.77 22.7 11.3 3.33 2.90 4.07 11.3 1.74 17.8 3.75 -5.7 -3.4 5.27 6.08 11.2 0.86 54.79 
2014.250 37.7 200 29.2 2.4 0.4 30.1 30.1 1.80 22.7 11.3 3.55 3.02 4.20 11.3 1.77 18.9 3.81 -6.2 -3.8 5.69 6.45 11.7 0.88 55.07 
2014.375 37 204 29.7 2.5 0.4 30.6 30.6 1.83 22.6 11.3 3.78 3.15 4.34 11.3 1.81 20.1 3.87 -6.7 -4.2 6.13 6.82 12.2 0.89 55.34 
2014.500 36.2 207 30.1 2.6 0.4 31.1 31.1 1.86 22.5 11.3 4.0 3.28 4.47 11.2 1.85 21.3 3.93 -7.1 -4.5 6.60 7.22 12.8 0.90 55.61 
2014.625 35.4 210 30.6 2.7 0.4 31.6 31.6 1.89 22.4 11.2 4.26 3.41 4.60 11.2 1.88 22.5 4.00 -7.6 -4.9 7.10 7.63 13.3 0.92 55.87 
2014.750 34.6 214 31.1 2.9 0.4 32.1 32.1 1.92 22.2 11.1 4.52 3.53 4.73 11.1 1.93 23.8 4.06 -8.1 -5.3 7.64 8.05 13.9 0.93 56.13 
2014.875 33.7 217 31.6 3.0 0.5 32.6 32.6 1.96 22.0 11.0 4.79 3.66 4.86 11.0 1.97 25.2 4.13 -8.6 -5.6 8.20 8.50 14.5 0.95 56.39 
2015.000 32.7 221 32.2 3.2 0.5 33.1 33.1 1.99 21.7 10.8 5.07 3.78 4.99 10.8 2.02 26.6 4.19 -9.2 -6.0 8.80 8.95 15.1 0.96 56.65 
* Refer to Table 6.11: Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks on page 169. 
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Table 8.20: Summary of the Dynamic Simulation Results for the Political Risks System 
Model 
ANP/SD Simulation Results 
Code System Variables *ANP inputs (%) 
PV2:   Political opposition 08 
PV3:   Government discontinuity 15 
PV9:   Protectionism 03 
PV10:   Delay in obtaining temporary Traffic 
Regulation Orders (TROs) 
06 
  SD Simulation Outputs (%)  
  Min Max Mean Median StDev (Norm) 
PR5 Political risks  17.0 42.1 35.2 37.7 7.04 20.0 
PV1:   Government funding  policy 89.3 220.8 145.4 140.4 38.4 26.4 
PV4:   Political support 13.0 32.2 21.2 20.5 5.6 26.4 
PV5:   Political indecision (decision) 1.47 3.18 1.84 1.69 0.42 22.9 
PV6:   Project termination 0.22 0.48 0.28 0.25 0.06 22.9 
PV7:   Delay in obtaining consent/approval 13.4 33.1 21.8 21.1 5.76 26.4 
PV8:   Legislative & regulatory changes  13.4 33.1 21.8 21.1 5.76 26.4 
PV9:   Cost of delays 0.80 1.99 1.31 1.26 0.35 26.4 
PV10:   Cost of legal & dispute resolution 4.55 22.7 15.9 17.1 5.94 37.5 
PV11:   Disputes 2.28 11.3 7.93 8.56 2.97 37.5 
PV12:   Error generation 0.00 5.07 1.32 0.72 1.42 108 
PV13:   Escalation to project cost overrun 0.31 3.78 1.32 0.89 1.07 81.0 
PV14:   Escalation to project time overrun. 0.69 4.99 2.21 1.84 1.30 58.7 
PV15:   Legal actions 2.28 11.33 7.93 8.56 2.97 37.5 
PV16:   Political certainties 1.37 2.29 1.60 1.51 0.23 14.3 
PV17:   Political debates on the project 0.00 26.6 7.02 3.86 7.62 109 
PV18:   Political harmony 1.70 4.19 2.76 2.67 0.73 26.4 
PV19:   Political interferences in the project -9.16 10.0 1.82 2.55 5.60 307. 
PV20:   Political uncertainties -5.97 12.3 3.66 4.06 5.33 146 
PV21:   Project quality deficiency 0.00 8.80 1.95 0.81 2.41 123 
PV22:   Risks of project cost overrun. 0.00 8.95 2.56 1.58 2.50 97.4 
PV23:   Risks of project time overrun 0.00 15.1 5.14 3.90 4.33 84.1 
PV24:   Social acceptability. 0.39 0.96 0.64 0.61 0.17 26.4 
PV25:   Worksite coordination problems 17.0 56.7 42.3 45.4 11.7 27.6 
Current simulation runs Time (Year) for Political Risk Model = 2008 to 2015, * Refer to Table 27: 
Summary of final ANP decision making priority results for all risks. 
 
Source: Field Work 2013 
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 Analysis of Dynamic Simulation Results for Project Objectives:  
The findings of the dynamic simulation results are explored in relation to the level of 
impacts of political risks on the objectives of the case study megaproject identified as 
been mainly risks of project time and cost overruns and project quality deficiency. Table 
8.21 presents a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the level of political risks 
impact on project time, cost and quality. The aim of the one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) is to explore whether one particular project objective experience more of 
risks impact than those of other project objectives using an alpha of .001. If so, what 
will be the nature of these distinctions and if not, what will be the form of the 
similarities. 
 
Table 8.21: One-Way Analysis of Variance: The Level and Extent to which Political 
Risks Affect the Objectives of the Case Study Megaproject during Construction 
Project Objectives Level of Political Risks Impact on Megaproject Objectives (%) 
Mean Std. deviation 
Time 5.14 4.33 
Cost 2.56 2.50 
Quality 1.95 2.41 
Variance  The Extent to which Political Risks Impact on Project Objectives  
Sum of 
squares 
Degrees of 
freedom (df). 
Mean 
square 
F P 
Between project objectives 326.590 2 163.295 15.666 .000 
Within project objectives 1751.192 168 10.424   
Total  2077.782 170    
Source: Field work 2013 
 
As presented in Table 8.21, the one-way analysis of variance reveals that project time, 
cost and quality of transportation megaprojects are all impacted by political risks. The 
mean scores reveal that project time is affected most, followed by the project cost and 
then the project quality. Subjecting the results to one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA), the F (obtained) is 15.666 which far exceeds the F-critical value of 7.41 for 
this test when using an alpha of .001. Correspondingly, the observed p-value of .000 is 
well below the chosen alpha of .001. By either standard, it implies that the difference 
between the levels of political risks impact on the objectives of the cases study project is 
statistically non-significant. 
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8.4: Summary  
Realistic ‘project time, cost and quality’ has become increasingly important during 
megaproject development. They serve as crucial benchmarks for assessing the 
performance of megaprojects and the efficiency of the principal contractor (Chan and 
Kumaraswamy, 2002). In this section of the research, potential risk variables which 
cause transportation megaprojects to underperform in the construction phase and 
problems likely to confront the current and future transportation megaprojects were 
classified and modelled in five (Social, Technical, Economic, Environmental and 
Political) sub systems. The idea is to develop a proactive megaproject dynamic system 
tool to assess transportation megaprojects in which potential problems are fully 
anticipated. 
 
 
A case study of tram network construction in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK) has been taken 
to explain how the ANP and the SD methodology can be integrated and used as an 
approach and tool to assess risks in transportation megaproject in the construction phase 
for managerial decision against project delays, over budgets and quality deficiency in 
megaproject development over time.  
 
        Table 8.22: Summary of Dynamic Simulation Result for Risks Impact on ETNP 
Risks Level of Risk Impact on Project Performance (%) 
 Cost  Time  Quality  Total Impact 
Social 12 6 1 19 
Technical 1.24 0.43 0.15 1.82 
Economic 22.36 30.74 8.88 61.98 
Environmental 11.43 29.3 3.35 44.08 
Political 2.56 5.14 1.95 9.65 
Total Impact 49.59 71.61 15.33 136.53 
Source: Field Work 2013 
 
The new approach was used to produce dynamic simulations and graphs to reveal the 
level of impacts of STEEP risks on project cost, time and quality for Edinburgh Tram 
Project over time. Table 8.22 illustrates a summary of the dynamic simulation results 
indicating the level of STEEP risks impact on project cost, time and quality on ETNP 
during construction. As Table 8.22 indicates, the total level of STEEP risks impact on 
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ETNP with respect to cost is 49.59%, and for time and quality, 71.61% and 15.33% 
respectively.  In addition, findings of the dynamic simulation results were further 
explored by subjecting the results to a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The aim 
of the ANOVA is to explore whether one particular project objective experiences more 
risks impact than those of other project objectives, and if so, what will be the nature of 
these distinctions and if not, what will be the form of the similarities. The results 
indicated non-significant differences between the levels of all risks impact on the 
objectives of the cases study project. Detail results of the extent to which the STEEP 
risks impacted on cost, time and quality are represented in Tables 8.5, 8.9, 8.13, 8.17 
and 8.21.   
 
 
It must be noted that, in the new approach, numbers are not very important as the 
researcher is basically interested in studying the behaviour and trend of the dynamic 
system. However, the model must pass the reality check, so that the inputs of the ANP’s 
RPIs into the system dynamics simulations can be proven realistic. The next chapter 
“Validation of the SDANP models” laid emphasis on different ways in which a model 
may be validated before its results can be accepted. 
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CHAPTER NINE: MODEL VALIDATION 
 
9.1: Introduction 
In Chapter 8, the SDANP models for assessing the dynamics of risks in transportation 
megaprojects were developed and major observations made from their simulated 
behaviour modes which replicate the existing problem entities (risks of project time and 
cost overruns and project quality deficiency) of Edinburgh Tram Network Project 
(ETNP) the construction phase in Scotland, UK. 
 
 
This chapter is about the major aspects of the model validation. It presents the final 
process that is to be carried out using the system dynamics methodology to address the 
research objective 4 stated in Section 1.3.2 of Chapter I.  The chapter is organized 
around six major sections, namely: Introduction; Model Validation Process; Validation 
Scheme for the Integrated System Models; data validity; policy analysis and design and 
finally, a brief summary of the chapter. 
 
 
9.1.1: Philosophical Aspects of Model Validity 
Validation of dynamic simulation models is one of the most vital phases in the process 
of modelling real systems. However, as is true for scientific theories in general, 
dynamic model validation also faces the problem that ‘correctness’ of a model cannot 
be proven. That means validation and verification of models is impossible (Sterman, 
2010). The word ‘verify’ derived from the Latin word “verus” means “truth” and is 
defined by the Webster dictionary as “to establish the truth, accuracy, or reality of.” 
While “valid” is defined as “well-grounded or justifiable.”  
 
 
By these definitions, it can be said that a model can only deliver correct results in a 
specific setting (reproduce the behaviour of the original) and cannot constitute proof 
that it will work correctly in all or even other circumstances. As Forrester (1961, p.123) 
states: “The validity (or significance) of a model should be judged by its suitability for a 
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particular purpose. A model is sound and defendable if it accomplishes what is expected 
of it…. Validity, as an abstract concept divorced from purpose, has no useful meaning.” 
With regards to objective criteria for model validity, Forrester further states that: “Any 
“objective” model-validation procedure rests eventually at some lower level on a 
judgement or faith that either the procedure or its goals are acceptable without 
objective proof.” Greenberger, Crenson, and Crissey (1976, p70-71) emphasized that: 
“No model has ever been or ever will be thoroughly validated… “Useful”, 
illuminating,” “convincing,” or “inspiring confidence” are more apt descriptors 
applying to models than “valid.” Sterman (2010, p. 846) confirmed this to conclude 
that: “Some modellers have long recognized the impossibility of validation in the sense 
of establishing the truth.” 
 
 
The author therefore does not speak of the “correctness” of the dynamic megaproject 
model (MegaDS) for transportation projects and its sub models in this research but only 
of their validity relative to their purposes in risk descriptions and assessment. This 
validity can be established by extensive scenario trials, but it is only true until evidence 
to the contrary appears.  
 
 
9.2: Model Validation Process 
Figure 9.1 illustrates a simpler form for the model validation process.  The ‘problem 
entity’ is the system (real or proposed – for example for this research, a Dynamic 
Systems Approach to Risk Assessment in Megaprojects is considered as a problem 
entity) to be modelled. The ‘conceptual model’ is the mathematical- verbal 
representation (influence or causal loop diagram) of the problem entity developed for a 
particular study; and the ‘computerised model’ is the conceptual model implemented on 
a computer (dynamic simulation model). The inferences about the problem entity are 
obtained by conducting simulations on the computerised model in the experimentation 
phase.  
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                                           Figure 9.1: Model Validation Process 
 
There are three steps in deciding if a simulation is an accurate representation of the 
actual system considered, namely, verification, validation and credibility (Garzia and 
Garzia 1990 and Law, 2003). Sargent (2003) defines ‘Conceptual model validation’ as 
the process of determining that the theories and assumptions underlying the conceptual 
model are correct and that the model representation of the problem entity is 
“reasonable” for the intended purpose of the model. ‘Computerised model verification’ 
is the process of determining that the model implementation accurately depicts the 
developers’ conceptual description of the model and the solution to the model (AIAA, 
1998). ‘Operational validation’ is defined as determining that the model’s output 
behaviour has adequate exactness for the model’s intended purpose over the domain of 
the model’s intended applicability (Sargent, 2003). Operational validity determines the 
model credibility. ‘Data validity’ ensures that the data necessary for model building, 
model evaluation and conducting the model experiments to solve the problem are 
adequate and correct (Love and Back, 2000). 
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9.3: Methods for Testing and Validating the Integrated System Models 
In order to show that the MegaDS model systems represent the original system well 
enough for the model purpose, validity was demonstrated with respect to a wide variety 
of specific system dynamics tests promoted by Forrester and Senge (1980) which are 
adopted and modified from Sterman (2010, esp. pp. 859-861) to uncover flaws and 
improve the models. Table 9.1 summarises the main tests used to build confidence in 
the models and the question addressed by each test. 
 
 
It is necessary to distinguish three systems (Real, Model and Hypothesized) that are 
mentioned in Table 9.1. The real system includes existing components, interactions, 
causal linkages between these components and the resulting behaviour of the system in 
reality. However, in most cases limited knowledge about the real system is known. The 
model system is the abstract system built by the modeller to simulate the real system, 
which can help megaproject managers, engineers and consultants in decision-making 
processes. The hypothesized system is the counterpart of the real system, which is 
constructed from the dynamic hypotheses models for the purpose of validation. The 
hypothesized system is created by and from the available knowledge of experts and/or 
the experiences of the stakeholders with the real system through the process of 
observation and reasoning.  
 
          Table 9.1: Tests for Building Confidence in the Integrated SDANP Models 
 
Dynamic Model Tests Question Addressed by the Test 
1. Model Structure   
Structure Verification Is the hypothesized model system structure consistent with relevant 
descriptive knowledge of the real system?  
Parameter Verification Are the parameters consistent with relevant descriptive (and 
numerical, when available) knowledge of the system? 
Boundary Adequacy 
(Structure) 
Are the important concepts for addressing the problems endogenous 
to the model? 
Dimensional 
Consistency 
Is each equation dimensionally consistent without the use of 
parameters having no real-world counterpart? 
Extreme Conditions  Does each equation make sense even when its inputs take on extreme 
values? 
            Source: Adopted and modified from Sterman (2010, esp. pp. 859-861) 
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Table 9.1: Tests for Building Confidence in the Integrated SDANP Models (Continued) 
 
Dynamic Model Tests Question Addressed by the Test 
2. Model Behaviour   
Behaviour 
Reproduction  
Does the model endogenously generate the symptoms of the 
problem, behaviour modes, phasing, frequencies, and other 
characteristics of the real system? 
Behaviour Anomaly Does anomalous behaviour arise if an assumption of the model is 
deleted? 
Family Member Can the model reproduce the behaviour of the examples of the 
systems in the same class as the model (e.g., can the environmental 
risks model generate similar behaviour when similar megaprojects 
are executed in similar cities in the UK and Europe)? 
Surprise Behaviour Does the model point to the existence of a previously unrecognised 
mode of behaviour in the real system? 
Extreme Policy Does the model behave properly when subjected to extreme policies 
or test inputs? 
Behavioural Boundary 
Adequacy 
Is the behaviour of the model sensitive to the addition or alteration 
of structure to represent plausible alternative theories? 
Behaviour Sensitivity Is the behaviour of the model sensitivity to plausible variations in 
parameters? 
Statistical Character Does the output of the model system have the same statistical 
character as the “output” of the real system? 
  
3. Policy Implication   
System Improvement Is the performance of the real system improved through the use of 
the model? 
Behaviour Prediction Does the model correctly describe the results of a new policy? 
Boundary Adequacy 
(Policy) 
Are the policy recommendations sensitive to the addition or 
alteration of the structure to represent plausible alternatives 
theories? 
Policy Sensitivity Are the policy recommendations sensitive to plausible variations in 
parameters? 
            Source: Adopted and modified from Sterman (2010, esp. pp. 859-861) 
 
 
 
9.3.1: Importance of the Integrated System Model Objective 
 
The objective of the MegaDS model is to assess the dynamics of risk in transportation 
megaprojects and its impact on project performance with respect to time, cost and 
quality at the construction phase overtime. The risks considered are: Social risks (PR1), 
Technical risks (PR2), Economic risks (PR3), Environmental risks (PR4), and Political 
risks (PR4). 
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9.3.2: Validating the Model Structure 
All the tests listed in Table 9.1 have been applied to evaluate the structural validity of 
the MegaDS sub models:  models constructed to understand the dynamics of STEEP 
risks on transportation megaprojects in the construction phase. These tests by no means 
are exhaustive but constitute the core of tests for the structural validity of the integrated 
SDANP simulation models. The purpose of these models is to describe and assess the 
impact of risks on project objectives of a transportation megaproject in Edinburgh (UK) 
at the construction phase over time (the simulations runs from 2008 to 2015). MegaDS 
is a dynamic general disequilibrium representation of STEEP risks identified in ETNP. 
Although illustration of the applicability of structural validity tests to MegaDS being 
demonstrated in this research is on risks assessment in megaprojects, it can also be 
applicable to any simulation model built to support policy decision making in similar 
complex dynamic systems with uncertain data.  
 
 
9.3.2.1: Tests of Suitability 
 Structure Verification 
The structural verification is of fundamental importance in the overall validation 
process. For the structural verification of STEEP models, two approaches were applied. 
First, available knowledge about the real system (Data from Edinburgh Tram Network 
Project) was utilized during the construction of the model, and second, literature 
regarding risks in transportation megaprojects, as given in Tables 2.4 and 2.6 of chapter 
2. The causal relationships developed in the models, which were based on the available 
knowledge about the real system, provided a sort of ‘empirical’ structural validation. 
Also, literature regarding risks in transportation megaprojects domain served as a 
‘theoretical’ structural validation for this research. 
 
 
 Parameter Verification 
The values assigned to the parameters of STEEP models are sourced from the existing 
knowledge (literature and project documents) and questionnaire survey conducted on 
Edinburgh Tram Network Project.  
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                                          Table 9.2: Parameters in the STEEP Models 
Model 
Name 
 Parameters 
Code  Variable  Description 
(Variable type) 
Assigned 
values (%) 
SoRM PR1 Social risks  Stock 13 
SV1 Social grievances  Stock 06 
SV7 Social Issues Exogenous 04 
TeRM PR2 Technical risks Stock 30 
TV1 Ambiguity of project scope Exogenous 06 
TV5 Cost estimation problems Exogenous 08 
TV6 Unforeseen modification to project Exogenous 06 
TV8 Engineering & design changes Exogenous 03 
TV9 Supply chain breakdown Exogenous 04 
TV12 Inadequate site investigation Exogenous 13 
EcRM PR3 Economic risks  Stock 25 
EV3   Government discontinuity Exogenous 13 
EV7 Material price  Stock 08 
EV8 Economic recession Exogenous 03 
EV10 Catastrophic environmental effects;  Exogenous 13 
EV11 Project technical difficulties  Exogenous 15 
EnRM PR4 Environmental risks  Stock 16 
ENV1 Environmental issues from works   Exogenous 20 
ENV2 Unfavourable climatic conditions   Exogenous 79 
PoRM PR5 Political risks Stock 17 
PV2   Political opposition Exogenous 08 
PV3 Government discontinuity Exogenous 15 
PV9 Protectionism Exogenous 03 
PV10 Delay in obtaining temporary Traffic 
Regulation Orders (TROs) 
Exogenous 06 
Source: Field Survey 2013  
 
Thereafter, data estimation was performed to derive numerical values for each 
parameter using Weighted Quantitative Scores (WQS) and the ANP pairwise 
calculations. The estimated values for the parameters using the WQS and the ANP are 
the Risk Priority Indexes (RPIs). For illustration purposes, Table 9.2 lists the stock and 
exogenous parameters and their RPIs used in constructing the STEEP model.   
 
 
 Boundary Adequacy 
 
The purpose of this test is to determine the important concepts for addressing the 
problems that are endogenous to the MegaDS sub models and to check for significant 
changes when boundary assumptions are relaxed (Sterman 2000). As indicated in 
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Tables 7.2 to 7.6 (chapter no. 7, section 7.1.3.1), the system boundary for risks (STEEP) 
sub models present system elements consistent with the purpose of MegaDS model 
which were developed based on relevant sources such as literature review, interviews, 
expert opinions and questionnaire survey conducted on Edinburgh Tram Network 
Project. 
 
 
As indicated in the integrated stock diagrams (See Figures 8.2, 8.6, 8.9, 8.12 and 8.15 in 
chapter 8), all elements relating to risks of project time overrun, risks of project cost 
overrun and project quality deficiency are represented endogenously. Only elements 
such as social issues for the social risks sub model (Figure 8.2),   Ambiguity of project 
scope, Unforeseen modification to project, Cost estimation problems, Engineering & 
design changes, Supply chain breakdown and Inadequate site investigation for the 
technical risks sub model (Figures 8.6), Government discontinuity, Economic recession, 
Catastrophic environmental effects; and Project technical difficulties for the economic 
risks sub model (Figures 8.9),  Environmental issues from works  and Unfavourable 
climatic conditions  for the environmental risks sub model (Figures 8.31),  and Political 
opposition, Government discontinuity, Protectionism and Delay in obtaining temporary 
Traffic Regulation Orders (TROs) for the political risks sub model (Figures 8.15)  are 
indicated as exogenous system. During simulation, the boundary adequacy was checked 
by modifying the endogenous risk element to exogenous and then to excluded. The 
reason was to observe the dynamic changes of the model outputs over time when the 
system boundary is extended so that policies can be analysed and recommended.  
 
 
 Dimensional Consistency 
 
Mathematical equations involving dimensional quantities are correct only if the 
operations presented on both sides of the equation agree not only in terms of the 
numerical value of the quantities but also in terms of their units of measurement 
(dimensions). In formulating the equations for the STEEP models, the requirements of 
the dimensional consistency were used to: 
i.  Check the validity of the model equations; 
ii. Determine correct conversion factors, and 
iii. Formulate model equations 
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In checking the equations, a built-in function in the Vensim software was used to ensure 
that (1) the mathematical expression used is legitimate, and that (2) units on both sides 
of the equations agree after performing the mathematical operations. Where there was 
no agreement, the two possibilities considered were: (a) the expression may be correct 
except for a conversion variable, or (b) the expression may be completely illegitimate. 
After the dimensional analysis, it was noted that, not only are the values of the elements 
in the models based on the existing knowledge of the real system, but they are also 
dimensionally consistent. 
 
 
 Extreme Conditions 
 
The sub models of the MegaDS model has been tested against extreme values. For 
example, the actual construction period for the case study megaproject is 78 months 
(Between December, 2008 and July, 2014). However, simulation for the models varied 
from 0 to 84 months (Between 2008 and 2015). Beyond 78 months, there was no 
significant change of behaviour. Also, the structures of the models and outputs were 
plausible for extreme and unlikely combinations of levels of variables in the system. In 
the integrated sub models, exogenous variables for each model were set at a high and 
low of +/-50% to test their robustness to extreme conditions. Outputs of individual 
models showed realistic trends and hence indicated no significant change in behaviours 
beyond the normal trend. 
 
 
9.3.3: Validating the Model Behaviour 
9.3.3.1: Behaviour Reproduction Test. 
As stated by Sterman (2010), the purpose of the behaviour reproduction test, are to: 
a. Produce the model behaviour of interest in the system qualitatively and 
quantitatively; 
b. Generate endogenously the symptoms of difficulty motivating the study, and 
c. Generate the various modes of the model behaviour observed in the real system. 
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Figure 9.2 shows the baseline (Current run) output from the system with all variables at 
their baseline levels. Since this research contains a number of these figures, the 
forthcoming discussion will explain the dynamic behaviour of the STEEP risks and how 
they are organized. At the bottom of Figure 9.2, there are a number of system variable 
names: 1) Social risks; 2) Technical risks; 3) Economic risks, 4) Environmental risks 
and 5) Political risks. Each of the traces of these risks on the graph, labelled 1 through 
5, represents each of their respective displayed variables. The scale on the left side of 
the graph (Y-axis) shows the scales for each of the traces. The X-axis presents the time 
scale in years. The time scope for the simulation is between year 2008 and year 2015, so 
the X-axis ends at seven years. In the baseline (Current run) condition shown in Figure 
9.2, the various patterns represent the desired level of impacts these risks have on the 
project performance of the case study megaproject at the construction phase with 
respect to time, cost and quality and are in tune with the real life situations.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Behaviour Reproduction Test for the Level of STEEP Risks Impacts on the 
System (All Variables at Baseline Levels) 
 
 
9.3.3.2: Sensitivity Analysis 
System dynamics models are generally not sensitive to changes in parameters and 
behavioral relationships. Sensitivity analysis is performed to test the robustness of the 
model by ensuring that uncertainties and estimating errors do not significantly affect the 
overall behaviour of the model. Sensitivity analysis is to test the limits of the STEEP 
models and their ability to adjust to changes. According to Sterman (2010), a model is 
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considered robust if its behaviour does not change drastically when a parameter or 
behavioural relationship is altered. In this research, the extensive tests conducted on the 
models revealed that, the models are not sensitive behaviourally. Visual inspection of 
the dynamic graphs showed that the patterns generated were similar to those generated 
by the Current (Actual) runs.  However, the magnitude and value of the system 
variables changed when the values (RPIs) of the parameters were altered. There are 
three types of sensitivity: numerical, behaviour mode, and policy sensitivity. 
 
 
 Numerical Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The numerical sensitivity analysis is carried out by changing the parameters in the 
models such as the initial value of stocks and the value of the exogenous system 
variables. For each parameter, the numerical sensitivity test is conducted by reducing 
and increasing the value of the parameter by twenty-five percent (+/-25%). Parameters 
for stock and exogenous system entities of the STEEP models and their distribution 
functions used in screening the analysis of the entire MegaDS model are given in Table 
9.3. To ascertain the sensitivity of each parameter, the dynamic simulation results of the 
system variables are compared with the base run (Current run) results. Summaries of 
these results are presented in Tables 9.4 to 9.8. 
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                                       Table 9.3: Parameter Distributions of Stock and Exogenous System Entities for STEEP Risks Models 
 
Model 
Name 
Code Parameters Description 
(Variable Type) 
Assigned 
values (%) 
Range  
(-/+25%) 
Distribution 
SoRM PR1 Social risks  Stock 13 [9.7-16.3] Uniform 
SV1 Social grievances  Stock 06 [4.5-7.5] Uniform 
SV7 Social Issues Exogenous 04 [03-05] Uniform 
TeRM PR2 Technical risks Stock 30 [22.5-37.5] Uniform 
TV1 Ambiguity of project scope Exogenous 06 [4.5-7.5] Uniform 
TV5 Cost estimation problems Exogenous 08 [6-10] Uniform 
TV6 Unforeseen modification to project Exogenous 06 [4.5-7.5] Uniform 
TV8 Engineering & design changes Exogenous 03 [2.3-3.8] Uniform 
TV9 Supply chain breakdown Exogenous 04 [03-05] Uniform 
TV12 Inadequate site investigation Exogenous 13 [9.7-16.3] Uniform 
EcRM PR3 Economic risks  Stock 25 [18.8-31.3] Uniform 
EV3   Government discontinuity Exogenous 13 [9.7-16.3] Uniform 
EV7 Material price  Stock 08 [6-10] Uniform 
EV8 Economic recession Exogenous 03 [2.3-3.8] Uniform 
EV10 Catastrophic environmental effects  Exogenous 13 [9.7-16.3] Uniform 
EV11 Project technical difficulties  Exogenous 15 [11.3-18.8] Uniform 
EnRM PR4 Environmental risks  Stock 16 [12-20] Uniform 
ENV1 Environmental issues from works   Exogenous 20 [15-25] Uniform 
ENV2 Unfavourable climatic conditions   Exogenous 79 [59.3-98.8] Uniform 
PoRM PR5 Political risks Stock 17 [12.8-21.3] Uniform 
PV2   Political opposition Exogenous 08 [6-10] Uniform 
PV3 Government discontinuity Exogenous 15 [11.3-18.8] Uniform 
PV9 Protectionism Exogenous 03 [2.3-3.8] Uniform 
PV10 Delay in obtaining temporary Traffic Regulation Orders (TROs) Exogenous 06 [4.5-7.5] Uniform 
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                                                                    Table 9.4: Numerical Sensitivity Test for the Social Risks Parameters 
 
Parameter ANP/SD Simulation Results (%) 
             Inputs 
             Actual  Test 1 (-25%) Test 2 (+25%) 
SG              06 4.5 7.5 
SI             04 03 05 
SR              13  9.7  16.3 
 Sensitivity Simulation Outputs (%) 
 Test Results (Actual) Test 1 Results: (-25%  of Actual Input) Test 2 Results: (+25%  of Actual Input) 
 Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm 
CDR 00 01 00 00 00 54 00 00 00 00 00 218 00 01 00 00 00 125 
DEG 06 20 19 20 02 11 05 17 17 17 02 11 08 22 22 22 02 11 
Disp. 06 20 19 20 02 11 05 17 17 17 02 11 08 22 22 22 02 11 
ErG 00 04 01 00 01 121 00 00 00 00 00 85 00 02 00 00 00 70 
EG 20 67 21 20 06 29 17 67 19 17 07 35 22 67 24 22 06 25 
EPCO 00 13 06 06 04 71 00 02 01 02 01 46 00 09 03 02 02 95 
EPTO 00 03 02 02 01 42 00 01 00 00 00 170 -01 04 01 01 02 119 
LC -02 14 08 08 04 51 -03 06 01 01 02 203 -03 19 06 04 07 121 
MLDMBI 00 04 04 04 01 16 00 03 03 03 00 16 01 05 05 05 01 16 
PMPS 00 04 04 04 01 16 00 03 03 03 00 16 01 05 05 05 01 16 
PQD 00 08 01 00 02 148 00 00 00 00 00 118 00 01 00 00 00 167 
RPCO 00 41 12 07 12 103 00 09 04 03 03 85 00 17 04 02 05 108 
RPTO 00 13 06 06 04 71 00 02 01 02 01 46 00 09 03 02 02 95 
SC -391 262 06 14 81 142 -16 29 03 -12 67 26 -51 302 -05 -13 101 -208 
SG 06 20 19 20 02 11 05 17 17 17 02 11 08 22 22 22 02 11 
SR -31 48 19 20 18 96 -4 18 -09 -11 15 -16 -0.4 63 04 -02 31 697 
SU 00 01 00 00 00 71 00 00 00 00 00 46 00 00 00 00 00 96 
TPAS 06 20 19 20 02 11 05 17 17 17 02 11 08 22 22 22 02 11 
WCP 00 12 06 06 04 70 00 02 01 02 01 45 00 10 03 02 03 99 
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                                                                Table 9.5: Numerical Sensitivity Test for the Technical Risks Parameters 
 
Parameter ANP/SD Simulation Results (%) 
       Inputs 
          Actual  Test 1 (-25%) Test 2 (+25%) 
TR          30 22.5 37.5 
APS          06 4.5 7.5 
CEP           08  06  10 
UMP          06 4.5 7.5 
EDC          03 2.3 3.8 
SCB          04 03 05 
ISI          13 9.7 16.3 
 Sensitivity Simulation Outputs (%) 
 Test Results (Actual) Test 1 Results: (-25%  of Actual Input) Test 2 Results: (+25%  of Actual Input) 
 Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm 
CDUD 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.0002 110.5 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 127.3 0.00 0.55 0.10 0.04 0.14 134.9 
CR 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.06 0.12 110.5 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.027 0.00 33.6 0.61 0.23 0.83 134.9 
ErG 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.06 0.12 110.5 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 102.7 0.00 33.6 0.61 0.23 0.83 134.9 
EPCO 0.00 2.28 0.71 0.50 0.63 89.64 0.00 0.46 0.17 0.13 0.13 79.21 0.00 12.46 29.0 1.57 3.20 110.5 
EPTO 0.08 0.30 0.16 0.14 0.06 37.94 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.01 195.5 0.21 20.9 0.68 0.49 0.49 72.04 
GCP 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 0.00 0.00 9.70 9.70 9.70 9.70 0.00 0.00 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3 0.00 0.00 
MPDS 0.27 0.87 0.49 0.45 0.17 34.47 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.02 17.16 0.68 61.7 2.11 1.57 1.44 68.28 
Proj.C 100.4 172 129.9 126.8 20.7 15.92 75.2 98.34 85.76 85.23 67.7 78.9 125 355.2 202.8 185.7 63.33 31.23 
PQD 0.00 0.71 0.15 0.06 0.20 128.3 0.00 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.04 123.4 0.00 3.96 0.72 0.21 1.01 141.6 
PC 60.2 17.76 10.4 9.62 3.34 32.21 25.4 4.35 3.32 3.26 0.53 15.85 11.8 95.35 33.90 25.82 21.90 64.59 
Rwk 0.00 0.42 0.11 0.06 0.12 110.5 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02 127.3 0.00 .336 0.61 0.23 0.83 134.9 
RPCO 0.00 4.76 1.24 0.69 1.35 108.7 0.00 1.12 0.32 0.20 0.33 12.50 0.00 19.10 4.27 1.97 5.12 120.0 
RPTO 0.00 1.09 0.43 0.38 0.31 71.90 0.00 0.26 0.11 0.11 0.07 65.18 0.00 4.60 1.47 1.10 12.6 85.46 
TC 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.04 56.56 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 28.90 0.08 2.54 0.56 0.29 0.60 108.2 
TDUD 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 0.00 0.00 9.70 9.70 9.70 9.70 0.00 0.00 16.3 16.30 16.30 16.30 0.00 0.00 
TR 30.0 55.69 40.48 39.28 7.41 18.31 22.5 30.80 26.26 26.05 2.43 9.24 37.5 121.2 65.22 58.78 23.07 35.37 
TU 2.11 6.71 3.79 3.49 1.31 34.47 0.90 1.61 1.20 1.18 0.21 17.16 4.14 37.88 12.92 9.61 88.2 68.28 
TDUU 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 110.5 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.73 0.00 0.55 0.10 0.04 0.14 134.9 
WTD 100 171.7 129.6 126.4 20.69 15.97 0.75 98.13 85.55 85.02 6.77 7.91 12.5 354.6 202.2 185.6 63.33 31.32 
CDUD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 167.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 152.1 0.00 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.05 2.031 
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                                                           Table 9.6: Numerical Sensitivity Test for the Economic Risks Parameters 
 
Parameter ANP/SD Simulation Results (%) 
       Inputs 
          Actual  Test 1 (-25%) Test 2 (+25%) 
GD          13 9.7 16.3 
ER          03 06 3.8 
CER          13 9.7 16.3 
PTD          15 11.3 18.8 
EcR          25 18.8 31.3 
MP          08 06 10 
 Sensitivity Simulation Outputs (%) 
 Test Results (Actual) Test 1 Results: (-25%  of Actual Input) Test 2 Results: (+25%  of Actual Input) 
 Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm 
COD 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
CDR 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.00 0.00 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 0.00 0.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 
DOAF 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Disp. 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.00 0.00 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 0.00 0.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 
EC 0.00 9.56 5.13 5.13 3.06 59.58 0.00 4.41 2.71 2.85 1.32 48.82 0.00 18.98 8.60 7.66 6.42 74.71 
EcR  1.72 33.03 21.51 26.07 10.73 49.86 2.73 2.22 15.76 18.85 6.45 40.93 0.53 45.48 26.14 32.33 16.27 62.25 
EU -3.4 7.22 1.82 1.61 4.19 230.7 -2.2 3.03 0.40 0.36 2.11 526.4 -4.4 14.66 4.25 2.01 7.23 169.9 
EP 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ErG 0.00 15.42 4.56 4.18 3.61 79.23 0.00 7.49 3.02 2.98 2.01 66.66 0.00 25.50 5.68 4.98 5.34 94.07 
EPCO 0.02 0.35 0.12 0.08 9.29 80.49 2.85 24.08 9.50 7.45 6.34 66.78 1.73 4.565 12.64 8.82 1.127 89.16 
EPTO 5.01 15.97 8.59 8.67 0.02 28.42 5.15 8.57 6.19 6.19 0.75 12.07 3.57 26.14 11.65 11.82 5.54 47.54 
FE 0.24 1.41 0.8 0.77 0.39 49.42 0.24 1.08 0.63 0.60 0.27 42.96 0.24 1.58 0.95 0.97 0.48 50.80 
GFP 2.21 2.21 2.21 2.21 0.00 0.00 2.76 2.76 2.76 2.76 0.00 0.00 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 
LIR 3.29 33.68 22.46 26.67 10.37 46.17 4.07 22.85 16.64 19.63 6.20 37.28 2.11 46.05 27.09 32.58 15.84 58.49 
MP 8.00 47.13 26.58 25.65 13.14 49.42 8.00 36.15 20.90 20.06 8.98 42.96 8.00 52.68 31.54 32.38 16.03 50.80 
MPH 2.27 8.33 5.54 5.55 1.94 35.03 1.94 5.23 4.01 4.13 0.99 24.59 1.11 11.56 6.29 6.00 3.39 53.97 
PQD 0.00 30.56 8.88 5.71 8.9 100.3 0.00 20.59 6.46 4.42 6.21 96.11 0.00 37.25 10.21 6.65 10.38 101.6 
RPCO 0.00 77.8 22.36 13.91 21.85 97.72 0.00 64.65 20.75 14.67 18.33 88.35 0.00 84.36 22.73 13.11 23.49 103.4 
RPTO 0.00 59.2 30.74 33.99 17.02 55.37 0.00 43.01 21.66 22.55 12.54 57.90 0.00 79.75 43.67 51.82 22.68 51.95 
Tax. 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 
WI 1.01 1.67 1.5 1.57 0.19 12.41 0.83 12.5 1.15 1.23 0.13 11.13 1.19 2.09 1.79 1.79 0.23 12.92 
WCP 15.87 33.47 25.62 26.9 6.29 24.56 0.11 0.224 0.179 0.195 4.04 22.59 18.0 46.17 32.63 33.38 9.92 30.41 
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                                                          Table 9.7: Numerical Sensitivity Test for the Environmental Risks Parameters 
 
Parameter ANP/SD Simulation Results (%) 
       Inputs 
          Actual  Test 1 (-25%) Test 2 (+25%) 
EnvR          16 12 20 
EIFW          20 15 25 
UCC          79 59.3 98.8 
 Sensitivity Simulation Outputs (%) 
 Test Results (Actual) Test 1 Results: (-25%  of Actual Input) Test 2 Results: (+25%  of Actual Input) 
 Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm 
CLA 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
Disp 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
EnC 0.00 5.30 3.70 4.30 1.60 43.3 0.00 2.60 1.80 2.20 0.80 44.5 0.00 10.2 6.70 7.30 3.00 44.4 
EnRC 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 0.00 0.00 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 0.00 0.00 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 0.00 0.00 
EnR  6.60 18.8 14.9 16.4 3.80 25.9 6.00 13.0 10.8 11.8 2.20 20.4 5.70 26.0 18.9 21.2 6.60 34.7 
EnU 1.00 3.00 2.30 2.60 0.60 25.9 0.50 1.20 1.00 1.10 0.2 20.4 1.40 6.40 4.70 5.20 1.60 34.7 
ErG 0.00 4.50 1.70 1.50 1.20 7.42 0.00 1.60 0.70 0.70 0.50 64.3 0.00 16.8 4.00 2.80 4.00 9.86 
EPCO 1.70 13.4 5.20 4.00 3.40 66.1 1.30 6.5 3.00 2.50 1.60 52.0 2.00 30.2 9.20 6.30 7.60 83.0 
EPTO 6.60 8.50 7.90 8.10 0.60 7.40 4.90 5.50 5.30 5.40 0.20 3.60 8.40 13.1 11.4 11.9 1.50 13.5 
LA 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 
MBMDI 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.50 0.00 0.00 4.40 4.40 4.40 4.40 0.00 0.00 6.70 6.70 6.70 6.70 0.00 0.00 
PQD 0.00 11.4 3.40 2.20 3.30 99.5 0.00 5.10 1.60 1.10 1.50 94.9 0.00 26.7 6.80 3.90 7.30 108.1 
RPCO 0.00 35.2 11.4 8.30 9.90 86.5 0.00 20.5 7.40 5.90 5.80 78.6 0.00 61.8 17.7 11.4 17.0 95.8 
RPTO 0.00 55.4 28.7 29.3 16.5 57.6 0.00 37.4 19.0 19.2 11.1 58.1 0.00 80.3 42.7 44.4 24.3 56.9 
SG 26.1 26.1 26.1 26.1 0.00 0.00 26.1 26.1 26.1 26.1 0.00 0.00 26.1 26.1 26.1 26.1 0.00 0.00 
SI 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 0.00 0.00 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 0.00 0.00 29.0 29.0 29.0 29.0 0.00 0.00 
WCP 12.8 18.9 16.3 16.9 2.10 13.1 7.90 13.0 11.3 12.0 1.70 14.8 20.0 27.2 23.3 23.4 2.20 9.30 
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                                                               Table 9.8: Numerical Sensitivity Test for the Political Risks Parameters 
Parameter ANP/SD Simulation Results (%) 
       Inputs 
          Actual  Test 1 (-25%) Test 2 (+25%) 
PR          17 12.8 21.3 
PO          08 06 10 
GD          15 11.3 18.8 
P          03 2.3 3.8 
TRO          06 4.5 7.5 
PS          13 9.7 16.3 
 Sensitivity Simulation Outputs (%) 
 Test Results (Actual) Test 1 Results: (-25%  of Actual Input) Test 2 Results: (+25%  of Actual Input) 
 Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm Min Max Mean Med StDev Norm 
COD 0.80 1.990 1.31 1.26 0.35 26.42 0.45 1.120 0.73 0.71 0.20 26.92 1.27 3.17 2.080 2.010 0.560 26.72 
CDR 4.55 22.67 15.9 17.1 5.94 37.47 2.54 12.70 8.91 9.66 3.33 37.40 7.21 36.02 25.19 2.715 9.470 37.59 
DOC 13.4 33.12 21.8 21.1 5.76 26.42 9.92 24.97 16.3 15.7 4.40 26.92 16.9 42.29 27.73 26.75 7.410 26.72 
Disp 2.28 11.33 7.93 8.56 2.97 37.47 1.27 6.350 4.46 4.83 1.67 37.40 3.60 18.01 12.60 13.57 4.740 37.59 
ErG 0.00 5.070 1.32 0.72 1.42 107.6 0.00 0.860 0.30 0.22 0.26 86.51 0.00 36.08 6.390 2.140 8.870 138.9 
EPCO 0.31 3.780 1.32 0.89 1.07 80.97 0.16 0.950 0.40 0.30 0.25 62.02 0.52 16.07 4.370 2.450 4.400 100.6 
EPTO 0.69 4.990 2.21 1.84 1.30 58.73 0.34 1.440 0.82 0.76 0.36 43.76 1.22 21.17 6.220 3.980 5.370 86.32 
GFP 89.3 220.8 145 140 38.4 26.42 87.8 221.0 145 139 38.9 26.92 90.0 224.9 147.5 142.3 39.41 26.72 
LA 2.28 11.33 7.93 8.56 2.97 37.47 1.27 6.350 4.46 4.83 1.67 37.40 3.60 18.01 12.60 13.57 4.740 37.59 
LRC 13.4 33.12 21.8 21.1 5.76 26.42 9.92 24.97 16.3 15.7 4.40 26.92 16.9 42.29 27.73 26.75 7.410 26.72 
PC 1.37 2.290 1.60 1.51 0.23 14.29 1.08 1.900 1.30 1.21 0.22 17.29 1.68 2.910 1.880 1.790 0.270 14.26 
PDP 0.00 26.57 7.02 3.86 7.62 108.6 0.00 8.210 2.64 1.83 2.50 94.72 0.00 96.92 19.87 7.890 25.40 127.8 
PH 1.70 4.190 2.76 2.67 0.73 26.42 1.29 3.250 2.12 2.05 0.57 26.92 2.15 5.380 3.520 3.400 0.940 26.72 
PI 1.47 3.180 1.84 1.69 0.42 22.90 1.12 2.400 1.41 1.28 0.32 22.70 1.87 5.210 2.440 2.150 0.740 30.33 
PIP -9.16 10.00 1.82 2.55 5.60 307.0 -7.1 7.600 1.34 1.91 4.30 320.8 -12 12.50 2.090 3.030 7.140 342.1 
PR 17.0 42.14 35.2 37.7 7.04 20.01 12.8 31.73 26.4 28.1 5.28 19.97 21.3 52.54 43.95 46.97 8.730 19.87 
PS 13.0 32.16 21.2 20.5 5.60 26.42 9.70 24.41 16.0 15.4 4.30 26.92 16.3 40.74 26.71 25.77 7.140 26.72 
PU -5.97 12.29 3.66 4.06 5.33 145.6 -4.7 9.340 2.75 3.06 4.09 149.1 -6.7 15.41 4.530 4.950 6.660 147.1 
PQD 0.00 8.800 1.95 0.81 2.41 123.4 0.00 2.050 0.54 0.29 0.59 109.9 0.00 40.99 7.24 2.110 10.33 142.7 
PT 0.22 0.480 0.28 0.25 0.06 22.90 0.13 0.270 0.16 0.15 0.04 22.70 0.35 0.980 0.460 0.400 0.140 30.33 
RPCO 0.00 8.950 2.56 1.58 2.50 97.36 0.00 2.720 9.20 0.68 0.76 82.61 0.00 29.12 70.60 3.540 7.910 112.0 
RPTO 0.00 15.11 5.14 3.90 4.33 84.12 0.00 5.640 2.13 1.75 1.65 77.69 0.00 41.68 11.76 7.680 11.29 96.04 
SA 0.39 0.960 0.64 0.61 0.17 26.42 0.22 0.560 0.37 0.35 0.10 26.92 0.62 1.550 1.020 0.980 0.270 26.72 
WCP 17.0 56.65 42.3 45.4 11.7 27.63 12.8 35.33 29.1 32.2 6.67 22.91 21.3 123.9 62.95 60.53 25.78 40.95 
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 Behaviour Mode Sensitivity Analysis 
After the numerical sensitivity, behaviour mode sensitivity analysis was performed to 
check model behaviour and to gain more confidence in the models. Using the changes 
in the parameter (Stock and exogenous system variables) values, the modes of 
individual models were experimented with to see the resulting changes in behaviour 
under different parameter settings. 
 
 
For example, in the social risks model, three parameters and their initial ANP’s Risk 
Priority Indexes (RPIs) were used to explore the sensitivity of the model. The three 
parameters are “Social Issues,” “Social Risks,” and “Social Grievances.” The 
comparative run for the social risks and the social grievances are shown in Figure 9.3. 
Although the three curves do not look exactly the same, changes in the parameters do 
not affect the general mode of behaviour of the system. All three curves for the social 
risks show a small decrease in the stock right after the step increase and then continue to 
behave in similar manner until year 2015. On the other hand, the three behaviour 
patterns for the social grievances show increase in stock and then a slow approach to 
equilibrium. The curves indicate that the faster project managers adopt proactive risk 
mitigation techniques, the faster the stock of social grievances will approach 
equilibrium. 
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  Figure 9.3: Behaviour Mode Sensitivity Graphs for Social Risks and Social Grievances 
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“Technical risks”; “Economic risks”; “Environmental risks” and “Political risks”   are 
other major parameters about whose level of impacts on the performance of Edinburgh 
Tram Network Project are uncertain. Figures 9.4, 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7 show the comparative 
runs of these parameters. 
 
 
                 Figure 9.4: Behaviour Mode Sensitivity Graphs for Technical Risks 
 
 
 Figure 9.5: Behaviour Mode Sensitivity Graphs for Economic Risks 
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           Figure 9.6: Behaviour Mode Sensitivity Graphs for Environmental Risks 
 
 
                 Figure 9.7: Behaviour Mode Sensitivity Graphs for Political Risks 
 
It is noticed again that whereas the behaviour modes of these risks look different from 
one another and from the social risks and social grievances, the general behaviours have 
not changed. Even when each of these risks starts out with a larger or smaller amount of 
parameter values, the behaviours of the stocks of the models will not change greatly.  
As expected, changing the values of parameters in the model produces certain 
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parameter changes result in “greater,” or more significant, changes than others. For 
example, compare Figures 9.6 and 9.7. In Figure 9.6,  the changes in “Environmental 
Issues from Works” and “Unfavourable Climatic Conditions” produce little difference 
in the behaviours, while in Figure 9.7,  the curves show the same behaviours, but at 
different values of the stocks. This measure of more significant changes is studied 
through sensitivity analysis. In all cases, however, it is the structure of the system that 
primarily determines the behaviour mode. In general, but with exceptions, parameter 
values, when altered individually, only have a small influence on behaviour. 
 
 
Now what should be expected if works on ETNP are not completed as per the revised 
completion dates in summer 2014? That means there is a need for simulation to 
continue for another few months or even years. If so then will the uncertainties and risks 
continue to grow larger with time or not within the extended time? The situations 
represented in Figures 8.4, 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7 are not the most likely outcomes.  With a 
limited time available for works, one would expect the STEEP models to exhibit 
various shapes of growth over time.  Monte Carlo simulation helps to generate most 
likely outcomes with dynamic confidence intervals for the trajectories of the variables in 
the STEEP models using the ranges of the probability distributions for the parameters 
represented in Table 9.3. The results of the Monte Carlo simulation are represented in 
Figures 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 9.11, and 9.12. The Figures show the 50%, 75%, 95% and 100% 
levels for Social grievances, Technical risks, Economic risks, Environmental risks and 
Political risks in a sample of 500 simulations. 
 
 
Figure 9.8 shows the sensitivity analysis of the social grievances. There are 0.06 (6%) 
of initial grievances level at the time of simulation, and the base case simulation (Actual 
run) shows the grievance level growing to around 19% after two years. The confidence 
bounds show the same general pattern as in the actual base run.  There is a narrow band 
of uncertainty in the first quarter of year 2008 when the project commenced but the 
width of the interval grows in an equilibrium form over time. By the year 2010, the 95% 
confidence bounds suggest that the level of social grievances as a result of the 
construction activities range from a low of 18% to as high as 22%. The eventual 
equilibrium is found when the positive and negative loops come into balance. 
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      Figure 9.8: Dynamic Confidence Bounds Sensitivity Graph for Social Grievances 
 
 
       Figure 9.9: Dynamic Confidence Bounds Sensitivity Graph for Technical Risks 
 
Similarly, in Figure 9.9, the analysis reveals that the width of the simulation intervals 
continue to grow larger over time. Narrow range of the technical risks in the early years 
of project development is typical to systems that are dominated by negative feedback 
loops. Differences in the input parameters are eventually overridden by the actions of 
the negative feedback loops and hence the technical uncertainties may shrink over time. 
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      Figure 9.10: Dynamic Confidence Bounds Sensitivity Graph for Economic Risks 
 
 
 
  Figure 9.11: Dynamic Confidence Bounds Sensitivity Graph for Environmental Risks 
 
In the case of Figure 9.10, the narrowing in the range of economic risks between year 
2008 and year 2010 seems similar to that of the technical risks but much more 
dominated by negative feedback loops in the systems. By the first quarter in year 2010, 
the width of the interval started to grow larger. However, the graph declines steadily 
over time. A similar result is seen in Figure 9.11. 
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        Figure 9.12: Dynamic Confidence Bounds Sensitivity Graph for Political Risks 
 
Finally, Figure 9.12 shows a sensitivity analysis for the political risks model. The 
analysis reveals that the width of the simulation interval continues to grow larger over 
time.  Until the 7
th
 year (2015) of the simulation, there is a 50% chance that the level of 
political risks will be between 15% and 55%. By the same year, the 75% and the 95% 
confidence bounds suggest that the level of political risks could range from 10% to 65% 
and 5% to 80% respectively. 
 
 
9.3.3.3: Other Tests 
The remainder of the tests under the model behaviour test namely: Behaviour Anomaly; 
Family Member; Surprise Behaviour; Extreme Policy; Behavioural Boundary Adequacy 
and Statistical Character are all interrelated, so the MegaDS sub models were tested 
concurrently with their respective questions indicated in Table 9.1 in mind. The main 
goal for these tests is to determine if the model responds as expected under abnormal 
conditions and if the model responds (or does not respond) when system variables of 
each sub model are changed from their baseline values. Therefore, tests for effects from 
extreme policies were performed on each model. During these tests, the integration 
system variables were the sole focus, since this is the focus of the research. Comparative 
traces of baseline, minimum, and maximum values on each associated graph were also 
performed. Vensim software allows the modeller to simulate the same variable multiple 
times under differing conditions for each simulation run to allow comparison. Testing 
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consisted of multiple simulation runs (and, as a result, multiple traces) of the same 
variable and graphed under different model conditions. Hence, each of the simulation 
runs and traces were represented by different behaviour based on the extreme points for 
the system variables being studied. In these cases, the variable scale was the same 
throughout each figure. 
 
 
9.4: Data Validity  
This section discusses data validity, even though it is often not considered to be part of 
model validation, because it is usually difficult, time consuming, and costly to obtain 
appropriate, accurate, and sufficient data, and is often the reason that attempts to 
validate a model fails. Data is needed for three purposes: for building the conceptual 
model, for validating the model, and for performing experiments with the validated 
model. In validating the STEEP models, two purposes are of concern. One is to build 
conceptual models that have sufficient data on the problem entity to develop the 
integrated models, to develop mathematical and logical relationships for use in the 
models such that they will adequately represent the problem entity for intended purpose, 
and the other is to test the model’s underlying assumptions. In addition, behavioural 
data are needed on the problem entity to be used in the operational validity step of 
comparing the problem entity’s behaviour with the model’s behaviour.  
 
 
With the system classification and explanation in Table 9.1, two tests (empirical and 
rational) can be said to be carried out with and without field data. Empirical tests are 
those tests that are based on the direct comparison between the model outcomes and 
field data. Empirical tests are conducted to examine the ability of a model to match the 
historical data (hind casting), the future data (forecasting), and other qualitative 
behaviours of the real system. In case no data is available, the hypothesized system and 
the model system are used to conduct a series of rational tests, such as: parameter-
verification, structure-verification, and extreme policy tests listed in Table 9.1. These 
tests are referred to as rational tests, since they can be carried out, based on the 
availability of expert knowledge and through reasoning processes. Rational tests are 
increasingly important for the situation where the real data of the complex system are 
lacking and subject to considerable uncertainty. 
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                    Table 9.9: Data Validity on Edinburgh Tram Network Project 
Original Project Information (OPI) 
Cost (£ Million) Planned Project Budget (PPB)  545 
 Revised Project Budget (RPB)  776 
 Project Cost Variation (PCV)  231 
Year of 
Completion 
Original Planned Date (OPD)  2011 (3 Years) 
 Expected New Date (END)  2014 (6 Years) 
 Completion Date  Variation (CDV)  3 Years 
ANP/SD Simulation Project Information (SPI) Validated Project Information 
Risks Level of Risk Impact on Project 
Performance –LRIPP (%) 
(OPI X SPI) 
 Cost 
 (C) 
Time 
(T)  
Quality 
(Q) 
Total 
Impact 
Cost (£ million) Time (year) 
 (SPIC) (SPIT) (SPIQ)  {(SPIC) x (PPB)} {(SPIT) x (OPD)} 
Social 12 6 1 19 65.4 0.18 
Technical 1.24 0.43 0.15 1.82 6.758 0.013 
Economic 22.36 30.74 8.88 61.98 121.862 0.922 
Environmental 11.43 29.3 3.35 44.08 62.294 0.879 
Political 2.56 5.14 1.95 9.65 13.952 0.154 
Total Impact 49.59 71.61 15.33 136.53 270.266 2.148 
Source: Field Work 2013 
 
For practical reasons, the empirical tests are conducted to examine the ability of the 
STEEP models to match the historical data of the Edinburgh Tram Network Project 
(ETNP). The results of the real system compared to the simulated results of the level of 
risks impact on project cost and time are indicated on Table 9.9. As Table 9.9 indicates, 
the total level of risks impact of ETNP which led to cost overrun, time overruns and 
project quality deficiency is 136.53%. Out of this, the total level of impact of risks on 
cost, time and quality is 49.53%, 71.61% and 15.33% respectively. Before simulation 
was performed, the planned budget for the project was £545 million for a 3-year project 
completion times but was later revised to £776 million (a variation of £231 million) for 
a 6-year project completion time. After simulation, it is revealed that project 
information on cost is about £270.266 million of overrun within a 2.148- year of 
additional project completion time compared to that of the original project cost variation 
of £231 million for a 3-year completion time. 
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Similarly, the simulation results show that the project quality of ETNP has been 
impacted by 15.33%. However, there was no available historical data on the original 
level of project quality deficiency to be validated. As a result, the hypothesized system 
made up by expert’s knowledge was used to compare the real system as the case of data 
validation with the model system and for performing experiments so that a better 
presentation of the real system and a higher degree of confidence can be obtained. 
Examples of expert knowledge calibration techniques used are meetings with academic 
staff, some members of E-COST and industrial stakeholders and the Analytical 
Network Process (ANP).  
 
 
9.5: Policy Analysis, Design and Improvement 
Once the model is fully tested and its properties understood, the final step is to test 
alternative new policies for system improvement. The system improvement tests ask 
whether the modelling process helps to change the system for better. To pass the test, 
the modelling process must identify policies that lead to improvement; those policies 
must be implemented for improved performance of the system. A policy is a decision 
rule, a general way of making decisions. In practice, assessing the impact of a model is 
extremely difficult. It is hard to assess the extent to which the modelling process will 
change people’s mental models and beliefs. It is rare for clients to adopt the 
recommendations of any model promptly or without modification.  
 
 
In this last step, alternative policies are designed and tested by simulation runs to 
minimize risks at the construction phase of transportation megaprojects. It must be 
noted that many other variables and conditions may change at the same time the new 
policies are implemented, confounding attempts to attribute any results to the policies. 
Performance improvement following a study does not mean the model-based policies 
were responsible; the system may have improved for reasons unrelated to the modelling 
process. Likewise, deteriorating performance after policy implementation does not 
mean the models failed since the outcome could have been even worse without the new 
policies. 
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To improve the system, the policy analysis and design are performed by altering one or 
more characteristics of the STEEP models and examining the resulting behaviours. Like 
sensitivity analysis, policy analysis can also be numerical or pattern oriented. Pattern-
oriented policy analysis is naturally much more important, since the purpose of system 
dynamics studies is to improve undesirable dynamic behaviour patterns. Policy design 
is determining what changes in the model structure and parameters would lead to 
improved model behaviour. While choosing the policies, practicality and usefulness 
have been checked with the experts and industrial stakeholders working on mega 
transportation projects. 
 
 
With regard to the MegaDS models, it is argued here that four central characteristics 
make STEEP models well-suited for learning about and designing effective policies: 1) 
the feedback approach and emphasis on endogenous explanations of behaviour, 2) the 
disaggregation approach, 3) the simulation approach, and 4) the fact that the models are 
manageable enough such that their structures are clear and the links between structure 
and behaviour can be easily discovered through experimentation. Each of these four 
characteristics is explored in turn. 
 
 
9.5.1: Feedback Approach 
First, the STEEP models share feedback loop approaches to modelling endogenous 
sources of behaviour. The models illustrate how megaprojects under construction can be 
affected by risks and can endogenously create the conditions for time and cost overruns 
and quality deficiency once social, technical, economic, environmental and political 
uncertainties become high, causing excessive impact on project performance.  By 
emphasizing feedback and an endogenous perspective, these system models will help 
policymakers understand how policy resistance can arise. The models challenge 
common beliefs about how systems work by revealing feedback loops that can 
exacerbate the situation, thereby facilitating learning for even the most overconfident 
users. 
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9.5.2: Disaggregation approach 
Second, the MegaDS model takes a disaggregation approach to modelling. This implies 
that the STEEP system models are heterogeneous and do not track each individual 
model in the group, but instead are grouped in disaggregation. In keeping with the 
system dynamics modelling tradition, the building blocks of the model structure are 
stocks and flows rather than individual agents. However, these models are statistically 
estimated from data based on individual STEEP risk characteristics and level of impacts 
on a transportation megaproject. As such, a more efficient analysis, involving a better 
set of explanatory variables, can be carried out directly using disaggregated (i.e. 
individual risk level) data and model relationships. These reasons led to the 
development of the disaggregated models into five STEEP risk system models. The 
MegaDS model has five stocks each for the social, technical, economic and political sub 
models and four stocks for the environmental sub models (See Figure 9.13). All the 
models have common detailed implications of time and cost overruns and quality 
deficiency that arise from the interrelationship of variables within each sub system. 
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Figure 9.13: Disaggregation of the Dynamic Simulation Models for Transportation Megaprojects (See the attached sheet for clarity) 
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While there is much interest among modellers in an aggregated approach to the 
modelling of social problems, Rahmandad and Sterman (2008) argued that differential 
equation-based models – of which the models here are examples – are easier to 
understand and usually have similar policy implications when disaggregated. In 
addition, disaggregation reduces the models into manageable sizes, thereby decreasing 
the cost of developing and running complex models and allowing for easy but clear 
experimentation. Given limitations in individuals’ cognitive capacity, disaggregation 
also allows users to focus on feedback ahead of agent level detail and therefore develop 
a more holistic and endogenous perspective to the problem.  
 
 
Further, recent research has shown that individuals often fail to understand the 
dynamics of accumulation (Sterman, 2008), with huge implications for the policies that 
they will then support. By focusing on stocks and flows as the building blocks of model 
structure, the STEEP models can directly help policymakers build intuition regarding 
the dynamics of accumulation and thereby overcome one potential source of policy 
error. 
 
 
9.5.3: Simulation Approach 
Third, the reviewed models are running mathematical simulations that provide the 
opportunity to conduct experiments. While many lessons can be learned from a causal 
loop diagram, other more substantial insights require the development and testing of a 
simulation model. In both cases, simulation helps to illustrate why deliberate rational 
policies lead to policy resistance. In addition, the simulation models provide learning 
environments where modellers, policymakers, and other industrial stakeholders can 
design and test policies. Given the complexity of many policy environments, 
experimentation is essential for the design of effective policies. Simulations provide a 
helpful environment where policymakers can experiment and learn about the effects of 
different policies without any significant social and economic cost for policymakers. 
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Finally, simulations can help to build consensus surrounding difficult policy problems. 
By communicating the counter-intuitive nature of policy problems to policymakers, 
simulations can encourage dialogue and lead to the development of shared 
interpretations regarding the source of problem behaviour. Even when different goals 
and value systems persist, simulation can help to focus the discussion on specific 
variables and outcomes that are the sources of divergence. 
 
 
9.5.4: Manageable Model Size 
Finally, the STEEP models are “manageable.” Here, we define “manageable” to mean 
that the models consist of few significant stocks and feedback loops. There are two 
main benefits to these types of model sizes. First, they are small in size and allow for 
exhaustive experimentation through parameter changes. With these types of models, it 
is much easier to learn from sensitivity analysis (as shown in Figures 9.8, 9.9, 9.10, 
9.11, and 9.12) and examine the interactions among different parameters. Thus, 
important leverage points in the system can more be easily identified. 
 
 
Second, the manageable size ensures that the results of experiments can be fully and 
easily understood by policymakers. Short exposition makes a holistic view possible. 
Due to the small size, individuals can see the feedback structure as a whole and not be 
frustrated by the need to track many variables and links at once. In addition, short 
exposition facilitates presentation of lessons to others, and helps bring the dynamic 
lessons to the meetings of stakeholders. Our emphasis on small models reflects that of 
Repenning (2003), who argues that in an academic context as well, small models are 
necessary to build the intuition of readers who are not accustomed to a dynamic or 
holistic view of systems. 
 
 
In conclusion, manageable but small system dynamics models offer numerous benefits 
to the policy making process during megaproject development. Table 9.10 summarizes 
the above discussion by depicting how each of the characteristics of the MegaDS 
models can help address the challenges inherent in policy making during megaproject 
development. 
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           Table 9.10: The Significance of the Dynamics Simulation Models for Transportation Megaprojects in Addressing Policy Problems 
Policy problems 
characteristics 
Model Characteristics  
Feedback Approach Disaggregated approach Simulation Approach Manageable Model Size 
The policy resistance 
environment 
Feedback is the major 
source of policy resistance. 
Accumulations (stocks) are 
essential to understanding 
policy resistance 
Simulation can illustrate why 
some intuitive policies lead to 
policy resistance and allow for the 
design and testing of more robust 
policies 
Small size allows for exhaustive 
experimentation and sensitivity 
analysis, wise interpretation of 
parameters and parameter 
changes. 
Need to experiment 
and cost of 
experimenting 
Feedback diagrams and 
mental simulation models 
must substitute actual 
policy trials. 
Disaggregate approach 
decreases the cost of 
developing and running 
complex models, allowing for 
more experimentation.  
Simulations allow for exhaustive 
experimentation and games for 
policymakers without incurring 
actual social and economic costs 
Small size ensures that the results 
of experiments can be fully and 
easily understood by 
policymakers. 
Need to persuade 
stakeholders 
Feedback diagrams and 
qualitative analysis can 
contribute to policy 
discussions. 
Disaggregate approach 
facilitates presentation of 
lessons to others. Highlights 
feedback and endogenous 
sources of problem behaviour. 
Simulations can help build 
consensus around difficult policy 
problems that may otherwise have 
multiple interpretations. 
Small size facilitates presentation 
of lessons to others. Short 
exposition and holistic view 
made possible. 
Overconfident 
policymakers 
Causal loop (feedback) 
diagrams reveal new 
insights and challenge 
policymakers to be wary of 
overconfidence 
Failure to understand the 
dynamics of accumulation is a 
common source of policy error. 
Simulations effectively 
communicate the counter intuitive 
nature of policy problems to 
policymakers who otherwise may 
remain not having been induced. 
Small size ensures that model 
insights are fully understood, 
allowing policymakers to 
appreciate and address their own 
overconfidence. 
Need to have an 
endogenous 
perspective 
Feedback approach helps 
policymakers learn what an 
endogenous view is and 
why it is necessary to 
effective policymaking. 
Disaggregate approach creates 
room and flexibility in 
individuals’ cognitive capacity 
to concentrate on feedback and 
develop an endogenous 
perspective. 
Simulations allow policymakers 
to explore how behaviours are 
created endogenously through a 
broad model boundary. 
Small size allows individuals to 
see the feedback structure as a 
whole and not be frustrated by 
the need to track many variables 
and links at once. 
Note: Project Policy refers to principles, rules, and guidelines formulated or adopted by an organization to reach its long-term goals and typically published in a booklet or other form that is 
widely accessible.
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9.6: Policy Implementation 
Having studied the influences of critical system variables on project performance for 
various simulation scenarios overtime, the megaproject managers can now implement 
appropriate policies that best suit the situation at hand to assess risks effectively. For 
best and worst case simulation scenarios that can inform project managers to design 
effective risk mitigation policies, the behaviour mode sensitivity graphs represented in 
Figures 9.3 to 9.7 for Edinburgh Tram Network Project are typical examples.  
 
 
Other recommendations to contractors involved in megaproject construction for policy 
implementation are: 
 
1. Megaproject contractors must obtain assurances from the relevant government 
departments in the host country, especially as regards the availability of consents 
and permits; 
 
2. The Central Bank of the host government may be persuaded to guarantee the 
availability of hard currency for export in connection with the project; and/or 
 
3.  As a last resort, but an exercise which should be undertaken in any event, by a 
thorough review of the legal and regulatory regime in the country where the project 
is to be executed to ensure that all laws and regulations are strictly complied with 
and all the correct procedures are followed with a view to reducing the scope for 
challenges at a future date. 
 
 
9.7: Summary 
This penultimate chapter has addressed the validation of the model developed in this 
research.  Unfortunately, there is no set of specific tests that can easily be applied to 
determine the “correctness” of the MegaDS models. Furthermore, no algorithm exists to 
determine what techniques or procedures to use because every new simulation project 
presents a new and unique challenge.  
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In this study, two major groups of tests (empirical and rational) were carried out and 
described with and without field data. The empirical tests were conducted to examine 
the ability of the STEEP models to match the historical data of the Edinburgh Tram 
Network Project (ETNP). The findings of these tests from the simulated results on the 
level of risks impact on project cost and time and quality compared to the real system 
suggest that the models reflect reasonable predictive fit and could therefore be 
generalised. 
 
 
On the other hand, the hypothesized system and the model system are used to conduct a 
series of rational tests, such as: parameter-verification, structure-verification, extreme 
policy tests and sensitivity tests. Throughout this process, the concepts, methodology 
and the findings of the research have been found to be reasonably supported by the 
extensive use of the Vensim software tools in support of the study. It is therefore 
contended that the developed model has the potential for subsequent development and 
use by practitioners. 
 
 
Finally, it can be said that validation is both an art and a science, requiring creativity 
and insight. But validation is difficult to comprehend and has diverse procedures, and is 
unavoidable as it is the evidence for the steadfastness and legitimacy of the model. This 
chapter has provided an insight on the widely approved schemes of model validation 
and techniques in practice. The validation schemes can be applicable to quantitative 
(mathematical/ computerised) as well as qualitative (conceptual) models. But reliability 
of the model can only be ascertained as the model passes more and more tests. Also, the 
decision of accepting a model as valid cannot be left to the modeller alone, and 
inclusion of the industrial practitioners involved in megaprojects development in the 
validation procedure should be obligatory. Researchers and practitioners may find this 
chapter quite useful as the procedures for validation discussed are quite generic, and 
hence may be applied to other dynamic models as well. The next chapter therefore 
concludes the research by providing a summary of the work done, drawing the main 
conclusions arising from the study and making recommendations for future research.  
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   CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1: Introduction 
Against the background that owners and developers need to be proactive in employing 
effective measures for managing ever increasing challenges in megaproject during 
construction, this research has developed a model for assessing generic risks that  
impact on project performance leading to project cost and time overruns and quality 
deficiency. The eight chapters presented so far have elucidated the literary, conceptual, 
methodological and substantive approaches adopted in addressing the research agenda. 
 
 
In this chapter, the research is brought to a close by summarising the issues addressed 
throughout the study. Readers are first reminded of the key research questions. 
Thereafter, a summary of how the key objectives were satisfied are presented, followed 
by the main conclusions of the research. Finally, the thesis is brought to a close with 
recommendations for future research.  
 
 
10.2: Research Questions 
In undertaking this research, four main questions were posed, namely: 
1. What are the generic risk events inherent in transportation megaprojects during 
construction? 
2. How can the qualitative risk effects on project performance be quantified, prioritized 
and analyzed in transportation megaprojects? 
3. How can risk interrelationships in transportation megaprojects be modelled? 
4. How can project managers (PMs) assess the dynamics of risk effects in 
transportation megaprojects over time? 
 
 
To address the above research questions, the study performed a literature review, 
conducted a survey and interviews to investigate the generic risks that influence project 
performance. This was followed by risk prioritization and causal loop diagrams 
development to indicate the interdependencies and interactions of identified risk events. 
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Finally, simulations were conducted by integrating the Analytical Network Process 
(ANP) and the System Dynamics (SD) methodology to model the dynamics of risk 
impact on megaproject performance in the construction phase. 
 
 
                  Table 10.1: Research Findings/Answers to the Research Questions 
Research Questions Findings/Answers Reliability and Validity 
1. What are the generic risk 
events inherent in 
transportation megaprojects 
during construction? 
43 generic risk factors 
(See Table 5.6) 
- Cross-checking the multiple 
sources of evidence. 
- Well defined risk factors. 
- Well documented data 
2. How can the qualitative risk 
effects on project 
performance be quantified, 
prioritized and analysed in 
transportation megaprojects? 
- Qualitative and 
quantitative Risk 
ranking methods  
- ANP Pairwise 
Comparison for all risks 
- Seven ANP Network 
Models  
- Well defined questionnaire 
and risk effect rating scales. 
- Well documented data 
3. How can risk 
interrelationships in 
transportation megaprojects 
be modelled? 
- Five SD causal loop 
diagrams 
- Five SDANP integrated 
stock and flow diagrams 
- Cross-checking the multiple 
sources of evidence. 
- Boundary adequacy test and 
model structure assessment. 
- Well documented data 
4. How can project managers 
(PMs) assess the dynamics 
of risk effects in 
transportation megaprojects 
overtime? 
- Fifteen  integrated 
SDANP dynamic 
simulated diagrams 
 
- Behaviour Reproduction Test 
- Monte-Carlo simulation. 
- Sensitivity Analysis. 
- Extreme Conditions tests, etc. 
- Cross-checking the multiple 
sources of evidence 
 Source: Fieldwork 2013 
 
 
In all, 43 generic risk variables were drawn from current empirical studies and official 
publications, which included journal articles, conference papers, research reports, 
textbooks, commercial or organizational documents, governments practice guidance, 
records, reports, and the like. The 43 generic risks were collected and identified through 
cross-checking the multiple sources of evidence, and were well defined and documented 
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to ensure reliability and applicability to most of the transportation megaprojects. Table 
10.1 illustrates the research questions, research answers/findings with related reliability, 
and validity processing to ensure research answers/findings is reliable and accurate to 
all of the research questions. 
 
 
10.3: Review of Research Objectives 
The main aim of this research, as noted earlier, was to apply and further develop the 
theory of risk informatics for megaprojects development for informed decision making 
under risk related scenarios. Subsequently a number of secondary objectives were 
developed in order to collectively satisfy this aim. Here, the research objectives are 
revisited to highlight the extent to which they were accomplished through the various 
phases of the research. 
 
 
 Objective One: To identify and describe the significant risks of partial or entire set 
of social, technical, economic, environmental and political (STEEP) problems for 
megaprojects development and construction.  
 
To address this objective, some important issues regarding significant STEEP risks 
which impact the performance of megaprojects in the construction phase were identified 
from the broader literature including recent contributions in construction management 
publications. The risk identification process began with the compilation of the risk 
events in transportation megaprojects. The identification process was dependent on the 
construction phase of the lifecycle of megaproject development, but began mostly with 
an examination of issues and concerns created in the early stages of the project 
development. These issues and concerns were derived from an examination of the 
project description, work breakdown structure, cost estimate, design and construction 
schedule, procurement plan, and the general risk checklists. Tables 2.4 and 2.6 (Chapter 
2, p 29 and pp 44-48) and Table 4.4 (Chapter 4, pp 130-131) provide a summary of lists 
of risks identified in literature and case studies respectively.  
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The identified risks were examined and reduced to a level of detail that permits 
understanding of the impacts they have on project performance. This served as a 
practical way of addressing the large and diverse number of potential risks that often 
occur on megaproject construction projects. The selected risks are chosen as those 
events that are deemed to have adverse effect on megaproject development. After the 
risks are identified, they were described and classified into groups of like risks. 
Classification of the risks helps reduce redundancy and provides for easier management 
of the risks in later phases of the risk analysis process in the study. Classifying risks also 
provided for the creation of risk checklists and databases for future megaprojects and 
further scientific research. In the end, 43 risk variables were identified (See Table 5.6 of 
Chapter 5, pp 142-143) as the highest level of generic risks impacting on megaproject at 
the construction phase. 
  
 
Based on these variables, a research instrument in the form of a self-administered postal 
questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire was piloted in Edinburgh (Scotland) by 
drawing on the expertise of experienced industrial and academic stakeholders involved 
in megaproject development. Suggestions made by the respondents were incorporated to 
improve the quality and suitability of the research instrument. The literature review was 
therefore helpful in underpinning the research agenda and provided reasonable 
justification for the need of the research. 
 
 
 Objective Two: To simulate and analyse the interactions among the risks 
 
In fulfilling this objective, a multi-criteria decision making tool, the Analytical Network 
Process (ANP) and the System Dynamics (SD) were employed to prioritise, simulate 
and analyse the interactions among all risks as designated in chapters six and seven 
respectively. 
 
 
Recognising which risk will have the greatest effect on project performance is a difficult 
task. Additionally, managing risks which are currently presenting problems in a 
coordinated and joined up manner requires an informed policy response which proceeds 
328 
 
in a transparent manner open to project management team scrutiny. Therefore, to 
address the second objective of this research, provision of a system(s) to meet such 
requirements is needed.  
 
First, experts’ decisions were solicited through a risk prioritization survey to select the 
potential “high risks” using a Likert scale type of 1 to 5 to score the level of STEEP 
risks impact on megaproject objectives (cost, time and quality) in the construction 
phase. The prioritization survey revealed some interesting results in the way 
respondents perceive the level of impacts that the 43 identified risk variables have on 
megaproject performances. It was noted that the results revealed could assist both 
project owners and developers to come to agreement on how to appropriately channel 
resources towards achieving project success in megaproject construction. 
 
 
Thereafter, it was necessary to convert the 43 dependent risk variables to a single 
dependent variable. This was achieved using a weighted quantitative score (WQS) 
analysis as explained in section 3.4.4.1 of chapter three. The WQS analysis was useful 
in establishing which of the variables could be measuring the same underlying effect. 
Above all, the findings obtained emerged to be reasonably convincing and supported by 
the extant literature.  
 
 
Second, risk prioritization was performed. Prioritization is one process that can allow 
megaproject owners and contractors to make decisions in a transparent and traceable 
manner within a risk assessment framework. This assessment method is a key to 
understanding the relative level of impact of risk associated with the project. The 
prioritisation risk assessment was carried out for 43 risks recorded during literature 
search and interviews conducted with stakeholders involved in the Edinburgh Tram 
Network Project. The Analytical Network Process (ANP) was chosen as against other 
alternative methods such as discriminant analysis and artificial neural network because 
of its explanatory characteristics, which is a most desired function of this research. The 
ANP technique included ANP network model construction; paired comparisons; criteria 
normalization through super matrix calculation; and risk priority index (RPI) 
calculation.  
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As a multi-criterion decision making (MCDM) tool, the Analytical Network Process 
(ANP) was used to aid the prioritisation of STEEP risk impacts on project performance 
and was successful. This risk assessment process developed by Professor Saaty (Saaty, 
1991) allows for risk impact ranking and categorisation into very high, high, medium or 
moderate, low and very low impact categories. The categorisation provided a basis on 
which policy decision makers can focus their attention. 
 
 
One key lesson is that risk issues will continue to emerge as the project proceeds and so 
experts involved in megaproject management will continue to identify new risks that are 
not currently listed in this research as their invasion may begin to exhibit new 
challenges suggesting an unforeseen potential. The ANP prioritization process 
therefore, allows for this in that it is easily updated as and when new risk information 
becomes available. However, this process stands and falls on the availability of relevant 
data on risks impact and experts willingness to engage the application of the ANP’s risk 
prioritization process. 
 
 
Lastly, the System Dynamics (SD) modelling approach was adopted to indicate and 
address interactions among all risks and their level of impact on the case study project 
during construction over time. The causal loop diagrams for the Edinburgh Tram 
Network Project system is presented in Figures 7.5, 7.9, 7.11, 7.14 and 7.17.  These 
diagrams show all system entities (stocks, variables, parameters and flows), together 
with their respective interconnections and interactions, in a qualitative way. This 
diagram has been drawn using the Vensim software tool. 
 
 
To conceptualize the real world system under investigation, SD was used to focus on 
the structure and behaviour of risks in Edinburgh Tram Network Project over time using 
multiple feedbacks (closed chains of cause and effect links, in which information about 
the results of actions is fed back to generate further action).  Being an object-oriented 
simulation approach, SD was used to simulate the complex interrelated structure of 
social, technical, economic, environmental and political risk parameters resulting from 
the feedback processes. 
330 
 
The research process employed in the establishment of the SD based risk assessment 
model includes 1) problem analysis and identification, 2) conceptualization of system 
variable relationship using causal loop diagrams, 3) formulation of stock and flow 
model, and 4) model verification via Vensim software tools and case study. Finally, the 
levels and extents to which individual STEEP risks affect the objectives of the Case 
Study megaproject during construction were checked using one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). 
 
 Objective Three: To assess major options against the risks 
One of the necessary conditions for the new risk assessment framework is that its 
application could be integrated with the traditional models, within the framework of the 
British Standard for risk management and other recognized risk management activities 
(See Figure 9.1) based on the Work Breakdown Structures (WBS).   
 
 
In the case of using traditional methods, the decision-makers have to convene a 
panel/board discussion of the risks and their level of consequences by using individual 
participants’ experience to identify or classify predictable risk events. Following current 
risk assessment practice, it is most likely that a risk assessment matrix (RAM) will be 
created. Although the RAM method is generally accepted by many decision-makers to 
assess the likelihood and the consequence of risks, its assessment method is, however, 
not based on either non-linear mathematical calculation or objective assumptions related 
to a real system. Also, it does not allow for comparisons amongst criteria. Therefore, the 
results produced by the matrix can be said to be subjective and do not provide detailed 
data required to assist decision makers to structure their decision- making processes 
effectively.  
 
 
Since the risk factors are numerous and complicated, particularly in megaprojects 
development, human judgement is limited for assessing many of such complex risk 
factors at the same time. As a result, the Analytical Network Process (ANP) was chosen 
as a major risk prioritisation option against the RAM and other alternative methods such 
as discriminant analysis and artificial neural network because of its explanatory 
characteristics, which was a most desired function in this research. 
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Similarly, the system dynamics approach was also chosen over the conventional 
approach in aiding the risk assessment process.  Unlike the conventional approach 
(PERT/CPM), where planners use human judgement to interpret their own mental 
models, the SD approach uses computer models to overcome limitations of the mental 
models (Sterman, 1992). Sterman established that the SD computer models are explicit 
and open to all to review; capable to compute the logical consequences of the 
modeller’s assumptions; able to interrelate many factors simultaneously and finally, can 
be simulated under controlled conditions for analysts to conduct experiments outside the 
real system. As a proven tool and technique, the new methodology could be applied 
with success to various real megaproject cases to provide added value to risk 
management processes, in particular to risk identification, risk quantification and to 
response planning and control. 
 
 
 Objective Four: To develop a new megaproject dynamics methodology and tool for 
risk assessment in line with British and ISO standards on risk management. 
To explore the extent to which scientists can frame their ideas and research so that 
politicians, business-leaders and the general public can begin to understand the complex 
systems with which they interact and subsequently make transparent and scientifically 
based decisions about these systems, a new megaproject dynamics methodology and 
tool for risk assessment was developed in this research in line with the British and the 
ISO standards on risk management. The new risk assessment methodology provides a 
tool to understand, explain and address key challenges and problems that megaproject 
developers face during project execution and can provide a unique method of 
communicating project risk information rather than the usual language and concepts of 
the traditional risk management tools. 
 
Within the new framework (See Figure 10.1), the ANP’s RPIs can be used as credible 
exogenous risk values to be input into the SD final models during simulation to derive 
risk outputs and behaviour trends over time. As a new methodology, the new approach 
will provide a complete framework for understanding the criteria used for evaluating 
and assigning ratings to system elements, and the dynamic interrelationship among 
those elements. The simulation results from the new approach will serve as reliable 
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outputs for the project management team to depend on when making decisions during 
risk assessment. This implies that the SDANP approach for risk assessment will go 
beyond the strict decision metaphor and can be applied to support effective thinking, 
group discussion and most importantly modelling of complex dynamic project systems.  
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The goal of the SDANP risk assessment approach is not to eliminate all risks from the 
project. Rather, it is to recognize the significant risk challenges and their complexities to 
the project over its life in the construction phase and to initiate appropriate management 
responses for their management.  
 
The SDANP approach will cover a wide range of project management needs, by 
addressing the systemic issues that influence and dominate the outcome of 
megaprojects. It will ensure the proper management of risk and the highest value return 
from the project. It will also:  
i. Provide a proactive new methodology for megaproject risk analysis and 
assessment 
ii. Define the cluster of significant risks in megaprojects 
iii. Provide an independent risk assessment tool for stakeholders.  
iv. Aid policy-makers by allowing them to investigate different scenarios and policy 
options. Decisions about a system involve first considering, for certain relevant 
external conditions, a number of possible future scenarios, which should be 
based on an understanding of the broad structure of the system and how it 
operates. Then decisions have to be made in the light of these possible scenarios. 
The scenarios can be represented schematically as graphs of the changes in the 
operation, or output, over time, depending on inputs or external influences. 
v. Provide better decision making support to cost and time management. That is to 
say decision-makers can use the new system modelling methodology and 
concepts more generally as a framework for describing and analysing the 
behaviour of a system in changing conditions. 
 
The application of the new tool in the context of risk management will provide a 
dynamic analysis of risks. The  limits of this dynamic modelling approach is essentially 
linked to the degree  of complexity the expert seeks to handle, the time devoted to the 
development of the  model, the definition of the variables, the simulation process and 
the interpretation of the  results. 
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10.4: Conclusion 
This study has successfully addressed an important research topic in the risk assessment 
literature — the patterns of risk during system development in the construction phase. 
The theoretical foundation of this study is risks in transportation megaproject 
construction.  Based on findings from literature, a model known as the MegaDS model 
was developed to assess the level of identified risks and the interactions such risks cause 
to impact the performance of megaprojects during construction.  
 
 
The MegaDS suggested that transportation megaproject system is composed of five 
subsystems namely, a social subsystem (actor and structure) and a technical subsystem 
(technology and task), an economic subsystem, an environmental subsystem and a 
political subsystem. From the simulation results, it can be emphasised that any 
organizational system can maximize performance only by ensuring these five 
subsystems are working in harmony. As a result, project managers involved in 
transportation megaproject construction must consider all of these factors equally 
important during the entire system development life cycle. 
 
 
During the model validation process, it was revealed that there is no single model 
developed for managing risks within the domain of the construction industry. As 
companies face ever-increasing challenges, there is heightened awareness of generic 
risks preventing leading organizations from realizing the importance of well-defined 
model validation procedures. Regular and periodic review of models through a formal 
model validation process can help management and stakeholders gain confidence in 
these critically important business tools. Companies also need to validate their models 
to keep pace with changes in market dynamics; the model validated yesterday may not 
still be valid today given the changes and shifts in the marketplace. Put simply, model 
validation is the quintessential tool in an organization’s model risk management 
process.  
 
From the view point of industrial stakeholders and people living (social view) along the 
route of Edinburgh Tram Network Project (ETNP), risk management requires 
organizing and connecting heterogeneous actors within organizations that allow for 
335 
 
project development and evolution. In other words, successful risk management is 
characterized by skilled actors within appropriate organizational contexts and 
institutional arrangements at all times. The more the actors, the greater the incurred risk 
of having an insufficient or inappropriate structure.  
 
Considering technical risks in ETNP for example, task risks such as worksite 
coordination problems remain relatively consistent throughout the construction stages of 
the project life cycle but technology risks like correct size of tram car to fit tracks were 
not realized until the latter stages of development. Tasks are conducted on a regular 
basis with established procedures and generation of outputs, but technology is not 
realized until the testing and implementation stages. Thus, the pattern of realized risks 
follows a pattern similar to those of process importance and technology presence at the 
various stages of the life cycle. A successful project involves acquiring clear tasks and 
managing them to integrate, control and coordinate heterogeneous capabilities. Though 
the design of the technology may occur in earlier stages, the hands-on experiences occur 
in the latter stages. 
 
 
In summary, the dynamic simulation patterns and results show that the economic risks 
tend to dominate and cause project cost and time overruns and quality deficiency as 
construction progresses followed by environmental risks and social risks, political risks, 
and technical risks.  For project managers who control risks within the fixed problem 
and limited resources, there is a need to study how to manage the inter-relationships 
among these risks to ensure effective reactions to problems in the working environment. 
In controlling risks at multiple stages, the risk assessor and project management team 
need to focus on the mitigation techniques required by stages of the project life cycle to 
compose the portfolio of controls at the most appropriate time. Different risks will often 
require different forms of mitigation and control. Several of these have been described 
in the British Standards for risk management codes of practice (BS 31100:2011 Risk 
management- Code of practice; BS ISO 31000:2009 Risk management- Principles and 
guidelines and BS EN 31010:2010 Risk management-Risk assessment techniques), but 
resources for implementing control need to be allocated appropriately. 
 
336 
 
An organization may also find it useful to segregate risk policies according to the 
patterns identified in this research. Economic and environmental risks tend to be 
uniformly distributed throughout the project execution life cycle and may best be 
controlled through centralized practices, such as documented procedures established by 
a project office and skill databases maintained by human resources. Technical and 
political risks grow as the cycle progresses, indicating that they might best be controlled 
by the project teams rather than rely on uniform practices throughout an organization. 
Social risks represent a combination of challenges from the political risks and 
environmental issues created by the works (technical). Further, project managers of 
megaproject construction can’t overlook the risks they create themselves which relate to 
poor project management practices. 
 
 
Attention to good communication and structural practices by all levels of management 
will address the highest incidence of these risks in megaproject construction. Lastly, 
even if the risks are not realized until later stages, project managers should develop 
mitigation and control plans as early in the life cycle as possible in order to be best 
prepared. Even though this research has the merit of offering insights into a new way of 
assessing risks in the megaproject construction process, it considers only the dimensions 
of incidence and timing. We focused on STEEP risks impact on project time, cost and 
quality as a gap in literature by developing a new methodology for assessing the 
dynamics of impact of such risks on project performance in megaproject construction. 
Further, we rely on data from Edinburgh Tram Network Project to draw conclusions. 
Specific counts derived from the data may not reflect exact patterns in all socio-cultures 
and political environment. Future studies are encouraged to consider these limitations to 
generalize our findings and provide additional insights on understanding the impacts of 
these risk components during a megaproject development life cycle. 
 
 
10.5: Long Term Impact of the New Methodology  
It appears inescapable that megaproject consultants need an organized way to collect 
relevant risk information and make decisions on important factors that affect project 
performance throughout its lifecycle. 
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As a multi criterion methodology, the Analytical Network Process (ANP) can be 
applied by project consultants who facilitate risk identification workshops to conduct 
risk assessment based on the facilitator's skills and experience in risk elicitation to draw 
out judgments about uncertain events from the project team. The facilitator can conduct 
meetings with a smaller group of the most experienced project team members to elicit 
qualitative assessments of the major risks for the project. The likelihood and 
consequences of each risk event can be elicited from each team member. For simplicity, 
the facilitator has to use the discrete scale of 1 - 9 to represent the verbal judgment in 
pairwise comparisons to generate a ranked list of risk priority values of consequences or 
risk priority indexes (RPI).  
 
As a proven Multi-Criterion Decision Making (MCDM) methodology, the ANP is 
capable to evaluate criteria and assign ratings to risks factors. It can further lead to the 
selection of most risky factors acceptable to decision makers during the establishment 
of the RPI for the entire project. However, there is one area that needs greater attention 
in its application during decision making. That is, how to use the RPI obtained from pair 
comparisons to perform risk assessment over time in order to anticipate and deal with 
the future more successfully through risk impact prediction and planning. To bridge this 
gap, system dynamics (SD) is proposed to integrate the RPI from the ANP paired 
comparisons into the system dynamics methodology in order to solve these important 
real world problems concerning nonlinear dynamics and feedback control of risks 
behaviour in megaprojects as complex systems.  
 
 
System dynamics is one of the successful well formulated methodologies that provide a 
framework for building a highly interactive problem-solving environment in a system 
where decision makers are involved in reasoning about the relationships between the 
structure and the dynamics of a complex system. It provides a way to represent and 
model expectations of project management team over time for policy decision making. 
In its simplest form, SD focuses on information flow and return (feedback) through the 
system’s component. SD approach is capable of analysing relevant cause-effect 
relationships and the impacts of time delays and feedback loops in a complex system 
that exhibits unexpected behaviour. It provides this capability and supports conceptually 
linking the explanations for complex behaviour to the underlying structure. This allows 
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decision makers or planners to use system dynamics simulation as a way to test a 
hypothesis about how a system will behave in particular circumstances. In other words, 
decision makers can use system dynamics to understand and explain system behaviour 
in terms of underlying system structure. In addition, the project management team can 
use system dynamics to show how changes in the structure of a system will lead to 
changes in its behaviour.  
 
To reduce risks, companies can use the outputs of the new generic tool for risk 
management in five steps: risk management planning, risk identification, qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis, risk response planning, risk monitoring and control. 
 
Step 1: Risk management planning- Within the STEEP risk management planning, 
feedback loops concerning project risks can be used by planners to pro-actively test and 
improve the existing project plan such as forecasting and diagnosing the likely 
outcomes of the current plan.   
 
Step 2: Risk identification-The SDANP models can support risk identification in a 
qualitative level through the causal loop diagrams. Given STEEP as specific risks, it is 
possible to identify which feedback loops favour or counter the occurrences of such 
risks so that the direct or indirect impacts of the project magnitude can be understood.  
 
Step 3: Risk analysis-The causal loop models can further assist project managers in 
assessing all risks in both qualitative and quantitative manners.   In the qualitative 
analysis, each feedback loop can be a dynamic force that pushes away from the risk 
occurrence. With regards to risk likelihood, magnitude and impacts, a simulation model 
can be used to identify and capture the full impacts of potential risks on the project. 
Further impacts of risks can be quantified and simulated to generate a wide range of 
estimates and scenarios to reflect the full impacts of the risks occurrences and impacts 
on megaprojects during construction. 
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Step 4: Risk response planning- The models can be effectively used to support risk 
response planning in megaproject development in three ways. 
- Provide a feedback perspective for risk identification 
- Provide a better understanding of the multiple- factor causes of risks and a trace 
through the chain to identify further causes and effects. 
- Serve as powerful tools to support project managers to devise effective responses. 
 
Step 5:  Risk monitoring and control- The models provide effective tools for risk 
monitoring and control. Through the cause and effects diagrams, early signs of 
unperceived risk emergence can be identified to avoid aggravation. In addition, 
simulated models can provide an effective monitoring and control mechanism for risk 
diagnosis.  
 
Based on the above reasons, it would therefore be more appropriate to assess risks in 
megaprojects during construction with the system dynamics methodology using Risk 
Priority Indexes (RPI) derived from the ANP as inputs for dynamic simulation.  Then 
every project management team member at the decision level can benefit from the 
knowledge that went into making these decisions before arriving at the final level of 
risk implications on the megaproject objectives throughout the project schedule time. 
 
 Implications of the SDANP models for Research, Practice, and Society. 
 
The developed SDANP system models in this thesis have a number of implications for 
research, practice, and/ or society.  
 
Firstly, the study explored the complex intrinsic interrelationships among STEEP risks 
at the construction phase of megaproject development by capturing their causes and 
effects on project performance. This is with the sole aim of improving the 
understanding of the complex system of risk behaviours from systems thinking and 
analytical perspectives thereby extending the knowledge base for integrating the ANP 
and the SD to risk assessment in megaproject construction. For example, the causal 
diagrams can lead to theory building by the interested researchers. Additionally, the 
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output of this research has the capability to spur research activities as enunciated under 
the recommendations for future research in Section 10.8. 
 
Secondly, the research in this thesis has implications for practice and can be used to 
achieve results by following the under listed steps 1 to 15. The SDANP methodology 
builds on the existing modelling efforts, which are traditionally restricted to building 
physics and regression-based forecasting, in order to generate new insights into the 
future using a non-deterministic systems approach. This then adds to the pool of tools 
available in the field for practitioners. Since the SDANP modelling process is highly 
transparent as all the modelling steps, inputs such as variables, data and the algorithms 
developed can be scrutinised.  Therefore, the new risk assessment tool has the capacity 
to immensely benefit from software developers by prototyping it into other suitable user 
friendly platforms. 
 
1. Identify and categorise risks 
2. List potential risks 
3. Conduct prioritization survey 
4. Perform weighted quantitative scores (WQS) 
5. Develop ANP network model 
6. Conduct comparison matrices using the WQS and normalize criteria 
7. Calculate risk priority index (RPI) and list potential high risks. 
8. Verify with experts and modify the model 
9. Develop the initial SD model (Causer-loop diagram) 
10. Repeat step (8) 
11. Develop SDANP stock & flow model (Input RPI into SD model) 
12. Test model for dimensional & structural consistencies 
13. Perform risk scenario simulation to derive dynamic patterns 
14. Validate results with the real system 
15. Design policies for implementation to improve the system 
 
Thirdly, the outcome of this research has implications for society and other stakeholders 
involved in megaproject development. This is by providing the policy makers with a 
decision making tool upon which different scenarios regarding STEEP risk assessment 
strategies can be tested before implementation. 
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10.6: Contribution to Knowledge  
An original contribution to knowledge is an important concern in any doctoral research. 
The problem is that the concept of originality could be subject to individual judgment or 
preference (Fellows and Liu, 2008). Walker (1997) has documented various ways to 
demonstrate originality such as development of new methodologies, tools and/or 
techniques, new areas of research, new interpretation of existing material, new 
application of existing theories to new areas or a new blend of ideas.  
  
Drawing on this background, this research has demonstrated the dynamic effects of 
social, technical, economic, environmental and political (STEEP) risks on the 
performance of megaproject construction using an integrated approach of Analytical 
Network Process (ANP) and the System Dynamics (SD) applications for risk 
assessment, and contributed to the body of knowledge regarding the interrelated system 
variables of risk effectiveness. The models produced by the new risk assessment tool 
successfully demonstrate the behaviour of project time and cost overruns and quality 
deficiency in a transportation megaproject under construction in Edinburgh, Scotland 
using the SDANP based risk assessment process. The model is able to predict the 
relative change in project performance. The new risk assessment model, also known as 
the MegaDS model, will support on-going research since updated model parameters can 
be easily incorporated. This work has also corroborated that the combined Analytical 
Network Process and System Dynamics is a suitable modelling paradigm for risks 
assessment processes in general in megaproject development and has shown that such 
modelling can be augmented with expert heuristics to support risk management. Other 
contributions to supports risk management are highlighted below: 
 The research in this thesis indicates for the first time the application of a dynamic 
systems modelling to a transportation megaproject in order to model the risks of cost 
and time overruns and quality deficiencies during construction based on the 
complex STEEP interactions of the influencing variables 
 
 It contributes to both project risk management (PRM) knowledge and ANP 
implementation in this field. From PRM perspective the ANP-based framework of 
the SDANP methodology is proposed for assessing the impact of different STEEP 
risk factors on megaproject construction. Since ANP is capable of dealing with all 
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kinds of feedback and dependence when modelling a complex decision 
environment, this research contends that the study results are more accurate. ANP 
deals with uncertainty and complexity and provides insights that other, more 
traditional methods could miss. The proposed ANP approach would enable a 
decision maker to visualize the impact of various criteria in the final outcome. In 
such way that is very simple to communicate the results to all involved stakeholders, 
without time and place limitations and it is equally easy to have collaborative 
decision making processes by having more than one decision makers working on the 
same model. A secondary benefit of the research is that by using the proposed 
framework a valuable insight of the criteria that dominate the decision making 
process is given, providing value-added knowledge to front-ended stakeholders. 
 
 The model, especially the developed SD conceptual model – system thinking aspect, 
is capable of improving the theoretical knowledge base regarding the complex 
intrinsic inter-relationships that exist among the STEEP risk influences of 
megaproject development. 
 
 The SDANP system models within this thesis have the capabilities of being used to 
simulate and support behavioural understanding, prediction and evaluation of risks 
for project planning and project performance improvement across a range of 
alternative megaprojects. Some of the modelling constructs can be used for other 
project lifecycle models, such as an evolutionary risk-driven process.  
 
 The SDANP system models have the capability to serve as decision making policy 
tools with the ability to direct policy decisions by testing the effect of different 
policy scenarios such system improvements and behavioural change likely to have 
on megaprojects during construction. The insights generated will allow policy 
makers to make informed decisions regarding any future policy formulations 
concerning the STEEP risks effect on megaproject performance.  
 
Further to the above contribution to the body of knowledge, several facets of this 
research have been presented at conferences and others published in co-authorship in 
the lists of publications and presentations indicated on page xxiv of this report. 
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10.7: Limitations of the Findings 
As with all survey based research there are bound to be limitations, which need to be 
acknowledged. Readers are therefore reminded of the potential effect of sampling, 
unsystematic (i.e. random) and measurement errors and their likely impact on the data 
collected, analysis undertaken and the conclusions drawn. These notwithstanding, the 
demographic profile of the respondents suggest that they have reasonable involvement 
and direct professional experience in megaproject construction which should accord 
some reasonable credibility to the quality of responses received. 
 
It is also important to acknowledge the relatively small sample size used for the study 
(See Table 5.2 of Chapter 5, section 5.2.2). However, this should not nullify the 
conclusions drawn, given that the relevant preliminary tests associated with the 
adequacy of sample size (including the assumptions of central limit theorem) proved 
favourable for the analysis to proceed. 
 
Also the margin of error associated with the study is 1.7 % (see chapter five). That is, 
the predictive power of the MegaDS model at 95% confidence level can be tolerated at 
an approximate confidence interval of •+/- 2%, which appears reasonably good for a 
stochastic study of this nature. Cross validation of the model suggested it has reasonable 
predictive power and could therefore be generalised at least in the risk assessment 
context for megaproject construction. While emphasising the significance of the model 
in reflecting the project lifecycle, it is important to remind readers that development of 
the substantive STEEP models focused on the “construction phase”. This is largely due 
to resource constraints placed on the study. However, the successful completion of the 
model for the construction phase provides an important stepping stone for further 
research as indicated in section 9.9.  
 
 
Furthermore, the researcher still lacked some real data to demonstrate the validity of the 
SDANP model developed by the proposed approach. Due to confidentiality and 
reserved matters, the public sector officials and contractors of ETNP were not allowed 
to disclose any data in terms of full project cost and level of quality deficiency. For 
example, the researcher could not obtain bidding proposals for various work packages 
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with bidding costs for sub-contractors involved in the project and project cash flow 
during the construction stage. Most of data in terms of cost obtained by the researcher 
relied heavily on the current audit, media and government reports on the project and this 
data was limited. Also, with no data availability the researcher used hypothetical data to 
model the level of risk effects on the project quality. Without comparing simulation 
results on project quality deficiency against real data, there is inadequate evidence to 
support the position that the model can properly function to represent reality. As a 
result, the model validation for project quality deficiency modelling is very limited. 
Therefore, applying a case with sufficient real data in the future research to test the level 
of STEEP impact on project quality within the MegaDS model developed by the 
proposed SDANP approach is suggested. 
 
10.8: Recommendations for Further Research 
1.  Although the researcher has established that the theoretical approach has proved to 
be valid in developing a risk assessment decision support model for transportation 
megaproject in the construction phase, this theory still requires further research to 
assure its realistic representation. 
 
2. Since there was not enough real data in terms of qualitative risk effects, many 
parameter values in the MegaDS model heavily relied on interviewees with experts 
involved in megaproject development. To enhance the model validity, the model 
parameters needed to be calibrated (Lyneis, 2007) by tracing and comparing the 
simulation results with the real project data in the future, particularly with data 
concerning project quality at the construction phase which would normally be 
lacking in most megaprojects. 
 
3. There is a need for future research to investigate into the dynamics of STEEP risks 
and impact on project performance in the total lifecycles of megaproject 
development and different types of megaprojects as compared to transportation 
megaprojects. 
 
4. By this research, it is believed that the findings could be used by academic 
professionals and industrial stakeholders as a reflective document for initiating the 
establishment of an Association of a Dynamic Risk Assessment for Megaproject 
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Development (ADRAMD), and the competency profiles identified herein could be 
further developed to form baseline competencies in project managers’ performance, 
for gaining recognition and value in their performance and for benchmarking and 
best practices during risk management. 
 
 
10.9: Summary 
This chapter has provided a review of the original research objectives and the extent to 
which they were achieved. The main conclusions have been presented and the 
limitations of the research have been acknowledged. Recommendations for further 
research have been proposed. 
 
In summary the research has developed a competency-based SDANP model 
representing a robust mechanism for assessing STEEP risks impact on the performance 
of transportation megaproject at the construction phase. The model, known as MegaDS, 
could be used by project managers to reveal the behaviour of risks and maximise project 
performance over time. It is contended that the MegaDS model has the potential for 
improving the performance of PMs anywhere in the world, when used as part of a wider 
sphere of risk management practices and procedures. 
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                                                           APPENDICES 
                           Appendix A: Research Instruments for Data Collection 
 
1. Cover letter for the Questionnaires Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
         1 March 2013 
To Whom It May Concern  
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
Invitation to Questionnaire Survey 
 
We would very much appreciate it if you could take time to contribute to an on-going doctoral 
research into a Dynamic System Approach to Risk Assessment in Megaprojects in the School of 
Built Environment (SBE) at Heriot-watt University in Edinburgh. 
 
The research aims to use Analytical Network Process (ANP) and System Dynamics (SD) 
methods to prioritize and simulate risks against cost and time overruns and quality deficiency in 
megaproject development for the first time. Data to be collected from this questionnaire survey 
will be used to develop an integrated (SDANP) models to cover social, technical, economic, 
environmental and political (STEEP) risks related to megaproject development at construction 
stage in order to inform better decision making on risk management. 
 
The questionnaire consists of the following three parts: 
- Section A: About the Respondent , 
- Section B: Project characteristics, 
- Section C: Project performance, and 
- Section D: STEEP risks in mega construction projects.  
 
We would like to thank you very much for your valued and kind help and contribution, and look 
forward to hearing from you soon. Many thanks. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Prince Boateng 
PhD Candidate 
School of Built Environment, 
Heriot Watt University, 
Riccarton, Edinburgh, 
EH14 4AS 
Tel: +44 (0) 131 451 4664(O) 
Mobile: +44 (0) 754 1930 957 
Email: pb128@hw.ac.uk 
Dr. George Zhen Chen 
Lecturer in Facility Management 
School of Built Environment, 
Heriot Watt University, 
Riccarton, Edinburgh, 
EH14 4AS 
Tel: + +44 (0)131 451 4635 (O) 
Email: Zhen.Chen@hw.ac.uk 
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2. Questionnaires to Participants involved in Edinburgh Tram Network 
Construction 
 
Section A: General information (Optional) 
 
Name of Respondent: 
 
Educational Level of Respondent: 
 
Address of Respondent: 
 
 
Telephone: Email: 
 
 
 
Section B: Project characteristics (most recently completed sections of the project) 
 
Please provide a description of the most recently completed/ongoing project section on which 
you were personally involved, by providing appropriate answers to the questions below. 
 
1. Type of work (please tick all applicable options) 
 Infrastructure works 
- Ground works 
- Earthworks 
- Foundation works 
- Concrete works 
- Laying of trucks 
- Steel and welding works 
- False works 
- Demolishing works 
 Utility diversion works 
 Others (please specify) 
 
  Very  
simple 
 Very Complex 
2. How would you rate the complexity of this project? 1 2 3 4         5 
3. What is the contract price? 
4. What is the proposed project duration? 
   
 
5. Which of these areas is the project located?  (please check applicable) 
 
Edinburgh Airport                       Edinburgh Park & Ride                       Murray field station 
Picardy place                               Port of Leith                                         Ingliston Park & Ride 
Edinburgh Park station                Haymarket                                           MacDonald road 
Ocean Terminal                           Gogarburn                                            Bank head 
Shandwick place                          Balfour street                                       Newhaven 
Edi. Int. Gateway                         Saughton                                              Princes street 
Foot of the walk                           Gyle centre                                          Balgreen 
St. Andrews square                      Other, (Please state) 
383 
 
 
6. How long have you worked on this project? (please tick) 
      1 years              2 years             3years             4 years and above         Other (please state) 
 
7. Please indicate the procurement approach employed for this project. (Please tick) 
 
Traditional lump sum competitive tendering 
Design & Build 
Partnering 
Management contracting 
Construction Management 
Other approach (Please specify) 
 
8. What is the designation of your company on this project? (Please tick) 
 
Main contractor                           Subcontractor                              Project Manager 
Consultant                                   Supplier                                       Other (Please specify) 
 
9. For each of the following participants, indicate how much influence they have on the project 
lifecycle. (Please rank from 1 to 5) 
 No 
influence 
   Highly 
influential 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Project lifecycle Phases 
 Concept Planning Execution Transfer Operation 
Client      
Architect      
Project Manager      
Civil Engineer      
Main Contractor 
Local business owners 
Regulatory bodies 
Other (please specify) 
     
 
 
10. Was your company involved in the design phase of this project?         Yes                 No 
 
11.Please rank the following objectives from 1 to 5 in order of priority on this project 
 
 
 
Cost  
Time   
Quality  
Other (Please specify) 
Very low  Very High 
   
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Section C: Project performance outcomes for the project described above. 
 
         Please indicate by providing appropriate answers below for the project performance. 
 
Cost 
 
1. What is/was the final cost of this project? 
 
2. Which of these risk factors account for differences between project final cost and contract price on 
this project?  (Please rank from 1 to 5 in order of priority) 
 
 
 
Social risk 
Technical risk 
Economical risk 
Environmental risk 
Political risk  
Other (Please specify) 
Very low  Very High 
   
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
 
Time  
 
3. How long did it take to complete this project? 
 
4. Which of these risk factors account for differences between actual and proposed duration for this 
project?  (Please rank from 1 to 5 in order of priority) 
 
 
  Social risk 
  Technical risk 
  Economical risk 
  Environmental risk 
  Political risk  
  Other (Please specify) 
Very low  Very High 
   
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
 
Quality 
5. At the time of handing over completed sections of the project, to what extend was the project free 
from defects as a result of STEEP risks impact on the project during construction? 
 
     The project was free from defects 
     There were few defects but the project handed over on time 
     There were few defects that delayed handover slightly  -  by how many week?  
     There were major defects which delayed hand over substantially - by how many week? 
     Don’t know 
 
Productivity 
6. Please rate the overall level of productivity during project delivery under the listed risks below 
 
 
Social risk 
Technical risk 
Economical risk 
Environmental risk 
Political risk  
Other (Please specify) 
Very  
low 
 Very 
high 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
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Section D: STEEP risks in Megaproject development and construction 
 
From your experience on this project, please indicate by ranking the extent to which the 
following risk factors impact on the project objectives (Please rank from 1 to 5) 
 Level of impact on project objectives 
  
7. Social risk factors cost Time  Quality  
    
Social grievances 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Multi-player/level decision making bodies 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Disputes 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Legal action by project external stakeholders 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Legal actions by Client 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Stakeholders’ pressure 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Treats to person/asset security 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Social issues 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 Level of impact on project objectives 
  
8. Technical risk factors cost Time  Quality  
    
Ambiguity of project scope 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Ground conditions on given project sites 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
inadequate project complexity analysis 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Unforeseen modification to project 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Incorrect project cost estimate  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Incorrect project time estimate 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Failure to meet specified standards 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Technical difficulties in utilities diversions 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Project time overruns 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Project delays of all forms 1 2 3 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 Level of impact on project objectives 
  
9. Economic risk factors cost Time  Quality  
    
Change in government funding policy 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Taxation changes 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Change in government 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Changes in V.A.T 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Wage inflation 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Local inflation change 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Foreign exchange 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Material price changes 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Global economic recession 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Global energy price changes 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Catastrophic environmental effects 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Project technical difficulties 1 2 3 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Project delays of all forms 1 2 3 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
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 Level of impact on project objectives 
  
10. Environmental risk factors cost Time  Quality  
a. Unfavourable climatic conditions    
Earthquake 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Hurricane 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Heat waves 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Thunder and Lightning                             1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Drought 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Heavy rainfall 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Snowfall 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Flood 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Wind storm 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Dust storm 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
High and low humidity conditions 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Temperature 1 2 3 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
b. Environmental issues from works                
Pollution (air, water, soil, noise, dust, waste 
generation etc...) 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Traffic 1 2 3 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 Level of imp Level of impact on project objectives act on project 
objectives 
  
11. Political  risk factors cost Time  Quality  
    
Change in government funding 
policy 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Political opposition 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Government discontinuity 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Lack of political support 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Political indecision 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Project termination 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Delay in obtaining consent 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Legislative/regulatory changes 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Delay in obtaining temporary 
Traffic Regulation Orders  
(TROs) 
1 2 3 3 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Learning /Innovation 
 
12. Please rate the following: Very  
low  
    Very  
high  
a. The level of organisational learning that took place 
on this project relative to previous projects you 
undertook under similar weather conditions 
1 2 3    4 5 
      
b. The level of innovation on this project relative to 
similar projects you undertook under similar 
weather conditions 
1 2          3 
 
   4 5 
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Satisfaction 
 
13. In your opinion, how satisfied are the project 
stakeholders with: 
Very  
dissatisfied 
    Very  
satisfied  
a. Service 1  2  3    4 5 
b. Project cost 1  2  3    4 5 
c. Project duration 1  2       3    4 5 
d. Project quality 1  2       3    4 5 
 
14. In your opinion, how satisfied are the employees and 
operatives with: 
a. Site conditions and welfare facilities 
b. Wages 
c. Level of health and safety on/off sites 
 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
 2       3 
 2       3 
 2       3 
 
 
 
  4 
  4 
  4 
 
 
 
5 
5 
5 
     
15. How satisfied is your company with the level of 
profitability of this project? 
1  2       3   4 5 
 
16. How satisfied was management with the level of 
collaboration and harmony between project 
participants? 
 
1 
 
 2       3 
 
  4 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
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3. Prior Notification to Potential Respondents 
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                  Appendix B: Structured Interview Questionnaire and Participants 
 
1. Structured Interview Questionnaire 
 
 
A Dynamic System Approach to Risk Assessment in Megaprojects 
 
Profile/Demography of Interviewee 
Type of Organisation: __________________Date: ______________ Time: 
______________ 
Type of Megaproject: ____________________________________________________ 
Size of Megaproject:   _______________________       Designation: 
___________________ 
 
1. Role/Responsibility of Interviewee: 
a. What was your role on the Project? 
b. How long were you involved in megaproject construction? 
2. Project Goal/Scope: 
b. What were the main goals and objectives? 
c. How did the project scope change over time? 
 
3. Generic Risk Events: 
a. What were the generic risk events inherit in the project? 
b. How did the generic risk events affect the project schedule overtime? 
c. How did the generic risk events affect the project cost? 
 
7. Funding: 
a. Was the project funding source a dedicated fund source? 
b. How were additional funds obtained as project costs increased? 
c. Was the funding source stable over time? 
 
8. How can the qualitative risk effects on project performance be quantified and 
analyzed to reduce under performances in megaproject construction? 
 
5. How effective were the risks assessment practices used in managing /modeling risk 
interrelationships in megaprojects during construction? 
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2. Structured Interview Participants 
 
 Company Type of Organisation 
1 Atkins Consultant 
2 Atkins PLC Consultant 
3 Bilfinger Berger /Siemens Consortium Contractor 
4 City of Edinburgh Council Owner 
5 Crummock (Scotland) Ltd Contractor 
6 Farrans Construction Contractor 
7 Halcrow Group Contractor 
8 Jacobs Consultancy Consultant 
9 McNicholas Construction Co. Ltd Contractor 
10 Scottish Water Consultant 
11 Turner& Townsend Consultant 
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                           Appendix C: Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance 
 
1. Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Project Objectives (Po) 
Considerations: Cost, Time and Quality Risks 
Number of 
respondents  
Years of experience (Y) in % Input (i) for Cost 
(c), Time (t) & 
Quality (q) 
Experimental Input (Ei)               
 Ei = Y*i 
N Yr. 
Range 
Year 
(Yr) 
Y (%) ic it iq Y ic Y it Y iq 
1 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
2 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
3 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
4 < 5 5 0.3715 4 4 5 1.4859 1.4859 1.8574 
5 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 5 4.7548 4.7548 5.9435 
6 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 4 6.2407 6.2407 6.2407 
8 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
9 5-10 8 0.5944 3 5 3 1.7831 2.9718 1.7831 
10 5-10 8 0.5944 3 3 3 1.7831 1.7831 1.7831 
11 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 5 5.9435 4.7548 5.9435 
12 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
13 5-10 8 0.5944 5 2 3 2.9718 1.1887 1.7831 
14 5-10 8 0.5944 4 1 5 2.3774 0.5944 2.9718 
15 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
16 11-20 16 1.1887 5 3 5 5.9435 3.5661 5.9435 
17 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 21+ 21 1.5602 4 5 4 6.2407 7.8009 6.2407 
20 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 3 5.9435 4.7548 3.5661 
21 11-20 16 1.1887 3 4 5 3.5661 4.7548 5.9435 
22 5-10 8 0.5944 5 3 5 2.9718 1.7831 2.9718 
23 < 5 5 0.3715 4 5 5 1.4859 1.8574 1.8574 
24 5-10 8 0.5944 4 5 5 2.3774 2.9718 2.9718 
25 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
26 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
27 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
28 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
29 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
30 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
31 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
32 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
33 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
34 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
35 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
36 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
37 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
38 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
39 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
40 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
41 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
42 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
43 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
44 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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45 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
46 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
47 < 5 5 0.3715 4 5 4 1.4859 1.8574 1.4859 
48 < 5 5 0.3715 4 5 4 1.4859 1.8574 1.4859 
49 < 5 5 0.3715 4 5 4 1.4859 1.8574 1.4859 
50 < 5 5 0.3715 4 5 4 1.4859 1.8574 1.4859 
51 < 5 5 0.3715 4 5 4 1.4859 1.8574 1.4859 
52 < 5 5 0.3715 4 5 4 1.4859 1.8574 1.4859 
53 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
54 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
55 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
56 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
57 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
58 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
59 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
60 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
61 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
62 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
63 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
64 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
65 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
66 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
67 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
68 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
69 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
70 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
71 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
72 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
73 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
74 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
75 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 3 6.2407 6.2407 4.6805 
76 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 5 6.2407 6.2407 7.8009 
77 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 5 6.2407 6.2407 7.8009 
78 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 4 4.7548 4.7548 4.7548 
79 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 4 4.7548 4.7548 4.7548 
80 21+ 21 1.5602 3 5 3 4.6805 7.8009 4.6805 
81 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
82 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 5 7.8009 6.2407 7.8009 
83 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 5 6.2407 6.2407 7.8009 
84 11-20 16 1.1887 5 2 3 5.9435 2.3774 3.5661 
85 11-20 16 1.1887 4 1 5 4.7548 1.1887 5.9435 
86 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
87 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 5 7.8009 4.6805 7.8009 
88 11-20 16 1.1887 4 3 5 4.7548 3.5661 5.9435 
89 11-20 16 1.1887 4 3 5 4.7548 3.5661 5.9435 
90 11-20 16 1.1887 4 5 4 4.7548 5.9435 4.7548 
Total 1346 100.0000       444.58 432.32 450.8 
Mean Value (MVpo)        = |∑EiX1-3| ∕ Ntotal 4.9 4.8 5.0 
Ei = Experimental Input, X = Value for individual experimental inputs for cost, time and quality 
 i = Respondents inputs, X1 = ic = Respondents inputs for project cost, X2 =  it = Respondents inputs for 
project time and X3 =  iq = Respondents inputs for project quality, Ntotal = Total number of respondents       
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2. Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Potential Risks (PR1):  Social Risks 
 
Number of 
respondents  
Years of experience (Y) in % Input (i) for G1 
under Cost (c), 
Time (t) & 
Quality (q) 
Experimental Input (Ei)               
 Ei = Y*i 
N Yr. 
Range 
Year (Yr) Y (%) ic it iq Y ic Y it Y iq 
1 11-20 16 1.1887 4 5 2 4.7548 5.9435 2.3774 
2 11-20 16 1.1887 4 5 2 4.7548 5.9435 2.3774 
3 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
4 < 5 5 0.3715 3 1 3 1.1144 0.3715 1.1144 
5 11-20 16 1.1887 4 3 4 4.7548 3.5661 4.7548 
6 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
8 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
9 5-10 8 0.5944 2 4 3 1.1887 2.3774 1.7831 
10 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 3 1.1887 1.7831 1.7831 
11 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
12 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
13 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
14 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
15 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
16 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 3 5.9435 5.9435 3.5661 
17 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20 11-20 16 1.1887 4 5 4 4.7548 5.9435 4.7548 
21 11-20 16 1.1887 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
22 5-10 8 0.5944 4 5 5 2.3774 2.9718 2.9718 
23 < 5 5 0.3715 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
24 5-10 8 0.5944 5 3 1 2.9718 1.7831 0.5944 
25 5-10 8 0.5944 5 3 1 2.9718 1.7831 0.5944 
26 5-10 8 0.5944 5 3 1 2.9718 1.7831 0.5944 
27 5-10 8 0.5944 5 3 1 2.9718 1.7831 0.5944 
28 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
29 21+ 21 1.5602 2 2 2 3.1204 3.1204 3.1204 
30 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 4 6.2407 6.2407 6.2407 
31 5-10 8 0.5944 5 4 1 2.9718 2.3774 0.5944 
32 5-10 8 0.5944 5 4 1 2.9718 2.3774 0.5944 
33 5-10 8 0.5944 5 4 1 2.9718 2.3774 0.5944 
34 5-10 8 0.5944 5 4 1 2.9718 2.3774 0.5944 
35 5-10 8 0.5944 5 4 1 2.9718 2.3774 0.5944 
36 11-20 16 1.1887 2 4 1 2.3774 4.7548 1.1887 
37 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 1 6.2407 6.2407 1.5602 
38 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
39 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
40 11-20 16 1.1887 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
41 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
42 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
43 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
44 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
45 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
46 11-20 16 1.1887 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
47 < 5 5 0.3715 5 2 2 1.8574 0.7429 0.7429 
48 < 5 5 0.3715 5 2 2 1.8574 0.7429 0.7429 
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49 < 5 5 0.3715 3 2 2 1.1144 0.7429 0.7429 
50 < 5 5 0.3715 5 2 2 1.8574 0.7429 0.7429 
51 < 5 5 0.3715 5 2 2 1.8574 0.7429 0.7429 
52 < 5 5 0.3715 3 2 2 1.1144 0.7429 0.7429 
53 11-20 16 1.1887 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
54 11-20 16 1.1887 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
55 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 3 7.8009 6.2407 4.6805 
56 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 3 5.9435 4.7548 3.5661 
57 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 3 7.8009 7.8009 4.6805 
58 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 3 7.8009 6.2407 4.6805 
59 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 1 7.8009 6.2407 1.5602 
60 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 3 7.8009 6.2407 4.6805 
61 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 1 7.8009 6.2407 1.5602 
62 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 3 7.8009 6.2407 4.6805 
63 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
64 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
65 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 1 7.8009 7.8009 1.5602 
66 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
67 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 1 7.8009 6.2407 1.5602 
68 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 5 7.8009 6.2407 7.8009 
69 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 4 7.8009 7.8009 6.2407 
70 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 4 5.9435 4.7548 4.7548 
71 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
72 5-10 8 0.5944 4 5 4 2.3774 2.9718 2.3774 
73 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 3 2.9718 2.9718 1.7831 
74 11-20 16 1.1887 2 2 1 2.3774 2.3774 1.1887 
75 21+ 21 1.5602 5 2 2 7.8009 3.1204 3.1204 
76 21+ 21 1.5602 5 2 2 7.8009 3.1204 3.1204 
77 21+ 21 1.5602 2 2 2 3.1204 3.1204 3.1204 
78 11-20 16 1.1887 1 1 1 1.1887 1.1887 1.1887 
79 11-20 16 1.1887 3 4 3 3.5661 4.7548 3.5661 
80 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 1 7.8009 4.6805 1.5602 
81 11-20 16 1.1887 5 3 1 5.9435 3.5661 1.1887 
82 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 1 7.8009 4.6805 1.5602 
83 21+ 21 1.5602 5 4 1 7.8009 6.2407 1.5602 
84 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 3 5.9435 4.7548 3.5661 
85 11-20 16 1.1887 5 3 2 5.9435 3.5661 2.3774 
86 11-20 16 1.1887 5 3 3 5.9435 3.5661 3.5661 
87 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 2 7.8009 4.6805 3.1204 
88 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 2 5.9435 4.7548 2.3774 
89 11-20 16 1.1887 5 3 3 5.9435 3.5661 3.5661 
90 11-20 16 1.1887 5 3 2 5.9435 3.5661 2.3774 
Total 1346 100.00    375.93 321.77 215.97 
Mean Value (MVPR1)        = |∑EiX1-3| ∕ Ntotal 4.2 3.6 2.4 
Ei = Experimental Input, X = Value for individual experimental inputs for cost, time and quality 
 i = Respondents inputs, X1 = ic = Respondents inputs for project cost, X2 =  it = Respondents inputs for 
project time and X3 =  iq = Respondents inputs for project quality, Ntotal = Total number of respondents       
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3. Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Potential Risks (PR2):  Technical Risks 
 
Number of 
respondents 
  
Years of experience (Y) in % 
Input (i) for G2 
under Cost (c), 
Time (t) & 
Quality (q) 
Experimental Input (Ei)               
 Ei = Y*i 
N Yr. 
Range 
Year 
(Yr) 
Y (%) ic it iq Y ic Y it Y iq 
1 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
2 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
3 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
4 < 5 5 0.3715 3 4 3 1.1144 1.4859 1.1144 
5 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
6 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
8 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
9 5-10 8 0.5944 3 3 3 1.7831 1.7831 1.7831 
10 5-10 8 0.5944 3 2 2 1.7831 1.1887 1.1887 
11 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
12 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
13 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
14 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
15 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
16 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
17 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 4 4.7548 4.7548 4.7548 
21 11-20 16 1.1887 3 2 5 3.5661 2.3774 5.9435 
22 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
23 < 5 5 0.3715 5 5 4 1.8574 1.8574 1.4859 
24 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
25 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
26 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
27 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
28 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 5 4.7548 4.7548 5.9435 
29 21+ 21 1.5602 1 2 1 1.5602 3.1204 1.5602 
30 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 4 6.2407 6.2407 6.2407 
31 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
32 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
33 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
34 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
35 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
36 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 2 4.7548 4.7548 2.3774 
37 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
38 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 4 7.8009 7.8009 6.2407 
39 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
40 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
41 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
42 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
43 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
44 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
45 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
46 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
47 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
48 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
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49 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
50 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
51 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
52 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
53 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
54 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
55 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
56 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
57 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
58 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
59 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
60 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
61 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
62 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
63 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
64 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
65 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
66 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
67 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
68 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
69 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
70 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
71 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
72 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
73 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
74 11-20 16 1.1887 3 4 3 3.5661 4.7548 3.5661 
75 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
76 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
77 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
78 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
79 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
80 21+ 21 1.5602 3 2 2 4.6805 3.1204 3.1204 
81 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
82 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
83 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
84 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
85 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
86 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
87 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 4 7.8009 7.8009 6.2407 
88 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
89 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
90 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
      Total 1346 100.00    422.59 424.59 412.18 
Mean Value (MVPR2)        = |∑EiX1-3| ∕ Ntotal 4.7 4.7 4.6 
Ei = Experimental Input, X = Value for individual experimental inputs for cost, time and quality 
 i = Respondents inputs, X1 = ic = Respondents inputs for project cost, X2 =  it = Respondents inputs for 
project time and X3 =  iq = Respondents inputs for project quality, Ntotal = Total number of respondents 
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4. Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Potential Risks (PR3):  Economic Risks 
  
Number of 
respondents  
Years of experience (Y) in % Input (i) for G3 
under Cost (c), 
Time (t) & 
Quality (q) 
Experimental Input (Ei)               
 Ei = Y*i 
N Yr. 
Range 
Year 
(Yr) 
Y (%) ic it iq Y ic Y it Y iq 
1 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
2 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
3 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
4 < 5  5 0.3715 4 4 1 1.4859 1.4859 0.3715 
5 11-20 16 1.1887 4 3 3 4.7548 3.5661 3.5661 
6 0 0 0.0000 0 3 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
8 5-10 8 0.5944 0 3 3 0.0000 1.7831 1.7831 
9 5-10 8 0.5944 4 3 3 2.3774 1.7831 1.7831 
10 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 2 1.1887 1.7831 1.1887 
11 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
12 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
13 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
14 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
15 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
16 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
17 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 3 5.9435 4.7548 3.5661 
21 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 5 3.5661 3.5661 5.9435 
22 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 3 2.9718 2.9718 1.7831 
23  < 5 5 0.3715 5 5 4 1.8574 1.8574 1.4859 
24 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 3 2.9718 2.9718 1.7831 
25 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
26 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
27 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
28 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
29 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
30 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 4 6.2407 6.2407 6.2407 
31 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
32 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
33 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
34 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
35 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
36 11-20 16 1.1887 2 2 2 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
37 21+  21 1.5602 5 2 2 7.8009 3.1204 3.1204 
38 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
39 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
40 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
41 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
42 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
43 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
44 21+  21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
45 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
46 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
47 < 5  5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
48 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
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49 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
50 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
51 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
52 < 5 5 0.3715 2 3 2 0.7429 1.1144 0.7429 
53 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
54 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
55 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
56 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
57 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
58 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
59 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
60 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
61 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
62 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
63 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
64 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
65 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
66 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
67 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
68 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
69 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
70 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
71 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
72 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
73 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
74 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 1 4.7548 4.7548 1.1887 
75 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
76 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
77 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
78 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
79 11-20 16 1.1887 4 3 3 4.7548 3.5661 3.5661 
80 21+ 21 1.5602 2 3 2 3.1204 4.6805 3.1204 
81 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
82 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
83 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
84 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
85 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
86 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
87 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 4 7.8009 7.8009 6.2407 
88 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
89 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
90 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
     Total 1346 100    420.06 417.38 394.58 
Mean Value (MVPR3)        = |∑EiX1-3| ∕ Ntotal 4.7 4.6 4.4 
Ei = Experimental Input, X = Value for individual experimental inputs for cost, time and quality 
 i = Respondents inputs, X1 = ic = Respondents inputs for project cost, X2 =  it = Respondents inputs for 
project time and X3 =  iq = Respondents inputs for project quality, Ntotal = Total number of respondents            
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5. Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Potential Risks (PR4):  Environmental Risks 
 
Number of 
respondents  
Years of experience (Y) in %  Input (i) for G4 
under Cost (c), 
Time (t) & Quality 
(q) 
Experimental Input (Ei)               
 Ei = Y*i 
N Yr. 
Range 
Year 
(Yr) 
Y (%) ic it iq Y ic Y it Y iq 
1 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 4 3.5661 3.5661 4.7548 
2 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 4 3.5661 3.5661 4.7548 
3 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 4 4.7548 4.7548 4.7548 
4 < 5 5 0.3715 4 4 4 1.4859 1.4859 1.4859 
5 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 4 4.7548 4.7548 4.7548 
6 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 21+ 21 1.5602 2 2 2 3.1204 3.1204 3.1204 
8 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
9 5-10 8 0.5944 3 3 3 1.7831 1.7831 1.7831 
10 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 3 1.1887 1.7831 1.7831 
11 11-20 16 1.1887 1 1 1 1.1887 1.1887 1.1887 
12 5-10 8 0.5944 1 1 1 0.5944 0.5944 0.5944 
13 5-10 8 0.5944 1 1 1 0.5944 0.5944 0.5944 
14 5-10 8 0.5944 1 1 1 0.5944 0.5944 0.5944 
15 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
16 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
17 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20 11-20 16 1.1887 4 3 3 4.7548 3.5661 3.5661 
21 11-20 16 1.1887 4 3 3 4.7548 3.5661 3.5661 
22 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
23  < 5 5 0.3715 5 5 5 1.8574 1.8574 1.8574 
24 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 3 2.3774 2.3774 1.7831 
25 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
26 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
27 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
28 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 3 4.7548 4.7548 3.5661 
29 21+ 21 1.5602 3 2 2 4.6805 3.1204 3.1204 
30 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 4 6.2407 6.2407 6.2407 
31 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 4 2.9718 2.9718 2.3774 
32 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 4 2.9718 2.9718 2.3774 
33 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 4 2.9718 2.9718 2.3774 
34 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 4 2.9718 2.9718 2.3774 
35 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 4 2.9718 2.9718 2.3774 
36 11-20 16 1.1887 2 3 2 2.3774 3.5661 2.3774 
37 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 3 7.8009 7.8009 4.6805 
38 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
39 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
40 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
41 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
42 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
43 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
44 21+  21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
45 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
46 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
47 < 5  5 0.3715 1 1 2 0.3715 0.3715 0.7429 
48 < 5 5 0.3715 1 1 2 0.3715 0.3715 0.7429 
400 
 
49 < 5 5 0.3715 1 1 2 0.3715 0.3715 0.7429 
50 < 5 5 0.3715 1 1 2 0.3715 0.3715 0.7429 
51 < 5 5 0.3715 1 1 2 0.3715 0.3715 0.7429 
52 < 5 5 0.3715 1 1 2 0.3715 0.3715 0.7429 
53 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
54 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
55 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
56 11-20. 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
57 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
58 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
59 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
60 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
61 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
62 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
63 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
64 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
65 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
66 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
67 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
68 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
69 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
70 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
71 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
72 5-10 8 0.5944 3 3 3 1.7831 1.7831 1.7831 
73 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
74 11-20 16 1.1887 1 1 1 1.1887 1.1887 1.1887 
75 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
76 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
77 21+ 21 1.5602 3 3 3 4.6805 4.6805 4.6805 
78 11-20 16 1.1887 2 2 2 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
79 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
80 21+ 21 1.5602 2 3 3 3.1204 4.6805 4.6805 
81 11-20 16 1.1887 1 1 1 1.1887 1.1887 1.1887 
82 21+ 21 1.5602 2 2 2 3.1204 3.1204 3.1204 
83 21+ 21 1.5602 2 2 2 3.1204 3.1204 3.1204 
84 11-20 16 1.1887 2 2 2 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
85 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
86 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 3 3.5661 3.5661 3.5661 
87 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 4 7.8009 7.8009 6.2407 
88 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
89 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
90 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 4 5.9435 5.9435 4.7548 
Total 1346 100.00    371.40 370.80 360.03 
Mean Value (MVPR4)        = |∑EiX1-3| ∕ Ntotal 4.1 4.1 4.0 
Ei = Experimental Input, X = Value for individual experimental inputs for cost, time and quality 
 i = Respondents inputs, X1 = ic = Respondents inputs for project cost, X2 =  it = Respondents inputs for 
project time and X3 =  iq = Respondents inputs for project quality, Ntotal = Total number of respondents 
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6. Respondent’s Mean Scores of Importance for Potential Risks (PR5):  Political Risks 
 
Number of 
respondents  
Years of experience (Y) in %  Input (i) for G5 
under Cost (c), 
Time (t) & Quality 
(q) 
Experimental Input (Ei)               
 Ei = Y*i 
N Yr. 
Range 
Year 
(Yr) 
Y (%) ic it iq Y ic Y it Y iq 
1 11-20 16 1.1887 3 4 2 3.5661 4.7548 2.3774 
2 11-20 16 1.1887 3 3 2 3.5661 3.5661 2.3774 
3 11-20 16 1.1887 3 5 2 3.5661 5.9435 2.3774 
4 < 5 5 0.3715 3 1 1 1.1144 0.3715 0.3715 
5 11-20 16 1.1887 3 2 2 3.5661 2.3774 2.3774 
6 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
7 21+ 21 1.5602 2 2 2 3.1204 3.1204 3.1204 
8 5-10 8 0.5944 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
9 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 3 2.3774 2.3774 1.7831 
10 5-10 8 0.5944 3 4 3 1.7831 2.3774 1.7831 
11 11-20 16 1.1887 4 2 4 4.7548 2.3774 4.7548 
12 5-10 8 0.5944 4 2 4 2.3774 1.1887 2.3774 
13 5-10 8 0.5944 4 2 4 2.3774 1.1887 2.3774 
14 5-10 8 0.5944 4 2 4 2.3774 1.1887 2.3774 
15 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
16 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
17 0 0 0.0000 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
18 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
19 21+ 21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
20 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 3 4.7548 4.7548 3.5661 
21 11-20 16 1.1887 1 1 1 1.1887 1.1887 1.1887 
22 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 5 2.9718 2.9718 2.9718 
23  < 5 5 0.3715 5 5 3 1.8574 1.8574 1.1144 
24 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 3 2.9718 2.9718 1.7831 
25 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
26 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
27 5-10 8 0.5944 4 4 4 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
28 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 3 4.7548 4.7548 3.5661 
29 21+ 21 1.5602 1 1 1 1.5602 1.5602 1.5602 
30 21+ 21 1.5602 4 4 4 6.2407 6.2407 6.2407 
31 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 3 1.1887 1.7831 1.7831 
32 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 2 1.1887 1.7831 1.1887 
33 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 2 1.1887 1.7831 1.1887 
34 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 3 1.1887 1.7831 1.7831 
35 5-10 8 0.5944 2 3 3 1.1887 1.7831 1.7831 
36 11-20 16 1.1887 2 2 2 2.3774 2.3774 2.3774 
37 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 3 7.8009 7.8009 4.6805 
38 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
39 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
40 11-20 16 1.1887 5 2 2 5.9435 2.3774 2.3774 
41 11-20 16 1.1887 5 2 2 5.9435 2.3774 2.3774 
42 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
43 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
44 21+  21 1.5602 0 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
45 21+  21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
46 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
47 < 5  5 0.3715 5 4 1 1.8574 1.4859 0.3715 
48 < 5 5 0.3715 5 4 1 1.8574 1.4859 0.3715 
402 
 
49 < 5 5 0.3715 5 3 1 1.8574 1.1144 0.3715 
50 < 5 5 0.3715 5 3 1 1.8574 1.1144 0.3715 
51 < 5 5 0.3715 5 4 1 1.8574 1.4859 0.3715 
52 < 5 5 0.3715 5 4 1 1.8574 1.4859 0.3715 
53 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
54 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
55 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 5 7.8009 4.6805 7.8009 
56 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
57 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
58 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 5 7.8009 4.6805 7.8009 
59 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
60 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
61 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 2 7.8009 4.6805 3.1204 
62 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
63 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
64 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 5 7.8009 4.6805 7.8009 
65 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
66 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 2 7.8009 4.6805 3.1204 
67 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
68 21+ 21 1.5602 5 3 2 7.8009 4.6805 3.1204 
69 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
70 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
71 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
72 5-10 8 0.5944 3 3 2 1.7831 1.7831 1.1887 
73 5-10 8 0.5944 5 5 2 2.9718 2.9718 1.1887 
74 11-20 16 1.1887 1 1 1 1.1887 1.1887 1.1887 
75 21+ 21 1.5602 3 2 2 4.6805 3.1204 3.1204 
76 21+ 21 1.5602 3 2 2 4.6805 3.1204 3.1204 
77 21+ 21 1.5602 3 2 2 4.6805 3.1204 3.1204 
78 11-20 16 1.1887 3 1 1 3.5661 1.1887 1.1887 
79 11-20 16 1.1887 4 4 3 4.7548 4.7548 3.5661 
80 21+ 21 1.5602 3 4 3 4.6805 6.2407 4.6805 
81 11-20 16 1.1887 4 2 4 4.7548 2.3774 4.7548 
82 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
83 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 5 7.8009 7.8009 7.8009 
84 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 2 5.9435 5.9435 2.3774 
85 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 2 5.9435 4.7548 2.3774 
86 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 5 5.9435 4.7548 5.9435 
87 21+ 21 1.5602 5 5 2 7.8009 7.8009 3.1204 
88 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 2 5.9435 4.7548 2.3774 
89 11-20 16 1.1887 5 4 5 5.9435 4.7548 5.9435 
90 11-20 16 1.1887 5 5 5 5.9435 5.9435 5.9435 
Total 1346 100.0000    401.56 359.36 310.33 
Mean Value (MVPR5)        = |∑EiX1-3| ∕ Ntotal 4.5 4.0 3.4 
Ei = Experimental Input, X = Value for individual experimental inputs for cost, time and quality 
 i = Respondents inputs, X1 = ic = Respondents inputs for project cost, X2 =  it = Respondents inputs for 
project time and X3 =  iq = Respondents inputs for project quality, Ntotal = Total number of respondents 
           
  
